Judgment :- 1. C.S. No. 191 of 1979 was filed in this Court by Punjab National Bank against the applicants herein and others for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,30,07,283.76 with interest thereon due on a mortgage. C.S. No. 567 of 1980 is a similar suit by Central Bank of India against the applicants and others for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,22,86,828.54 with interest due on a mortgage. Both the suits were being tried together. The parties settled their disputes and compromise decrees were passed on 4.9.1987. In C.S. No. 191 of 1979, a decree for Rs. 4,63,26,903.01 with subsequent interest was granted in favour of the plaintiff therein. The decree provided that in the event of the applicants paying a sum of Rs. 1,02,95,000/- within a period of twenty months in two installments i.e., Rs. 11,45,000/- within four months and Rs. 91,59,000/- within 20 months, the plaintiff bank will enter full satisfaction. In the event of default, the Bank was entitled to execute the decree for the entire amount. Similarly in the other suit, a decree was passed for Rs. 7,11,81,067.44 with interest. It was provided that if a sum of Rs. 2,25,00,000/- was paid within 20 months therefrom in three installments viz., Rs. 25,00,000/- with in four months, Rs. 1,00,00,000/- within six months thereafter and Rs. 1,00,00,000/- within ten months thereafter, the plaintiff bank will enter full satisfaction. A similar default clause was also included in the decree. 2. The applicants obtained permission of the Court to sell some of the suit properties to private parties, who were directed to pay the sale consideration to the decree-holders. Blue Jaggers & Co., paid a sum of Rs. 51,00,000/- to Punjab National Bank and purchased one of the suit properties. Udayar Investment Corporation Limited paid a sum of Rs. 75,00,000/- and purchased the property situated in Salem. Thereafter, a balance of Rs. 51,95,000/- was payable to the plaintiff in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 and a sum of Rs. 150 lakhs was payable to the plaintiff in the other suit. The first respondent herein filed Applications 2892 of 1988 and 2893 of 1988 for purchase of the suit lands subject to the conditions which may be imposed by the Court. 51,95,000/- was payable to the plaintiff in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 and a sum of Rs. 150 lakhs was payable to the plaintiff in the other suit. The first respondent herein filed Applications 2892 of 1988 and 2893 of 1988 for purchase of the suit lands subject to the conditions which may be imposed by the Court. In Application No. 2892 of 1988 in C.S. No. 567 of 1980, the offer was to purchase a total extent of 46.26 acres fully described in the Schedule to the application. In the other application, the offer was to purchase an extent of 21.03 acres described fully in the Schedule to the application. The first respondent had, before filing the applications in this Court, written a letter to the applicants on 14.6.1988 setting out the conditions under which it was prepared to purchase the properties. One of the conditions was to pay at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre in respect of the plottable area of the land. The other conditions are not relevant for the purpose of these applications. A copy of the letter was filed along with the application and the first respondent stated that it was prepared to purchase the properties subject to the conditions set out in the said letter. 3. When the applications were heard by the Court, the decree-holders as well as the applicants herein represented that they were agreeable to the sale of the properties at the rate offered by the first respondent, but without any condition. The Court accepted their submissions and passed the following order on 28.6.1988:— “1) The third party applicant K.K.R. Building Syndicate has offered to purchase the landed properties of the defendants in both the suits at the rate of Rs. 3,75,000/- (Rupees three lakhs seventy-five thousand only) per acre.” The plaintiff viz., the respective bank, in each suit as well as the respective defendants are agreeable to the sale of the properties at this rate without any condition. The proposed offer is accepted without prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff in both the suits under the compromise decrees. 2) The proposed purchaser shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs only) to the Central Bank of India viz., the plaintiff in C.S. No. 567 of 1980, and a sum of Rs. The proposed offer is accepted without prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff in both the suits under the compromise decrees. 