S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) A common question of law as regards interpretation of Section 11 (2) read with Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) arises in these groups of petitions. The question is as to whether in case where an award is made by the Collector u/s. 11 (2) (popularly known as consent award or award based on agreement) is it open to the persons interested in the land to make an application to the Collector u/s. 18 (1) of the Act for making reference to the Court for its determination as regards amount of compensation ? ( 2 ) BEFORE we proceed to consider the legal submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties it would be necessary to set out the relevant facts for these two groups of petitions separately hereunder :first Group of Special Civil Application Nos. 4979 to 4992/91 : spl. C. A. No. 4979/91 : the relevant facts are as under :i. Various parcels of land situated at village Mandagam were sought to be acquired for construction of Industrial Estate by the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (for short `g. I. D. C. ). In November 1984 notification under Section 4 of the said Act was published wherein lands of the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 4979/1991 were included. It is pertinent to note that admittedly possession of various parcels of land belonging to the petitioners was taken over by the acquiring Body-the G. I. D. C. under an agreement which was entered into between the petitioners on the one hand and the responsible officer of the acquiring Body on the other. II. It appears that before the issuance of Section 4 notification it was agreed between the owners of the land on the one hand and the G. I. D. C. on the other hand to receive possession of the land from the occupants in 1981. Agreements to that effect were duly executed between the parties. The price agreed for compensation was Rs. 6100. 00 per acre inclusive of solatium. It is thereafter that notification dated 19/06/1984 was issued u/sec. Agreements to that effect were duly executed between the parties. The price agreed for compensation was Rs. 6100. 00 per acre inclusive of solatium. It is thereafter that notification dated 19/06/1984 was issued u/sec. 4 of the Act and published in the Gazatte on 2/08/1984 Section 6 notification was issued and published on 28/07/1987 It may be stated that in between the landowners had second thought and moved the appropriate authority for increase in the amount of compensation and therefore price was raised to Rs. 9250/ - per acre keeping in view the market price prevalent on 2/08/1984 This time also agreements were entered into between the owners of the land on the one S hand and the G. I. D. C. on the other hand and the owners of the land specifically agreed to receive the market price at the rate of Rs. 9250. 00. The advance compensation being 85% of the agreed amount was in fact paid when the possession of the land was taken over. III. Based on the aforesaid subsequent agreement which was entered into between the owners of the land and the acquiring Body - the Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation the Land Acquisition Officer published the award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act on 29/03/1989. IV. On 4/05/1969 the petitioners made application to the Land Acquisition Officer for making a reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act inasmuch as the petitioners were not satisfied with the rate at which the compensation was awarded to them. The Land Acquisition Officer however did not make any reference and on his refusal to make a reference the present petition came to he filed for a writ of mandamus or direction directing the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference to the District Court under Section 18 of the said Act. ( 3 ) SPL. C. A. No. 4980/91 :i. In Special Civil Application No. 4980/ 91 the parcels of land belonging to the petitioner situated at village Fansagam were sought to be acquired by the G. I. D. C. for the purposes of making Industrial Estates and Notification under Section 4 came to he issued in the month of June 1984ii. It may be stated that the petitioners of this petition instituted Special Civil Application No. 16 before the issuance of the aforesaid Notification. It may be stated that the petitioners of this petition instituted Special Civil Application No. 16 before the issuance of the aforesaid Notification. The said petition came to be heard along with one another petition bearing Special Civil Application No. 9/1988. Both these petitions came to be disposed of by a common Judgment and order dated 12/04/1988 whereby a Division Bench of the court disposed of the said petitions. According to the statement of the learned Counsel for the petitioners no agreement was agreed as regards compensation amount to be awarded. The Court also recorded the statement of the learned Counsel appearing for the State to the effect that the Collector will pass the order in accordance with Section 11 of the said Act. It is thus clear that the Division Bench of this Court in fact did not express any opinion but directed the Competent Authority to decide the question of making of award in accordance with law. III. It appears that the aforesaid order of the Division Bench was taken in review as Misc. Civil Application No. 364/1990 by the acquiring authority. The Division Bench passed an order on such application for review wherein the said division Bench clarified that on the Land Acquisition Officer being satisfied that there was binding agreement between the acquiring Body and the original petitioners he can prepare the award u/sec. 11 (2) of the said Act and can declare such award in accordance with law. IV. Thereafter the Land Acquisition Officer made the award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act on 4/06/1991. It may be mentioned at this stage that even before issuance of the award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act the petitioners instituted Special Civil Applications No. 7642 and 7643/1990. restraining the Land Acquisition Officer from making award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and the Division Bench of this Court directed the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) to decide first whether provisions of Section 11 (2) of the said Act were satisfied after hearing the petitioners and thereafter the Collector was directed to prepare and publish the award. restraining the Land Acquisition Officer from making award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and the Division Bench of this Court directed the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) to decide first whether provisions of Section 11 (2) of the said Act were satisfied after hearing the petitioners and thereafter the Collector was directed to prepare and publish the award. V. It appears that after hearing the petitioners the Land Acquisition Officer published the award dated 4/06/1991 under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and it is this action of declaring the award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act which is under challenge in this second group of petitions. ( 4 ) SPL C. A. Nos. 4981 and 4982 of 1991 :i. In Special Civil Applications No. 4981 and 4982 various parcels of land at village Sarigam were sought to be acquired by the G. I. D. C. for the purpose of construction (sic.) Industrial Estates by issuing Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in the month of June 1984. After following the procedure prescribed by law and as there was agreement between the G. I. D. C. on the one hand and the petitioners on the other an award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act was passed on 4/06/1991 In these petitions the challenge of the petitioners is to the action of the respondent in publishing the award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act as the petitioners dispute that there was any agreement between the petitioners on the one hand and the acquiring Body on the other as regards rate of compensation to be awarded for the acquisition. ( 5 ) IN substance in this group of 4 petitions firstly the challenge is to the declaration of the award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and secondly the right of the claimant to have a reference made under Section 18 (1) of the said Act in cases where the award is made by the competent authority under Section 11 (2) of the said Act. Second Group of Special Civil Applications Nos. Second Group of Special Civil Applications Nos. 7069 7076 7078 7080 7084 and 7086 of 1987 :i. In this group of petitions various parcels of land situated at village Sambalpur in District Junagadh of the ownership of various petitioners were sought to be acquired by the G. I. D. C. for the purposes of expansion of Industrial Estate. After following procedure prescribed by law it appears that the award in respect of the parcels of land was made on 29/03/1984. It is the case of the petitioners in this group of petitions that no intimation was given to the petitioners about making of an award on 29/03/1984 nor was any notice given to them under Section 12 (3) of the said Act and therefore according to the petitioners they had no knowledge whatsoever about the contents of the award. It is their further case that they applied for a certified copy of the award which was made available to them on 27/11/1986 that they came to know about the contents of the award and thereafter they made application for reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act by order dated 20/01/1987 Land Acquisition Officer informed the petitioners that an award was published under Section 11 (2) of the said Act pursuant to an agreement in the prescribed form about the amount of compensation and that the whole amount of compensation was paid to the petitioners and therefore the question of making any reference with respect to a consent award or agreement award under Section 18 does not arise and therefore applications made by the various petitioners were in fact filed and not proceeded any further by the authority. II. It is the aforesaid action of the respondent in not entertaining the application of the petitioners for reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act which has given rise to the present petition. The petitioners pray to this court that the respondent authorities are required to be directed to treat the award published in the year 1984 as not based on any consent and further to direct the respondent to make a reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act. The petitioners pray to this court that the respondent authorities are required to be directed to treat the award published in the year 1984 as not based on any consent and further to direct the respondent to make a reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act. ( 6 ) IT is in the aforesaid factual matrics that we are required to consider the question formulated in para 1 of this judgment as well as the other legal submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. Statutory Provisions : before we proceed to set out the legal submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties it will be appropriate at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions being Sections 8 and 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 as they stood originally and after their amendment by the Gujarat State Legislature by Gujarat Act 20 of 1965 as well as the Central amendment by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 Since the amendment in Section 11 of the Act in the State of Gujarat by Act 20 of 1965 has preceded the Parliamentary amendment by the Land Acquisition Act 1984 we shall have also to decide incidentally the question as to which Act would apply in the State of Gujarat vis- a-vis making of award u/sec. 11 and making of reference u/sec. 18 of the Act. This exercise would also require this court to refer to the question of repugnancy between the provisions of the Central Act and the State Act. 10 Section 11 in its original form in the Land Acquision Act 1894 stood as under : 11 Enquiry and award by Collector - On the day so fixed or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under Section 9 to the measurements made under Section 8 and into the value of the land [at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 sub-sec. (1)] and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of - (I) the true area of the land; (II) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (III) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land. Of whom or of whose claims he has information whether or not they have respectively appeared before him. ( 7 ) BY Section 10 of Gujarat Act 20 of 1965 in its application to the State of Gujarat Section 11 as reproduced hereinabove was renumbered as sub-sec (1) of Section 11 and following provisos were added and thereafter sub-Sec. (2) to (4) as under were inserted:provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this Section without the previous approval of the State government or of such superior office as the State Government may authorise in this behalf:provided further that it shall be competent to the State Government to direct that the Collector or such class officers specially appointed by the State Government to perform the function of a Collector under this Act may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the State Government may specify in this behalf. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1) if at any stage of the proceeding the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appear before him are agreeable to the award which he proposes to make under this Section the collector may without making further enquiry require such persons to execute an agreement in the form prescribed by the State government and make an award according to the terms of such agreement (3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-sec. (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act 1908 (XVI of 1908) no agreement made under sub-sec. (2) shall be liable to registration under this Act. (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Registration Act 1908 (XVI of 1908) no agreement made under sub-sec. (2) shall be liable to registration under this Act. ( 8 ) FROM the comparison of the aforesaid two provisions it becomes clear that the concept of making of award by agreement between all the persons interested in the land was for the first time introduced by the State of Gujarat as back as 1965 It appears that the Parliament thereafter found that the provision of making an award as a result of agreement between all the persons interested in the land was a welcome provision and therefore sub-secs. (2) to (4) came to be introduced in Section 11 of the Principal Act by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 which came into force with effect from 29-4-1984. Said sub-Secs. (2) to (4) are reproduced herein; Addition or Amendment to Sec. 11 by Act 68 of 1984 : (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Section (1) if at any Stage of the proceedings the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government he may without making further enquiry make an award according to the terms of such agreement. (3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act. 1908 (16 of 1908) no agreement made under sub-section (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act. 13 From the aforesaid provisions which are introduced in the principal Act by the Parliament for the first time in 1984 it becomes at once clear that the Union Parliament also accepted that the Collector while exercising power of making of an award u/sec. 13 From the aforesaid provisions which are introduced in the principal Act by the Parliament for the first time in 1984 it becomes at once clear that the Union Parliament also accepted that the Collector while exercising power of making of an award u/sec. 11 can act on an agreement between the parties on the matters to be included in the award and he may without making further enquiry make an award according to the terms of said agreement. 6 Since legal submission made before this court are referable to obligation of the Collector to make reference u/sec. 18 and since no noticeable amendment has taken place in the said Section we set out herein Section 18 of the principal Act :18 Reference to Court : (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector require that the matters be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court whether his objection to be the measurement of the land the amount of compensation the persons to whom it is payable or the appointment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which the objection to the award is taken :provided that every such application shall be made - (A) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award (B) in other cases within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/ Sec. 12 sub-Sec. (2) or within six months from the date of the Collectors award whichever period shall first expire. Legal Submissions : mr. P. R. Majmudar and Mr. R. R. Trivedi learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously urged before this court that in the facts of the case there was no agreement before the Collector as contemplated by Section 11 (2) of the Act. Mr. Legal Submissions : mr. P. R. Majmudar and Mr. R. R. Trivedi learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously urged before this court that in the facts of the case there was no agreement before the Collector as contemplated by Section 11 (2) of the Act. Mr. P. B. Majmudar by reference to sub-sec (2) of Section 11 of Gujarat Act strenuously urged before this court that in order to enable the Collector to act under sub-sec (2) of Section 11 of the Act: firstly all the persons interested in the land must appear before the Collector secondly there must be an agreement between all the persons interested in the land and the acquiring body to the proposed award and thirdly all such persons interested in the land must be required to execute an agreement in the prescribed form and thereupon only award in terms of said agreement can be made. In his submission Section 11 (2) to (4) as introduced by the Gujarat Act would apply and since neither of the conditions was satisfied it was not permissible for the Collector to make award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act based solely on agreement which was executed by the petitioners (persons interested in the land) on one hand add the acquiring body namely Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation on the other hand. He further submitted that even if the petitioners have accepted amount of compensation at the agreed rate as back as 1980 or 1985 and even if the possession is given by the petitioners to the acquiring body it will not be permissible for the Collector to make an award based on such agreements as such agreements were subsequently rescinded by the petitioners unilaterally. Mr. Majmudar on the facts of group of his (sic.) petitions has further submitted that the award of the Collector was in contravention of the order of the Divn. Bench of this court in Spl. C. A. No. 9 dated 12 - 4 - 89 and therefore also it was required to he quashed. Mr. Majmudar on the facts of group of his (sic.) petitions has further submitted that the award of the Collector was in contravention of the order of the Divn. Bench of this court in Spl. C. A. No. 9 dated 12 - 4 - 89 and therefore also it was required to he quashed. It was further submitted before this court that having reached an agreement about amount of compensation with the acquiring body under Section 11 (2) of the Act it is always open to the claimant to revoke the agreement before the award is made and in such an eventuality the award shall have to be treated as one made under Section 11 (1) of the said Act so as to permit the claimants to apply for reference u/sec 18 of the said Act to the Collector. ( 9 ) MR. S. N. Shelat learned Counsel appearing for the acquiring body as well as Mr. M. R. Raval Ld. AGP appearing for the State on the other hand strenuously urged before this Court that prior to amendment of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act by the State of Gujarat in 1965 and by the Union Parliament in 1984 consent awards were not permissible at all and as per the judicial pronouncements the Collector was required to examine all necessary material for the purpose of making award. The award of the Collector was regarded as one which was made by an agent or officer of the Govt. after necessary enquiry and therefore it was desirable for him to make an award independently and not on any agreement. He further submitted that after introduction of sub-sec (2) in Section 11 in the State of Gujarat it became permissible for the Collector to make award based on agreement between all the persons interested in the land and the acquiring body provided the procedural safeguards enacted in sub-sec (2) of Section 11 were satisfied. The Union Parliament legislated on the same field by enacting subsecs. (2) to (4) of Section 11 in 1984 and thus it has become now permissible for the Collector to pass consent award. The Union Parliament legislated on the same field by enacting subsecs. (2) to (4) of Section 11 in 1984 and thus it has become now permissible for the Collector to pass consent award. In cases where the award is made by the Collector based on agreement between the persons interested in the land on one hand and the acquiring body on the other hand the Collector was required to satisfy himself about the voluntary nature of the agreement between the parties and secondly about the fact that such agreement is reduced into writing. In his submission Section 11 (2) has in fact permitted and encouraged agreement or element of conciliation and negotiation between the parties so that all the persons interested in the lands whose lands are proposed to be acquired on one hand and acquiring body on the other hand may freely