JAYANTILAL DAHYALAL v. BATUK BHAISHANKER — 1993 DIGILAW 423 (GUJ)

KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision application is filed under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The petitioner is the original plaintiff-landlord. Petitioner No. 2 is subsequently joined as an assignee of the suit premises in place of the original landlord and therefore he is added as petitioner no. 2 as per the order of this Court dated 2/03/1993. Defendants nos. 1 and 2 were occupying the suit premises being a shop having main door abutting in the west on the station road at Chalala. As is averred in the plaint, there was a joint Hindu family of Bhanji Devji and his sons and they were the owners of the suit property since many years. They had gone with their families to Africa and said Bhanji Devji was managing the said ancestral property of the joint family. Bhanji Devji died in the year 1955. Subsequently, the joint Hindu family continued. One babulal Devchand who was daughters son of Bhanji Devji was managing the said ancestral property of the joint family contrary to law. None of the coparceners of the joint family had given any authority or a power of attorney for managing the property to said Babulal Devchand. Still however, he was managing the shops of the joint family and handed over the possession thereof to some persons in 1967 unauthorisedly and against law. When the plaintiff returned to Bombay from Africa he visited Chalala and found out that deceased Bhaishanker Mavji was doing business in the suit shop. On enquiry, said Bhaishanker Mavji told the plaintiff that the suit property had been let out to him by Babulal Devchand. Thereupon the plaintiff told Bhaishanker Mavji that Babulal Devchand had no authority to let the suit premises and asked him to hand over the possession of the suit premises. ( 2 ) IT is further stated that one notice dated 2/08/1967 (Exh. 36) was also served on Babulal Devchand. However, deceased did not hand over the possession of the suit premises and the mesne profits were also not given. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the plaintiff was required to go to Africa for an important work and returned to India in 1969 and visited Chalala. At that time also defendant did not show any inclination to pay the mesne profits. Hence the second notice was given on 3/02/1969 (Exh. 38 ). ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the plaintiff was required to go to Africa for an important work and returned to India in 1969 and visited Chalala. At that time also defendant did not show any inclination to pay the mesne profits. Hence the second notice was given on 3/02/1969 (Exh. 38 ). Still however, defendant did not show any inclination to hand over the possession of the suit premises as well as that of paying the mesne profits. At that time also, deceased Bhaishanker Mavji had contended that babulal Devchand had let out the suit property at the monthly rent of rs. 16. Subsequently, the plaintiff was again required to go to Africa and he could not take any action against the defendant. However, the plaintiff returned to India in 1971. At that time bhaishanker Mavji was dead and the defendants Batukbhai Bhaishanker and chandulal Bhaishanker had sub-let the suit premises to defendants Nos. 3 to 6. It was also alleged that the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had not acquired the tenancy rights of the deceased and therefore they had no right to let out the property. ( 4 ) AFTER the aforesaid averments were made it was also averred that if it is believed that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are the tenants, they had not paid the rent for more than six months, that is, for 51 months, from the date of the first notice and, therefore, the plaintiff had acquired the right to get the possession. The another ground that was pleaded was about sub-letting of the suit premises by charging more rent. The third ground was with regard to permanent construction, that is, changes made in the floor and on the roof without written consent of the landlord. The ground of bona fide requirement was also made saying that adverse situation was developing day by day in Africa and at any tune the plaintiff has to leave africa and to return to India and, therefore, for his own use he bona fide and reasonably required the suit premises. ( 5 ) IT is, therefore, clearly averred that in the alternative if the defendants are held to be tenants, the tenancy is terminated by the notice dated 13-11-1971 (Exh. 39) and in the said notice plaintiff has also demanded the mesne profits for 51 months and also possession from defendants Nos. ( 5 ) IT is, therefore, clearly averred that in the alternative if the defendants are held to be tenants, the tenancy is terminated by the notice dated 13-11-1971 (Exh. 39) and in the said notice plaintiff has also demanded the mesne profits for 51 months and also possession from defendants Nos. 3 to 6 who are illegally occupying the same as subtenants. The copy of said notice was also given to defendant No. 3 but it was not accepted by him. Accordingly, the plaintiff prayed in the suit that the possession of the suit premises be given to the plaintiff by passing the order of eviction against the defendants. It is also prayed in the suit for the decree of amount of Rs. 576 as arrears of rent and/or mesne profits for, the last three years as the other amount was time barred and also mesne profits till the possession of the suit premises be granted. ( 6 ) IT may be stated that so far as present suit is concerned, court stamps of Rs. 77. 50 are affixed as per Sec. 6 (12) (d) of the Bombay court Fees Act valuing the annual rent at Rs. 192. 00, that is, Rs. 16. 00 per month plus the amount of Rs. 576. 