Judgment R.N.SAHAY, J. 1. In this batch of 22 criminal writ cases which have been heard together for convenience the only question for decision is as to whether the prosecution of the petitioners under Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short TADA Act) is in, accordance with law. In other words whether the allegations against these petitioners constitutes offence under Section 3 (1) of the TADA Act. 2. The salient features of the Act have been considered in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja, AIR 1990 SC 1962 : "The Act was enacted to make special provisions for the prevention of, and forcoping with, terrorist and disruptive activities and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto Section 2 (d) defines the expression disruptive activity to have the meaning assigned to it in Section 4. Section 2 (h) defines the expression terrorist Act to have the meaning assigned to it under Section 3 (1) of the Act, the relevant part of Section 3 (1) provides that whoever with intent (i) to overawe the Government as by law established or (ii) to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or (iv) to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people, does any act or thing by using any of the lethal weapons mentioned the rein in such a manner as to cause death of/or injuries to any persons, commits a terrorist act. Section 3 (2) lays down the penalty for the commission of such an act. Section 4 (1) prescribes the penalty for indulging in any disruptive activity. Section 4 (2) defines a disruptive activity to mean any action taken in whatever manner (i) which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or (ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly, for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union. Section-6 provides enhanced penalty for aiding any terrorist or disruptionist. Part III to the creats the machinery for tryir terrorists and. disruptionist charged with the commission any offence under the Act. Section 9 empowers the Act. Section-6 provides enhanced penalty for aiding any terrorist or disruptionist. Part III to the creats the machinery for tryir terrorists and. disruptionist charged with the commission any offence under the Act. Section 9 empowers the Act. Section 9 empowers the Central Government as well as the State Governments to constitute by notification one or more Designated Courts for such area or areas, or for such case or class or group of cases as may be specified in the notification. Section 9 (6) provides that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge or an Additional Judge of a Designated Court unless he is immediately before such appointment a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge in any State. Section 11 says that every offence punishable under the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder shall be tried by a Designated Court constitute under Section 9 (1) of the Act. Section 12 (1) is relevant for our purpose and read as under :- When trying any offence, a Designated Court may also try any other offence with which the accused may, under the Code, be charged at the same trial if the offence is connected with such other offence. Section 14 seats out the procedure and powers of Designated courts. Sub-section (3) of Section 14 is relevant for our purpose. It reads as under : Subject to other provisions of this Act, Designated Court shall for the purpose of any offence have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for trial before a Court of Session." 3. The scheme of the Act, its scope and application in its diverse aspects have been considered by the Hon ble Supreme Court and several High Courts. The first case that went to Supreme Court was Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and others v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 in which the Supreme Court observed: "The Act is as extreme measure to be resorted to when the police cannot tackel the situation under the ordinary penal La. The first case that went to Supreme Court was Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon and others v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 in which the Supreme Court observed: "The Act is as extreme measure to be resorted to when the police cannot tackel the situation under the ordinary penal La. The intendment is to provide special machinery to combat the growing menance of terrorism in different parts of the country since, however, the Act is a drastic measure, it should not ordinarily be resorted to unless the Governments law enforcing machinery fails." The Hon ble Supreme Court further observed :- "The Act being a special Act prevails in respect of the jurisdiction and power of the High Court to entertain an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code or by recourse to its inherent powers under Section 482. Under the scheme of the act, there is complete exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court in any case involving the arrest of any person or any accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder. The Legislature by enacting the law has treated terrorism as a special criminal problems and created a special court called a Designated Court to deal with the special problem and provided for a special procedure for the trial of such offences. Just as the Legislature can create a special court to deal with a special problem, it can also create new procedures within the existing system. Parliament in its wisdom has adopted the frame work of the Code, but the Code is not applicable. The Act is a special Act and create a new class of offences calle terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Sections 3 (1) and 4 (2) and proves for a special procedure for the trial." 