voluntarily agree about the area of the land and the amount of compensation to be paid so that further litigation between the parties is avoided and land is made available to the acquiring body without any further loss of time so that it can be used for public purpose. He further submitted that even if the award of the Collector u/sec. 11 (1) is treated as merely an offer in case where Section 11 (2) operates such an offer is accepted by all the persons interested in the land and has therefore become an agreement and therefore it has accepted the award. Once the award is an accepted award Section 18 (1) of the said Act cannot apply and no reference can be made by the Collector to the District Court. He further pointed out that the requirement of prior approval of the Government to the award which is contemplated by first proviso to Section 11 (1) is advisably not to be found in case of consent or agreed award under Section 11 (2 ). In fact. the Legislature never wanted approval of the Govt. in case of awards which were based on agreement and absence of identical proviso after sub-sec (2) of Section 11 is also an indication of the fact that the legislature wanted to authorise the Collector to make award based on agreement. In order to smoothen and ease the procedure the legislature has even gone to the extent of enacting sub-sec. in case of awards which were based on agreement and absence of identical proviso after sub-sec (2) of Section 11 is also an indication of the fact that the legislature wanted to authorise the Collector to make award based on agreement. In order to smoothen and ease the procedure the legislature has even gone to the extent of enacting sub-sec. (4) of Section 11 by enacting that no agreement made under sub-sec (2) shall he liable to registration under the Registration Act 1908 Since the award is to be made under Section 11 (2) after agreement between the parties in writing on the matters to be included in the award even further enquiry by the Collector is dispensed with and therefore there was no need of further reference under Section 18. It was therefore. submitted before this Court that the Collector was justified in declaring award under Section 11 (2) of the act and no application for reference could be made under Section 18 of the said Act and therefore they prayed that this group of petitions should he dismissed. ( 10 ) POSITION of Law prior to Amendment Act of 1984 : 16 Was the Collector acting under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (under its unamended form) competent to make an award based on agreement or binding contract between the parties ? In the case of Fort Press Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay reported in AIR 1922 PC 365 the Privy Council held that an agreement between the parties as to the price does not interfere with the decision of the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act. In the case of Fort Press Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay reported in AIR 1922 PC 365 the Privy Council held that an agreement between the parties as to the price does not interfere with the decision of the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act. Their Lordships observed that : ( 11 ) IT may be a very unusual thing that he (Collector) should proceed to determine what in his view the price should be after he had evidence of a complete contract on the point but if he thought right to do so their Lordships judgment will not affect his taking such a course Once again in the case of Samiullah v. Collector of Aligarh reported in AIR 1946 PC 75 after analysing the relevant sections of the Land Acquisition Act their Lordships observed as under: it is clear therefore that the land acquisition officer in awarding the amount of compensation under Section 11 is performing a statutory duty a duty the exercise of which in cases where the land is to be acquired for a public purpose concerns the public since it affects the expenditure of public money. In assessing compensation he is bound to exercise his own judgment as to the correct basis of valuation and his judgment cannot be controlled by an agreement between the parties interested. On a reference under Section 18 the Dist. Judge must also exercise his own judgment and consider among other things whether the award of the Land Acquisition Officer was based on a correct principle. ( 12 ) FROM the aforesaid observations it becomes at once clear that the Collector or the Land Acquisition Officer in awarding the amount of compensation under Section 11 was performing the statutory duty and in assessing the compensation he was bound to exercise his own judgment as to the correct basis of valuation. His judgment as such cannot be controlled by agreement between the parties interested. However in case when the Land Acquisition Officer or the Collector would act on such agreement after exercising his own judgment and consideration the court may not interfere with such exercise and this would not amount to saying that the Collector was bound to make award on agreement between the parties interested. However in case when the Land Acquisition Officer or the Collector would act on such agreement after exercising his own judgment and consideration the court may not interfere with such exercise and this would not amount to saying that the Collector was bound to make award on agreement between the parties interested. ( 13 ) YET in another case while speaking about the legal character of the award made by the Collector and the meaning to be given to the word AWARD under Section 11 in the case of Ezra v. Sect. or State reported In I. L. R. 30 Cal. 36 their Lordships of Calcutta High Court observed as under: that the meaning to be attached to the word award under Section 11 and its nature and effect must be arrived at not from the mere use of the same expression in both instances from the examination of the law relating to the Collectors proceedings culminating in the award. The consideration to which we have referred satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Govt. and not as a judicial officer; and that consequently although the Govt. is bound by his proceedings the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to he awarded. ( 14 ) AMEER Ali and Stephen JJ. explained the functions of the Collector in the following words: throughout the proceeding the Collector acts as the agent of the Govt. for the purpose of acquisition. . . . He is in no sense of the term a judicial officer nor is the proceeding before him a judicial proceeding. . . he is not a court. . . The Govt. . . . at whose instance the land is being taken up is not entitled to demand a reference. . . The reason of this is plain. The Collector acts as the agent of the Government. . . and they are accordingly bound by the award of their agent. ( 15 ) THE aforesaid observations of the Calcutta High Court are approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the very case of Ezra v. Secretary of State reported in ILR 32 CAL (PC ). The Collector acts as the agent of the Government. . . and they are accordingly bound by the award of their agent. ( 15 ) THE aforesaid observations of the Calcutta High Court are approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the very case of Ezra v. Secretary of State reported in ILR 32 CAL (PC ). ( 16 ) WHILE dealing with the functions of the Collector in making award under Section 11 the Privy Council laid down that the functions of the Collector are not judicial but administrative and all that he does is to make an offer to the claimants with regard to the valuation of the property to be acquired. It thereafter proceeded to observe as under: the proceedings of the Collector resulting in the award are administrative and not judicial. The award in which the enquiry results is merely a decision (binding only on the Collector) as to what sum shall be tendered to the owner of the lands and if a judicial ascertainment is desired by the owner he can obtain it by requiring the matter to be referred by the Collector to the Court. ( 17 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions it becomes clear that the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property. The power which the Collector exercises in the matter of enquiry and the valuation of the land is not as a judicial officer but only as an agent of the Govt. Therefore the Government is bound by the proceeding of the collector but the persons interested are not bound by his findings regarding valuation of the compensation to be awarded. ( 18 ) SUPREME Court Decisions on unamended Law : 20 In the case of Raja Harishchandra Raj Singh v. The Dy. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 1961 SC 1500 the court was called upon to decide the question as to when the period of limitation for making application for reference under Section 18 would commence to run in view of the use of the expression date of award used in proviso (b) to Section 18 (2) of the Act. Under Section 11 there is a duty cast on the Collector to make award and Section 12 of the Act stipulates the requirement of giving of notice. Under Section 11 there is a duty cast on the Collector to make award and Section 12 of the Act stipulates the requirement of giving of notice. Section 12 (1) lays down that the award when made by the Collector and filed in his office shall be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested of the true area and valuation of land. Section 12 (2) makes it obligatory on the part of the Collector to give immediate notice of said award to such of the persons interested as are not personally present or by their representatives when the award is made. From these provisions the court was called upon to decide as to whether the expression date of award used in proviso (b) to Section 18 (2) of the Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated or is made known by him either actually or constructively or it may mean the date of the award by giving literal or mechanical meaning to the said terms. In this context Justice P. B. Gajendrakar (as His Lordship then was) referred to the legal character of the award made by the Collector as well as its true nature and effect. The court referred to the decision of PC in Ezras case (supra) and made following pertinent observations: in dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under Section 12. In a sense it is decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the Act. It is a decision inter alia in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; It is in law an offer or tender of compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceeding are concluded. If however the owner does not accept the offer Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by court and it is the amount of compensation which the court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. If however the owner does not accept the offer Section 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by court and it is the amount of compensation which the