JUDGMENT Dr. E.S. Da Silva, J.-This Second Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned District Judge. South Goa, dated 26th April, 1989, in Civil Appeal No. 174/1981 which has unsettled the judgment of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Margao, in Civil Suit No. 153/69 dated 6th December, 1977. 2. The plaintiff in the suit was the late predecessor of the appellants, one Atchut Damu Sinai Cundo, who had claimed to be the owner in possession by virtue of a lease of 1/12th part of a property known as "Danktto" situated at Panzarcone, Cuncolim, and the building standing therein. He filed a suit for recovery of possession against the respondent in respect of the premises occupied by a d grocery shop installed in four rooms on the northern portion of the building. That part according to him was separated from the remaining portion of the property bearing registration No. 7221 in the Land Registration Office and Matriz No. 7292. The portion of the land with the house had been allotted to Atchut and his wife in the partition suit bearing No. 1624 in the Court of Quepem by order dated 27th August, 1943. Originally the said part of the land and the building standing therein were being enjoyed by Atchut and his brothers Vamona and Pundolica as the lease had been taken in the names of all the three brothers. Upon the death of Vamona's wife Saraswati inventory proceedings were instituted and that part with the house was allotted to Atchut. The building was consisting of four rooms in the southern portion out of which three on the southern portion were constructed by Atchut and his brothers in the year 1930 and were being enjoyed by all of them jointly and a fourth room on the northern portion wherein a grocery shop was installed. 3. After the inventory proceedings the late Atchut became the a sole owner of the entire land and the building. However, when in the year 1960 Atchut fell sick and had to leave for Bombay wherein he stated till 1964 he entrusted his brother with the management of his entire business and requested him to stay in the southern portion of the building. However, when in the year 1960 Atchut fell sick and had to leave for Bombay wherein he stated till 1964 he entrusted his brother with the management of his entire business and requested him to stay in the southern portion of the building. Vamona died on 27th September, 1964 and as soon as Atchut got the news of his death he returned to Goa in the same month in order to perform religious ceremonies and take charge of his house and the other assets which had been entrusted to Vamona. Atchut then came to know that Vamona being very old had requested the respondent to look after his business. As Atchut decided to close down the business and go to Bombay on account of illness of his wife and he himself was not keeping good health, he was requested by the respondent not to close the business and he undertook to hand over the house and the shop as soon as Atchut returned to Goa from Bombay. Somewhere in 1966 Atchut returned to Goa and respondent handed over to him the southern portion of the building which was being occupied by him for his residence. But as far as the southern portion which was being occupied by the shop the respondent went on delaying its delivery. Then Atchut approached Pundolica Sinai Cundo, Kashinath Poi Anglo and Seguna Naik and requested them to use their good offices with the respondent to convince him to give up the shop and the portion of the building occupied by it. At that time the respondent when approached by these persons requested for sometime for delivering possession and thereafter on 19. 11. 1966 he gave an undertaking in writing that he would hand it over to Atchut on 30th June, 1968. However, since the respondent did not honour his commitment Atchut wrote to him a letter on 19th April, 1969 requesting him once again to vacate the ship till 30th April, 1969 without fail. The respondent did not give any definite reply. Vamona had entrusted the respondent with some pieces of furniture and some other items which he had entered in his note-book. The respondent did not vacate the shop on 30th June, 1969 as he had promised to do. Therefore, his occupation of the shop became unlawful. The respondent did not give any definite reply. Vamona had entrusted the respondent with some pieces of furniture and some other items which he had entered in his note-book. The respondent did not vacate the shop on 30th June, 1969 as he had promised to do. Therefore, his occupation of the shop became unlawful. Since then the respondent being a trespasser was bound to vacate the shop and to hand-over the pieces of furniture which he was using in the suit premises worth Rs. 1,000/-. He therefore, prayed that the respondent be ordered to deliver vacant possession of the premises occupied by the shop, return the pieces of furniture as per the list attached and indemnification for the unlawful occupation of the shop. 4. The respondent resisted the suit although he admitted that Atchut was the lessee of 1/12 part of the property "Danktto". He however, denied that the lease included the building wherein he had his shop and that the building was situated in the property registered under No. 7221 and Matriz No. 7292. According to him the shop was installed in a building situated in a property bearing Matriz No. 166 known as Predio Mixto Princirio Doncto situated at Comba of Cuncolim and belonging to one Scrvulo Furtado of Sarzora. The building was existing in the property since 1918 and the shop belonging to Pandu Sinai Cundo was installed therein. Thereafter Vamona started running the shop in the building. The late Atchut had transferred the shop in the name of Vamona who by virtue of his transfer became the absolute owner of the shop. On 13th September, 1963 Vamona sold and transferred the ship to the respondent. The transfer was authorised by the Government by order dated 8th August, 1963. Thus, the respondent became the legitimate owner in possession of the suit shop which was originally of Atchut and thereafter of Vamona. 