4 The Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singhs case (supra) held that the provision of the Act need not be resorted to if the nature of the activities of the accused can be checked and controlled under the ordinary, law of the land. It is only in those cases where the law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law to be inadequate or not sufficiently effective or tackeling the menance of terrorist and disruptive activities that resort should be had to the drastic provisions of the Act, the prosecution is duty bound to show from the record of the case and the documents collected in the course of investigation that facts emerging there from prima facie constitute an offence within the letter of law. It was further held by the Hon ble Supreme Court that persons belonging to gang committing offences like murdes statement that they would create terror and fear in minds of people and gain supremacy in under-world revealed intention to kill and not to strike terror, hence such act does not constitute offence under Section 3 (1), 5. The first question that arise is as to whether the observation of the Supreme Court in Usman Dawoods case (supra) impinges upon and affects the power of the High Court under Article 226 and of the Constitution of India to determine whether the TADA Act has been validly invoked. 6. In Rafique Abid Patel and others v. Inspector of Police, Thane in 1992 Cr LJ 394 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court after referring to the relevant provisions of the Act which are drastic in nature held the TADA Act during the pendency of the Investigation seriously affects the accused person and in appropriate cases, the High Court can intervene even at the stage of investigation to set aside the application of TADA Act to the accused if no case whatsoever is made for applying it. The Bombay High Court relied on State of W. B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and State of W. B. v. Sanchaila Investments reported in 1982 LJ 819. The Bombay High Court relied on State of W. B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and State of W. B. v. Sanchaila Investments reported in 1982 LJ 819. In the case of S. K. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari, reported in AIR 1970 SC 786 , the Supreme Court held that "though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all eases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the powers if the High Court could be convined that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal powers. 7. The right to life and liberty which is constitutionally guaranteed is substantially eclipsed by the application of the TADA Act to an individual. It is necessary that the Act is not misused and the authorities concerned with the implementation of the TADA Act apply their minds to the facts and circumstances of the case with great care before they extend the provisions of the TADA Act to any person. A learned single of Madras High Court in D. Veerasekaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1932 Cr LJ 2168 made the following comments on the observation of the Supreme Court Usman Bhai Dawoods case (supra) about exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court. "A careful reading of the abovementioned decisions of the S. C. do not show that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been taken, as contended by the learned special public prosecutor. In fact, in Usmanbhai Dawood Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 , the Supreme Court has observed as follows : At the outset, Shir Poti learned Counsel appearing for the State Government with his usual fairness, unequivocally accepted that the provisions available to a citizen to approach the High Court under Article 226 or Article 227 or move this court by a petition under Article 32 for the grant of an appropriate writ, direction or order. It must necessarily follow that a citizen can always move the High Court under Article 226 or 227 or this Court under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of the Act or its provision on the ground they offend against Articles 14, 21 and 22 or on the ground that a notification issued by the Central Government or the State Government under Section 9 (1) of the Act constituting a Designated Court for any area or areas or for such case or class or groups of cases as specified in the notification was a fraud on powers and thus constitutionally invalid." 