court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. It is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance. ( 19 ) PROM the aforesaid observations it becomes clear that the award of the Collector is nothing but his own decision reached by him as agent of the Govt. after holding enquiry. It is a decision in respect of the amount of compensation which would be paid to the person interested. However such award is not to be treated as a decision of the Collector as such award is not binding on the person interested. The Collector in fixing the award is in substance acting as an agent of the Govt. What is determined by the Collector by way of his award is to be treated in law as an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the agent of the Govt. If the owner of the land accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken as on acceptance of award concluded contract takes place and the amount so accepted is required to be paid and the compensation proceeding would therefore come to an end. The owner is not bound to accept the offer. He has a statutory remedy of making an application for reference to the Dist. Court. If he applies for reference by exercising his statutory right the justness or otherwise of the compensation fixed by the collector in his award shall be determined by the court of law. The decision which will be rendered by the court would bind the owner and the Collector subject of course to their right of appeal. When such an amount of compensation is judicially determined the acquisition proceedings would come to an end. It is thus clear that the award which the Collector makes under Section 11 is only in the nature of decision taken by the agent of the Govt. on behalf of the Govt. When such an amount of compensation is judicially determined the acquisition proceedings would come to an end. It is thus clear that the award which the Collector makes under Section 11 is only in the nature of decision taken by the agent of the Govt. on behalf of the Govt. and such decision is in the nature of offer made to the owner of the property. Once such an offer or amount of compensation determined by the Collector is accepted the ground is made out for concluded contract and then only the amount is to be paid and acquisition proceedings are required to be concluded. It may be noted that this was the position of law prior to amendment of the Principal Act in 1984 when the Collector was required to take decision for making the award after holding enquiry. ( 20 ) IN the case of Dr. Grant v. The State of Bihar reported in AIR 1966 SC 237 in the context of powers of Collector to make reference under Sections 18 and 30 which invest the Collector the power to refer to the court a dispute as to apportionment of compensation the court noticed that the two powers are distinct and in the course of considering Sections 11 12 and 18 of the Act Justice J. C. Shah (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the majority made following pertinent observations : an award by the Collector is strictly speaking an offer made to the person interested in the land notified for acquisition; the latter may accept the offer but is not bound to accept it. He may ask for a reference to the court for adjudication of his claim for adequate compensation. The person interested may even accept the compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount and ask for reference. It is also open to the Government even after the award is made but before possession is taken to withdraw from acquisition of any land in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is therefore not the award of the Collector which is the source of right to compensation; the award qualifies the offer of the appropriate Govt. which is made because the Govt. has taken over or intends to take the land of the owner under the authority conferred by the Land Acquistion Act. . It is therefore not the award of the Collector which is the source of right to compensation; the award qualifies the offer of the appropriate Govt. which is made because the Govt. has taken over or intends to take the land of the owner under the authority conferred by the Land Acquistion Act. . ( 21 ) IN the case of Assam Railways and Trading Co v. Collector of Lakhimpur reported in AIR 1976 SC 1182 the area of land belonging to the appellant-company was sought to be acquired. Before the acquistion proceeding started Assam Railways had negotiated with the company for purchase of the land. It appears that the railway was prepared to pay Rs. 2 500 per bigha for the land though the transaction was not completed. Thereafter the acquistion proceedings of the land started. The Collector who was to find out the market value of the land assessed the value at Rs. 10 per bigha. The railway was therefore not agreeable to pay price at the higher rate of Rs. 2 500 per bigha. The Collector thereafter made an award allowing compensation at the rate of Rs. 1000 per bigha. The appellant-company being dissatisfied asked for reference under Section 18. The Dist. Judge who heard the reference rejected it. The appeal to the High Court also failed. Before the Supreme Court it was contended by the appellant-company that since there was binding contract between the company and the railway for sale of land at the rate of Rs. 2500. 00 per bigha and if it was found that there was no such binding contract duly executed between the parties there was at least a gentlemans agreement regarding the price which indicated what a willing purchaser was ready to pay for the land. The Supreme Court found that though there was agreement between the parties about the price there was no concluded contract. Assuming that there was an agreement which bound the parties the Supreme Court held that the Collector had still a jurisdiction to determine the market value of the land because the agreement between the parties as to prices does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Collector. The Collector may act on such agreement while exercising his own power but it was not correct to state that he was bound to act on such agreement between the parties. The Collector may act on such agreement while exercising his own power but it was not correct to state that he was bound to act on such agreement between the parties. It may be noted that the Supreme Court was dealing with the position of law as it stood prior to its amendment when sub-sec. (2) of Section 11 was not on Statute book. The Collector was required to act on his own decision as to the correct basis of valuation and his judgment cannot be controlled by an agreement between the parties interested but it was still open to him after exercising his own judgment to act on agreement between the parties interested. ( 22 ) IN the case of M. D. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1979 SC 404 the Supreme Court made distinction between the functions of the Collector while acting under Sections 11 and 12 of the Act and while acting under Section 18 of the Act. By referring to the decision of the PC as well as of the Bombay High Court and while approving the view taken by the Bombay High Court the Supreme Court observed that merely because the Collector while making award under Section 11 or in serving a notice on the owner of the land under Section 12 acts as an agent of the Govt. it does not necessarily imply while making reference to the court under Section 18 he acts in the capacity of agent of the Govt. Section 18 (1) entrusted to the Collector a statutory duty of making reference on the fulfilment of conditions mentioned therein. The Collector therefore acting under Section 18 is nothing but a statutory authority exercising his own power under said section. The fulfilment of the conditions particularly the one regarding limitation are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector under Section 18 to make the reference exists. Making of application for reference within time prescribed by provision to Section 18 (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. ( 23 ) ON the scope of power of the Collector under Section 18 court made following perti- nent observations in paras 24 and 25 of the judgment : the word require in S. 18 of the Act implies compulsion. ( 23 ) ON the scope of power of the Collector under Section 18 court made following perti- nent observations in paras 24 and 25 of the judgment : the word require in S. 18 of the Act implies compulsion. It carries with it the idea that the written application makes it incumbent on the Collector to make a reference. The Collector is required to make a reference u/sec. 18 on the fulfilment of certain conditions. The first condition is that there shall he a written application by a person interested who has not accepted the award. The second condition is as to the nature of the objections which may be taken and the third condition is as to the time within which the application shall be made. The power of the Collector to make a reference u/sec. 18 is thus circumscribed by the condition laid down therein and one condition is the condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso. The condition laid down in Sec. 18 are `matters of substance and their observance is a condition precedent to the Collectors power of reference as rightly observed by Chandavarkar J. in Re. Land Acquisition Act (supra ). We are inclined to the view that the fulfilment of the conditions particularly the one regarding limitation are the conditions subject to which the power of the Collector to make the reference exists. It must accordingly be held that the making of an application for reference within the time prescribed by proviso to Section 18 sub-sec (2) is a sine qua non for a valid reference by the Collector. ( 24 ) GUJARAT High Court Decisions prior to Amendment : 26 In the case of A. Abbasbhai v. Collector Panchmahals District reported in AIR 1967 Guj 118 Justice P. N. Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) was called upon to decide an interesting question of law as to whether a reference u/sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act abates where the applicant dies and their heirs do not make application for bringing themselves on record within period of 90 days from the date of death of applicant. It was in this context that the court referred to the scheme of the Act and tried to ascertain the nature of the award which the Collector makes under Section 18. It was in this context that the court referred to the scheme of the Act and tried to ascertain the nature of the award which the Collector makes under Section 18. The court observed that it is well settled that though called an award it is really nothing but an offer on the part of the Govt. which the person interested may or may not accept. If he accepts well and good if he does not accept the remedy is provided to him by Sec. 18 of the Act. ( 25 ) SIMILARLY in the case of Mohan Mulji v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer Rajpipla reported in AIR 1967 Guj 154 the Division Bench of this court speaking through Bhagwati J. (as His Lordship then was) considered the validity of contention that on true construction of the provisions of Sections 18 19 and 20 of the Land Acquistion Act the Collector is merely a conduit-pipe through whom the application for reference is made to the Dist. Court. While rejecting the said contention the Division Bench found that : the application which is contemplated by Sec. 18 is an application to the Collector for making reference to the Dist. Court and the Collector may either grant the application or reject it. If the application does not comply with the requirements of Sec. 18 or does not bear the requisite court fee stamp the Collector would reject the application and if application bears the proper court fee stamp and complies with the requirements of Section 18 the Collector would grant it. The order of the Collector in either case would dispose of the application; in one case it would be disposed of by order rejecting it and in other case it would be disposed of by an order making a reference to the Dist. Court. When a reference is made to the Dist. Court by the Collector on the application it would be a reference which would come before the Dist. Court for disposal and not the application which would be already disposed of by the Collector. It is therefore not possible to hold that the Collector is merely a conduit-pipe through whom the application is routed in its onward journey to the Dist. Court. Court for disposal and not the application which would be already disposed of by the Collector. It is therefore not possible to hold that the Collector is merely a conduit-pipe through whom the application is routed in its onward journey to the Dist. Court. ( 26 ) THE Collector is a Public Officer entrusted with the duty to dispose of the application made to him for a reference under Section 18 and if the application is properly stamped with the requisite court fee stamp and complies with the requirements of Section 18 there is statutory duty incumbent upon him to make a reference and equally if the application does not bear proper court fee stamp or the conditions specified in Section 18 are not satisfied he cannot make a reference. The Collector is therefore is not merely a conduit-pipe but he has an important function to discharge under Section 18. This view which we are taking is wholly supported by the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in 53 Bom LR 257. ( 27 ) FROM the aforesaid position of law about the nature of an award to be made by the Collector u/sec. 11 and the nature of his power in making such an award it can be concluded that prior to amendment Collector while acting u/sec. 11 was required by making an enquiry to fix the market price of the land in question on the basis of available material and was required to make his own decision. His function in making award was treated as administrative function assigned to him was an agent or officer of the Government. The amount of compensation determined by him in his award was for all purposes binding on the Government as he was acting as an agent of the Government. It was open to the party interested to accept such amount in which case the award can be said to have been accepted. The award made by the Collector was therefore treated to be merely an offer by the Government to the person interested in the land. On acceptance of that offer a concluded contract came into existence and the party interested was entitled to recover such amount and the land acquistion proceedings would get concluded. The award made by the Collector was therefore treated to be merely an offer by the Government to the person interested in the land. On acceptance of that offer a concluded contract came into existence and the party interested was entitled to recover such amount and the land acquistion proceedings would get concluded. However in case where the amount determined and awarded by the Collector is not acceptable to the party interested remedy in law was provided to such party of making application for reference to judicial forum u/sec. 18 of the said Act. It may be stated that while exercising the power u/sec. 11 the Collector may act on some agreement between the parties interested but he was required to apply his decision making power. He was not expected to abdicate his function. Even when agreement was reached between the parties it was open to him either to reject such an agreement or to accept it in toto or to accept it partially. Prior to amendment of Section 11 it was therefore correct to state that the Collector while making award was not bound to act on agreement between the parties. As observed by the P. C. in Fort Press Co. Ltd. (supra) if the parties before the institution of the proceedings contemplated by the Act chose to agree they were perfectly competent to do so and there was nothing whatever in the words of the Act to suggest that this power was thereby taken away. The fact that the compulsory powers have been invoked in order to secure property from unwilling vendors should not be regarded as denuding all parties of the rights they possessed before the proceedings began. This decision not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Collector to determine what in his view the price should be after he had evidence to complete contract on the point if he thought right to do so. The proceedings of the collector resulting in award are administrative and not judicial. The award which the Collector renders after enquiry is merely a decision binding only on the Collector. He is not a judicial officer. The proceedings before him are not judicial proceedings. He is not a court. Since the Collector acts as an agent of the Government the Government is not entitled to demand a reference. The award which the Collector renders after enquiry is merely a decision binding only on the Collector. He is not a judicial officer. The proceedings before him are not judicial proceedings. He is not a court. Since the Collector acts as an agent of the Government the Government is not entitled to demand a reference. Therefore to sum up it can be said that though it was open to the Collector under the old Act to act upon the agreement or contract between the parties while determining price of the land he was required to make his independent decision. Though there was no prohibition on him restraining him from acting on such agreement there was no positive obligation also on him to accept and act upon such agreement between the parties. ( 28 ) POSITION of Law after Amendment : the State of Gujarat by enacting Gujarat Act No. 20 of 1965 substantially amended the Land Acquisition Act 1894 in its application to the area of the State of Gujarat. By Section 10 of the amending Act Seciton 11 of the Principal Act was amended. Existing Section 11 was renumbered as sub-section (1) of Section 11 and two provisos were added and therefore sub-sections (2) to (4) came to be added in Section 11. From the provisions of Section (2) it becomes clear that the State Legislature for the first time introduced the concept of consent award or award by agreement. It is pertinent to note that sub- sec (2) contains non-obstante clause giving overriding power to the Collector to make an award at any stage of the proceeding if he was satisfied : (I) that all the persons interested in the land appear before him (II) that they are agreeable to the award which he proposes to make and (III) that he has required such persons to execute an agreement in the form prescribed by the State Govt. (IV) thereupon he may proceed to pass award according to the terms of the agreement (V) it was not necessary for the Collector to make any further inquiry. ( 29 ) FROM the aforesaid ingredients of sub. (IV) thereupon he may proceed to pass award according to the terms of the agreement (V) it was not necessary for the Collector to make any further inquiry. ( 29 ) FROM the aforesaid ingredients of sub. sec (2) of Section 11 in its application to the State of Gujarat it becomes at once clear that in the area of State of Gujarat it becomes permissible for the Collector to make an award based on agreement in writing of all the persons interested in the land. Such an agreement was required to be executed in the prescribed form. It was also not necessary for him to make any further enquiry. Sub-sec. (3) of Section 11 also provided that such determination of compensation by agreement between the parties for any land shall not in anyway affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the said locality. The Legislature thus also provided against the possibility of such determination by agreement being treated as a precedent or as a comparable instance. Since determination of price or value of the land by resorting to comparable instances of sale of identical lands situated in the same locality is a permissible method for determining the value of land the Legislature has taken sufficient precaution by providing that such agreements entered into u/sec. 11 (2) do not create comparable instance. It is thus clear that by enacting Section 11 (2) to (4) what was hitherto not permissible is made permissible. The concept of consent of award or award by agreement between the parties is introduced and the Collector is empowered to act on such agreement provided the conditions stipulated by sub-sec (2) of Section 11 are fulfilled. The object of the Legislature in making this type of amendment is to encourage negotiations or to promote conciliation between the parties interested in the land and the acquiring body mainly as regards value of the land sought to be acquired. If the price or value of the land is determined by agreement between those who are required to pay the price and those to whom the price is to be paid there is no need of further enquiry nor is there any scope for reference u/sec. 18 as the amount of award is determined by consent between the parties. If the price or value of the land is determined by agreement between those who are required to pay the price and those to whom the price is to be paid there is no need of further enquiry nor is there any scope for reference u/sec. 18 as the amount of award is determined by consent between the parties. This device would also help in accelerating in expediting and completing the process of acquisition and unnecessary litigation will be avoided. The party interested in the land would also get the desired amount of compensation very soon without any need of resorting to any litigation and the acquiring body who is in need of the parcel of land would also get possession thereof without being required to wait till reference is answered and till appeals are disposed of. In every respect the concept of award by consent or agreement between the parties was a welcome step which was introduced by the State of Gujarat as back as 1965. On a subject in the Concurrent List an experiment at the State level is constitutionally permissible. The experimentation of consent award worked well in the State of Gujarat. ( 30 ) THE Union Parliament found that concept of award by consent or award by agreement was a welcome