5. The respondent stated that he was also the lessee in respect of he portion of the building occupied by the shop by virtue of the lease contract executed by him on 4th January, 1968 with the landlord Servulo Furtado. The respondent further stated that Atchut ceased to be the lessee of the building because he lost his right of tenancy when he effected the transfer of the shop in favour of Vamona. The respondent further stated that Atchut ceased to be the lessee of the building because he lost his right of tenancy when he effected the transfer of the shop in favour of Vamona. He denied that at any time he had requested Atchut not to close his business and that he had promised to hand over to him to building as soon as he returned from Bombay. The southern portion of the building was handed over to Atchut because Vamona had told him to do so. But with regards to the northern portion wherein the shop is installed the respondent had always refused to hand it over to Atchut and had told him that he was a sub-lessee in respect of that portion. The writing dated 19th November, 1966 was signed by him under coercion because Atchut came along with some persons who warned him that they were going to lock the shop in case he refused to vacate it. 6. The learned Civil Judge after recording evidence of the parties partly allowed and decreed the suit being satisfied that whatever transfers claimed by the respondent in respect of the suit shop from Atchut to Vamona and from Vamona to Jaganath were not valid in view of Articles 85 of Decree No. 43525 of 961 (hereinafter referred to as the Decree). The learned Judge, however, held that originally the shop belonged to Atchut who thereafter transferred it to Varnona and he in turn passed it to respondent. However, this transfer did not amount in his view to a legal "trespasse" because in terms of the aforesaid Decree "trespasse" or transfer of a commercial establishment could have been validly done only by means of an "escritura publica" (registered deed). He, however, held that the building in which the shop was located was existing in the property subject-matter of the deed of lease dated 26.3.1923 thus, negativing the respondents contention that the said building was situated in a different property. 7. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge was challenged by both the parties who had filed separate appeals and the learned District Judge by the impugned judgment allowed the respondent's appeal and dismissed the one filed by the late plaintiff Atchut to the extent to judgment of the learned trial Judge went against him. 7. The judgment of the learned Civil Judge was challenged by both the parties who had filed separate appeals and the learned District Judge by the impugned judgment allowed the respondent's appeal and dismissed the one filed by the late plaintiff Atchut to the extent to judgment of the learned trial Judge went against him. The learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the finding of the learned Civil Judge that the absence of an "escritura publica" was rendering the transfer of the shop made null and void was unacceptable. The learned District Judge however, agreed with the learned Civil Judge that after the Decree was enforced in this Territory the transfers of the commercial establishments were to be done by "escrituras publicas" but he was of the view that since both the transfers had been allowed and sanctioned by the Government and the concerned parties having paid the corresponding taxes the late Atchut had lost contact at all with the business of the a shop. He also took note that the first transfer from Atchut to Vamona had been done in 1960 before the enforcement of the Decree. Therefore, Atchut had already lost legal right of claiming back the business and shop from his brother Vamona. 8. Shri Bernardo Reis, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, in his submissions has defaulted the impugned judgment on several grounds, namely, the fact that the learned Judge totally overlooked the circumstances that as per the law in force the transfer of a running business in order to confer the right to the transferee as a lessee of the shop required that the same transfer should be made by a public deed which means a contract which is to be executed before a Notary Public with the intervention of the transferor and the transferee. It was therefore, urged that since there was no such public deed it could not be said in terms of Article 85(4) of the Decree that there was any valid transfer of leasehold rights from Atchut to Vamona and then from Vamona to the respondent. The learned Judge was d thus. wrong in holding that the document issued by the Revenue Department dated 6.9.1969 was satisfying the requirements of Articles 85(4) of the Decree since it could not be held as a public deed which was required for the purpose of transfer in terms of the law. The learned Judge was d thus. wrong in holding that the document issued by the Revenue Department dated 6.9.1969 was satisfying the requirements of Articles 85(4) of the Decree since it could not be held as a public deed which was required for the purpose of transfer in terms of the law. The learned counsel submitted that the said document at the most could be said to refer to a permission obtained by the Government for the purpose of running a shop and for the purpose of recovering the taxes imposed by the fiscal laws, namely. "Regulamento de Contribuicoes Industrials" which was enforced in this Territory from 1947. It was further contended by the learned senior counsel that the learned Judge totally ignored the fact that an act which is bound to be executed with the formalities imposed by the law would become void ab initio consequent upon the non-execution of such formalities and being thus unable to create any rights or obligations unless the laws directs to the contrary. 9. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law : (1) Whether within the facts of the case and Article 85(4) of Decree No. 43525 the respondent can claim a valid transfer of the right of the lessee Atchut to the suit shop in his favour. (2) Whether the said document dated 6.9.1969 can be equated to a public deed required under the above provision for a valid transfer of a commercial concern with leasehold rights to the shop where the concern is functioning. 