8. In Ayubkhan Kalandarkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 1990 (1) Crimes 183 a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court has held .- "a petition under Article 226 or Article 227 of the constitution is maintainable and the High Court is empowered to examine the question as to whether the provisions of the TADA Act would apply or not especially when the TADA Act is drastic measure and it should not be ordinarily resorted to unless the Governments law enforcing machinery fails. So, it is clear that in absence of any such provisions taking away the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for entertaining any such petitions, it cannot be said that such powers of this Court under Article 225 or Article 227 of the Constitution have been taken away by any Act of Parliament. In fact, no such provision has been made in the TADA Act also." In view of the aforesaid decision the argument of the learned Standing Counsel, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is also excluded by the decision of the Supreme Court is not tenable and must be rejected. 9. In some cases argued before us the TADA Act was invoked not at the time registration of the case but subsequently on the application of the Investigation Officer. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that C. J. M. has no jurisdiction to pass order adding TADA Act and to remand the accused because under the scheme of the Act, only Designated Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the TADA Act is applicable or not. 10. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that C. J. M. has no jurisdiction to pass order adding TADA Act and to remand the accused because under the scheme of the Act, only Designated Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the TADA Act is applicable or not. 10. This precise question was considered in by S. N. Phukan, J. of Gauhati High Court in Sampatmall Jain v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, in 1992 Cri LJ 919. It was held by the learned Judge that "On receiving the F.I.R. the first duty of the Designated Court is to apply its mind to the said report and other materials made available and shall take a decision whether prosecution should be allowed to rope in a person under the Act and in so doing, the Designated Court is duty bound to record its satisfaction or otherwise as to whether the offence disclosed in the F.I.R. could be dealt with under the normal law of the land and whether the Governments law enforcing machinery has failed before passing the order, Designated Court may hear the Public Prosecutor and the persons accused of the offence. If the Designated Court is of opinion that no prima facie case has been made out under the Act, the Designated Court may transfer the case to any other court having jurisdiction under Criminal Procedure Code. This has to be done promptly as the sword of Domocles need not be kept hanging unnecessarily without any point or purpose". The view of S. N. Phukan, J., in Sampatmall Jain case was not approved by Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in Muninora Basumatary and others v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 1992 East Cr C 234 (Gau). The Division Bench observed :- "When such an additional report is received the court does not have any judicial function to perform except perhaps to the extent permissible under Section 159 of the Code, if it could be invoked. The Court is not required to pass any order at that stage. The application of the Judicial mind of the court in a criminal case arise for the first time only when an accused person is produced before it in terms of Section 167 of the Code and not at any earlier stage. The Court is not required to pass any order at that stage. The application of the Judicial mind of the court in a criminal case arise for the first time only when an accused person is produced before it in terms of Section 167 of the Code and not at any earlier stage. The question of finding if a prima facie case is made out also does not arise at that stage. The observation to the contrary in Sampatmail Jains case (supra) with respect do not lay down good law". The Division Bench, however, expressed no opinion as to whether C. J. M. had power to add the TADA Act on application of the Investigating Officer. 11 Before dealing with the cases before us it would be essential to first consider the scope and ambit of Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA Act and essential requirements for invoking the said provision. Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act reads as follows :- Section 3, Punishment for terrorist acts :- "1. Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substance or fire-arms or other lethal weapons or poison or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies of services, essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such persons in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act. 2. 2. Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall- (i) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine; (ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for the life and shall also be liable to fine. 3. Whoever conspires or attempt to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorists to act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. 4. Whoever harbour or conceals, or attempt to harbour or conceal, any terrorist shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also he liable to fine." Section 4.-Punishment for disruptive activities : "Whoever commits or conspires or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises, or knowingly facilitates the commission of, any disruptive activity or any act preparatory to a disruptive activity shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall not be liable to fine. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1)- disruptive activity means any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever,- (i) which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India ; or (ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly, for the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union. Explanation-for the purpose of this sub-section: (a) cession includes the admission of any claim of any foreign country to any part of India, and (b) secession includes the assertion of any claim to determine whether a part of India will remain with the Union. Explanation-for the purpose of this sub-section: (a) cession includes the admission of any claim of any foreign country to any part of India, and (b) secession includes the assertion of any claim to determine whether a part of India will remain with the Union. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (2), it is hereby declared that any action taken, whether by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever which- (a) advocates, advise, suggests or incites ; or (b) predicts, prophesies or pronounces or otherwise expresses, in such manner as to incite, advise, suggest or prompt, the killing or the destruction of any person, bound by oath under the Constitution to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India or any public servant shall be deemied to be a disruptive activity within the meaning of this section. (4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or concel, any disruptionist sall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine." 12. Section 3 of the said Act has been interpreted in the following cases : Erram Santosh Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1672 at p. 1674: 1991 Cr LJ 2189 SC; see also Dilaver Hussain v. State of Gujarat, 1991 Cr LJ 15 SC: AIR 1991 SC 56 ; Suresh Ramtirath Yadav v. State of Gujarat, 1990 (2) Cr LC (Guj) 129: 1990 Cr LJ 1834 (Guj) ; Niranjan Singh v. Jitendra Bhimraj, AIR 1990 SC 1962 : 1990 Cr LJ 1869 SC ; Kathula Somulu v. State of A. P., AIR 1991 SC 1556 : 1991 Cr LJ 1905 SC ; Sri Bacha Bora v. State of Assam, 1991 Cr LJ 2782 Gau; Ayub Khan Kalamdar Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, 1990 Cr LC 204 Guj ; Court of its own motion v. State of Punjab, 1990 Cr LJ 76 (P & H). 13. Section 3 (1) of the said Act is very wide and covers any act which strikes terror in the people or any section the people would attract the said provisions. 13. Section 3 (1) of the said Act is very wide and covers any act which strikes terror in the people or any section the people would attract the said provisions. The meaning of terrorists has to be gathered from Section 3 (1) are (a), The act must be done with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people, (b) Such act is done by use of bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or fire-arms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause, or as is likely to cause, death or, injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damage to or destruction of, property or disruption of any supply of services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act. 14. From reading of Section 3(1) of the Act that it is plain if the act simply causes terror in the people is not sufficient unless the act is done by bombs, explosive etc. mentioned in Section 3 (1) of the Act. 15. I shall now address myself the facts of cases before us in order to decide whether the investigation for offence under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act in these cases is justified and in accordance with law or investigation is mala fide exercise or statutory power of investigation : (1) Cr W J C No. 212 of 1992 (R) Laldip Sah v. The State of Bihar and another. In this writ application the petitioner has challenged the vires of Section 3/4 of TADA Act as ultra vires the Constitution of India. The, vires of this Act is under consideration by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, Dilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 56 . We, therefore, cannot decide the vires of the Act. In this writ application the petitioner has challenged the vires of Section 3/4 of TADA Act as ultra vires the Constitution of India. The, vires of this Act is under consideration