JUDGMENT : S.C. Mathur, J. 1. The Appellant was elected Pradhan of Gaon Sabha, Bibiyapur Kayasthan, Pargana and Tahsil Bareilly. By order dated 224d September, 1992, passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Bareilly, he was placed under suspension. The Appellant challenged the suspension order before the Commissioner, Bareilly Division, Bareilly, through revision. The revision was dismissed on 24th November, 1992. Aggrieved by the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Commissioner, the Appellant preferred writ petition No. 4711 of 1993 before this Court. A learned Single Judge by his judgment and order dated 16th April, 1993, dismissed the writ petition. The present appeal is directed against that judgment and order. 2. The Stamp Reporter has reported that the appeal, which has been filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court, 1952, is not maintainable. The learned Counsel for the Appellant contests the report. 3. The relevant portion of Rule 5, Chapter VIII reads as follows: An appeal shall lie to the Court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a tribunal Court or statutory arbitrator made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act) of one judge. 4. In the present case, the Divisional Commissioner had exercised revisional jurisdiction. The learned Counsel, however, submits that the revisional jurisdiction was not exercised under any 'Uttar Pradesh Act' but was exercised under a notification issued u/s 96-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, for short 'Act'. On this basis he submits that the present appeal is not excepted by the exclusionary clause of Rule 5. 5. The power to suspend a Pradhan pending proceeding against him has been conferred u/s 95(1) (gg) of the Act. This power has been conferred upon the State Government. Section 96-A of the Act empowers the State Government to delegate all or any of its powers under the Act to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit to impose. This power has been conferred upon the State Government. Section 96-A of the Act empowers the State Government to delegate all or any of its powers under the Act to any officer or authority subordinate to it subject to such conditions and restrictions as it may deem fit to impose. In exercise of this power, the State Government issued notification dated 14th October, 1976, delegating its power to suspend under Clause (gg) to the Sub-Divisional Officer subject to the condition that any order passed by the said officer shall be revisable by the Commissioner of the Division and also by the State Government. It was in the exercise of this power that the order of suspension was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and it was also in the exercise of the power conferred upon the Divisional Commissioner that he entertained the revision against the order of suspension passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. In our opinion, once the delegation was made it became a part of the Act and, therefore, it is not possible to say that the revisional power exercised by the Commissioner was not under the Act. Consequently the exclusionary clause of Rule 5 is applicable to the present case and the appeal is, therefore, barred under the said provision. 6. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that prescription of remedy and forum therefore is an essential legislative act and it cannot be delegated. A similar argument was raised before a Division Bench of this Court in Matloob Ahmad v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Bijnor 1986 UPLBEC 901, but was negatived. In this case, writ petition was filed in this Court against the order of suspension passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Treating the remedy of revision prescribed through notification dated 14th October, 1976 as statutory, the Division Bench dismissed the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. The Division Bench accepted identical view expressed by a learned Single Judge in Birendra Pal Singh Vs. Additional District Magistrate and Others, AIR 1972 All 392 . When the remedy is statutory, it cannot be said that it is not under the Act. 7. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the above Division Bench decision is contrary to the Full Bench decision of this Court in The Notified Area Committee and Another Vs. Additional District Magistrate and Others, AIR 1972 All 392 . When the remedy is statutory, it cannot be said that it is not under the Act. 7. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the above Division Bench decision is contrary to the Full Bench decision of this Court in The Notified Area Committee and Another Vs. Sri Ram Singhasan Prasad Kalwar, AIR 1970 All 561 , wherein it was observed that Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, 1952 was a reproduction of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and Special Appeal was maintainable against judgment of a learned Single rendered in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. This judgment was rendered in the year 1970. Since then Rule 5 has been amended and the exclusionary clause reproduced hereinabove has been added. In view of the amendment, the Full Bench decision is of no assistance to the Appellant. 8. Swami Prasad Pradhan Vs. Hargovind Sahai Mathur and Others, AIR 1970 All 251 was also cited by the learned Counsel. This judgment does not deal with revisional power of the Commissioner. It only says that a Pradhan cannot be suspended pending inquiry. This judgment was rendered before amendment of Section 95 of the Act. Under the unamended provision power to suspended was given in Clause (g) of Section 95(1). It was held that a Pradhan could not be suspended during the pendency of proceedings; against him for his removal from office. Subsequent to this decision, the Act was amended and Clause (gg) was added, in which power to suspend a Pradhan against whom proceedings under Clause (g) were pending was reserved. This decision is, therefore, of no assistance to the Appellant. 9. AIR 1951 SC 332 (Special Reference No. 1 of 1951) was relied upon for submitting that essential legislative function cannot be delegated. Reliance has been placed on paragraph 74 of the report. According to the observations made in this paragraph. Legislature has sovereign power to legislate and it has also the power to engage outside agencies to carry out its intentions. After making these observations, it has been observed that the Legislature cannot abdicate its legislative function and, therefore, while entrusting the power to outside agency it must see that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel legislature. After making these observations, it has been observed that the Legislature cannot abdicate its legislative function and, therefore, while entrusting the power to outside agency it must see that such agency acts as a subordinate authority and does not become a parallel legislature. In our opinion, by reserving right in the State Government to delegate its powers, the Legislature has not delegated its essential legislative function. No observation has been made in this paragraph in respect of conferment of revisional and appellate jurisdictions through notification. Accordingly, this authority is of no assistance to the Appellant. 10. Harishankar Bagla and Another Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465 and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala Vs. The State of Bombay and Others, AIR 1961 SC 4 , also do not lay down that revisional jurisdiction available to the State Government cannot be delegated. 11. Apart from the above authorities, reliance has been placed upon observations contained in 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De Smith, Administrative Law' by Wade, Legal Dictionary by Mitra and 'Principles of Interpretation' by Jagdish Swarup. None of the observations relied upon lay down that the power of revision conferred by the Legislature on the State Government cannot be delegated to a subordinate authority. 12. We are further of the opinion that if the delegation made by the State Government is invalid, as contended by the learned Counsel for the Appellant, he should have prayed for quashing of the notification dated 14th October, 1976, but no such prayer has been sought to be incorporated even though the application- for amendment moved by him. The validity of the Rules of the Court cannot be challenged on that ground. 13. It is also the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the revisional jurisdiction referred to in Rule 5, Chapter VIII, is in respect of judicial or quasi-judicial matters, and not in respect of administrative powers. It was submitted that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the Commissioner in the present case was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, it was administrative. We are unable to accept this submission. Once a person is elected to the office of Pradhan, he acquires a right to continue in that office till he is ousted therefrom in accordance with law. It was submitted that the revisional jurisdiction exercised by the Commissioner in the present case was neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, it was administrative. We are unable to accept this submission. Once a person is elected to the office of Pradhan, he acquires a right to continue in that office till he is ousted therefrom in accordance with law. When the Appellant was suspended, his right to continue in office was affected and, therefore, a lis came into existence between the Appellant and the Sub-Divisional Officer which, under the notification dated 14th October, 1976, was to be decided by the Commissioner. Thus, the exercise of power by the Commissioner cannot be said to be administrative in nature ; it was clearly quasi judicial. 14. In order to challenge the validity of Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, the Appellant moved an application for impleadment also. we are not inclined to allow the amendment application and, therefore, this application is also liable to be rejected. 15. In view of the above, the application for amendment of the memorandum of appeal and the application for impleadment are dismissed and the Special Appeal is dismissed as incompetent.