2) The proposed purchaser shall pay a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs only) to the Central Bank of India viz., the plaintiff in C.S. No. 567 of 1980, and a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- to the Punjab National Bank viz., the plaintiff in C.S. No. 191 of 1979, on or before 15th July, 1988 towards part sale consideration. The proposed purchaser will also pay a further sum of Rs. 2,00,00/- to the Central Bank of India viz., the plaintiff in O.S. No. 567 of 1980, and a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the Punjab National Bank viz., the plaintiff in C.S. No. 191 of 1979, on or before 30th July 1988. 3) On payment of the money by the proposed purchaser, as directed above, the respective bank viz., the plaintiff in both the suits, shall endorse part satisfaction towards the respective decree against the defendants. The sale shall be unconditional and shall be completed by the purchaser by paying the balance of sale consideration on or before 31st December, 1988. Both these applications are ordered accordingly.” 4. The first respondent filed Application Nos. 3666 to 3671 of 1988 in C.S. 567 of 1980 and Application Nos. 3772 to 3777 of 1988 in C.S. 191 of 1979 praying for various directions from this Court. In Application Nos. 3666 of 1988 and 3772 of 1978, the prayer was for a direction to the applicants herein to execute Power of Attorney in favour of the first respondent for the specific purpose of appearing before Urban Land Ceiling Authorities, M.M.D.A. and other Governmental authorities to get the lands released for sale. The applications were not pressed and they were dismissed as such on 28.6.1988. A notarised power had been given by the applicants to Sri K. Kumar, a partner of the first respondent, to represent them before the Government authorities. The plaintiff in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 filed application No. 642 of 1989 for revocation of the order dated 28.6.1988 on the ground that the first respondent had not compiled with t he terms of the said order and they are unduly delaying the payment of amount due to it. The first respondent filed Applications No. 813 of 1989 for extension of time by two months till 28.2.1989. The first respondent filed Applications No. 813 of 1989 for extension of time by two months till 28.2.1989. Both the applications were disposed by a common order dated 13.2.1989, which reads as follows:— “When the applications were called, counsel for the applicant in Application No. 813 of 1989 handed over a cheque for Rs. 7 lakhs to learned counsel for the first respondent in that application. He has also agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs to the first respondent on or before 28.2.1989 and the entire balance due as per the order dated 28.6.1988 on or before 15.3.1989. In view of the said agreement, time is extended to pay a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs on or before 28.2.1989 and the entire balance on or before 15.3.1989. If the cheque handed over to-day to learned counsel for the first respondent is dishonoured or if the applicant does not pay the installment due on or before 28.2.1989 or if the last installment is not paid on or before 15.3.1989, the applicant will not be entitled to any indulgence and Application No. 813 of 1989 will stand automatically dismissed. 2. In view of the order passed in Application No. 813 of 1989, there is ho necessity to pass a separate order in Application No. 642 of 1989 cancelling the order dated 28.6.1988. I have already made the extension conditionally on payments as indicated above. If there is any failure on the part of the applicant in Application No. 813 of 1989 to comply with the aforesaid directions, this application No. 642 of 1989 will stand ordered and Application No. 813 of 1989 will stand dismissed.” 5. The first respondent also filed applications 995 to 997 of 1989 in C.S. 567 of 1980 for directing the applicants herein to obtain permission from the appropriate authorities to sell the properties in its favour or its nominees, to direct the applicants herein to hand over vacant possession of the properties after evicting the tenants and to extend the time for payment of balance of sale consideration for two months from the date of obtaining the permission from the authorities. In Application No. 997 of 1989, on 27.2.1989, the Court extended the time for payment of balance till 30.4.1989 finally. In Application No. 997 of 1989, on 27.2.1989, the Court extended the time for payment of balance till 30.4.1989 finally. The other two applications for delivery of vacant possession after evicting the tenants end for directions to the applicants herein to obtain the permission of the appropriate authorities were dismissed as not pressed. In C.S. No. 191 of 1979, the first respondent filed Applications 1620 to 1622 of 1989 for release of original documents, direction to give irrecovable power of attorney and to evict the tenants and hand over vacant possession. They were dismissed on 27.3.1989 as not pressed. Time was extended finally till 15.4.1989 in Application No. 1623 of 1989. The first respondent made certain payments to the decree-holders who accepted the same, though they were not made strictly within the time specified by the