00 as the mesne profit. As regards cause of action, it is mentioned that the cause of action has arisen on the termination of tenancy on 13-12-1971 and for the purpose of rent and/ or mesne profits it has arisen on or about 13-12-1968. The suit was filed on 21/01/1972 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), dhari being Regular Civil Suit No. 30 of 1972. ( 7 ) IT may also be mentioned that out of the notices referred to above in the suit, one is dated 2/08/1967 (Exh. 36 ). It was addressed to deceased Bhaishanker Mavji. In the said notice it was inter alia mentioned that the possession of the deceased Bhaishanker Mavji in respect of the suit premises was illegal and that the plaintiff was not accepting him as the tenant and he had claimed the mesne profits for three years, that is, Rs. 576. 00 and also requested him to hand over the possession. The second notice which was referred to hereinabove was also addressed to Bhaishanker Mavji which is at exh. 38. 576. 00 and also requested him to hand over the possession. The second notice which was referred to hereinabove was also addressed to Bhaishanker Mavji which is at exh. 38. In this notice also similar averments as mentioned in the earlier part of the plaint were made saying that Babulal Devchand had no authority to manage the property of the Undivided Hindu Family of Bhanji Devji and that his possession was unlawful and he was required to hand over the possession. The third notice is suit notice and it is addressed to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as the heirs of Bhaishanker Mavji. In the said notice by making reference to earlier notices it was stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in illegal possession of the suit property and they did not acquire any rights as tenants from deceased Bhaishanker Mavji as he was not the tenant of the suit premises. There is also a reference of sub-letting of suit premises to other defendants and that they are running the general machinery stores and there is also reference of making pucca flooring and changes in the roof without plaintiffs permission. In para 5 again a reference was made that possession of the suit premises by deceased Bhaishanker Mavji and after his death the possession of the suit premises of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 was also illegal. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, in subsequent para it was mentioned that even if it is held for any reason that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were the tenants, they were in arrears of 51 months at the rate of Rs. 40. 00 per month which comes to Rs. 2,040. 00 and/or mesne profit for sub-letting the suit premises to Popatlal Devshi. It was also mentioned that the defendants have made permanent construction without written consent of the plaintiff and therefore he has acquired the right of getting the suit property. ( 9 ) IN paragraph 6 of the said notice, it was mentioned that defendants nos. 1 and 2 were informed that their possession was illegal and for any reason if they were held to be tenants in the alternative the tenancy was terminated on the last date of the month on which they believed their tenancy commenced. . . They were also called upon to hand over the possession thereof. 1 and 2 were informed that their possession was illegal and for any reason if they were held to be tenants in the alternative the tenancy was terminated on the last date of the month on which they believed their tenancy commenced. . . They were also called upon to hand over the possession thereof. They were also demanded an amount of Rs. 2,040 as aforesaid and all the amount due before that date and in non-compliance thereof legal action will be taken. ( 10 ) IN this case, the trial Court raised as many as 14 issues at Exh. 25. On issue No. 1 it was held that the plaintiff had right to file the suit as the Karta of the joint Hindu family. On issue No. 2 it was held that Babulal Devchand was not authorised by Bhanji Devji to work as Mukatyar. So far as issae No. 3 is concerned, it was held that defendants were in arrears of rent for more than six months. So far as issue No. 4 was concerned, it was held that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were not ready and willing to pay the rent. On issues Nos. 5 and 6 are concerned, it was held against the plaintiff on the point of bona fide requirement. So far as issue No. 7, it is with regard to legality and validity of the suit notice and it was held that suit notice was legal and valid. So far as issue No. 8 is concerned, it is with regard to" standard rent and it was held to be Rs. 16 per month. So far issue No. 9 is concerned, it is with regard to sub-letting and it was decided that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have not sub-let the suit premises to defendants Nos. 3 to 6. So far as issue No. 10 is concerned, it is on the point of making permanent construction and it was held against the plaintiff. So far as issue no. 11 is concerned, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover rs. 576/- and recurring rent of Rs. 16. 00 per month from 21-1-1972 till the possession of the suit property is handed over to the plaintiff. So far as issue no. 11 is concerned, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover rs. 576/- and recurring rent of Rs. 16. 00 per month from 21-1-1972 till the possession of the suit property is handed over to the plaintiff. So far as issue No. 12 is concerned, it is on the point whether plaintiff was entitled to get possession of the suit premises and it was answered in favour of the plaintiff inasmuch as it was held that defendants were in arrears of more than six months rent and they were not ready and willing to pay the arrears to the plaintiff and accordingly the learned Civil Judge (J. D.) passed the judgment and decree dated 27/01/1977 decreeing the plaintiffs suit for possession and directing the defendants to hand over the possession of the suit premises. on or before 30/04/1977 to the plaintiff, fixing the standard rent at the rate of Rs. 16. 