by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, Dilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 56 . We, therefore, cannot decide the vires of the Act. On merits the plea of the petitioner is that Section 3 of TADA Act applied against the petitioner is illegal having regard to the allegations made in the F. I. R. According to the allegation in the F. I. R. on 8-12-1991 at 4.00 a.m. while the informant was at this door at Village Janghashi about 40-50 extremists came there and forcibly took away two licence guns and some cartridges. The question for consideration is as to whether Section 3 (1) of the Act is applicable. Whether the petitioner can be said to have committed "terrorist Act" within meaning of Section 3 (1) of the Act. The allegation is that 40-50 extremists raided the house of the informant and took away his gun. This must have had effect of striking terror in the mind of the people. But nontheless Section 3 (1) is plainly not attracted because the culprits had not used any arms or explosive which is an essential for requirements for application of the Act. The other illegality is that the petitioner was remanded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and not by the Designated Court. This application is allowed. (2) Cr W J C No. 189 of 1992 (R) Laxman Mdhto alias Laxman Mehta v. State of Bihar and others. The petitioner, in this case, is in custody under Section 386/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the TADA Act. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the application of Section 3 of the TADA Act is illegal and unwarranted as ingredients of offence under Sections 3/4 of the Act is absent. On the basis of the written report a case was registered under Sections 386/34 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. Thereafter on requisition of the Investigating Officer, the Judicial Magistrate, Palamau added Section 3 of the TADA Act vide Annexure 2. It has been rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that C. J. M. had no jurisdiction to add Section 3 of the said Act. Thereafter on requisition of the Investigating Officer, the Judicial Magistrate, Palamau added Section 3 of the TADA Act vide Annexure 2. It has been rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that C. J. M. had no jurisdiction to add Section 3 of the said Act. It is only Designated Court under the Act who can deal with the case and decide whether the allegations come within the mischief of the TADA Act. The order of the C. J. M. contained in Annexure 2 is without jurisdiction and. it is accordingly set aside. Section 3 (1) or Section 4 cannot be invoked in this case. This application is, accordingly, allowed. (3) Cr W J C No. 183 of 1992 (R), Bhrigunath Singh v. State of Bihar. In this case, the petitioner is in custody in connection with Bish-rampur P. S. Case No. 22/92 under Section 353/307 of the Indian Penal Code, 27 Arms Act and Section 3/4 of teh TADA Act. According to the F. I. R. on 2-4-1992 the informant alongwith other police officials had gone to Village Sirha to arrest Bhrigunath Singh in connection with Bishramlpur P. S. Case No. 94/90. The police officials surrounded the house of Bhrigunath but he had fled away towards railway line. The police officials chased him. The police party also fired upon the accused. On the basis of a petition, dated 4-5-1992 filed by the Respondent No. 2, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau has added Section 3/4 of TADA Act (Annexure 2). The order is without jurisdiction and is quashed. In my opinion, the allegation in the F. I. R. do not constitute offence under the TADA Act. The facts of this case somewhat similar to facts in Erram Santosh Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1672 . In this case before the Supreme Court it was established by the evidence that the police party raided the premises of accused-appellants and that one of the appellants hurled a bomb on them. When the appellants surrendered firearms and explosive substances were recovered from them. The Supreme Court held that these facts constitute for the offence under 2 (f) as well as Section 3 (1) but in this case before us no fire arm was recovered from the possession of the accused. The petitioner was chased by the police officer. This application is, therefore, allowed. The Supreme Court held that these facts constitute for the offence under 2 (f) as well as Section 3 (1) but in this case before us no fire arm was recovered from the possession of the accused. The petitioner was chased by the police officer. This application is, therefore, allowed. (4) Cr W J C No. 182 of 1992 (R), Ashok Kumar Singh v. The State of Bihar and others, In this case, F. I. R. has been registered under Section 302/210 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the TADA Act. The allegation against the petitioner is that on 20-11-1991 the informant came to learn in the Majhiaon Market that one dead body was lying near Sirha village. On this information the informant went near the dead body and found one dead body of the one unknown person. The informant noticed some injuries on