V. H. BHAIRAVIA, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prayed for a write in the nature of mandamus against the respondents directing the respondent Government to fill up the post of Tutor in Community Dentistry from general class candidates by appointing the petitioner on that post It is the case of the petitioner that in response to the advertisement issued by the Government on 19. 9. 1992 (Annex. B) inviting applications for the post of Tutor in Community Dentistry, the petitioner applied for the said post. She was called for interview by the Interview Call letter dated 2. 10. 1992- (Annex. C ). The petitioner appeared before the Selection committee on 12. 10. 1992 and she was selected and placed at Serial No. 2 in the Select list. The candidate at Sr. No. 1 of that select list was given appointment, but though the petitioner was at Sr. No. 2, she has not been appointed on the post of Tutor in Community dentistry, for which post she was selected. Hence, this petition under Article 226 of the constitution of India invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. ( 2 ) MR. Sen, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the principles of "promissory estoppel" are applicable in the instant case once the government has selected the petitioner for the post of Tutor and now, they are estopped from denying appointment. In support of his submission, Mr. Sen relied on the decision in the case of Union of India and others vs. Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. , reported in AIR 1986 sc 806 , wherein the Supreme Court observed as under: -" Now the doctrine of promissory estoppel is well-established in the administrative law of India. It represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and, though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the real of estoppel. The basis of this doctrine is the interposition of equity which has always, true to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law. This doctrine, though of ancient vintage, was rescued from obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees house Ltd. (1956) I All ER 256. This doctrine, though of ancient vintage, was rescued from obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property Trust Ltd. vs. High Trees house Ltd. (1956) I All ER 256. The true principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party the promise or representation would be binding on the party asking it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. It has often been said in England that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action: it can only be a shield and not a sword: but the law in India has gone far ahead of the narrow position adopted in England and as a result of the decision of this Court in Motilal Sugar Mills vs. State of Uttar pradesh ( 1979) 2 SCR 641: ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ) it is now well-settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also found a cause of action. The decision of this Court in Motilal sugar Mills case (supra) contains an exhaustive discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel and we find ourselves wholly in agreement with the various parameters of this doctrine outlined in that decision. (para: 9 ). It has further been observed by the Supreme Court in para: 12 of the said judgment as under:-"there can therefore be no doubt that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. We must concede that the subsequent decision of this Court in Jeet Ram vs. State of Haryana (1980) 3 SCR 689 : ( AIR 1980 sc 1285 ) takes a slightly different view and holds that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not available against the exercise of executive functions of the State and the State cannot be prevented from exercising its functions under the law. This decision also expresses its disagreement with the observations made in Motilal Sugar Mills case ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ) that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity, suggesting by necessary implication that the doctrine of executive necessity is available to the Government to escape its obligation under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. We find it difficult to understand how a Bench of two Judges in Jeet Rams case could possibly overturn or disagree with what was said by another Bench of two Judges in Motilal Sugar mills case. If the Bench of two Judges in Jeet Rams case found themselves unable to agree with law laid down in Motilal Sugar Mills case, they could have referred Jeet Rams case to a larger Bench, but we do not think it was right on their part to express their disagreement with the enunciation of the law by a co-ordinate Bench of the same Court in Motilal Sugar Mills. "relying on the principles enunciated in this judgment, Mr. Sen vehemently submitted that conduct of the Government in issuing advertisement is a promise to the candidate for the appointment and that creates right of legal entity between the candidates and the government. Mr. Sen has further submitted that once a candidate is selected as in accordance with the procedures and Rules, the Government is bound to fulfil the promise as given in the advertisement by giving appointment to the candidate selected. Mr. Sen also relied on the decisions reported in 1949 Appeal Cases p. 46 and AIR 1979 SC 621 . ( 3 ) THOUGH there is no dispute with respect to the observations made by the Supreme court in the aforesaid cases, in my view, this petition is not maintainable in view of well-settled law that selection of a candidate for a particular post, is no promise for apointment. The theory of promissory estoppel, heavily relied on by Mr. ( 3 ) THOUGH there is no dispute with respect to the observations made by the Supreme court in the aforesaid cases, in my view, this petition is not maintainable in view of well-settled law that selection of a candidate for a particular post, is no promise for apointment. The theory of promissory estoppel, heavily relied on by Mr. Sen, is not applicable to the facts of the present case at all. Advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates for a particular post creates no right or gives no promise to the candidates for appointment on such post Further, selection in select list also does not create any legal right or gives promise to a candidate so selected, for the appointment on the post for which the candidate is selected and, therefore, there is no question of promissory estoppel. It has been clearly suited in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Government that though advertisement was issued for 2 posts and the candidates were selected, respondents could give appointment to the candidate at Sr. No. 1 in the select list on one post only and 2nd post could not be filled up as it was not sanctioned. Para-6 of the said affidavit reads as undcr:-"it is most respectfully submitted that the Dean Dental College had sent a proposal to the Government for increasing certain posts because number of students in the Dental College were likely to be increased. It is submitted that there was a proposal for increasing one Tutor in the subject of Community dentistry. It is submitted that one post was vacant in the said cadre and there was proposal for creation of additional post. It was, therefore, believed that two tutors in the subjects of Community Dentistry would be required. "it has been further stated in the said affidavit that ultimately, the State Govt. did not accept the proposal with regard to increasing the post of one Tutor in the subject of community Dentistry and, therefore, 2nd post could not be filled up. In view of the facts stated in the said affidavit, the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for. It is to be noted that merely name of a candidate is included in a select list, it does not confer any vested right of appointment on such candidate. In view of the facts stated in the said affidavit, the petitioner is not entitled to any of the reliefs prayed for. It is to be noted that merely name of a candidate is included in a select list, it does not confer any vested right of appointment on such candidate. Therefore, the petitioner has not been conferred with any vested right of appointment and, therefore, a petition for a writ of mandamus under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. ( 4 ) RECENTLY, the Supreme Court, in the case of Jai Sing Dalal and others vs State of haryana and another, reported in 1993 Supp. (2) Supreme Court Cases P. 600, has observed as under:-"the law is settled that even candidates selected for appointment have no right to appointment and it is open to the State Government at a subsequent date not to fill up the posts or to resort to fresh selection according to the revised criteria. In the present case, the selection was yet to be made by the commission. Therefore, the petitioners cannot even claim that they were selected for appointment by the Commission. The selection process had not been completed and before that, the State Government reviewed its earlier decision and decided to revise the eligibility criterial for appointment. No right of petitioners has been violated. "in view of the aforesaid settled legal position and for the reasons stated above, in my view, there is no substance in this petition and it requires to be rejected. In the result, petition is rejected. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. .