Judgment : Inviting the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Elayaperumal, President of Human Rights Party of India sought admission of the present revision challenging the order passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. In Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 872 of 1993, dated 27. 1993 with reference to its illegality, impropriety and irregularity, based therein. .2. The short facts which are necessary to consider this revision are stated as follows: .A private complaint as provided under Sec. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed by the petitioner herein before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras against the respondent herein. Selvi Jayalalitha the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, alleging that she has committed offences punishable under Secs.306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code. The substratum of the facts which made the revision petitioner to file the private complaint are that, on 17. 1993 at about 9a.m. the respondent herein went on indefinite fasting at Madras Marina Beach without any prior announcement or intimation thereon by sitting there with the so-called object of vindicating the compelling need for taking action by the Government of India in implementing the Award passed by the Cauvery Tribunal, in releasing water to Tamil Nadu and with a view to make the Government of India to take immediate action on that score. The fast above referred to was observed by the respondent herein. The venue of the place where the respondent selected for her indefinite fasting, since happened to be at Marina Beach, lot of inconvenience to the general public was caused in the sense that traffic was completely blocked and that no citizen can follow the normal activities through the Beach Road and so to illustrate, that the revision petitioner and his followers were not able even to have access to Anna Square Police Station to lodge a complaint during the said days. While the respondent was going on indefinite fasting, the normal life of whole of the State was paralysed due to stopping of transport facilities by the Government undertakings or private transports and the public were forced to close down their shops and so on and thus everyone underwent lot of hardship. While the respondent was going on indefinite fasting, the normal life of whole of the State was paralysed due to stopping of transport facilities by the Government undertakings or private transports and the public were forced to close down their shops and so on and thus everyone underwent lot of hardship. Above all one or two followers of the respondent committed suicide by self immolation by setting fire upon themselves and burnt away and the families of those who lost their lives were rewarded with monetary considerations by the respondent subsequently. It was also alleged that while the fasting was going on for about 3 or 4 days the respondent stopped her fasting abruptly. To substantiate the above allegation by placing reliance mainly on the news item published in the various news media, the petitioner had alleged that the respondent had committed the offences under Secs. 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code. .3. On seeing the contentions above referred to in the complaint itself and on taking the sworn statement given by the revision petitioner, the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate found that either the complaint or the sworn statement given by the revision petitioner, has not provided the very basic ingredients of the offence under Secs. 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code and by virtue of the power conferred upon him under Sec. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he dismissed the said complaint as no offence to take cognizance of has been made out. Aggrieved at this, the revision petitioner herein has sought the admission of the present revision challenging the legality and propriety and regularity of the same as above mentioned. 4. I have heard Mr.Elayaperumal, the revision petitioner in person. The revision petitioner, while making his submissions before me, mainly contended that the respondent being Chief Minister of a State was not reasonable nor justifiable to go on indefinite fasting in a public place so as to cause every hindrance and obstruction to the normal life of the citizens in Madras which also resulted in paralysing the normal life throughout the State, and the Law and Order problem was not properly maintained for about 2 or 3 days and that in fact. The very choice of the respondent herein amounts to the very offence provided under Sec. 309 of the Indian Penal Code. The very choice of the respondent herein amounts to the very offence provided under Sec. 309 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr.Elayaperumal would further contend that one or two of the followers of the respondent committed suicide by setting fire upon themselves by way of self-immolation because of the reason that the respondent was going on indefinite fasting, that the basic element and ingredient provided under Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code was very much available and that the said two basic facts were totally ignored by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in not taking cognizance of the two offences and that, therefore, he would contend that the impugned order was liable to be interfered with in this revision. In the light of the above contentions made in person, 1 have perused carefully and so meticulously the written complaint filed by the revision petitioner before the learned Trial Magistrate dated 27. 1993 which was filed under Sec. 200 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, Sec. 200 reads as follows: “A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complaint and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate: Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses: .(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a court has made the complaint; or .(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under Sec.192: Provided further if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under Sec.192 after examing the complaint and the witness, the latter Magistrate need not reexamine them”. Sec. 203 also became relevant in the sense that the same is very much involved in this Revision which reads as follows: “If, after considering the statements on oath (if any) of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation (if any) under Sec. 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall demise the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reason for so doing”. 