SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN, J. ( 1 ) THE facts leading to this writ petition inter alia are that on 30th July, 1982 the petitioner No. 1 opened a Savings Fund Account No. 684 in his name and the said Bhajan Finance Company opened a Current Account No. 264 at the Zakeria Street Branch of the bank in this regard. ( 2 ) BY a letter dated 29 of November, 1982 the said branch of the respondent bank informed the petitioners $at the respondent Bank had sanctioned an overdraft limit of Rs. 5,00,000/- in favor of the petitioners on the securities mentioned therein. A copy of the said letter dated 29th jf November, 1982 has been annexed to the writ petition. The said overdraft facility was availed of by the petitioners by overdrawing in the said current account No. 264. ( 3 ) FROM time to time. the respondent bank made diverse advances to the petitioners by allowing the said current to be overdrawn and the petitioners also repaid diverse amount to the respondent bank in the current account. In or about January, 1983 the respondent, bank at the request of the petitioners enhanced the said overdraft limit to Rs. 20,00,000/ -. In this connection the petitioners wild relied on the certificate dated 2nd of April, 1983 issued by the said branch of the respondent bank a copy whereof has been annexed to the writ petition. The respondent bank before granting the said overdraft facilities to the petitioners had in fact written a letter dated 11th January 1983 addressed to the New India Assurance Co. asking them for indemnity policy of Rs. 20 lacs. In the said letter the respondent bank expressed satisfaction about the financial stability and good market reputation of the said firm. The said recommendation was made on the basis of the documents deposited to the bank which show that the aforesaid firm at the material time was to get from various debtors money to tune of Rs. 45 lacs, which was secured by hire purchase agreements with the said parties. Accordingly the petitioners availed of the said enhanced limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- by overdrawing in the said current account from time to time. The said financial facility by way of overdraft limit was sanctioned by the respondent bank after being satisfied about the financial stability of the said company. Accordingly the petitioners availed of the said enhanced limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- by overdrawing in the said current account from time to time. The said financial facility by way of overdraft limit was sanctioned by the respondent bank after being satisfied about the financial stability of the said company. ( 4 ) IT has also been alleged in the petition that by sanctioning the said overdraft limit, the respondent bank made solemn representation to the effect that it would make finance available to the petitioners upto the limit of Rs. 20,00,000/ -. On 3rd week of June 1983, the petitioners received two letters from the New India Assurance Company Limited, dated 14th June, 1983 and 18th June, 1983 respectively stating that two cheques issued in favor of the said insurance company by the petitioners drawn upon the respondent bank in the said current account had been returned to the said insurance company by the said respondent bank on the ground exceeds arrangements. ( 5 ) THEREAFTER the petitioners made enquiries at the said branch of the respondent bank as to why the said cheques had not been honored by the respondent bank whereupon the petitioners were informed that the said overdraft limits had been granted to the petitioners by the respondent bank allegedly without appropriate sanction. It was further alleged that there were alleged irregularities in the said current account and that the debit balance was Rs. 10,69,036. 41p. It was pointed out on behalf of petitioners that the debt balance as alleged by the respondent bank was not correct and that in fact, the same was in the region of approximately Rs. 14 lacs. The respondent bank was requested by the petitioners to send a statement of accounts so that the petitioners could verify the correct position. The respondent bank has not given any reply to the said letter dated 4th of August 1983. In the course of the months of August and September 1983, the petitioners deposited a total sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- in the said current account. At the time of making the last deposit on 21st September, 1983 the Manager of the said Branch tried to discourage the petitioners for making the said deposits on the purposed ground that the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation being respondent No. 2 had been informed about the alleged mal-practices committed by the erstwhile. 