Court. The first respondent also paid a sum of Rs. 94,725/- by way of interest for delayed payments. After the banks received the amounts set out in the decree, the applicants filed applications for recording of full satisfaction and for recovery of title deeds. In C.S. 567 of 1980 full satisfaction was recorded by order dated 18.7.1989 in Application No. 3148 of 1989. In C.S. No. 191 of 1979, the applicants filed Application No. 3365 of 1989 for refund of a sum of Rs. 3,62,500/- paid in excess to the bank. That was ordered on 26.9.1989 for refund of a sum of Rs. 3,62,500/- paid in excess to the bank. That was ordered on 26.9.1989. In Application No. 3366 of 1989 the plaintiff bank was directed to return all the title deeds to counsel for the applicants. By the same order, full satisfaction of the decree was recorded. 6. The parties did not bring to the notice of the Court at that time that the first respondent had not paid the entire balance of sale consideration either into Court or to the applicants as directed by the earlier orders. The applicants executed a registered power of attorney on 27.7.1989 in favour of Sri K. Kumar, partner of the first respondent. While the applicants contended that a clause authorising the power of attorney to execute sale deeds was surreptiously introduced without their knowledge, the case of the first respondent was that power of attorney was executed by the applicants knowing the contents fully well. While the applicants contended that a clause authorising the power of attorney to execute sale deeds was surreptiously introduced without their knowledge, the case of the first respondent was that power of attorney was executed by the applicants knowing the contents fully well. Ultimately, however, that controversy was not pressed into service at the time of arguments in these applications. Thereafter, disputes arose between the parties as regards the amounts to be paid to the applicants by the first respondent. While the applicants contended that a huge amount was due from the first respondent, the latter claimed that it had paid more amount than due by it and the applicants should refund the excess. After exchange of notices through lawyers, the applicants filed these two applications. In Application No. 4422 of 1992 the prayer is to clarity the order dated 27.3.1989 in Application No. 1623 of 1989 (extending time for payment of sale consideration) to the effect that beyond 15-4-1989 the first respondent has no right under the order dated 28.6.1988 passed in Application No. 2893 of 1988 (permitting the sale of the properties) and that the applicants and other co-owners are entitled to deal with the properties in any manner as owners thereof. Similarly in Application No. 4423 of 1992, the prayer is to clarify the order dated 27.2.1989 in Application No. 997 of 1989 (extending time for payment of sale consideration) to the effect that beyond 30.4.1989 the first respondent has no right under the orders dated 28.6.1988 in Application No. 2892 of 1988 (permitting the sale of the property) and that the applicants and other co-owners are entitled to deal with the properties in any manner as owners thereof. 7. The complaint of the applicants is that the first respondent has paid only a sum of Rs. 55,57,500/-to the plaintiff in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 and the balance of Rs. 23,28,750/- is due from it as the total consideration for the extent of 21.03 acres at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre works out to Rs. 78,86,250/- Similarly, in the other suit, the first respondent has paid a sum of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- to the plaintiff in C.S. No. 567 of 1980 whereas it has to pay a total of Rs. 1,73,47,500/- at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre for an extent of 46.26 acres. 3.75 lakhs per acre works out to Rs. 78,86,250/- Similarly, in the other suit, the first respondent has paid a sum of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- to the plaintiff in C.S. No. 567 of 1980 whereas it has to pay a total of Rs. 1,73,47,500/- at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre for an extent of 46.26 acres. According to the first respondent, the balance payable in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 was only Rs. 23,14,145/- and the balance payable in C.S. 567 of 1980 was Rs. 3,96,448/. That was the stand taken by the first respondent in the notices exchanged prior to the filing of these applications and also in the common counter affidavit dated 29.11.1992 filed herein. But, the first respondent claimed that as per the arrangement between itself and the applicants, it was acting only as the agent of the applicant on the understanding that it should be paid a commission of 10% of the total outlay as remuneration for the services rendered by it besides reimbursement of all expenses incurred by it. The first respondent was claiming that the applicants were liable to pay a sum of Rs. 