provision in the statute and therefore by amendment of 1984 it amended Section 11 so as to include two provisos to original Section 11 and to number it as Section 11 (1) and so as to introduce sub-secs. (2) to (4 ). Sub-secs. (2) of Section 11 as introduced by the Union Parliament in the Principal Act also begins with non-obstante clause and empowers the Collector to pass consent award or award on agreement if the Collector is satisfied that : (I) all the persons interested in the land appeared before him (II) they have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award (III) such agreement in writing must be in the form prescribed in the award (IV) the Collector can make award on such agreement without making further inquiry. ( 31 ) SUCH determination of compensation for any land by consent shall not in any way affect determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality. Excepting the difference in the language of sub-sec. (2) of Central Act as well as sub. ( 31 ) SUCH determination of compensation for any land by consent shall not in any way affect determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality. Excepting the difference in the language of sub-sec. (2) of Central Act as well as sub. sec (2) of Gujarat amendment no material distinction except that of procedure is to be found in sub-sec. (2) of CENTRAL AMENDMENT. Under the Gujarat amendment all the parties interested in the land must appear before the Collector and must be agreeable to the award which the Collector proposes to make and which in its turn may become award in terms of agreement which he will require the persons to execute. On the other hand in the Central law on all persons interested in the land appearing and agreeing in writing on the matters to be included in the award in the form prescribed by the rules the Collector was to proceed to make award in terms of such agreement. The agreement is to precede based on which the award is to be made. Though ultimate result may be the same the procedure to be followed by the Collector under sub-sec. (2) of Section 11 of the Central amendment is different. ( 32 ) BASED on the above statutory position we are required to consider as to whether in the instant case the Collector was justified in making the award based on agreement duly executed between the parties under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and if our answer is in the affirmative we are required to consider the second question as to whether when an award is made on an agreement between the parties under Section 11 (2) is Collector bound to make reference to District Court under Section 18 when called upon by a party by making an application ? Or is he justified in rejecting said application on the ground that no application for reference under Section 18 is maintainable in case of award falling under Section 11 (2) ? ( 33 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions of Statute Law its interpretation by courts of law consistently since 1992 and from the nature scope and extent of power which the Collector exercises under Section 11 of the Act the limitations subject to which power to make reference u/sec. ( 33 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions of Statute Law its interpretation by courts of law consistently since 1992 and from the nature scope and extent of power which the Collector exercises under Section 11 of the Act the limitations subject to which power to make reference u/sec. 18 is to be exercised and lastly need or desirability of judicial intervention in cases where ultimate product i. e. decision or award is an outcome of consent of consensus between the parties to the agreement the terms and conditions whereof are duly executed in writing we are called upon to decide as to what extent if at all an application for reference u/sec. 18 can he entertained in cases of consent award or award based on agreement. ( 34 ) FROM the aforesaid resume of weighty observations made by the learned Law - Lords and from the scheme of the Act and ultimate objectives sought to be achieved following logical and legal summations of reasoning can be made. (A) Collector or Land Acquisition Officer acting u/sec. 11 of the Act is required to make inquiry and to take decision as regards the contents of the award which he proposes to make. He is required to take decision about the true area of the land the compensation which should be allowed for the land and the apportionment of the compensation among all the persons interested in the land. Question is : What is the nature of this decision and what is the nature of power exercised. (B) Consistently from the case of Ezra v. Secretary of State (supra) till approval thereof by the Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harischandra (supra) and in the case of Mohammed Hasnuddin (supra) it is now well accepted that the proceedings of the Collector resulting in the award are administrative and not judicial. The award made after inquiry is the decision of the Govt. bindings only on Govt. Throughout the proceedings the Collector acts as agent of the Govt. for the purpose of acquisition. He is in no sense of the term a judicial officer nor is the proceeding before him a judicial proceeding. He in not a court. (C) Legally and logically therefore immediately the question arises as to whether such decision of Collector acting as agent of Govt. for the purpose of acquisition. He is in no sense of the term a judicial officer nor is the proceeding before him a judicial proceeding. He in not a court. (C) Legally and logically therefore immediately the question arises as to whether such decision of Collector acting as agent of Govt. and which is administrative in nature binding on all persons interested in the land as well as on the Govt. Answer to the question is obvious. The Govt. at whose instance the land is being acquired is not entitled to demand a reference. The reason of this is plain. The Collector acts as the agent of the Govt. and the Govt. is accordingly bound by the award of its agent. On the other hand the persons interested in the land are not bound by the findings reached by the Collector more particularly about the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded. The owners of the land or persons interested in the land are not bound to accept the amount offered or tendered as compensation by the Collector. The award of the Collector is therefore regarded as merely an offer. It is an offer made by an agent of the Govt. The owner or person interested in the land has two options - (a) to accept the offer as such which in law would result into concluded contract. The Govt. shall be liable to pay the amount offered and on payment of the amount and delivery of possession of the land the land acquistion proceedings are concluded (b) to reject the offer and if judicial ascertainment is desired by the owner he can obtain it by making an application for reference to the court under Section 18 of the Act. (D) The Legislature of the State by enacting sub-secs. (2) to (4) of Section 11 took a step in the right direction. If compensation to be paid for acquisition of land/property is nothing but just equivalent of market value of the property and if the persons interested whose lands are sought to be acquired and the acquiring body for whose benefit the acquistion is being made or from whose coffers the compensation is to come by mutual free agreement agree to a market price to be paid as compensation ordinarily no objection can be taken. The Collector while making his decision about compensation to be awarded after due enquiry is expected to arrive at the amount of just equivalent of marketable price if both the parties to the agreement agree to the amount of compensation and if agreement is not void or voidable being vitiated on the ground of fraud coercion undue influence or misrepresentation there never was and there could not be any objection to relying on such agreement. As pointed out hereinabove the Collector even under the law could have after due enquiry in his own independent decision acted on an agreement between the parties while making an award. Under the unamended law he was not bound to act on such agreement. The Legislature has now by enacting sub-secs (2) to (4) of Section 11 provided that it will be open to the Collector if he is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who have appeared before him and have agreed in writing in a prescribed form matters to be included in the award he may make an award in terms of agreement without making further enquiry. It is required to be noted that the Legislature has used the words he may and not he shall. Sub-sec. (2) of Section 11 is thus an enabling provision which enables the Collector to act on duly executed agreement between the parties if he is otherwise satisfied about the genuineness of the agreement its voluntary nature and about the fact that such agreement is not vitiated by duress coercion fraud undue influence or misrepresentation. (E) After the award is made in terms of agreement duly executed between the parties in writing it is in the nature of a consent award. Both the parties agree to the contents of the award and they call upon the authority to pass award in terms of agreement. This is more or less a consent decree to which seal of the Collector is super-added. The Collector as a deciding authority puts his seal over the agreement if he is satisfied that the parties appearing before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award. Such an award undoubtedly retains the character of administrative decision which is reached at the instance of two parties who agreed to the terms and conditions and contents of the award. Such an award undoubtedly retains the character of administrative decision which is reached at the instance of two parties who agreed to the terms and conditions and contents of the award. Is it thereafter open to any party to refuse to accept such award or to make a demand for judicial reference for ascertainment of true market value of the parcel of land ? In our opinion the scheme of Section 11 (2) to (4) and the purpose and objective with which the said provisions came to be introduced do not leave any scope for permitting all persons interested in the land to apply for reference to the Collector under Section 18. The reason is obvious. The award declared by the Collector is not solely his decision. In fact it is the decision reached by the parties by their mutual agreement. The Collector has simply super - added his seal to such an agreement. Such consent award therefore cannot be subjected to process of reference so as to permit the persons interested in the land to back out from the agreement they have already entered into and to claim higher amount of compensation. Such was not and could not be the intention of the Legislature. The Legislature in fact intended to encourage parties to arrive at amount of compensation by duly executed agreement so that the process of acquisition of property is expedited and market value of the property is tendered