the dead body. The dead body was not identified by any of the villagers. Thereafter, on the basis of a petition filed by the Respondent No. 2, Sections 3/4 of TADA Act was added by order of Chief Judicial Magistrate, dated 4-4-1992 (Aninexures 2 and 2/1). In my opinion Sections 3/4 of the said Act has been wrongly applied and the order of the C. J. M. is without jurisdiction. This application is, therefore, allowed and the order of the C. J. M. is quashed. (5) CrW J C No. 148 of 1992 (R), Harebansha Singh v. The State of Bihar. The allegation in the F. I. R. against the petitioner is that on 8-12-1991 at about 5.00 a.m. in the morning about 70 to 75 persons variously armed with weapons entered into the courtyard of the informant and caught hold of the informant and took away gun from the informant. The facts of this case is similar to facts is Cr W J C No. 212 of 1992 (R), (Laldip Sah v. The State of Bihar) which has been allowed as, Section 3 of the TADA Act is not applicable against the petitioner. This application is allowed. (6) (A) Cr WJC No, 152 of 1992 (R), Dadhichi Rai v. State of Bihar and others. (B) Cr W J C No. 57 of 1993 (R), Ramkeshwar Singh v. State of Bihar and others. This application is allowed. (6) (A) Cr WJC No, 152 of 1992 (R), Dadhichi Rai v. State of Bihar and others. (B) Cr W J C No. 57 of 1993 (R), Ramkeshwar Singh v. State of Bihar and others. These cases relate to Chandwa P. S. Case No. 47/92, dated 12-4-1992 registered under Sections 147/148/149/302/436/342/307 of the Indian Penal Code and 26 of the Arms Act and Sections 3/4 of the TADA Act. The allegations against the petitioners in the F. I. R. is that on 12-4-1992 at about 4.30 a.m. the informant climbed on the roof and saw some persons who had surrounded the village. The accused persons were asking as to where Bhuneshwar Oraon was. Thereafter, they lit fire in the corner of western and northern side. The informants father came out whom they took away. After assaulting the Extremists took the informant, his father and his brother after tying them with rope towards the field of Harja Lohra where six persons were also kept in similar condition. The Extremists were in number of 25/30 out of them one woman namely, Sumitra Kumari who was armed with gun. Other persons were also armed with gun. The informant also identified one Ramkeshwar Singh alias Pappu, Birla Oraon, Lakhan Oraon, Jeru Oraon, Harja Lohra, Kan war Oraon, Baslal Oraon and Mangaldeo Oraon with Farsa.. In this case charge-sheet has not been received till 24-4-1998 as it appears from the report of Sessions Judge Palamau. We are of the opinion that Sections 3/4 of the TADA Act is plainly not attracted on the allegations in the F. I. R. there being no allegation that any explosive arms...... was used by the marauders. Section 3 was wrongly invoked. This application is allowed. (7) Cr W J C No. 213 of 1992 (R), Siddeshwar Giri v. State of Bihar. In this case, the petitioner is in jail custody in connection with Patan P. S. Case No. III of 1991 under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 (1) of the TADA Act. The police completed investigation and has submitted the charge-sheet. Cognizance was not taken till 20-4-1993 as per the report of the Designated Court. Since charger sheet has been submitted it desirable that Designated Court should consider as to whether there is evidence against the petitioner under Section 3 (1) of the TADA Act. The police completed investigation and has submitted the charge-sheet. Cognizance was not taken till 20-4-1993 as per the report of the Designated Court. Since charger sheet has been submitted it desirable that Designated Court should consider as to whether there is evidence against the petitioner under Section 3 (1) of the TADA Act. It would not be proper for us to express any opinion. In view of the decision Supreme Court in AIR 1991 SC 1672 , the Designated Court is directed to decide this question in accordance with law expeditiously. With above observation this application is disposed of. (8) Cr W J C No. 342 of 1992 (R), Sarjoo Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar. The petitioner is an accused and in jail custody in connection with Bishrampur P. S. Case No. 19/91 registered under Section 25. (A)/26/ 23 of the Arms Act and Section 3 (1) of the Act. In this case charge-sheet has been submitted on 25-5-1931. Cognizance had not been taken by the Designated Court. We are not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner at this stage. Since the entire matter is pending before the Designated Court, we direct him to decide after considering the material in the case diary as to whether the case is under the TADA Act is made out against the petitioner. With the above observations this application is disposed of. (9) Cr W J C No. 238 of 1992 (R), Jamuna Mistry v. The State of Bihar and others. The petitioner is in jail custody in connection with Patan P. S. Case No. 115/91 registered under Section 395 of the Indian Penal Code and, TADA Act. In this case charge-sheet has been received and cognizance has not been taken. In the circumstances we