25,45,050/- to it in all. 8. Initially when the applications were taken up for hearing, the first respondent was represented by Sri A.S. Kailasam, who, after arguing the matter for some time, said that he Would make an attempt and bring about a compromise between the parties. It was also said that arrangements would be made to pay the amounts due to the applicants. For that purpose a long adjournment was sought. It was also represented that a marriage was to take place in the family of one of the partners of the first respondent and the talks of compromise could be had only thereafter. Believing the representation, the Court granted time. Adjournments were taken again and again and subsequently, the summer vacation intervened. After the reopening, a Senior Counsel appeared for the first respondent and started contending that no amount was due to the applicant and it is only the applicants who must be directed to pay the amount paid in excess by the first respondent. Adjournments were taken again and again and subsequently, the summer vacation intervened. After the reopening, a Senior Counsel appeared for the first respondent and started contending that no amount was due to the applicant and it is only the applicants who must be directed to pay the amount paid in excess by the first respondent. When his attention was drawn to the statements pf calculation filed by the counsel on record on the earlier occasion, senior counsel represented that those statements were filed only to point out the errors in the statements of calculation filed by the applicants and the figures mentioned in the statements were not accepted by the first respondent. It should be noted that as per the calculation statements filed by Mr. Kailasam, the amount due to the applicants in C.S. 191 of 1979 is Rs. 23,14,145/- and the amount due to the applicants in C.S. 567 of 1980 is Rs. 3,96,448/- This same figures were set out in the common counter affidavit filed by the party in these applications. I directed the counsel on record Mr. A.S. Kailasam to be present in Court and questioned him as to how the senior counsel now appearing in the case is taking a different stand from what he took earlier. He represented that he was suffering from illness by which his vocal chord got affected and the Senior Counsel was engaged by the party. He also said that he could not bring about any compromise and the Senior Counsel was in charge of the entire case. I am referring to this aspect of the matter only to point out that the first respondent has taken a stand completely different from the one taken earlier at the beginning of the arguments by the counsel on record. The present contention of the first respondent projected through the Senior Counsel is that the entire amount due to the applicants has been paid and a sum of Rs. 4,79,575/- is paid in excess to the applicants, which they are bound to refund to the first respondent. 9. In view of the disputes raised in the affidavits, I pointed out that oral evidence must be necessary on both sides to decide the said disputes and the parties should be ready to adduce the same. 4,79,575/- is paid in excess to the applicants, which they are bound to refund to the first respondent. 9. In view of the disputes raised in the affidavits, I pointed out that oral evidence must be necessary on both sides to decide the said disputes and the parties should be ready to adduce the same. Thereafter, counsel represented that they were confining their arguments to the points set out hereunder and leaving out the other disputes. Learned counsel for the applicants submitted that they would be satisfied if an order is passed directing the first respondent to pay the balance of consideration due to them in which event, they would not be insisting upon grant of the prayer as made in the applications. Consequently, the following points are formulated for consideration:— 1. Whether the applicants are entitled to the grant of an order directing the first respondent to pay any sum of money as balance of consideration to them? 2. What is the total amount payable by the first respondent to the applicants 3. What is the amount paid by the first respondent till now towards the consideration? 4. What is the balance payable to the applicants? 