6. Thus a plain and combined reading of Secs. 6. Thus a plain and combined reading of Secs. 200 and 203, Crl.P.C. make it clear that while a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present on his behalf, if any, and as a whole, the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed ‘by the complainant and the witnesses. The very object of examining the written complaint submitted on behlaf of an aggrieved person and recording his statement on oath and examining the witnesses, if any, on oath, would clearly postulate the fact that the aggrieved person namely the complainant should provide enough and adequate materials to the Magistrate for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence. This legal mandate can be clearly identified by due allowance of the interpretation to be given to Sec. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under this section, if upon considering the said statements on oath, given by the complainant and his witnesses or such other materials produced by him, if the Magistrate feels that there is no sufficient ground to proceed, then he shall dismiss the complaint for the reasonings specifically and particularly recorded by him. While going through the contents of the impugned order, I have no hesitation to hold that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has clearly followed the procedural mandate in Secs. 200 and 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. Now coming to the basic ingredients of the grievances exposed by Mr.Elayaperumal, I would like to emphasise the following facts inherent in the complaint itself. A close reading of the very complaint submitted by the revision petitioner before the learned Magistrate itself shows that nowhere in the said complaint he has averred that the respondent undertook a fasting-unto-death. What has been repeatedly and consistently held in that complaint was that an indefinite fasting was. undertaken by the respondent. 8. So also, I would like to mention that neither the sworn statement given by him nor the written complaint filed by him under Sec. 200, Crl.P.C. as evident from the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate, contain any word about the fact that the indefinite fasting undertook by the respondent directly or indirectly incited some persons to commit suicide elsewhere in the State. 9. 9. In this context, it has become necessary to advert to Secs.306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code for the purpose of finding out whether the complaint given by the revision petitioner under Sec. 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has made out a prima facie case atleast for the court to take cognizance of the offences alleged. Sec. 306 reads thus: “If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine”. Sec. 309, I.P.C. reads as follows: “Whoever attempts to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both”. 10. Thus, a conjoined reading of Secs. 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code which are very much involved in this case and on which much emphasis has been laid by the revision petitioner, involves the common element of “suicide”. The element or the word “suicide” has not been defined anywhere in the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, in this context, I have to advert the possible meaning for the said word as held by several High Courts and the Apex Court. To establish the offence of “suicide” as inbuilt in Sec. 309, it has become imperative that the prosecution must show that the overt act or act of the accused was complete by doing so towards the commission of “suicide” which would mean that if a person refrains from taking bodily sustenance for the purpose of destroying his own life, being conscious of the probable consequences and having at that time sufficient mind, to will destruction of life, then the ingredients of Sec. 309 will be attracted. What has been provided in the section is the “mens rea” of the person who is doing positive activities by means of overt declaration and that by doing so, he is going to die will be the actual position to attract Sec. 309, I.P.C. But, on the contrary, if fasting-unto-death had been commenced with certain demands and even before they were conceded the person chooses to get himself treated without protest, it would indicate only that there was neither sufficient mind or the will to destroy himself. If that be the position, the factum that he was conscious of the probable consequences does not at all arise. 11. The Allahabad High Court in Ram Sunder Dubey v. State, A.I.R. 1962 All. 262: (1962)1.Crl. L.J. 697 had taken the view that it would be more appropriate to hold that the fast-unto-death undertaken by the petitioner referred to in that case, was more aimed at publicity with no real desire to destroy himself. But, in the instant case, I do not propose to go into that aspect for the reasoning the several allegations and averments were made which were not, in my firm view, conducive to the disposal of the case. Enough for me at this stage to advert the following only to attract Sec. 306, I.P.C. The basic ingredients which are required by Law under the very provision itself is that the activities said to have been committed by such person shall have a direct or indirect nexus to abet other person to commit the very act of “suicide” and if that element is absent. It is very difficult to take the cognizance of the offence of abetment of “suicide” as provided under Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code. In Ramamoorthy alias Vannia Adikalar v. State, 1992 Crl.L.J. 2074, my learned brother Arunchalam, J. has held the same view that unless the proposed act of fasting-unto-death has been established with such mens rea on the part of the person who undertakes the fasting-unto-death by means of an overt declaration and the possible activities are done with probable consequences of his or her death, then it is very difficult to bring such activities within the teeth of Sec. 309, I.P.C. or the concept of “suicide” The learned Judge has held the view in the above referred citation after having elaborately discussed the judgements rendered by various High Courts and Apex Court of our country. 12. Maybe the revision petitioner is interested always in the public life one way or other. But, however, that does not mean, in my view, that a criminal complaint can be lodged by him against anyone to mulct with criminal liability without proper materials and basic ingredients provided by law. One other contention pointed out during the course of arguments by Mr. Elayaperumal was the news item published with regard to the indefinite fasting-unto-death by the respondent. One other contention pointed out during the course of arguments by Mr. Elayaperumal was the news item published with regard to the indefinite fasting-unto-death by the respondent. But, I feel that this contention needs no elaboration for the simple reason that it is well settled principle of law that newspaper reports cannot be taken as a material piece of evidence by a court of Law, unless and until it is proved authentically and properly. 