10. In order to appreciate he submission of the learned counsel and the legal points raised in this appeal it is expedient to advert to the scheme of certain provisions of the Decree namely its Articles 1 and 85 and in a particular way with regard to its sub-section (4) which admittedly appears to be applicable in the instant case. 11. There is no dispute that the said Decree was in force at the time of the relevant facts sub-judice and that it should be under its provisions that the controversy is to be adjudicated. Article 1 of the said Decree provides that the said Decree governs the lease of the buildings, without prejudice to the provisions of the Civil Code, either generally or related to the contract of the leases which are not contrary to the enactments contained in the Decree. Article 1 of the said Decree provides that the said Decree governs the lease of the buildings, without prejudice to the provisions of the Civil Code, either generally or related to the contract of the leases which are not contrary to the enactments contained in the Decree. Article 85(1) provides that any transfer inter vivos of the rights of the lessee, without the consent of the landlord, is only permitted in case of trespasse which means transfer of a running business, that is to say, transfer by sale of a establishment with all its assets and liabilities. Article 85(2) lays down that there is no trespasse when the transferee runs in the leased premises some different type of business, or industry and when the transfer is not accompanied with the transfer of the whole of the installations untensils, goods comprised in the shop. Article 85(3) confers on the landlord right of pre-emption in case of "tresspasse". Finally Article 85(4) which is the relevant provision in our case reads as under :- "O trespasse so pode-se constituir validamente por escritura publica." being its translation as follows :- "Transfer of running business can only be validly executed by a public deed (emphasis supplied)." 12. It was thus, contended by the learned counsel that the late appellant Atchut after the construction of the building and having run the suit shop for sometime went to Bombay and entrusted the management of such shop to his brother Vamona. It was this brother who permitted the respondent Jaganata to run the shop as a licensee. Atchut left for Bombay in 1960 and Vamona died in 1964. It was sometime before his death that he gave licence to Jaganata to run the business of the shop. After the death of his brother Atchut returned to Goa and wanted to close the shop. At that time the respondent requested to allow him to continue the business in the shop for sometime more. Atchut agreed but Jaganata went on promising to vacate the shop and every time failed to honour the promise. This situation went on till 1969. Sometime in the year 1966 Jaganata executed a document in writing undertaking to vacate the shop on 30th June, 1968 without fail. It was a private: document. Atchut agreed but Jaganata went on promising to vacate the shop and every time failed to honour the promise. This situation went on till 1969. Sometime in the year 1966 Jaganata executed a document in writing undertaking to vacate the shop on 30th June, 1968 without fail. It was a private: document. However, as he again failed to, honour the commitment Atchut had no other alternative than to, file the suit to obtain possession of the shop. The respondent then started alleging that the suit shop was not located in the property which has been leased by A. He also denied that he was Atchut's licensee in respect of the shop. His another property belonging to one Servulo Furtado who had allowed him to occupy the land. His further defence was that Vamona had transferred in his favour the licence to run the shop by a private deed dated 30.9.1963. 13. It was further contended by the learned counsel that admittedly the trial Court has held that the shop was situated in the property leased by Atchut and was belonging to him and expressly ruled that the same was not located in any property of Servulo Furtado. The trial Court has also given a finding that the valid transfer of the business by Vamona to the respondent if any could be done only by a public deed and therefore, the transfer made by private document was null and inoperative. Accordingly the suit was decreed and the respondent was directed to hand over the possession of the shop to Atchut. For this purpose the learned trial Judge heavily relied on the provisions of Article 85(4) of the Decree. However, the learned District Judge although concurring with the finding of the trial Court that the shop was not located in the land of Servulo Furtado and instead was situated in the property leased to Atchut and also accepting the legal position that public deed was very much required to execute a valid "trespasse" in terms of Article 85(4) of the Decree and that its non-existence was rendering the "trespasse" null and void however. inconsistently held that in the instant case considering that the transfer of the establishment from Atchut to Vamlona and then from Vamona To Jaganata had been sanctioned by the Government and also that the respondent had paid the fiscal dues to Government for a long period of about nine years, the requirement of public deed could be dispensed with. The learned counsel has vehemtnely urged in this regard that if the law required the execution of a public deed for the purpose of proving the "trespasse" it was obvious that in terms of Article 10 of the Portuguese Civil Code (hereinafter called the Code) anything done against the law would attract nullity of the act. The said Article 10 of the Code which was relied upon by the learned counsel provides that any acts executed against the legal provisions are null and void except when the law directs to the contrary. And its sole paragraph lays down that the nullity can be condoned by consent of the parties if the law which is violated is not of public order and interest. 