to the owners thereof without any unreasonable delay. A very long period used to lapse in making award in applying for reference in deciding the reference by the District Court and ultimately in disposal of appeals therefrom by the High Court or the Supreme Court. Very often because of stay granted by the Courts for decades proceedings of land acquisition would keep pending and very object of acquisition would get frustrated. With a view to avoid such delays and with a view to seeking that price fixed by the willing purchaser and willing seller would be the market price or nearer to market price the Legislature has introduced these provisions so that award on consent is passed. Once consent award is passed under Section 11 (2) of the Act based on the agreement duly executed between the parties in our opinion there is no further scope of application under Section 18. Once consent award is passed under Section 11 (2) of the Act based on the agreement duly executed between the parties in our opinion there is no further scope of application under Section 18. Excepting those cases where agreement is vitiated being void or voidable on the general grounds which are available under the Law of Contract we do not see any case where a party to consent award can be permitted to back out therefrom so as to claim further higher price than the one which he has agreed with open eyes. (F) There is in the scheme of the Act itself answer to the question. If reference is made to Section 18 of the Act it becomes clear that any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector require him to make reference for the determination of the court. The party applying for reference therefore must be one who has not accepted the award. The party who has executed the agreement in writing containing the contents of the award and a party who has accepted the payment of compensation without protest and has even delivered the possession of his property in token of his acceptance thereof cannot be permitted to unilaterally rescind the contract to claim the benefit of judicial ascertainment of compensation by applying for reference. It may be noted that the acquiring body or the Govt. has agreed to payment of compensation and in fact has paid the compensation as determined by consent award as there was agreement between the parties. In tact in cases where amount of compensation under the award is accepted without protest the Supreme Court in the case of Ashwanikumar Dhingra v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1992 SC 974 made following pertinent observations : ( 35 ) IT is clear from the provisions of Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act that the person interested in order to enable him to seek the remedy of reference can do so only if he does not accept the award. In order to show that the person concerned had not accepted the award the claimants accept the compensation only under protest because once the compensation awarded is accepted without protest the person concerned may lose his right to a reference for various matter mentioned in Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In order to show that the person concerned had not accepted the award the claimants accept the compensation only under protest because once the compensation awarded is accepted without protest the person concerned may lose his right to a reference for various matter mentioned in Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. On the same reasoning or perhaps on stronger reasoning a party who has agreed to an award being made u/sec. 11 (2) of the Act has no right to apply for reference u/sec. 18 of the Act because such a party cannot be said to be a party who has not accepted the award. (G) There is further intrinsic support from the scheme of the Act to the view we are inclined to take. Part V of the Act deals with payment. Sec. 31 which is in that part is captioned as PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION OR DEPOSIT OF SAME IN COURT. The relevant part of Sec. 31 is reproduced as under :31 Payment of compensation or deposit of same in court: - (1) On making an award under Section 11 the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contigencies mentioned in the next sub-sec. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it or if there be no person competent to alienate the land or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the appointment of it the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference u/sec. 18 would be submitted :provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount :provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18 :provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of compensation awarded under this Act to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. ( 36 ) SECOND proviso to sub-sec. ( 36 ) SECOND proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Section 31 in no uncertain terms stipulates that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application u/sec. 18 There is thus statutory prohibition against a person who has accepted the awarded amount of compensation without protest so as to disentitle him to make any application for reference. In our opinion the position of consent awarded cannot be different as award is passed on their executing the agreement in the prescribed form. Once the amount of compensation is determined by agreement between the parties in our opinion there is no scope for party applying for reference to a court. ( 37 ) AS pointed out hereinabove the Collector while entertaining the application for reference under Section 18 acts as a statutory authority. As a statutory authority the Collector is required to decide as to whether the condition precedent for making reference exists or not. When the Collector finds that the party seeking reference is one who has invited award based on agreement between the parties which is duly executed one of the conditions is precedent for exercise of power under Section 18 is not satisfied and he is therefore justified in refusing to make reference. In cases falling under Section 11 (2) only when the Collector is satisfied that the agreement was void or voidable being vitiated by duress coercion fraud undue influence or misrepresentation that he may entertain an application for reference. Otherwise he has no power or authority to entertain the application for reference vis-a-vis award made u/sec. 11 (2)of the said. Act. ( 38 ) REPUGNANCY : mr. P. B. Majmudar learned Advocate for petitioners contended that Sub-secs. (2) to (4) in Section 11 as introduced by Gujarat Act 20 of 1965 shall apply to the facts of the case. He submitted that even if the Union Parliament has subsequently amended the Principal Act by introduction of Sub-secs. (2) to (4) in Section 11 by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 the State amendment in the Central Law on the subject in the Concurrent List would continue to operate. He submitted that even if the Union Parliament has subsequently amended the Principal Act by introduction of Sub-secs. (2) to (4) in Section 11 by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 the State amendment in the Central Law on the subject in the Concurrent List would continue to operate. He further submitted that since it was not factually established that all the petitioners being the owners of land had appeared before the Collector and they were agreeable to the award which the Collector proposed to make and since no agreement in the prescribed form was got executed between the parties essential requirements of sub-sec. (2) of Section 11 as introduced by Gujarat amendment were not satisfied and therefore also the Collector was not competent to make award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and further that he was bound to make reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act. ( 39 ) IN our opinion the submission of Ld. Advocate for petitioners is thoroughly misconceived. In this connection reference may be made to Article 254 of the Constitution of India which reads as under : 254 Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislature of States : (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List then subject to the provisions of CI (2) the law made by the Parliament whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of the State shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter then the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent prevail in that State. PROVIDED that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any Law with respect to-the same matter including a law adding to amending varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. Sub. Art (2) of Article 254 undoubtely authorises the Legislature of a State to enact any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or existing law with respect to the manner in Concurrent List provided that such law of the Legislature of a State is reserved for consideration of the President and has received his assent. In such a contingency the law shall prevail in that State. The State of Gujarat when it enacted Gujarat Act No. 20 of 1965 so as to amend the same and provisions of Land Acquisition Act 1984 as stated hereinabove it introduced sub-secs. (2) to (4) in Section 11 of the Principal Act. By specifically enacting such provision the State Legislature permitted the Collector to make award based on an agreement between all the persons interested. It thus authorised the Collector to make award based on consent or agreement duly signed and executed between the parties. However the Union Parliament has subsequently with the effect from 29. 4. 