10. Point No. 1: I have already referred to the prayer made in the applications. An objection was taken in the counter affidavit that the applications are not maintainable in as much as the Court has become functus officio after the recording of the full satisfaction of the decrees. At the stage of arguments, when learned counsel for the applicants stated that they would be satisfied with an order for payment of money and they would not insist upon the declaration as prayed for in the application, the only objection raised by learned counsel for the first respondent was that such a relief could not be granted as it was not the one prayed for by the applicants. Learned senior counsel did not raise any objection that the Court had no jurisdiction or power to pass an order in these applications as prayed for or that the Court has become functus officio and cannot entertain the applications. The only objection raised is that the prayer in the applications is entirely different from the prayer made in the course of arguments. The only objection raised is that the prayer in the applications is entirely different from the prayer made in the course of arguments. There is no merit in the objection whatever: It is too well settled that this Court is empowered to mould the relief according to the facts and circumstances of the case and grant it in favour of the party entitled to it, even though the prayer made by the party is different and a larger one. (See Shingounda v. Ganesh (A.I.R. 1956 Bombay 243) 11. Further, it has been repeatedly held that the Court has inherent power to pass orders ex debito jusfitiae under S. 151, Code of Civil Procedure. In Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 S.C. 527 , referring to S. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, the Court said:— “The Section itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. (24) Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code.” 12. In the Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India ( AIR 1976 S.C. 1152 ), the Court quoted the following passage in Theoretical Basis of Inherent Powers Doctrine — Text material prepared by Jim R. Carrigan — Publication of National College of the State Judiciary, U.S.A.:— “The inherent power has its roots in necessity and its breadth is coextensive with the necessity.” 13. Recently, in Industrial Finance Corporation and others v. Official Liquidator, High Court, Calcutta and another (JT 1993 (2) S.C. 130), a question arose whether a Court could give directions reducing the number of installments and duration fixed earlier for the purpose of payment of sale price in a sale held through Court. A company went in liquidation and the assets thereof were directed to be sold by the Company Court. A company went in liquidation and the assets thereof were directed to be sold by the Company Court. Offers were received in response to sale notices and one Buxa made an offer of Rs. 6,00,00,000/- subject to certain terms and conditions stipulated by itself. When the matter came before the Court, the offer was raised to Rs. 8,00,00,000/- at the instance of the Court and it was accepted subject to the condition that the balance of consideration after deducting 10% earnest money which was to be deposited immediately shall be paid in installments prescribed by him. Complaining that the terms settled by the Company Court were too liberal to the purchaser and prejudicial to the interest of the financial institution, an appeal was preferred before the Division Bench. The Division Bench opined that it would not be appropriate to set aside the sale, but thought fit to provide some safeguards to protect the interests of the Financial Institutions and made certain modifications in the order. Not satisfied with the same, the Financial Institutions approached the Supreme Court. It was submitted before the Court that the purchasers should be directed to pay the entire balance consideration immediately or alternatively the number of installments should be reduced sharply with a provision for interest thereon. The purchaser opposed the appeal and contended that it was not open to the Court to modify the terms of the sale and the purchaser was not agreeable for any such modification. It was also represented that if the Court proposed to effect any modification, the purchaser should be left free to withdraw his offer and to walk out. The Court rejected the arguments of the purchaser and held that it is open to the Court to give appropriate directions having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the interests of the financial institutions. Consequently, the Court modified the terms imposed by the Division Bench and reduced the number or installments as well as the duration thereof. 14. Thus, there can be no doubt that this Court has ample power to issue suitable directions to the parties in this case to meet the ends of justice. 15. It is seen from the details furnished by the parties that several sale deeds have been executed in favour of third parties after 15.4.1989. 14. Thus, there can be no doubt that this Court has ample power to issue suitable directions to the parties in this case to meet the ends of justice. 15. It is seen from the details furnished by the parties that several sale deeds have been executed in favour of third parties after 15.4.1989. If the prayer as made in the applications is granted, it would affect the innocent third parties. Hence, the relief to be granted to the applicants should be suitably moulded and justice requires that an order for payment of balance of consideration should be made in favour of the applicants, if it is found that some more amounts are due to them from the first respondent. Hence, the contention of the first respondent in this regard is rejected. 