2,00,000/- in the said current account. At the time of making the last deposit on 21st September, 1983 the Manager of the said Branch tried to discourage the petitioners for making the said deposits on the purposed ground that the respondent Central Bureau of Investigation being respondent No. 2 had been informed about the alleged mal-practices committed by the erstwhile. Manager of the said Branch of the respondent bank. The petitioners pointed out to the said Manager of the said Branch of the respondent bank that the alleged reporting of the malpractice committed by the erstwhile Manager of the said branch of the respondent bank could not be a valid reason for suspending the overdraft facilitiest granted by the respondent bank. However, bank purported to justify the action of the respondent bank on the further purported ground that in the information given to the respondent No. 2 by the respondent bank with regard to the mal-practices committed by the erstwhile Manager of the said branch the name of the petitioners have been mentioned. ( 6 ) THE petitioners were informed that on 23rd of September, 1983 some police officers came to the said place of business of the petitioners for the purpose of interrogating the petitioners but could not do so inasmuch as the petitioners were not present at the said place of business at the point of time It is indeed important to note herein that the investigation embarked upon by the aforesaid C. E. I. culminated into- filing of charge sheet against the petitioners being Case No. 7/85 on 13. 5. 1985 by respondents Nos. 4 and 5 respectively. Xerox copies of the aforesaid charge sheet along with the letter of complaint as well as the sanction for prosecution of the petitioners along with erstwhile Branch Manager, Sri Amalendu Biksh Das and others has been annexed to the writ petition. ( 7 ) THE petitioners in the instant writ petition have challenged the validity of the prosecution of the petitioners in case No. 7 of 1985 pending in the Court of the Learned Judge, Calcutta, 2nd Special Court as also the Case No. 8 of 1985 of the same Court. ( 7 ) THE petitioners in the instant writ petition have challenged the validity of the prosecution of the petitioners in case No. 7 of 1985 pending in the Court of the Learned Judge, Calcutta, 2nd Special Court as also the Case No. 8 of 1985 of the same Court. The Case No. 7 of 1985 was instituted on the basis of an -information lodged by Sri P. N. Khanna, Manager, Punjab National Bank, Zakeria Street Branch, Calcutta on 20th August 1983, with the Delhi Special Police Establishment, Economic Offence Wing, Calcutta. The allegation made so far as the petitioners are concerned is Case No. 7 of 1985 is that the petitioners were having a current account with Punjab National Bank, Zakeria Street Branch, Calcutta. Between July 1982 and May 1983, Sri A. B. Das was the Manager of the Bank. The petitioners had obtained over draft facilities to the extent of Rupees twenty lacs, which was sanctioned by Sri A. B. Das Branch Manager of the Bank. The Branch Manager did not have the authority to sanction over draft to the extent he did. It was further alleged that on 14th January 1983, M/s. Bhajan Finance Company had withdrawn, by Bank Cheques the amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- from their Current Account No. 264 although the Credit balance on that date was only Rs. 16,110/ -. The excess amount was allowed to be withdrawn as the Branch Manager had extended the credit Limit of the over draft account to the extent of Rs. 20,00,000/- to which he had no authority. ( 8 ) THUS it is alleged that the petitioners had conspired with the Bank Manager and thereby committed several offences. By another complaint, the same Sri P. N. Khanna, Manager, Punjab National Bank, Zakeria Street Branch, alleged various irregular transfers by Sri Amalendu Bikash Das, alias A. B. Das between July 1982 and May 1983 in several accounts of the Bank and thereby adopted corrupt and illegal means or by abusing his official position in order to obtain pecuniary advantage for himself and for others. He failed to correctly maintain various accounts in the bank and supporting documents and vouchers there for. It has further been alleged that Sri A. B. Das, Branch Manager and Sri Santosh Kumar Dutta, Accountant, transferred a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the account of M/s. Joadas and Company on 24th May, 1983. He failed to correctly maintain various accounts in the bank and supporting documents and vouchers there for. It has further been alleged that Sri A. B. Das, Branch Manager and Sri Santosh Kumar Dutta, Accountant, transferred a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the account of M/s. Joadas and Company on 24th May, 1983. This amount was transferred from M/s. Bhajan Finance Company and the said amount was withdrawn by Shyamalendu Bikas Das, Partner of M/s. Jayadas Co. Bank Cheques. This was made possible as on 29th April, 1983 as the Account No. 264 of M/s. Bhajan Finance Company has been credited by transfer of a sum of Rs. 6,00,000/- from the account of M/s. Rameswar Prosad Plantation Engineering Industries Limited. It is alleged that the petitioners had entered into conspiracy with the said Bank Manager and had committed several offences. ( 9 ) AFTER investigation charge - sheet was submitted in both the cases. In case No. 7 of 1985. Charge - sheet was submitted on 13th May, 1985. In the charge - sheet the same allegation was made, namely, that on 14th January, 1983 an excess amount of Rs. 5,09,000/- was allowed to be withdrawn by extending credit limit of the overdraft account of M/s. Bhajan Finance Company upto Rs. 20 lacs. This extension was granted by Sri A. B. Das, Branch Manager without lawful authority. Quite some time before the charge - sheet was submitted. M/s. Bhajan Finance Company had paid the entire amount of Rs. 13,71,582. 