14. The learned counsel submitted that the documents which were produced by the respondent to prove the transfers were not public deeds and hence. Article 85(4) was attracted. Therefore the learned trial Judge was perfectly right in holding that there has never been a valid transfer of the business or of the commercial establishment regarding the suit shop originally from Atchut to Vamona and thereafter from Vamona to Jaganata. It was further urged by the learned counsel that Atchut had never transferred the shop to Vamona and although he had acknowledge that only licence was passed in his name even assuming that such transfer was made the provision of Article 85(5) of the Decree was not observed and as such the transfer of the licence could not lead to the transfer of the establishment in the eye of law. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court of Lisbon dated 6.12.1949 published in the Boletim do Ministerio de Justica No. 16 at page 231 which held that the "trespasse" because it is to be recorded in the deed cannot be proved by witnesses. 15. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court of Lisbon dated 6.12.1949 published in the Boletim do Ministerio de Justica No. 16 at page 231 which held that the "trespasse" because it is to be recorded in the deed cannot be proved by witnesses. 15. It was further submitted by the learned counsel that Article 1 of the Decree would show that the provisions of the said Decree were supplementary to the provisions of the Code and therefore. Article 10 of the Code was very much attracted in this case. The learned counsel took strong exception that the respondent on one hand alleged that he had obtained the lease from Vamona in 1963 consequent upon "trespass" but at the same time is claiming that he had acquired the right of lease in the year 1968 from one Servulo Furtado on the ground that the shop was situated in his property which latter plea was otherwise discarded by both the Courts below. According to the learned counsel this stand of the respondent would show that the case sought to be made out by him is not to be accepted. The trial Court had already held in this regard, by giving a definite finding, that Atchut had never leased or transferred the commercial establishment in the shop to Vamonabut had only handed over the assets of the shop and probably sold them to him for the purpose of its running. This finding was not negatived by the learned District Judge. The learned counsel then concluded that ours is a country governed by the rule of law and therefore, a strict compliance of the legal requirements enjoined by the law in force should be observed for the purpose of validity of an act in respect whereof the law prescribes a certain form for its valid execution. Reliance was placed in this regard in the case of S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 SC 1427 , wherein the Court observed that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be continued within clearly defined 'limits. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be continued within clearly defined 'limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules, and in general such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. 16. There is indeed considerable merit in the submissions of the learned appellant's counsel. I have gone through the judgment of the learned trial Judge as well as of the learned District Judge which is under challenge and I am in agreement with the learned counsel that it is difficult to accept that the "certidao" dated 6th September, 1969, at page 139 of the trial Court file (Exhibit D1), the challan or the receipt of payment of "contribuicao industrial" dated 13.9.1963 at page 143 (Exhibit D2) and the deed of lease dated 4th January, 1968, at page 147 (Exhibit D3) prove the "trespasse" or transfer of the suit c establishment from Vamona to Jaganata as it appears to have been held by the learned District Judge in his impugned judgment. I must say that there is nothing in the said documents to' suggest that the shop establishment as such which was originally belonging to Atchut was transferred from Atchut to Vamona and then from Vamon a to Jaganata. It is true that from those documents it is shown that both Vamona and Jaganata have paid the fiscal taxes to the Government in relation to the suit shop, that is to say, the “Imposto de contribuicao industrial” which was due in this Territory right since 1947 by virtue d of Portaria No. 4425 dated 19.6.1947 further elaborated by Portaria No. 5190 dated 18.1.1959 whereby some type of transactions like the "trespasse" of commercial establishments were required to obtain a sanction from the Government. However, this payment was to be made because they were obviously entrusted or in-charge of the running of the business in the shop. However, this payment was to be made because they were obviously entrusted or in-charge of the running of the business in the shop. This mere fact could not therefore, mean that the business of the establishment as such had been so transferred to them in strict compliance of the legal requirements for its validity and/or its very existence in the eye of the prevailing law. The sanction of the Government referred to in Exhibit B was necessary for the purpose of payment of "contribuicao industrial" and had nothing to do with civil rights of the parties at all. It is clear that the payment of taxes under the Regulamento de Contribuicao Industrial does not deal with the creation of any juridical relationship between the parties with regard to their civil rights in relation to the suit establishment. As it was rightly pointed out by the learned appellants counsel the requirement of permission from the Government to pay the “Contribuicao industrial” consequent upon the transfer of licence in terms of Portaria No. 5190 and the one which stipulates that a public deed is necessary for the a valid execution of a "trespasse" (transfer or sale of the establishment with all its assets and liabilities) are complementary to each other and one cannot substitute or dispense the other. That