are not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner at this stage. Since the matter is pending before the Designated Court, we direct him to decide it after considering the material in the case diary as to whether the case is under TADA Act is made out against the petitioner. With the above observations this application is disposed of. (10) Cr W J C No. 267 of 1992 (R), Raj Kumar Thakur v. The State of Bihar. With the above observations this application is disposed of. (10) Cr W J C No. 267 of 1992 (R), Raj Kumar Thakur v. The State of Bihar. The petitioner is an accused and in jail custody in connection with Bishrampur P. S. Case No. 037/92 registered under Section 386/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the TADA Act. In this case, the charge-sheet submitted but cognizance has not been taken. It has been submitted that Section 3 of the TADA Act was added by the order of the C. J. M. hence, the order of the C J. M. was -without jurisdiction since charge-sheet has been submitted then investigation cannot be quash ed on the ground that C. J. M. had no jurisdiction to add Section 3 of the said Act. Designated Court is directed to decide this in accordance with law expeditiously. With the above observation this application in disposed of. (11) Cr W J C No. 222 of 1922 (R), Mahindra Singh v. The State of Bihar. In this case, the petitioner is in jail custody in connection with Bishunpur P. S. Case No. 37/91 registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 364 and 210 of the Indian Penal Code. It has been submitted that the TADA Act was invoked against the petitioner by the order of C. J. M. Since charge-sheet has been submitted then investigation cannot be quashed, although the C. J. M. had no jurisdiction to add Section 3 of the said Act against the petitioner. Designated Court is directed to decide this question in accordance with law expeditiously. With the above observations this application is disposed of. (12) Cr W J C No. 209/92 (R), Siddeshwar Giri v. The State of Bihar. In this case, the petitioner is in jail custody in connection with Patan P S Case No. 116 of 1991 registered under Section 395, I. P. C and Section 3 (1) of the TADA Act. In this case charge-sheet has been submitted. We, therefore, direct the Designated Court to decide as to whether the case is under TADA Act is made out against the petitioner. Will the above observation this application is disposed of. In this case charge-sheet has been submitted. We, therefore, direct the Designated Court to decide as to whether the case is under TADA Act is made out against the petitioner. Will the above observation this application is disposed of. (13) (a) Cr W J C No. 119 of 1992 (R), Gayadutta Singh and others, (b) Cr W J C No. 154 of 1992 (R), Kishore Ram, (c) Cr W J C No. 145 of 1992 (R), Rajmuni and others and (d) Cr W J C No. 146 of 1992 (R), Kanhai Singh v. The State of Bihar. These cases relate to Manatu P. S. Case No. 6 of 1992 registered under Section 3 of the TADA Act and sections 148, 149, 302 ami 342 of the Indian Penal Code. In these cases the TADA Act was included by the order of the C. J M. after three months. In our opinion, the C. J. M. had no jurisdiction to add TADA Act, We, therefore, quash the order of the C. J. M. Section 3 of the TADA Act is treated to be cancelled. This application is allowed. Designated Court shall consider the question afresh and decide the case in accordance with law. (14) (a) CrWJC No. 210 of 1992 (R), Doha Nand Singh Gaha Singh, (b) Cr W J C No. 211 of 1992 (R), Rampati Bhuian and others v. The State of Bihar. These cases relate to Balumath P. S. Case No. 119 of 1991 registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 367 380 and 452 of the Indian Penal Code, 27 of the Arms Act and 3/4 of the TADA Act, 1987. According to the F. I. R. that on 10-12-1991 at about 9 p.m. informants uncle Jamuna Singh had come out from the house to urinate but he returned in the house arising hulla. On this informant saw out side the house and found several persons being armed with the arms. Informant closed the door from inside. The one extremist called the informant to open the door. The informant identified him as Prabhujee one of the Extremists. The informant out of fear opened the door and 10-15 Extremists being armed with gun and rifle entered in the house. They caught hold the informant and his uncle and tied their hands with rope. Thereafter all the family members were taken out side the house. The informant identified him as Prabhujee one of the Extremists. The informant out of fear opened the door and 10-15 Extremists being armed with gun and rifle entered in the house. They caught hold the informant and his uncle and tied their hands with rope. Thereafter all the family members were taken out side the house. , Some of the Extremists were calling Shambhu Singh to open the door of his house. The Extremists broke open the window. Thereafter, informant noticed that the Shambhu Singh was killed by Prabhujee and Lalanjee with gun. The Extremists also took out the articles from the house of Shambhu Singh, the deceased. The extremists took away a huge quantity of paddy, rice, maize, gram, utensils sewing machine, ornaments, cloths etc., from the house. In our opinion, Section 3 of the TADA Act is clearly attracted. Investigation is in progress. Designated Court is directed to decide after submission the charge-sheet as to whether on material on record Section 3 (1) of the Act is applicable or not. This application is dismissed with above observation. 