59p. and Rs. 3,88,711. 80p. being the interest thereon to Punjab National Bank, Zakeria Street Branch, Calcutta. The certificate showing acknowledgment of such payment has been annexed to the writ petition as well as to the affidavit-in Reply and marked with letter H to the Chief Manager dated 30th May, 1986 which confirmed that the overdraft in the Current Account was fully liquidated on 19th March, 1985. ( 10 ) IT appears from the letter dated July 2, 1984, issued by the Regional Manager to the Petitioner that the petitioner was requested to start repayment of the banks dues in the current account No. 264 Zakeria Street Branch in term of the minutes of the discussion earlier held on 4th May, 1984. Petitioner repaid the dues in terms of the said letter of the bank. Petitioner repaid the dues in terms of the said letter of the bank. It, therefore, appears that there was no reason for the bank to lodge complaint against the petitioner after they have accepted the amount after the debt has been repaid in the terms of the instruction of the bank. ( 11 ) IT has been submitted that in order to constitute an offence of conspiracy there must exist an unlawful agreement within the meaning of Section 120a of the Indian Penal Code. In the allegation made by the prosecution all that have been alleged are that the Bank Manager allowed extension of the upper limit of the over draft account. The allegation that the Bank Manager had no jurisdiction to do so is not the business of the Customers of the bank to know the same. The petitioners who found that their limit of sanctioned loan was extended upto Rs. 20 lacs operated the said account within the limit and the bank duly honoured the cheques issued by the petitioners. No unlawful act had been done by operating the account. It was open to the bank authorities not to honour the cheques. It is nobody s case that any deception was practised on the bank. ( 12 ) SIMILARLY, in respect of case No. 8 of 1985 that Sri S. B. Das of M/s. Jayadas and Company had withdrawn two lacs of Rupees from the account of M/s. Jayadoas and Company which account was credited by transfer from some other account cannot amount to unlawful agreement. So far the petitioners are concerned, the account of the company, it is alleged, was never credited by any activity on the part of the petitioner. Since the petitioners have paid back the amount which they obtained by operating the bank accounts, there is no wrongful gain of the petitioners and since interest in full were realised by the bank no wrongful loss was suffered by the bank. When a cheque is presented to a bank, the bank is entitled to refuse payments if the rules of the bank do not permit such payment. In the instant case there is no deception or fraudulent representation. When a cheque is presented to a bank, the bank is entitled to refuse payments if the rules of the bank do not permit such payment. In the instant case there is no deception or fraudulent representation. It has been submitted that in view of Section 5 of the Amending Act, namely, the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1988 the recording of evidence must be completed within four years from the date of application of the accused and if the recording of evidence is not completed within the period of four years, the accused shall be discharged unless the prosecution satisfies the Magistrate that (i) Upon evidence already produced and (ii) for special reasons there is good ground for presuming that it shall not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused. The Amending Section 5 is quoted here under:5. Amendment of Section 245 - In Section 245 of the Principal Act, after subsection (2) the following sub-section be inserted (3) If all the evidence referred to in Section 244 are not produced in support of the prosecution within four years from the date of appearance of the accused, the Magistrate shall discharge the accused unless the prosecution satisfies the Magistrate that upon the evidence already produced and for special reason there is ground for presuming that it shall not be in the interest of justice to discharge the accused. ( 13 ) IN case No. 7 of 1985 the accused appeared on 6th June, 1985. The first witness in case P. W. 4, was examined on 25th April, 1989, P. W. 1, was examined and cross - examined on 29th January, 1990. Since then no other witness has been examined. There are 17 witnesses in all to be examined in the case. The last date within which the examination of the witnesses should have been completed is 5th June, 1989. Till to-day no further witness has been examined