00 per month exclusive of taxes from 21-l-1972 till the possession of the suit property, and for the recovery of Rs. 576 as arrears of standard rent for the last 3 years and cost of the suit ( 11 ) AGAINST the said judgment and decree the defendants Nos. I and 2 preferred the appeal being Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1977 before the learned Assistant Judge, Amreli. The learned Assistant Judge has allowed the said appeal, modified the standard rent from Rs. 16. 00 to Rs. 6. 00, reversed and set aside the decree passed by the learned trial Judge. ( 12 ) AGAINST the said judgment the present revision application under Sec. 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act has been filed in this court. Mr. D. U. Shah learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has very vehemently argued the matter. He submits that the view taken by the appellate Court is erroneous and contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal v. Prabhudas, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2005 . Mr. D. U. Shah learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has very vehemently argued the matter. He submits that the view taken by the appellate Court is erroneous and contrary to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Harbanslal v. Prabhudas, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2005 . In the said case the Gujarat High Courts views reported in AIR 1964 (Guj.) 9 and (1966) VII GLR 945 were approved and it was held in the said matter, "in order to avoid operation of Sec. l2 (3) (a) of the Act the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increases must be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date, of service of notice under sec. 12 (2) of the Act and it is not enough to raise a dispute for the first time in written statement. " This judgement has also subsequently been followed in the case of Jaywant S. Kulkarni v. Mimchar Desobhai shroff, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1817 . ( 13 ) WHEN that is so. the observations made by the learned appellate judge are as under :"but the defendants have taken up their dispute for the first time in their statement wherein it does not transpire that they have replied to the last notice of the plaintiff. According to the defendant, they have got a genuine dispute about the standard rent and they have also given one application before the lower Court, which is at Exh. 46. In this application the defendants have taken up the contention that they have not been considered as the tenants by the plaintiff, and therefore, they have not been able to deposit any rent and costs of the suit. They have, therefore, requested by that application to regularise the payment of rent and costs, as contemplated by Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay rent Act. But on this application, the lower Court has passed an order as "nazir to accept the amount. " The lower Court has failed to take into consideration the regularisation of the payment into Court by the defendants or it may be that the lower Court has disallowed that application. But on this application, the lower Court has passed an order as "nazir to accept the amount. " The lower Court has failed to take into consideration the regularisation of the payment into Court by the defendants or it may be that the lower Court has disallowed that application. Therefore, in my view, looking to the peculiar circumstances of the case the defendants cannot be said to be in arrears of more than six months rent as they have been considered as tenants only on 7-9-1979. The defendants have deposited all the arrears of rent in Court, and therefore, they can be deemed to be ready and willing to pay the rent. " ( 14 ) IT is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid discussion made by the learned appellate Judge that he held that Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent act would not apply as the dispute with regard to the standard rent was raised for the first time in the written statement and the application for depositing the rent was made on the first day of hearing. In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court, it is only when the application disputing the standard rent is made within the time as contemplated by explanation to Sec. 12 of the Bombay Rent Act that the provisions of sub-sacs. (3) and (4) of Sec. 11 are attracted. In order to avoid operation of Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act, the dispute in regard to standard rent or permitted increase must be raised at the latest before the expiry of one month from the date of service of notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Act and it is not enough to raise a dispute for the first time in written statement. Therefore Mr. Shah has rightly submitted that the observations made by the learned appellate Judge are erroneous and illegal. ( 15 ) MR. Hathi, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents herein who are the original defendants-tenants in suit premises, raised a very important question as to whether the suit filed under Sec. 12 (3) (a) is maintainable or not. He submits that for the proper maintenance of the suit under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act the condition precedent is service of valid and legal notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. He submits that for the proper maintenance of the suit under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act