84 enacted Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 so as to introduce sub-secs. (2) to (4) in Section 11 of the Principal Act which achieve the same result which was achieved by sub. secs (2) to (4) OF Gujarat (Amendment) Act excepting that the procedure prescribed is slightly different. To the extent the procedure by sub-sec. (2) of Section 11 of Central Act is different from the procedure prescribed sub-sec. (2) of Section 11 of the Gujarat Act it can be said that the Union Parliament has made law repugnant to the State Law. However under proviso to sub-Art (2) to Article 254 it was permissible for the Parliament to enact any law at any time with respect to same matter on which the State has made a law. The Union Parliament was therefore competent to make statutory law and it is the said law which would thereafter apply even in the State which has made the law under Article 254 (2 ). The Union Parliament was therefore competent to make statutory law and it is the said law which would thereafter apply even in the State which has made the law under Article 254 (2 ). In that view of the matter there is no manner of doubt in holding that the amendment made by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 would apply in the State of Gujarat and the State amendment made by Gujarat Act 20 of 1965 shall not apply. ( 40 ) IN the case of Zaveribhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay reported in AIR 1954 SC 752 the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question of applicability of Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India in connection with the Central law which sought to repeal State law. The important thing to consider with reference to Article 254 (2) is whether the legislation is in respect to same matter. It. cannot be disputed before us that Gujarat (Amendment) Act 20 of 1965 and more particularly sub-secs. (2) to (4) which were sought to be introduced in Section 11 of the Principal Act of 1894 and sub-secs. (2) to (4) which are introduced by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act. 1984 are the provisions in respect of same matter. Article 254 (2) would therefore squarely apply. Under the Constitution the Parliament can acting under the provisions of Article 254 (2) repeal a State law. But where it does not expressly do so even then the State law will be void under that provision if it conflicts with a later law with respect to the same matter that may be enacted by Parliament. In the matter of procedure to be followed by the Collector while making award on agreement the Central law differs from the State law. Therefore the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 insofar as it introduced sub-secs. (2) to (4) shall prevail over the State amendment of 1965. To the same effect is the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Lalbhai T. Patel v. Addl. Spl. Therefore the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 insofar as it introduced sub-secs. (2) to (4) shall prevail over the State amendment of 1965. To the same effect is the decision of the Division Bench of this court in the case of Lalbhai T. Patel v. Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reproted in 26 (2) GLR 609 where Honble the Chief Justice P. S. Potti speaking for the bench made following pertinent observations : in a case where there is a parliamentary law in regard to one of the matters in the Concurrent List the State cannot make a law except in accordance with Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution. That provision is an exception to the Rule embodied in Art. 254 (1) that the law made by the Parliament would always prevail over the law made by the State in regard to the matter in the Concurrent List. Such a question would arise only when there is inconsistency or repugnancy. If both provisions i. e. the State law and the Parliamentary law cannot stand together there would necessarily be repugnancy and the State law must give way to the law made by the Parliament. The exception to this is when the President examines the law made by the State Legislature and on examination finds that assent could be given. But the Parliament may make a subsequent exercise. Such subsequent exercise may be such as to add to amend vary or to repeal the law of the State. The legislation by the Parliament would prevail over the State legislation thereafter. It is not necessary for the Parliament to expressly state that it adds to varies amends or repeals the law made by the State. If there is repugnancy between subsequent legislation made by the Parliament and the law operating in the State by virtue of Art. 256 (2) of the Constitution of India the law made by the Parliament would prevail to the extent of such repugnancy. . ( 41 ) TO the same effect are the observations made by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sairabibi v. State of Gujarat reported in 28 (2) GLR 903 which are as under: dealing with this situation and interpreting Art. 254 (2) of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court held that under the Constitution Parliament can acting under the proviso to Art. 254 (2) repeal a State law. But where it does not expressly do so even then the State law will be void under that provision if it conflicts with a later law with respect to the same matter that may be enacted by the Parliament. Whether an act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State no question of repeal rests namely that if the subject matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier so that they cannot both stand together then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment will be equally applicable to a question under Art. 254 (2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in respect of the same matter as that of the State law. ( 42 ) REPUGNANCY between two statues (sic.) may be ascertained on the basis of the following three principles (i) whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions (ii) whether Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the Act of the State legislature; and (iii) whether the law made by Parliament and the law made by the Legislature occupy the same field. ( 43 ) IT is thus clear that sub-secs. (2) to (4) of Section 11 as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 shall apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and it would not be permissible to this court to refer to the procedure prescribed by the State Legislature for the purpose of making an award by consent or based on agreement between the parties. ( 44 ) LASTLY Mr. Majmudar Ld. Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the award of the Collector was not in compliance with the order dated 12-4-89 passed by the Division Bench of this court in Spl. C. A. No. 9/88. We do not find any substance in this submission. If reference is made to the decision of the division Bench of this court in the aforesaid special civil application it becomes clear that the Division Bench has simply recorded the statement of the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents to the effect that the award shall be made by the authority under Section 11 of the Act in accordance with law. It was never stated before the Division Bench that the award shall be made by the Collector u/sec. 11 (1) of the Act. It was never stated before the Division Bench that the award shall be made by the Collector u/sec. 11 (1) of the Act. It has simply directed the Collector to pass award in accordance with Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Division Bench further directed that as and when the petitioners in the petitions make an application before the Land Acquisition Officer for referring the matter to the Dist. Court u/sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act he will consider said application for reference as per the provisions of law. On such direction the learned Counsel for petitioners has withdrawn the petition. Thereafter MCA No. 367/89 for review was filed by the Land Acquisition Officer. He wanted the court to clarify that in view of the binding agreements entered into between the land-owners on one hand and the GIDC on the other hand it was open to him to pass award u/sec. 11 (2) of the Act and therefore he sought clarification from the Court. The Division Bench thereupon by following order disposed of the said MCA : there is nothing in the record dated 12/04/1989 passed by the Division Bench of this court to suggest that it is not open to the collector to pass the award u/sec. 11 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. All that has been done in the said order is to record statements made by Mr. Majmudar and Mr. Chhaya and then to observe to the effect that as and when application for making reference to the Dist. court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is made it will be considered as per the provisions of law. In our opinion therefore the above order needs no clarification. It is therefore not necessary to stay the operation of the sand order as prayed for. In the result all these applications shall stand rejected. Notice issued in each of these applications stand discharged with no order as to costs. ( 45 ) IT is clear from the aforesaid order of the Division Bench that the Collector was not required to pass award u/sec. 11 (2) of the Act nor was he directed by the Division Bench. The Collector has passed the award u/sec. 11 (2) of the Act as he has passed the award based on agreements duly executed between the land-owners on one hand and the GIDC on the other hand. 11 (2) of the Act nor was he directed by the Division Bench. The Collector has passed the award u/sec. 11 (2) of the Act as he has passed the award based on agreements duly executed between the land-owners on one hand and the GIDC on the other hand. In that view of the matter we do not find any substance in this submission of the Ld. Counsel for the petitioners that the award of the Collector is in contravention of the direction issued by the Division Bench of this court. We may incidentally also refer to the decision of another Division Bench of this court dated 19-3-91 in Spl. C. A. Nos. 7642/90 and 7643/90 on which also reliance is placed by the learned Advocate for petitioners. In the said petitions the contention of those petitioners was that though they have not agreed to any consent award the Collector was likely to pass award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and therefore he should be directed not to pass award u/sec. 11 (2) of the said Act. The Division Bench thereupon referred to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Spl. C. A. s No. 9/88 and 16/88 as well as to the order on MCA No. 367/89. The Division Bench thereafter referred to the provisions of Section 11 and to the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Samiullah (supra) and thereafter issued following direction : ( 46 ) IN this view of the matter the Collector is directed to decide first whether the objective criteria laid down under Section 11 sub-sec. (2) of the Land Acquisition Act is satisfied before passing any consent order. For that purpose the Collector is required to hear the petitioners and decide it in accordance with law. The Collector is therefore directed to proceed further and pass appropriate award. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. ( 47 ) THE aforesaid directions of the Division Bench are complied with by the Collector and after hearing the petitioners the Collector has passed award under Section 11 (2) of the said Act and therefore also it cannot be said that the award passed by the Collector was in any manner in contravention of any of the orders passed by the Division Bench of this court. ( 48 ) AFORESAID were the only submissions made on behalf of the petitioners and since all the submissions fail this group of petitions must also fail. We hold that the Collector having declared his award under Section 11 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act based on the Agreement duly executed in writing between the petitioners on one had hand and the acquiring body on the other hand was well within his power not to entertain application for reference under Section 18 (1) of the said Act nor could be directed by any writ of this court to refer the matter to the District Court under Section 18 (1) of the said Act. ( 49 ) IN the result the petitions fail. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Rule discharged. .