but the case is still pending. In case No. 8 of 1985, the petitioners has appeared in Court on 10th June, 1985. Out of 5 Prosecution witnesses only, P. W. 1, was examined on 5th February, 1990. No other witness has been examined in this case. The last date by which the witness should have been examined in this case was 9th the, 1989. Since June, 1985, till to-day four years have passed. Out of 5 Prosecution witnesses only, P. W. 1, was examined on 5th February, 1990. No other witness has been examined in this case. The last date by which the witness should have been examined in this case was 9th the, 1989. Since June, 1985, till to-day four years have passed. During this period on application whatsoever has been made by the prosecution stating that on the evidence already on record and for special reason, if any, it was necessary to continue with the case in the interest of justice. Apparently, no such special reason can exist in the instant case as it has already been pointed out that the bank has received the entire amount together with full interests thereon and the bank has grievance to make. No wrongful loss has been suffered by the bank, nor have the petitioners made any wrongful gain. ( 14 ) IN several decisions of this Court it has been held that the provisions of section 245 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure do apply in case that were pending on the date, the Amending Act was enforced. A reference may be made to the decision of Syed Mohammad Hassan v. K. C. Das, Deputy Chief Controller of Import and Export1 and Satya Charan Das v. State. In cases of the nature that this Court is concerned if any application for extension of time is to be made, it has to be made before the expiry of the statutory period. A Division Bench of this Court in the Case of Kumar Keshori v. State also upheld the same view. In the case of Mihir Kumar Ghosh v. State of West Bengal and Shymal Kishor Gupta v. The State of West Bengal, it was held that the speedy trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right of a person and any infringement thereof would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in S. G. Nain v. Union of India, held that the prosecution against the appellant was pending for almost 14 Years and as such apart from mental agony such pendency of the prosecution has also affected the service career of the appellant in that case. The Supreme Court in S. G. Nain v. Union of India, held that the prosecution against the appellant was pending for almost 14 Years and as such apart from mental agony such pendency of the prosecution has also affected the service career of the appellant in that case. So, the Supreme Court held that it would be loss of public time and money apart from causing harassment to the accused to keep the proceeding pending and as such their Lordships quashed the proceeding. The Judges of the Supreme Court also took into account that even though the matter was pending in the Supreme Court for 11 years the Supreme Court is bound to quash such a state prosecution and did not allow the prosecution to go on. ( 15 ) BY speedy trial the Supreme Court prosecution which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial cannot be regarded as reasonable just and fair and falls foul of Article 21. In this connection, reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar7. There the Supreme Court observed as follows: There is also one other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under-trial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a sad reflection on the legal judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. It is interesting to note that in the United States. Speedy trial is one of the constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. So also Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that, everyone arrested or detained shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. So also Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that, everyone arrested or detained shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. ( 16 ) THE first information of this case was lodged on 18th August, 1983, which is a date about ten years before. The petitioners have been suffering for these ten years. None of the two cases can be proceeded with any further because of the lapse of more than ten years in the meantime and the prosecution being mainly responsible for the delay in proceeding with the cases and the chances of the cases ending in conviction being bleak, the cases are liable to be quashed in view of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Mahesh Chand and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, it was held that even in a case where the accused persons were tried for committing any offence under Section 307, of the Indian Penal Code which was non-compoundable, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case it may be proper that the trial Court shall permit them to compound the offence. In the aforesaid decision the accused persons were tried for committing