the finding given by the learned District Judge that the documents marked at Exhibits D1, D2 and D3 which were sufficient to legally establish a transfer of licence from the name of Atchut to the name of Vamona and thereafter from the name of Vamona to the name of Jaganata would mean that there has been also a transfer of business or a transfer of the establishment of the shop wherein the business was being run and t therefore, these documents would dispense with the public deed required for the valid execution of such transfer or "trespasse" appears to be misconceived and not based on a correct interpretation of the law. In this regard the learned trial Judge appears to be on a sound footing when he observed that such documents could not have any evidentiary value to prove a "trespasse" which according to the respondent took place as far as Atchut and Vamona is concerned on 28th July, 1961 when the Decree was already in force and that any transfer of a commercial establishment by way of "trespasse" could only be made by a "escritura publica" and could be proved only by such document in terms of Article 85(4) of the Decree. The learned trial Judge was also right when he held that the documents produced by the respondent at the most could be regarded as an indication that the assets of the shop had been sold by Atchut to Vamona and that is how its licence had been obtained in Vamona's name. Hence, on this count alone it was not permissible to hold that the shop and the commercial establishment had been transferred from Atchut to Vamona in the absence of any "escritura". I must say that there is no evidence at all on record to support the finding that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it can be said that the business of the shop was also transferred along with the shop by Atchut to Vamona first and thereafter from Vamona to Jaganata. It is therefore, difficult to agree with the learned District Judge's finding that the fact of the transfer of the licence of the shop sanctioned by the Government would mean that the transfer of the establishment has been also validly executed from Atchut to Vamona and from Vamona to Jaganata. To be noted also that with regard to the rendering of accounts in respect whereof the learned District Judge has made some observations if it is a fact that there is no evidence that such accounts were at any point of time rendered by Vamona to Atchut it should not be overlooked that Vamona and Atchut it should not be overlooked that Vamona and Atchut were brothers and therefore, there should be no question of Vamona having render formal accounts to Atchut. 17. On the other hand the respondent Jaganata has not proved that he had actually paid any consideration to Vamona for the purpose of getting the establishment of the suit shop transferred ("trespass ado") l in his name. 17. On the other hand the respondent Jaganata has not proved that he had actually paid any consideration to Vamona for the purpose of getting the establishment of the suit shop transferred ("trespass ado") l in his name. And it obvious that the onus of that payment cannot be placed on the appellants. 18. Admittedly any transfer ("trespasse") to be executed by a public deed in terms of the prevailing law was to be drawn by a Notary Public. It was only in 1965 that the Transfer of Property Act has been extended to then Union Territory of Goa as a result whereof even a private deed can be executed for the purpose of transfer of property provided the same is subsequently registered in the Land Registration Office. Further the fact of the original appellant, the late Atchut, having no contact with the business of the shop for many years has become irrelevant because he had admittedly handed over the shop to Vamona to run the business during his absence in Bombay. Thus the contention of the learned appellants counsel that in the year 1960 there was no transfer of any licence to Vamona when Atchut went to Bombay but only an entrustment of the shop for the purpose of running the business seems to be reasonably permissible and likely to be accepted. Besides there is also evidence suggesting that in the year 1966 Atchut had approached Jaganata to recover the possession of the suit shop and at that time he gave him a written undertaking dated 19.11.1966 that he would give it back on 30.6.1968. Thus, the finding of the learned District Judge that the said document does- not allow an inference that the respondent had agreed to surrender the suit establishment because in that case a deed in proper form would have been executed appears to be misplaced and inconsistent with the stand taken by the learned Judge himself when he is all prepared to admit the very existence of a "trespasse" of the suit shop even in the absence of an "escritura publica" despite the fact of such "esceritura" being the legal requisite for its valid execution in terms of Article 85(4) of the Decree. I am therefore, in agreement with the appellants learned counsel submission that all the three documents on the basis of which the respondent is seeking to make out a case of a valid "trespasse" of the suit establishment in his favour do not fill the requirements of the law for the purpose of its very existence as per the statutory provision of Article 85(4) of the Decree and that the finding of he learned District Judge that these documents prove such "trespasse" even without the execution of a public deed is to be outright rejected. 19. Mr. Usgaonkar, the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants has vehemently argued that the transfer of the licence of a commercial establishment does not require permission from the Government and that the "certidao" issued by the Head of Taluka Revenue Office dated 6.9.1969 clearly refers to the fact that the suit shop had been "trespassado" from Atchut to Vamon a on 28th July, 1961 and subsequently from Vamona to Jaganata on 13th September, 1963. Similarly the challan issued by the said office dated 13th September, 1963 is mentioning that the suit shop had been "trespassado" in favour of the respondent by virtue of the sanction of the Government dated 8.8.1963 of the purpose of payment of the fiscal dues (contribuicao industrial) which appear to have been paid by him. In this regard the learned counsel has urged that the said documents indicate that the permission of the Government for the transfer of the establishment ("trespasse)" was actually obtained by the respondent irrespective of the legal requisite of the execution of a public deed for its valid constitution in terms of Article 85(4) of the Decree. 