16. Point No. 2: - There is no dispute that the total extent of lands directed to be sold to the first respondent or its nominees in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 is 21.03 acres and the extent in the other suit is 46.26 acres. At the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre, the first respondent is bound to pay a sum of Rs. 78,86,250/- for the lands in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 and Rs. 1,73,47,500/- for the lands in C.S. No. 567 of 1980. 17. The contention of the first respondent is that out of the total extent of 21.03 acres in C.S. 191 of 1979, an extent of 15.63 acres has been sold and the amount payable therefor at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre is Rs. 58,61,645/-. According to learned counsel, a sum of Rs. 55,57,500/- has been paid to Punjab National Bank, the decree-holder in that suit. It is the further contention that for the remaining extent of 5.40 acres, the first respondent is not liable to pay any consideration. According to him, an extent of 4 cents is not available, as at actual measurement, it is found that the remaining extent is only 5.36 acres. The said extent of 5.36 acres comprises of the roads and open space and space reserved for recreation in the layout. It is submitted that in any lay out, provision has to be made for roads to have access to the plots sold and provision of open spaces has to be made for several purposes inc hiding recreation. The said extent of 5.36 acres comprises of the roads and open space and space reserved for recreation in the layout. It is submitted that in any lay out, provision has to be made for roads to have access to the plots sold and provision of open spaces has to be made for several purposes inc hiding recreation. Those extents reserved for roads and open spaces are not salable to third parties and they have to be gifted to the M.M.D.A. for future maintenance. 18. Similarly, out of the total extent of 39.51 acres had actually been sold and a sum of Rs. 1,50,00,000/- has been paid to the Central Bank of India, the decree-holder therein. According to learned counsel, the amount payable for the sale of 39.51 acres is only Rs. 1,48,16,280/- at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre. Here also it is contended that an extent of 3.15 acres is reserved for roads and open spaces in the layout. An extent of 2.20 acres comprised of roads formed by the applicants already and were in existence when the first respondent offered to purchase the land. An extent of 1.12 acres was in the possession of cultivating tenants and as the applicants were not in a position to give vacant possession, the first respondent is not liable to pay any amount therefor. The remaining extent of 28 cents is in the occupation of several hut dwellers and the entire extent has been gifted to the occupants under 14 gift deeds executed by the applicants themselves. According to learned counsel for the first respondent, his client is not liable to pay any amount for the said extent of 6.75 acres which remained unsold and which could not be sold. 19. The contention that the first respondent is not liable to pay any amount for the lands reserved for formation of roads and open spaces for recreation and other purposes is unsustainable. As stated above, when the first respondent made applications to this Court, the offer was to pay at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre for plottable area. But, the Court did not accept the same and passed an order directing the first respondent to pay at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre for the entire lands. As stated above, when the first respondent made applications to this Court, the offer was to pay at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre for plottable area. But, the Court did not accept the same and passed an order directing the first respondent to pay at the rate of Rs. 3.75 lakhs per acre for the entire lands. Having accepted that order and gained the advantage of selling the lands to various third parties and realising the sale proceeds, it is not open to the first respondent to turn round at this stage and claim that it is liable to pay only for the plottable area and not for the lands reserved for roads and open spaces for recreation and other purposes. There is no ambiguity whatever in the order passed by this Court and the first respondent is bound to pay for the entire extent of lands as described in the Schedules to the applications and the orders. 20. With regard to the extent of 2.20 acres which, according to the first respondent, represented the roads which were in existence already, having been formed by the applicants themselves, the contention is equally unsustainable. The applicants had, for the purpose of reaching the lands, formed its own private roads inside the lands and unless title thereto is conveyed by the applicants to any purchaser, the latter cannot claim the same as of right. That extent of 2.20 acres also formed part of the total extent of 46.26 acres, subject-matter of Application No. 2892 of 1988 and the order dated 28.6.1988 passed thereon. 