an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. The case ended in acquittal of the Accused which was displaced by an order of conviction and sentence passed by the High Court. On Special Leave to Supreme Court the parties sought for permission to compound the offence, though not compoundable. The Supreme Court allowed such prayer in the special facts and circumstances of the case. ( 17 ) THE contention of the respondent, on the other hand, are confined mainly to two grounds. i) The offence was complete on and by April 1983 and any payment made thereafter do not absolve the accused persons of their criminal liability. They may avoid the civil liability, which they own to the bank, but they cannot be granted acquittal of offence committed against the state. None of the offence in respect of which the accused persons have been charged is compoundable, that is to say, the law does not permit to make a compromise. They may avoid the civil liability, which they own to the bank, but they cannot be granted acquittal of offence committed against the state. None of the offence in respect of which the accused persons have been charged is compoundable, that is to say, the law does not permit to make a compromise. Vide Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the compounding of offences. ii) In regard to delay, it will be seen from the records that the prosecution should not be blamed. Initially the accused persons themselves caused delay in filing the charge - sheet upon obtaining an interim order from this Court though subsequently they themselves got the Rule discharged and stay order vacated on 24. 4. 1985, nearly 18th months after. So far as recording of evidence are concerned, the answering respondents have already posted the Court the reasons of delay of the affidavit in opposition of the answering respondents. On this point the respondents relied on the decision reported in Abdul Rahman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, wherein the apex Court inter alia observed that it is not possible in the very nature of things present in the then circumstances to draw a time limit beyond which a criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go. Their Lordships have further observed that in many cases, the accused may himself have been responsible for the delay. In such cases, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. In some cases delays may occur for which either the prosecution or the accused can be claimed, but the system itself. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable. Of course, it is a minor offence not being an economic offence and the delay is too long not caused by the accused, different consideration may arise, which case must be left to be decided on its own fact having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. Such delays too cannot be treated as unjustifiable. Of course, it is a minor offence not being an economic offence and the delay is too long not caused by the accused, different consideration may arise, which case must be left to be decided on its own fact having regard to the principles enunciated hereinafter. So far as the first point is concerned as already noted in appropriate cases even of the offence in respect of which the accused person has been charged are non-compoundable the Supreme Court in the case of Mahesh Chand and Another v. State of Rajasthan (supra) held that even in a case of non-compoundable offence under Section 307, of the Indian Penal Code the Trial Court shall permit the parties to compound the offence in view of the facts and circumstances of the case ( 18 ) IT is well settled that it is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case and to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice of permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case quash the proceeding. In this connection, I may take note the judgment and decision in the case of Madhab Rao Jiwaji Rao Scindia and Anr. v. Sambhu Rao Chandrajiras Angre and Ors. , wherein the aforesaid principal has been enunciated by the Supreme Court: considering the same principle in my view in the interest of justice since the bank has received the entire amount and that also on the basis of the correspondences exchanged between the bank and the petitioner and the bank accepted the payment in terms of the mutual arrangement and no useful purpose will be served by allowing the Criminal proceeding to continue. Learned Advocate for the Judgment also relied upon the judgment and decision in the case of Radhey Shyam Khemka and Anr. Learned Advocate for the Judgment also relied upon the judgment and decision in the case of Radhey Shyam Khemka and Anr. v. The State of Bihar, wherein the Supreme Court held that: While taking cognizance of offences in connection with registration, issuance of prospectus, collection of money from the investor and the misappropriation of fund collected from the share holders which constitute one offence or other under Penal Code has been disclosed on the materials produced before the Court. If the serenading on this question