20. The learned counsel has also contended that thereafter on 4. 1. 1968 the respondent has entered into a written agreement of lease with one Servulo Furtado the owner of the shop and as such a formal lease of the said shop was secured by him by virtue of the said deed subsequent to the actual transfer of the establishment in his favour by Vamona on 13.9.1963 as certified in the document dated 6.9.1969. The learned counsel relied in this respect on the deposition of the late Atchut himself, at page 54 of his statement given before the trial Court wherein he admitted that he had transferred the licence of the suit shop on 28.8.1961 in the name of his brother Vamona. But this admission is to be necessarily read in the context of his whole deposition recorded on the occasion and during which he clearly denied that he had transferred at any time the right of the shop to his brother although the licence was passed in his name or that he was aware that Vamona had transferred the right of the shop to the respondent in 1963 by expressly asserting that his brother could not legally transfer such right to Jaganata. According to the learned counsel the "trespasse" of a commercial concern includes not only the sub-lease of the premises where the concern being run but also the sale of the entire establishment with its assets and liabilities. The learned counsel has thus, urged that such "trespasse" should be held as complete consequent upon the transfer of the establishment from Atchut to Vamona and from Vamona to Jaganata after due sanction of the Government and also by virtue of the deed of lease executed by Servulo Furtado in favour of Jaganata on 4.1.1968. In this respect it was submitted that the "certidao" of the Taluka Revenue office clearly recites that a "trespasse" has been executed in respect of he suit shop. Whether such "trespasse" should be admitted as a valid act for want of "escritura publica" was altogether a different issue but the Court was not entitled to interpret the word "trespasse" used in the document in a different meaning unless the original applications had been brought forward by the appellants to show that only the licence to run on business of the shop had been transferred from Atchut to Vamona and from Vamona to Jaganata. It was further urged by the learned counsel that there is always a presumption that all the official acts have been regularly performed in terms of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, unless otherwise is proved. It was further urged by the learned counsel that there is always a presumption that all the official acts have been regularly performed in terms of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, unless otherwise is proved. Hence, the "certidao" dated 6.9.1969 should be accepted on its face value, till the contrary has established in order to hold that factually all the requirements for obtaining permission from the Government to effect the trespasse had been complied with by Atchut and then by Vamona. The subsequent deed of 4.1.1968 entered by Jaganata with Servulo has been ostensibily executed for the purpose of regularising the actual "trespasse" of the suit shop between Vamona and the respondent. In the learned counsel's view the right to the lease which was secured by the respondent at the time of the actual "trespasse" has been freshly accrued by him again by virtue of the said deed entered into with Furtado probabily to avoid further complications due to the fact that in the year 1963 there has been no “escritura publica” between Vamona and Jaganata. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the Commentary on Article 686 of the Code by Cunha Gonsalves (Tratado de Direito Civil Vol. IV, page 437) which reads that the external formalities in the deeds executed by the parties are meant for two sets of reasons, the first one being the necessity of guaranteeing to the parties the full expression of their will or to make them sure of the seriousness and precision of the act which is sought to be executed or even to difficult the execution of the act in order to protect the interest of the third parties or the general interest itself, the second reason being the need of certifying the identities of the said parties. Hence, the intervention of a public official and of two Witnesses was always necessary for that purpose. 21. I am, however, unable to concur with the argument of the learned counsel that only because the "certidao" dated 6.9.1939 makes reference to the fact that a "trespasse" 'has been executed in respect of the suit shop the Court is expected to admit the execution of such act as validly done in the eye of law. 21. I am, however, unable to concur with the argument of the learned counsel that only because the "certidao" dated 6.9.1939 makes reference to the fact that a "trespasse" 'has been executed in respect of the suit shop the Court is expected to admit the execution of such act as validly done in the eye of law. The question which is in issue before us is to find out whether such "trespasse" could have been accepted by the Courts without "escritura publica" as required by Article 85(4) of the Decree. This legal requisite having been inserted in the provision itself as an essential ingredient for the valid proof of the existence of such "trespasse" it is obvious that a mere reference made by the Head of the Taluka Revenue Office in the "certidao", even assuming that he did it on the basis of records which were not also disclosed, cannot certainly make us to presume that a public deed has been executed for this purpose being thus sufficient to prove the existence of such "trespasse". Admittedly a Head of