21. The contention of the first respondent that an extent of 4 cents is not available on land and on actual measurement it is found that the land remaining unsold is 5.36, acres has not been established. That contention is put forward for the first time in these applications and when the first respondent applied for extension of time for payment of amount on more than one occasion in this Court, there was no whisper that there was. a shortfall of land on actual measurement. In the absence of any acceptable evidence to prove that the land measures less actually, the contention has to be rejected. Thus, the first respondent is liable to pay for the entire extent of 21.03 acres in C.S. No. 191 of 1979. 22. a shortfall of land on actual measurement. In the absence of any acceptable evidence to prove that the land measures less actually, the contention has to be rejected. Thus, the first respondent is liable to pay for the entire extent of 21.03 acres in C.S. No. 191 of 1979. 22. As regards the extent of 1.12 acres said to be in the possession of cultivating tenants, the contention of the first respondent earlier in the notices and the counter affidavit was that no such land was available and if the land was identified by the applicants, the amount due therefor will be paid by the first respondent. But, at the time of arguments, the applicants produced several documents to prove that the land was actually available and the contention of the first respondent was false. The documents consisted of sale deed dated 4.4.1966 executed by the prior owner Dhanabhagyam Ammal in their favour as well as sketch, survey plan and patta pass-book. The applicants have also produced a copy of the plan prepared by Nagappa Industrial Estate for the proposed additions in Industrial Trading Corporation showing the exact location of the land in question abutting the Grand Trunk Road from Madras to Nellore. Realising that the contention that no land was available would fail, the first respondents Senior Counsel urged during the arguments that the lands were in the possession of cultivating tenants and unless they were evicted and vacant possession was given, the first respondent was not liable to pay any amount therefor. The contention is wholly unsustainable. As seen already, the order for sale in favour of the first respondent was unconditional. Moreover, the first respondent filed Application No. 995 of 1989 for a direction to the applicants to give vacant possession after evicting the tenants. That was dismissed as not pressed on 27.2.1989. In the circumstances, it is not open to the first respondent to contend that unless vacant possession was given to it, there was no liability to pay the consideration therefor. It is the responsibility of the first respondent to evict the tenants and take possession after purchasing the lands. Hence, the first respondent is bound to pay the amount due for the extent of 1.12 acres also. 23. With reference to the 28 cents, the applicants have executed 14 gift deeds in favour of the occupants thereof. It is the responsibility of the first respondent to evict the tenants and take possession after purchasing the lands. Hence, the first respondent is bound to pay the amount due for the extent of 1.12 acres also. 23. With reference to the 28 cents, the applicants have executed 14 gift deeds in favour of the occupants thereof. It is the contention of the applicants that the gift deeds were executed as required by the first respondent. According to the applicants, the first respondent obtained certain letters from the occupants of the lands as if the letters were addressed to the applicants and directed the applicants to execute girt deeds, in pursuance of which the applicants executed the gift deeds. It is also contended that the gift deeds are executed on stamp papers worth Rs. 3.50 and they are not valid for insufficient stamps and for want of registration. The applicants have not chosen to let in any evidence in support of their case that the gift deeds were executed at the instance of the first respondent, who obtained letters from the occupants as if they were given to applicants. In the absence of any evidence to that effect, the Court has to act upon the apparent tenor of the documents. No doubt, the documents will not be valid in law as gift deeds, as they are not sufficiently stamped arid they are unregistered. But, yet it is not open to the applicants to claim the price for the said lands from the first respondent after having executed such documents. If the applicants had not executed any document with regard to such extent, they would have been entitled to claim consideration therefor. But, the execution of the gift deeds, Would naturally enable the occupants of the land to resist any claim from the first respondent after its purchase and it would undoubtedly lead to litigations. In such circumstances, the applicants cannot insist upon the first respondent paying consideration for the said extent of 28 cents. 