Judgment :- The question for consideration is whether a domestic inquiry in which the charges are vague in that they do not particularize the allegations of misconduct, is vitiated by reason of such vagueness? 2. The petitioner K. Raman was appointed as the Secretary of the Service Co-operative Society Limited, Karuvatta, whose President is the respondent No.1 to this petition. Suspicion of misconduct resulted in her suspension from service on 28-10-1969. She did not appear at the inquiry. She was dismissed from service. However, on her application, an industrial dispute I.D. No. 13 of 1980 as to the validity of her dismissal was referred to the Labour Court, Quilon on 7-5-1980. Evidence was recorded. There were 20 charges against the petitioner. The charge Nos. 4,7,8,10,11 and 16 were held not proved. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that none of the charges ever told the petitioner, what accusation was she expected to meet at the trial and that therefore the inquiry by the Labour Court and the Enquiry officer is vitiated. The charge No.1 is that the society's records were not "written properly, truly and correctly". It is not alleged that the petitioner did not maintain the records properly. The charge is worded in passive voice. What was not written properly has not been stated. Did she fail to write the dates correctly, did she neglect to write the account books correctly, or did she omit to maintain the vouchers correctly. The "record" complains nothing. Total absence of particulars. The second charge is that "the amounts received in the society were entered without correctly writing receipts and is utilised for her own use and only when the President of the committee questioned they were entered". Again, what amounts were received and on what dates, are not mentioned. What is meant by not writing correctly? 1 Whether the entries were false, whether they did not represent the correct transaction, is not stated. No one can make out what the maker of the charges meant to convey. The third charge "huge amounts were kept in hand as balance cash against the society's byelaws and committee decision etc". What were the amounts that were kept, which byelaws were violated, which decisions of the committee were ignored, is not clear. The delinquent is not expected to issue interrogatories and find out what exactly the charge meant. The third charge "huge amounts were kept in hand as balance cash against the society's byelaws and committee decision etc". What were the amounts that were kept, which byelaws were violated, which decisions of the committee were ignored, is not clear. The delinquent is not expected to issue interrogatories and find out what exactly the charge meant. Most of the charges are of this nature and unless closer scrutiny and further inquiry is made as to what the maker of the charges intended to convey and until such information is communicated, the delinquent cannot make out as to what acts of misconduct she is accused of. In my opinion the charges framed against the delinquent do not bring out the accusations she is expected to meet. This is of importance because the particular acts of misconduct have to be met by the delinquent. For instance when the charge says that amounts were not correctly recorded she must know the day of commission of the act and the amount involved. So also where a breach of the byelaw or a decision of the committee is alleged, the specific byelaws and the particular decisions have to be brought to the notice of the delinquent. Again, where fabrication and false explanation is alleged the document fabricated or the explanation offered and how it is false has to be brought to the notice of the delinquent. None of such particulars are stated in the charges. The delinquent could not have met any one of them. It may be argued that she' could find out from the record of the society and the relevant byelaws. She is not expected to do it. Those who accuse her of misconduct must supply to her all the facts which constitute the charges. 5. However, one charge which purports to give some details, is charge No. 20. The charge No. 20 has been interpreted by the Labour Court as a charge which accused the delinquent of misappropriation of Rs. 5035/-. I am afraid, a plain reading of this charge does not bring out the facts necessary to make the accusation of misappropriation of money. The charge brings out these facts: (1) The Board meeting was held on 28-10-1969. (2) The accounts were inspected. (3) It was noticed that Rs. 5,035/- was entered by voucher No. 362. (4) When the voucher was demanded the petitioner could not produce it. The charge brings out these facts: (1) The Board meeting was held on 28-10-1969. (2) The accounts were inspected. (3) It was noticed that Rs. 5,035/- was entered by voucher No. 362. (4) When the voucher was demanded the petitioner could not produce it. Nor did she offer any explanation. From these facts the charge concludes: "Thus the amount of Rs. 5,035/-belonging to the society was fabricating entered by fabricating and misappropriated". All that the charges bring to the notice of the petitioner is that at the Board meeting it was found that there was an entry of Rs. 5,035/- by voucher No. 362 and that the petitioner was unable to produce the voucher. Misappropriation means actual withdrawal of money and using it for her own purpose. This essential ingredient is totally absent. Even if the whole charge is accepted as true, an inference of misappropriation does not follow. This charge is as vague as the other charges. 6. In State of U.P. v. mom5/jan/ (1982 iillj 180) the dismissal was held illegal because the charge failed to supply particulars with regard to the date and time of the incident. In Northern Railway Co-operative Credit Society Ltd, v. Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (1967 II LLJ 46) the Supreme Court held the dismissal illegal, as the charge was vague. 7. The purpose of framing charge is to bring to the notice of the delinquent, with reasonable certainty, the facts constituting the misconduct alleged to have been committed. This is not a technical requirement. Since the delinquent has to meet the charge, she must know in certain, and intelligible language, what she is accused off. The absence of a reasonably certain, and particularised charge, robs the inquiry of its substance. Such an inquiry with the "charges" is vitiated. 8. For all these reasons I hold that the charges on the basis of which the domestic inquiry and the inquiry in I.D. No. 13 of 1980 by the Labour Court, Quilon, were held, are so vague that the delinquent 'did not understand the accusations she was expected to meet. The inquiry is therefore vitiated. It is absolutely void. 9. I therefore quash the order, dated 30-9-1987 in I.D. No. 13 of 1980 made by the Labour Court, Quilon, and also the inquiry and the punishment of dismissal imposed in the domestic inquiry. The inquiry is therefore vitiated. It is absolutely void. 9. I therefore quash the order, dated 30-9-1987 in I.D. No. 13 of 1980 made by the Labour Court, Quilon, and also the inquiry and the punishment of dismissal imposed in the domestic inquiry. I order that: (i)the petitioner shall be reinstated into service in the post which she held on 28-10-1969 which was the date on which she was suspended. (ii) The respondent No.1 shall pay to the petitioner all the back wages, allowances and other benefits as if she were never suspended and dismissed. This order shall be complied with within one month from today.