is not done properly at the stage of initiation of Criminal proceedings, in many cases some disgruntled share holders may launch prosecutions against promoters, directors and those in charge of management of the Company concerned and can paralyse the functioning of such company. High Court should not while exercising power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code user the jurisdiction of the Trial Court. The power under section 482 of the Code has been vested in the High Court to quash In prosecution which amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. But the power cannot be exercised by the High Court to hold a parallel trial only on the basis of the statements and documents collected during investigation or equity for the purpose of expressing an opinion whether the accused concerned is likely to be punished if the trial is allowed to proceed. Appeal dismissed. T ( 19 ) IN my view the said judgment cannot be of any assistance to the respondent. In my view of the facts and the materials on record prima facie cannot disclose any offence when the payment has already been effected on the basis of arrangement made between the parties as contained in the correspondence that pass through between the bank and the writ petitioner. In the case of Surender Kumar Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Special Leave Petition was granted as early as in the year 1985 by the Supreme Court but it has been listed for hearing after about 8 years. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, after some arguments on merit confined his submissions to the question of sentence only. In the case of Surender Kumar Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Special Leave Petition was granted as early as in the year 1985 by the Supreme Court but it has been listed for hearing after about 8 years. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, after some arguments on merit confined his submissions to the question of sentence only. He pointed out that offences aforesaid had been committed by the appellant, as early as in the year 1973, more than 20 years from now and as such a compassionate view should be taken of the whole matter especially when the amount in respect of which the offences are alleged to have been committed is not excessive. He pointed out that the appellant has remained in jail for some time, in pursuance of the order of conviction and sentence and as such he need not be sent to jail again. An affidavit detailing the mitigating circumstances has also been filed by the Sic. * before us. Taking all facts and circumstances into consideration, by our Order dated 26th April, 1993 we directed we appellant to first deposit an amount of Rs. 40,000/- (the loan amount) with the U. P. Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. Pursuant to that order Rs. 40,000/- has been deposited with the U. P. Small Industries Corporation Ltd. on 4. 5. 1993 and original receipt granted by the Manager of the said Corporation was produced before us. The Xerox Copy of the said original returned to the learned counsel for the appellant. An affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the appellant stating about the aforesaid deposit. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case while maintaining the conviction of the appellant, we reduce the sentence of imprisonment under different Sections mentioned above to the period already undergone by him. The appellant, shall, however, pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment thereof he shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. The appeal is allowed in part. The deposit of Rs. 40,000/- made by the appellant with the U. P. Small Industries Corporation Ltd. shall be adjusted towards the amount advanced by the said corporation to the appellant. The Corporation shall of course be at liberty to take steps for realization of any further sum, which may be due, against the appellant. The deposit of Rs. 40,000/- made by the appellant with the U. P. Small Industries Corporation Ltd. shall be adjusted towards the amount advanced by the said corporation to the appellant. The Corporation shall of course be at liberty to take steps for realization of any further sum, which may be due, against the appellant. The aforesaid facts clearly show that the Supreme Court granted an opportunity to the appellant to deposit loan amount Rs. 40,000/- to the Small Industries Corporation Ltd. within a certain period and after the said payment was made the sentence of imprisonment was reduced to the period already undergone by the appellant. In the instant case the writ petitioner has already paid the mount and, therefore, the question of further punishing him may not serve the cause of justice. ( 20 ) IN the instant case it further appears from the letter being Ref. No. CN264/83 date. 2nd April, 1983 issued by the accused A. B. Das, who was the Manager of the Zakaria Street Branch of the Punjab National Bank that M/s. Bhajan Finance Company had been sanctioned an overdraft limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- in their favor against security of hypothecation of hire purchase document and balance outstanding in the said account as on 31. 