13. Thus having seen the scaned the very materials, averments and written allegations placed before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, I find that the very basic elements and ingredients of Secs. 306 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code are very much absent and totally missing. In fact, it was consistently emphasised in the complaint itself that respondent had undertaken indefinite fasting only and that nowhere the word ‘fasting-unto-death’ has been averred to in the said complaint. Therefore, what has now been projected before me by the revision petitioner on the basis of the newspaper report cannot be accepted at this stage as a basic material to take the cognizance of a criminal offence. I have perused carefully the impugned order passed under Sec. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I do not come across with any irregularity or illegality or impropriety as alleged, Remedy, if any, for the revision petitioner is elsewhere in accordance with the law and I am at every difficulty to see that this revision can be entertained for the simple reasoning that revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not an auto-matic one available to any aggrieved person which requires basic ingredients provided in Secs.397 and 401, I.P.C. to be established before a revision canbeadmitted,which elements are totally absent in this case. 14. In the result, with great constraint, I am not inclined to admit this revision since in my considered view, this is a futile exercise, to be rejected for want of proper materials projecting the basic ingredients of the alleged offences involved. Accordingly, this revision is dismissed at this stage of admission itself. Judgment : This civil revision petition is directed against the order in E.P.No.61 of 1985 in O.S.No. 632 of 1974 on the file of District Munsif, Palani. 2. Accordingly, this revision is dismissed at this stage of admission itself. Judgment : This civil revision petition is directed against the order in E.P.No.61 of 1985 in O.S.No. 632 of 1974 on the file of District Munsif, Palani. 2. Short facts are; The respondent has obtained money decree against the revision petitioner and to realise the decree debt, he had filed E.P.No. 61/ 85. The revision petitioner resisted the same on two grounds viz., that he had made part payment of Rs.2,000 and that he was not in a position to pay the decree debt. After elaborate enquiry, the learned District Munsif had held that the alleged part payment of Rs.2,000 is false and that the judgment-debtor has got sufficient means to pay the decree debt but has been neglecting payment and had ordered arrest. Aggrieved by the said order, the judgment-debtor has come forward with this civil revision petition. 3. Mr.Prabhu Rajadurai, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, would submit that on the evidence available in this case, the court below ought not have ordered arrest but could have directed the decree holder to proceed against the properties first or at any rate could have ordered payment in instalments or at least could have given some time for payment before ordering arrest. I have heard Mr.Chakrapani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the above aspects. 4. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the rival counsels. From the order of the court below, I find that the judgment-debtor has admitted in cross-examination that he is owning 5 acres of punja lands that there is a well in it and there are two motor pumpsets and is also owning a house. It was his further admission that he was realising Rs. 10,000 to Rs. 12,000 as income from the said lands. On the above premises, the court below had come to a conclusion that the judgment-debtor has got sufficient means to pay the decree debt and that the decree" was on 29. 78 but he had not paid any amount towards the decree debt and from the above fact, the court below had concluded that he had neglected to pay the decree debt. 78 but he had not paid any amount towards the decree debt and from the above fact, the court below had concluded that he had neglected to pay the decree debt. On the fact of the above two findings that the judgment-debtor has got sufficient means to pay the decree debt and that he had neglected to pay, the court below is correct in ordering arrest. 5. Mr.Prabhu Rajadurai, would rely upon Ganesa Nadarv. Chellathal Ammal, 100 L.W. 431. In that case, an order of arrest was made by the court below in execution of decree for money and that was set aside by this Court. But the facts of that case vary totally from the facts of this case. In that case, the claim of the judgment debtor that he was entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Act 13/80 was negatived. It was held that the above does not necessarily mean that an order of arrest should follow. Since that would not amount to a finding that the judgment debtor has got means to pay, this Court had held that order of arrest would not necessarily follow. In that case, the decree holder had given evidence that the income of the judgment-debtor was Rs.70,000. She had not afforded any basis for making such a claim that the judgment-debtor was getting an income of Rs.70,000 and in view of the above, that finding was not accepted by this Court and this Court held that it was a mere assumption. In those circumstances, this Court had held that if the judgment-debtor has got properties, it is open to the decree-holder to proceed against the property. I do not accept the submission made by Mr.Prabhu Rajadurai that the above ruling shall be construed to lay down the proposition that if the judgment-debtor has got properties, the decree holder is obliged to proceed first against the properties and that he should not proceed with a prayer for arrest of the judgment-debtor. I am clear that this ruling does not lay down such a proposition. 6. On the evidence and facts available in this case, the order of the Court below is correct and I do not find any ground whatsoever to interfere with the same, in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. Any way, in case, the amount was not paid, the. 6. On the evidence and facts available in this case, the order of the Court below is correct and I do not find any ground whatsoever to interfere with the same, in exercise of the revisional powers of this Court. Any way, in case, the amount was not paid, the. judgment-debtor is given two months time from today for payment of the decree debt, failing which the court below shall issue order of warrant of arrest in case, the E.P. is still pending. 7. With the above observation, this civil revision petition is dismissed. No costs.