Taluka Revenue is not a competent authority to speak of the civil rights of the parties and there cannot be any sanctity in his word as to the intrinsic genuineness or legal validity of an act certified by him for a different purpose of payment of fiscal taxes it is therefore, not permissible for the learned counsel to contend that the Courts are not entitled to interpret the word "trespasse" in the "certidao" in a different meaning unless the appellants have produced the original application of Vamona to prove that only the licence to the business of the shop had been transferred by him. The burden of such proof cannot be cast on the appellants shoulders and it was incumbent on the respondent who had relied on such document to bring home sufficient evidence in order to substantiate his plea about the existence of the alleged "trespasse" in his favour. Admittedly no "escritura publica" has been and therefore. the question of any "trespasse" having been legally and validly executed by the parties does not seem to arise at all. Admittedly no "escritura publica" has been and therefore. the question of any "trespasse" having been legally and validly executed by the parties does not seem to arise at all. The argument that the "certidao" is bound to show that at least the factual requirements of the "trespasse" such as permission from the Government appears to have been complied with by Atchut and then by Vamona is of no help for the respondent even accepting that the "trespasse" has two components as contended by Mr. Usgaonker, namely the sub-lease of the premises and the sale of the business and/or of the establishment. It is indeed the cumulative effect of these two components which alone can render the act of "trespasse" or transfer of the establishment as valid and legally constituted provided a public deed of "escritura publica" has been drawn in this regard as per the requirement of Article 85(4) of the Decree. Hence, the submission of the learned counsel that the subsequent deed of 1968 executed by the respondent for the purpose of legalising or regulating the actual "trespasse" appears to be of no avail for him in the facts and circumstances of the case being therefore, bound to be disallowed as devoid of any substance. 22. It was next contended by Mr. Usgaonkar that the provision of Section 85(4) has been enacted for the benefit of the owner of the buildings leased and therefore, the failure in complying with the legal requisites contemplated in the said provision could not be invoked by the actual parties involved in an act of transfer of a commercial concern or establishment executed between them. The learned counsel has invited my attention to Article 46(1) and Article 62 of the Decree which lays down the principle that any transfer by the lessee in respect of a leased premises is permissible only with the previous sanction of the lessor. Section 85(4) being therefore, an exception to this general principle the said provision should be read only in that context and therefore, once the lessor had willingly transferred the interest of the leased premises to a third party as it happened in the instant case by virtue of the lease agreement executed by Servulo Furtado on 4.1.1968 in favour of the respondent it could not be said that the provision of Article 85(4) was violated in the instant case. 23. 23. I am afraid that it is not possible to accede to such a proposition of the learned counsel. In my judgment there is nothing in Article 85 which enables us to hold that its sub-section (4) is meant to protect the interest of the landlord. As it was already mentioned above Section 85(1) is clear to provide that any transfer inter vivos of the rights of the lessee without the consent of the landlord is only permitted in case of "trespasse". In terms of Article 85(2) there could be no "trespasse" when the transferee runs in the leased premised some different type of business or industry or when the transfer is not accompanied with the transfer of the whole of transactions including the goods comprising the shop. Article 85(3) confers on the landlord the right of precemption in case of "trespasse" and Article 85(4) lays down that the "trespasse" can only be validly executed by a public deed. There is thus, no scope for the learned counsel to contend that this Section is aimed at protecting the sole interest of the landlord and therefore, he can on his own waive this protection by entering directly in agreement with the transferee. The legal requirement incorporated in the said provision in the interest of public order cannot be thus brushed aside or ignored by such type of considerations. Hence the submission of the learned counsel in this regard is again to be rejected. 24. It thus follows that the nullity of the "trespasse" arising out of the fact that the same was sought to be made without the execution of a "escritura publica" can be always invoked by any interested party being the late appellant Atchut certainly a party which can be said as really interested in claiming such nullity. The fact that the respondent got acquired his rights from Vamona to whom allegedly Atchut had transferred the business of the suit shop appears to be wholly irrelevant to this effect. Reliance placed by Mr. Reis on the observations of Cunha Gonsalves in Volume IV of his Tratado at page 462 seems to be very much to the point. According to the learned author the nullity of a contract can be invoked by somebody who although has not taken direct part in its execution is interested in the same. Reliance placed by Mr. Reis on the observations of Cunha Gonsalves in Volume IV of his Tratado at page 462 seems to be very much to the point. According to the learned author the nullity of a contract can be invoked by somebody who although has not taken direct part in its execution is interested in the same. In the instant case Atchut though was not a direct intervenor in the alleged "trespasse" purportedly done by Vamona to Jaganata is certainly aggrieved or interested in invoking the nullity for the reason that such "trespasse" cannot be held as good in the eye of law. Similarly G. Moreira in his "Instituicoes do Direito Civil Portugues", Vol. 1, at page 510, has also observed that the invalidity or inexistence of a juridical act or its absolute nullity arises from the lack of observance of any of the requisites which according to law are necessary for its valid consideration. This is what has exactly happened in our case. Section 85(4) expressly situates that the "trespasse" can be validly proved only by way of a public deed. This means that a public deed or "escritura publica" is the legal requirement which is necessary to be complied with for the validity of the "trespasse" and the failure of the parties to execute such public deed is bound to lead to the absolute nullity or in existence of such "trespasse" which thus becomes non est in the eye of law. Hence, if the act is null it cannot and should not operate as such in any circumstances. 