the condition precedent is service of valid and legal notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. He has challenged the legality of the notice under Rent Act in three-fold manner. First, he submits that though the notice at Exh. 36 dated 2-6-1967 refers to the rent of the suit premises at Rs. 16 per month, in the suit notice at Exh. 39 dated 13/11/1971 the demand made was Rs. 40 per month and therefore, the important requirement of the notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Act of demanding the standard rent and permitted increases is not complied with and hence the notice is bad. The second fold on which the notice is challenged is that in the notice nowhere the plaintiff has accepted the defendants as the tenants and unless the plaintiff has accepted the defendants as the tenants and serves the notice to the defendants as tenants demanding the standard rent, it cannot be said to be a valid notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The third fold on which the notice is challenged is that in the notice not only the mesne profits and/or rent for the period of 51 months at the rate of Rs. 40 per month are demanded, but there is also a demand for the earlier period. That earlier period is totally vague and, therefore, also the notice is bad on the ground of vagueness. He submits that even if the defendant wants to comply with the notice, he does not know whether the defendants would be accepted as tenants even on the payment of the amount demanded in the notice and even after paying the amount of 51 months rent at the rate of Rs. 40 per month he does not know whether the notice is deemed to be fully complied with or not. Therefore, he submits that the plaintiff has laid a trap of giving such inconsistent and vague notice. 40 per month he does not know whether the notice is deemed to be fully complied with or not. Therefore, he submits that the plaintiff has laid a trap of giving such inconsistent and vague notice. He also submits that even if the defendants comply with the notice, still the issue of non-compliance of the notice is open because, in the proceeding under Sec. l2 (3) (a) of the Act one can demand the entire arrears of rent irrespective of the fact as to whether the claim of the rent is time-barred or not. It may ultimately be that the Court may not pass the order of recovery of rent but, that will certainly remain as a ground for taking possession under Sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act if the notice demanding the rent of more than three years has not been complied with. ( 16 ) TO the aforesaid argument Mr. D. U. Shah, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submits that the first facet of the argument of Mr. Hatbi challenging the validity of the notice on the ground that the demand of the amount of arrears of rent is that of more than contractual rent will not be a ground for holding the notice to be invalid He submits that what is necessary is the factum of serving the notice which gives additional protection to the tenant under Sec. 12 (2) of the Act and to comply with the notice so that the suit for eviction cannot be filed. On that point, Mr. D. U. Shah has relied upon the judgment in case of modi Mohanlal v. Keshavlal Jethalal, reported in (1967) VIII GLR 814. In the said case it was observed by this Court, merely because in the notice a claim for a larger amount than the standard rent and permitted increases is made, the notice would not be rendered illegal. What is intended by the Legislature by providing for giving of a notice is that the tenant must know what was demanded from him and if the notice made it clear that he was demanding also the standard rent and the permitted increases, the notice would comply with the requirement of Sec. 12 (2)". What is intended by the Legislature by providing for giving of a notice is that the tenant must know what was demanded from him and if the notice made it clear that he was demanding also the standard rent and the permitted increases, the notice would comply with the requirement of Sec. 12 (2)". In the said case it was further held that "it may be that if by the notice, any amount is claimed which is beyond the amount of arrears of standard rent and permitted increases, the plaintiff may not be entitled to recover that amount ultimately if he were to file a suit to recover such amount. However, it is not possible to interpret this provision of law to mean that, in any case, where the demand exceeds the actual amount of standard rent and permitted increases, the notice would be rendered illegal if such a demand is in excess of such standard rent or permitted increases which may ultimately be held to be the standard rent or permitted increases. When a notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the bombay Rent Act is given for the payment of arrears of rent not at the rate of contractual rent but at a rate higher than standard rent, the notice itself does not become invalid so as to take away the right of the landlord to institute the suit one month after the notice". ( 17 ) THIS judgment has also subsequently been followed in the case of Mahant Madhavramji Durgaramji v. Ambalal Nagarji, reported in 1985 glh 361. Similar argument was advanced in the said case as is done by Mr. Hathi and to meet with such argument it was observed by Justice j. P. Desai, in paragraph 6 as under :"it is true that Sec. 12 (2) requires that demand should be of the standard rent, , but simply because a demand of more than standard rent is made, the notice does not necessarily become illegal or invalid. Hathi and to meet with such argument it was observed by Justice j. P. Desai, in paragraph 6 as under :"it is true that Sec. 12 (2) requires that demand should