24. Consequently, it is held that the first respondent is liable to pay the total consideration for an extent of 21.03 acres in C.S. 191 of 1979 and an extent of 45.98 acres in C.S. No. 567 of 1980. The total amount payable for the lands in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 is Rs. 24. Consequently, it is held that the first respondent is liable to pay the total consideration for an extent of 21.03 acres in C.S. 191 of 1979 and an extent of 45.98 acres in C.S. No. 567 of 1980. The total amount payable for the lands in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 is Rs. 78,86,250/- and the total amount payable for 45.98 acres in C.S. No. 567 of 1989 comes to Rs. 1,72,42,500/-, making a total of Rs. 2,51,28,750/-. The first respondent is liable to pay a total sum of Rs. 2,51,28,750. 25. Point No. 3: - There is no dispute that the first respondent paid a sum of Rs. 55,57,500/- to Punjab National Bank and Rs. 1,50,00,000/- to the Central Bank of India, making a total of Rs. 2,05,57,500/- There is also no dispute that the first respondent paid a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- to the applicants by cheques dated 29.8.1989 and 2.9.1989 for Rs. 3,00,000/- each. According to the applicants, the said amount was paid towards interest for delayed payments. It is the case of the applicants that because the first respondent had not paid the amount due within the time fixed by this Court, and was taking repeated extensions, the applicants wanted the first respondent to pay interest or the amounts due as they would be liable to pay interest to the banks. According to the applicants, the first respondent agreed to pay the said sum and paid a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- under the two cheques. Per contra, the contention of the first respondent is that there was no such agreement and it had paid a sum of Rs. 94,725/- to Punjab National Bank on 12.7.1989 directly by way of interest on the delayed payments as per the agreement between itself and the bank. According to the first respondent, the sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- was paid only towards the sale consideration to the applicants. There is no evidence before Court to show that the first respondent agreed with the applicants to pay a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- towards interest on belated payments. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the first respondent, the first respondent came on the scene only on 28.6.1988 and it had time to pay the amounts till 31.12.1988 as per the first order. 6,00,000/- towards interest on belated payments. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the first respondent, the first respondent came on the scene only on 28.6.1988 and it had time to pay the amounts till 31.12.1988 as per the first order. It is submitted by Senior Counsel for the first respondent that the amount claimed by the bank by way of interest on the belated payments, as against the applicants was for the earlier periods, as the applicants had made defaults in making payments within the specified time. Whatever that may be there is no evidence before Court to prove the alleged agreement between the applicants and the first respondent as regards the sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- Hence, the payment of Rs. 6,00,000/- should be taken only as a payment made by the first respondent towards the sale consideration. Consequently, that amount should be added to the amounts paid by the first respondent to the banks. Thus, a total amount of Rs. 2,11,57,500/- had been paid by the first respondent towards the total sale consideration payable by it under orders of Court. 26. Point No. 4: In view of the above findings, it is clear that out of the total sum of Rs. 2,51,28,750/-payable by the first respondent, it has already paid Rs. 2,11,57,500/-. The balance sum payable by the first respondent to the applicants is Rs. 39,71,250/-. The break-up figures are Rs. 23,28,750/- in C.S. No. 191 of 1979 and Rs. 16,42,500/- in C.S. 567 of 1980. The first respondent shall pay the said amounts to the applicants on or before 10.9.1993. In default, the amount will carry interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 10.9.1993. On such payment, the applicants shall execute such other documents as may be required by the first respondent for the perfection of the title of itself and its nominees. The applicants can recover the amounts from the first respondent by executing this order. It is also open to the applicants to resort to such other remedies as are available to them under law. 27. The applications are ordered accordingly. The first respondent shall pay the costs of the applicants in these applications. Counsels fee one set Rs. 5,000/-