25. In the case of Miyana Hasan Abdulla and another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj 214) it has been observed that irregular evidence not relevant and not duly proved cannot form basis of a judgment. Facts which are not properly proved cannot be considered by the Judge for that purpose. The same view has been taken by the Patna High Court in the decision of Mt. Khedia v. Mt. Tuna and others, AIR 1962 Patna 420), with regard to the admissibility of evidence not authorised by the Evidence Act. The Court held that the Act prohibits the employment of any kind of evidence not specifically authorised by the Act itself. 26. It was lastly urged by Mr. Khedia v. Mt. Tuna and others, AIR 1962 Patna 420), with regard to the admissibility of evidence not authorised by the Evidence Act. The Court held that the Act prohibits the employment of any kind of evidence not specifically authorised by the Act itself. 26. It was lastly urged by Mr. Usgaonkar that even assuming that "escritura publica" is a legal requisite for the purpose of validity of the "trespasse" the fact remains that the relationship created between the parties by that "trespasse" should not be affected by their failure in executing such public deed. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the ruling in Shankerlal v. V. Juadadishwar Rao, AIR 1980 AP 181, which is Full Bench decision of that Court wherein in a case of tenancy created in contravention of the provisions of Section 3(3) of the Hyderabad Act and Section 3(5) of Andhra Pradesh Act, the Court held that though it could be void against the Controller such agreement of lease would not be illegal and void inter se, between the parties either on the ground that it is forbidden by law of on the ground that it is opposed to public policy in terms of Section 23 of the Contract Act. The said judgment has followed an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Muralidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 1924 , which has laid down the law that a lease made in violation of provisions of Section 7(2) of the Uttar Pradesh (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 would be valid between the parties and would create relationship of landlord and tenant between them although it might not bind the authorities concerned. 27. With due respect it seems that there is an obvious fallacy in this line of argument of the learned counsel. The question which concerns us in the instant case is not whether the act of "trespasse" d alleged to have been executed between Atchut and Vamona and then between Vamona, and respondent Jaganata is or not binding the parties purported to have entered into such agreement on account of their failure to execute the same in strict compliance of the legal requirements of Section 85(4) of the Decree. What is sought to be determined is to whether the absence of such requirement renders the said "trespasse" totally null and void in the eye of law since the aforesaid provision expressly stipulates that a "trespasse" can be only proved and held to be valid if it is drawn on the basis of a public deed. 28. In my judgment the requirement of "escritura publica" being an essential requisite for the execution of a valid "trespasse" in the eye of law, it is obvious that the question of any internal relationship binding the concerned parties which are purported to have entered in such agreement without compliance of the legal requirements does not even seems to arise at all. This being the position this Court is of the firm view that if Vamona could not claim the suit shop as having been transferred in his name by virtue of a valid "trespasse" it is clear that he could not have also executed in the respondent's favour any act of "trespasse" in respect of the said shop. Hence, the last submission of the learned counsel also fails. 29. In the result this appeal is bound to succeed and is hereby allowed with costs for the respondent. Accordingly, the judgment of the learned District Judge dated 26th April, 1989 is quashed and set aside and the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division Margao dated 6th December, 1977 is restored. 30. The appellants have also filed an appeal before the District Court against the judgment of the learned Civil Judge to the extent that he declined to consider the later Atchut's prayer in the suit regarding the items of the furniture of the suit shop and also compensation which was sought, for by him. The learned District Judge while dismissing this appeal consequent upon the fact that the respondent's appeal was allowed failed however, to specifically deal with the grounds of the appeal and the submissions advanced by his learned counsel in support thereof. A bare reading of the impugned judgment discloses that no findings were recorded by the learned District Judge in this respect. A bare reading of the impugned judgment discloses that no findings were recorded by the learned District Judge in this respect. As such the case is to be remanded to the District Court with a direction to the learned District Judge to dispose of afresh the appeal No. 174/81 filed by the appellants before the District Court on its merits by a competent and reasoned judgment as per the law. Appeal allowed with costs.