be of the standard rent, , but simply because a demand of more than standard rent is made, the notice does not necessarily become illegal or invalid. In the case of Labhabhai vilhaldas v. Laxmidas Vithaldas, 4 GLR 567, a learned single Judge of this court had held that when a notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control act is given for the payment of arrears of rent at the rate of contractual rent but at a rate higher than standard rent, the notice itself does not become invalid so as to take away the right of the landlord to institute the suit one month after the notice. The same view has been taken by this Court in Modi Mohanlal bhagwandas v. Shah Keshavlal Jethalal, 8 GLR 814. Hence I am not inclined to agree with the conclusion reached by the learned District Judge that the notice is illegal and invalid because more than standard rent was demanded by the said notice. "in view of the aforesaid two judgments of this Court which are binding to the single Judge, I hold that Mr. Hathis argument on this point cannot be accepted. ( 18 ) HOWEVER, Mr Hathi has very strongly argued the point of vagueness as mentioned above. I have already stated in detail about the averments made in the plaint as well as in the suit notice at Exh. 39 dated 17/11/1971 while stating the facts of the case. It is clear from these averments in the notice which averments were also reproduced in the plaint that the plaintiff has not accepted the defendants as the tenants. The plaintiff has specifically stated in the notice that in case the defendants are held as tenants, they have to pay the rent/mesne profits for 51 months and also rent/ mesne profits for the earlier period. It is true that when the notice is to be considered, it is not to be considered in a pedantic manner. It is equally true that the notice is not issued to a strange person. It is true that when the notice is to be considered, it is not to be considered in a pedantic manner. It is equally true that the notice is not issued to a strange person. Still however, one thing is certain; there must be relationship between the landlord and the tenant and landlord must accept the person to whom the notice is given as tenant if he wants to serve the notice on tenant under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay rent Act. Unless that position is clear in the notice, the notice given to him in the alternative in case the Court held the defendant as a tenant can never be said to be a valid notice to the tenant under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. It is like riding two horses at a time. In the earlier part of the notice as well as in the plaint the plaintiff did not accept the defendants as tenants meaning thereby the defendants are the trespassers. If the plaintiff is sticking to that aspect of the averments made in the plaint as well as in the notice, then, the rent Court will not have jurisdiction under Sec. 28 of the Rent Act. However, inconsistent to what he has stated in earlier averments of the plaint, he takes a somersault and makes out a case that in case the defendants are held as tenants, then he terminates the tenancy of the defendants. This is a contingent and/or conditional one When that is the position it is very difficult to say this notice as a notice to the tenant by the landlord under See. 12 (2) of the bombay Rent Act because, the plaintiff himself is not in a position to decide as to whether defendants or persons to whom the notice is served are his tenants or not. Mr. D. U. Shah feebly argued with regard to this point saying that practice of taking alternative plea is very much prevalent and when a prevalent practice is followed there is nothing wrong. This argument of mr. Mr. D. U. Shah feebly argued with regard to this point saying that practice of taking alternative plea is very much prevalent and when a prevalent practice is followed there is nothing wrong. This argument of mr. Shah cannot be accepted on the simple reason that unless a specific stand is taken by the landlord against the person to whom the notice is given that they are his tenants and that he is demanding the standard rent due from the tenants, it cannot said to be a notice under Sec. 12 (2) and when no such notice under Sec. 12 (2) is given suit under Sec. 12 (3) (a) or 12 (3) (b) is not maintainable and the rent Court will not have jurisdiction. Therefore, this appears to be a stronger ground for accepting the argument of Mr. Hathi. Mr. Hathi, however, raised another ground saying that the present plaintiff is not satisfied only by calling upon the defendants to pay up the mesne profits and/or rent for 51 months at the rate of Rs. 40 per month in the suit notice but he has also demanded for the earlier period also. What is that earlier period is vague. In that view of the matter, he has relied upon the judgment in case of Bapulal kalidas v. Bai Kashiben, reported in (1977) XVIII GLR 77. In the said case it was held that the vague notice requiring the opponent to pay all the arrears of rent and permitted increases, without indicating the actual due on that account or the point of time from which the rent and permitted increases at a specified rate are, according to the landlord, in arrears, would afford no real opportunity to the tenant to avail of the facility or benefit of making payment of the arrears due by him before he is sued in ejectment. It was further held that in fact, such notice while apparently complying with the requirement of law might prove to be a trap to draw the tenant in by leaving the door open for a controversy to be raised later on that full amount of rent and permitted increases was not tendered within the prescribed time-limit after the service of the notice, ( 19 ) IN the said case of Bapulal Kalidas (supra) the notice in question was at Exh. 37. It was issued on 5/03/1965. 