3. 1983 was Rs. 15,28,442. 41p. and the interest charged on the said amount for the said period amounted to Rs. 25,681. 82p. It will also be apparent from the forwarding letter dated 13. 7. 1983 addressed by the Regional Manager of the Punjab National Bank to M/s. Bhajan Finance Company along with the statement of accounts for the period from 4. 11. 1982 to 21. 6. 1983 which was sent along with the said forwarding letter that interest of Rs. 25,681. 82p. was debited to the account of Mis. Bhajan Finance Company on 31. 3. 1983 on the said overdraft for the quarter ending 31st March, 1983. The aforesaid two letters dated 2. 4. 1983 and 13. 7. 1983 and those statement of accounts that were sent from the Regional office of the said bank to the company clearly establish the fact that over draft facility of Rs. 20,00,000/- was being enjoyed by the petitioners company and this fact was very much within the know ledge of the Regional office of the said bank because charging of interest was written the knowledge of the said Regional Office. 20,00,000/- was being enjoyed by the petitioners company and this fact was very much within the know ledge of the Regional office of the said bank because charging of interest was written the knowledge of the said Regional Office. The enhancement of limit of overdraft facility had been in accordance with normal banking procedures and all connected documents must be in the custody of the Punjab National Bank. The letter being Ref. No. CNCORR/83 dated 11. 1. 1983 written by the then Manager of Zakaria Street Branch of the Punjab National Bank to the Senior Area Manager, Calcutta Area Office of the New Assurance Company Limited of 4, Mangoe Lane, Calcutta - 70000/- is clearly indicative of the fact that pursuant to a proposal made by the petitioners and/or their company and after active and due consideration the proposal for enhancement was given effect to. In the premises aforesaid it appears that the Regional Office of the said bank was very much aware of the fact that the company of the petitioners were enjoying overdraft facility and also were aware of the fact that such facility was enhanced to Rs. 20,00,000/ -. ( 21 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 1 as deposed in cross - examination in Case No. C7 of 1985, makes it all the more probable. P. W. 1 said that according to the normal practice, the Auditor from the Head Office Audits a Branch once a year besides annual audit, surprise inspection of the Branch is held from the Regional Managers office. Such surprise inspection may be once a month or quarterly. T ( 22 ) NATURALLY such inspection or visit had been undertaken by the Regional Office of the said Bank in respect of the Zakaria Street Branch, Calcutta as well. Such inspection and Audit coupled with the letters hereinbefore mentioned to other with the statements of Accounts sent therewith indicate that such proposals were duly made, considered and accepted with the concurrence or at least knowledge of the Regional Office of the said bank, Denial of knowledge by the Regional Office of the said bank is not bona fide and honest. It may be reiterated that by his letter dated 4th August, 1983 addressed to the Regional Manager of the Punjab National Bank, the petitioner No. 2, who is one of the partners of M/s. Bhajan Finance Company, pointed out certain irregularities in the statements of accounts, that were forwarded to the said company along with a forwarding letter dated 13. 7. 1983 of the Regional Manager of the said bank. By that letter it was prayed that the irregular entries appearing in the statement might be deleted and/or rectified. ( 23 ) NEITHER any of the petitioners nor their company received any reply to the aforesaid letter dated 4th August, 1983 from the Regional Manager of the said Bank or from the then manager of the Zakaria Street Branch of the said bank. Thereafter, on 27th June, 1984 Mr. Keshwanand, Inspectorts Assistant, Camp Branch Office, Zakaria Street, Calcutta, issued fresh statements of accounts as pointed by the petitioners and for their company. From the said verified and/or corrected statements of accounts dated 27th June, 1984 it appears that after verification and/or corrected statements of accounts dated 27th June, 1984 it appears that after verification and/or correction of the irregularities in the entries of the earlier statements of accounts sent to the petitioners company along with the forwarding letter of the Regional Manager of the said Bank, the total balance of debit amounted to Rs. 14,53,030. 