15. Cr WJC No. 282 of 1992 (R) Jagdeo Prasad Sharma and others v. State of Bihar. The petitioners are in accused and in jail custody in connection with Chhattarpur Police Station Case No. 17/92 registered under Section 17 (2) (3) of the Criminal Amendment Act, 1908 and Sections 384, 385, 420, 216 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the TADA Act was invoked by the order of the C J. M. In this case, charge-sheet has been submitted but no cognizance has been taken. Although C. J. M. had no jurisdiction) to add the TADA Act, since charge-sheet has been submitted, we direct the Designated Court to decide this question in accordance with law and expeditiously. The application is disposed of with the above observations : 16. (a) Cr WJC No. 215 of 1992 (R) Laldip Soh, (b) Cr WCJ No. 151 of 1992 (R), Harebansha Singh v. State of Bihar. These cases relate to Manatu Police Station Case No. 99 of 1991 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 384, 342, 323, 307 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 3 of the TADA Act. These cases relate to Manatu Police Station Case No. 99 of 1991 under Sections 147, 148, 149, 384, 342, 323, 307 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 3 of the TADA Act. The allegations against these petitioners in the F.I.R. is that on 7-12-1991 at about 4.30 p.m. while the informant was working in the field about 100 miscreants arrived there assaulted him and took away his licence DB B. L. Gun. It has been submitted that the petitioner was not named in the F.I.R. nor any incriminating articles were recovered from the possession of the petitioner. The petitioner was remanded on the requisition of the I. O. The petitioner was remanded by the order of C. J. M. not by Designated Court. In this case chargesheet has not been submitted. In our opinion Section, 3 (1) is not applicable. This application is allowed. 17. In the result the following Cr. Writ application are allowed: Cr. WJC No. 212/92 (R), Cr. WJC No. 189/92 (R), Cr. WJC No. 183/92 (R), Cr. WJC No. 182/92 (R), Cr. WJC No. 148 of 1992 (R), (R). (a) Cr. WJC No. 152/92 (R), (b) Cr. WJC No. 57 of 93 (R), (a) Cr. WJC No. 213/92 (R), (b) Cr. WJC No. 151/92 (R). 18. In-corporation of Sections 3/4 of the TADA Act in these cases, is quashed. A writ of mandamus is issued to the Investigating Officers of these cases restraining them from investigation the ease under Sections 3/4 of the Act. This order will operate only if investigation has not been completed. Those cases in which investigation has been completed and chargesheet has been submitted, the Designated Court shall decide whether the material in the ease diary constitute offence under Sections 3/4 of the TADA Act. Designated Court is directed to decide this matter within two weeks of the receipt of this order and pass appropriate orders. 19. In following cases the chargesheet has been submitted Cr. WJC No. 342/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 213/92 (R), Cr. WJC No. 238/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 237/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 222/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 209/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 282/92 (R) and Cr. WJC No. 213/92 (R). 19. In following cases the chargesheet has been submitted Cr. WJC No. 342/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 213/92 (R), Cr. WJC No. 238/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 237/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 222/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 209/92 (R) ; Cr. WJC No. 282/92 (R) and Cr. WJC No. 213/92 (R). The Designated Court is directed to decide this matter within two weeks whether the materials in the case diary make out any case under Sections 3/4 of the Act. Designated Court shall decide in the light of this judgment and to pass appropriate orders. Before passing the orders he will hear the prosecutors and the petitioners and will dispose of the bail applications if any plea on behalf of the petitioners. 20. Before parting with the judgment we wish to record that TADA Act is being indiscriminately applied in the district of Palamu without applying mind whether the Sections 3/4 of the Act is applicable or not. To ensure that the persons who are booked for crime are not subjected to harassment by illegal application of Sections 3/4 of the Act, we direct that before registering a case under TADA Act the concerned In-charge of the Police Station shall seek prior approval of the Superintendent of Police or the Dy. S. P. 21. All the criminal writ applications are accordingly disposed of. N.K.Sinha, J. 22 I agree.