46p. ( 24 ) THE correspondence and correction of the statements of accounts above suggest that there was nothing irregular in obtaining or operating the overdraft facility. ( 25 ) IT may also be noted that the Suit No. 952 of 1986 instituted by the Punjab National Bank against paramjit Singh and Ors. in which the petitioner is a defendant No. 1 was disposed of by filing the said term of settlement is set out herein below: Or or about 4th May, 1984 a meeting was held at the Zonal Office of the Bank at No. 15, Park Street, Calcutta, between the partners of the said M/s. Bhajan Finance Company and senior officers of the Bank. The said firm and its partners agreed to pay the out standings in the said current Account with interest as recorded in the minutes of the said meeting. The said M/s. Bhajan Finance Company however, disputed the authenticity of the debit entry for Rs. The said firm and its partners agreed to pay the out standings in the said current Account with interest as recorded in the minutes of the said meeting. The said M/s. Bhajan Finance Company however, disputed the authenticity of the debit entry for Rs. 2,00,000/ - dated 24th May, 1983, the account of the said from of the ground that the authority letter was signed by one partner Shri Bhajan Singh, the petitioner No. 1 herein whereas the authority to operate the said Current Account of the firm was vested with both the partners jointly. Shri Bhajan Singh the petitioner No. 1 herein was held individually liable for the said entry of Rs. 2,00,000/- dated 24th May, 1983 and the said Shri Bhajan Singh the petitioner No. 1 herein agreed to pay the said amount by monthly installment of Rs. 5,000/- till the payment in full and interest at the rate of 15% per annum will be charged on the said amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- from 24th May, 1983 till payment. The said bank demanded the payment of the said sum of Rs. 1,01,400/- and Rs. 2,00,000/- with interest thereon till the date of payment. That on or about 23rd December, 1982 the said bank filed a suit in this Court being Suit No. 953 of 1986 (Punjab National Bank v. Bhajan Singh and Anr.) against the petitioner No. 1 and the said A. B. Das for decree for Rs. 2,10,568. 05 severally and for jointly interim interest and interest on judgment from 1st November, 1986 till realization, enquiry attachment before judgment, Receiver, Injunction, costs, further and the other reliefs. The petitioner defended the said suit and made a Counter Claim for the amount of 5 fixed deposit receipts of Rs. 50,000/- each. The said suit was disposed of on 7th October, 1988 by Mr. Monoranjan Mullick J. as His Lordship then was passing a decree in the said suit as claimed by the said bank and also in respect of the said 5 (five) fixed deposit receipts. The said decree and order of this Court has been duly carried out. Now neither the petitioner No. 1 nor the said bank has any claim against each other. ( 26 ) IN effect the entire offence has really been compounded in view of the aforesaid facts on record. The said decree and order of this Court has been duly carried out. Now neither the petitioner No. 1 nor the said bank has any claim against each other. ( 26 ) IN effect the entire offence has really been compounded in view of the aforesaid facts on record. It appears that the bank should not have any grievance against the petitioner and there is no justifiable reason for proceeding with the criminal cases. In the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. the Supreme Court laid down the guidelines wherein the High Court may under Article 226 or under Section 482 of Cr. P. C. interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court, however, observed that such power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases, namely. 1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code. 3) Where the un controverted allegations made in the F. I. R. or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4) Where the allegations in the F. I. R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. 5) Where the allegations made in the F. I. R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 5) Where the allegations made in the F. I. R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act under which criminal proceeding is instituted to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an anterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. ( 27 ) IN the instant case allegations made in the F. I. R. or complaint even if-taken in their face value do not disclose the commission of any offence so as to make out a case against the petitioner. ( 28 ) APPLYING the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision in my view it is a fit and proper case where this Court should interfere to quash the proceeding for the ends of justice. ( 29 ) NO useful purpose will be served, as I have already noted, to proceed against the petitioner. The proceeding against the petitioner is quashed. It will be open to the State to proceed against the other accused persons on the basis of the same complaint. However, I have not adjudicated on the merit of the said complaint against other accused persons. ( 30 ) THE writ petition is accordingly decided in favor of the petitioner. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Let a xerox copy of this order be given to the learned Advocate for the petitioners as prayed for on usual undertaking and upon compliance of usual formalities. .