37. It was issued on 5/03/1965. The notice insofar as it is material, describes the leased premises and states that the monthly rent was Rs. 23 inclusive of water tax. If he was in arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and that, therefore, he was not entitled to be continued as a tenant. The requisition in the notice ultimately was to pay up all the arrears of rent on receipt of the notice and to hand over possession of the suit premises after 15 days expiring with the end of the month of tenancy. The main question in that case was whether a notice under Sec. 12 (2) which merely demands arrears of rent by stating that the tenant was in arrears for a period of more than six months and which does not specify either the amount of rent in arrears or indicate the precise point of time from which the rent is in arrears, is ineffective in law. It was observed in the said judgment in para 6 that a vague notice requiring the tenant to pay all arrears of rent and permitted increases without indicating the actual amount due on that account or the point of time from which the rent and permitted increases at a specified rate are, according to the landlord, in arrears would afford no real opportunity to the tenant to avail of the facility or benefit of making payment of the arrears due by him before he is sued in ejectment. In fact, such notice, while apparently complying with the requirement of law, might prove to be a trap to draw the tenant in by leaving the door open for a controversy to be raised later on that full amount of rent and permitted increases was not tendered within the prescribed time-limit after the service of the notice. It is for this reason that the requirement of construing the provision of Sec. 12 (2) with strictness arise. Ultimately, in para 15 it was held, "the aforesaid discussion would show that the notice under Sec. 12 (2) served upon the petitioner in the present case is ineffective in law and that the condition precedent to the filing of the suit having thus not been satisfied, no decree under Sec. 12 (3) (a) could have been passed. ( 20 ) THE another judgment which is relied by Mr. ( 20 ) THE another judgment which is relied by Mr. Hathi is in case of Khimji Bhimji v. Taraben Laiji, reported in [1982 (2)] XXIII (2) glr 114. In the said case also the question that was referred to the division Bench was whether a notice given by the landlord precedent to the filing of the suit for possession on the ground of non-payment of rent must or must not contain a specific demand of the arrears of rent. In the said case the notice served on the tenant was at Exh. 25 on the record of the case. The notice issued on behalf of the landlady in the first paragraph informed the tenant that he had hired the premises from her at the rate of Rs. 10ft per month as rent, that he was in arrears of rent from 1-12-1973 to 30-6-1975 amounting to Rs. 1,900 that the tenant was liable to pay Rs. 253. 50 by way of education cess for the period between 20-12-1969 and 30-6-1975 and thus the tenant owed to her in all rs. 2,153. 50. The notice further proceeds to appraise the tenant of the fact that despite repeated demands, he bed not paid that amount of rent and as the amount of rent had become due for more than six months, the landlord had become entitled to evict the tenant from the rented premises on the ground of non-payment of rent. In the second paragraph, she then gave notice to the tenant that he should hand over her the possession of the rented premises on the expiry of the month of tenancy on 31-8-1975 or at any time after 15 days of the receipt of the notice when the tenant considered his month of tenancy getting over. On the facts mentioned in the notice, the Division Bench also referred to certain observations made in the case of Panchal Mohanlal Iswardas v. Maheswari mills Ltd. , reported in (1962) III GLR 575 and extracted the observations of the said judgment made at page No. 602 as under :"the sole object of giving notice under sub-sec. On the facts mentioned in the notice, the Division Bench also referred to certain observations made in the case of Panchal Mohanlal Iswardas v. Maheswari mills Ltd. , reported in (1962) III GLR 575 and extracted the observations of the said judgment made at page No. 602 as under :"the sole object of giving notice under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 12 is to afford an opportunity (obviously on eleventh hour opportunity) to the tenant to make good the default in payment of the standard rent or permitted increases so that the tenant can save the tenancy from the consequences of default by paying up the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases. This object would certainly be carried out if the notice given by the landlord to the tenant contains the demand of standard rent and permitted increases. "ultimately, it was held in that case in para 7 that the notice like Exh. 25 on the record of this case cannot be said to be a notice complying with the requirements of Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. And therefore, the matter was referred back to the learned single Judge. . ( 21 ) THE aforesaid judgments would squarely apply to the facts of the present case inasmuch as in the notice at Exh. 39 after demanding the rent at Rs. 40 a further demand was that of mesne profits and/or rent which was in arrears for which no specific period was mentioned and, therefore, the door for controversy was kept open even if the tenant paid up the rent of 51 months at the rate of Rs. 40 per month. Thus, this notice is suffering from the vice of vagueness as well as inconsistency as mentioned above, that the defendants were not accepted as the tenants by the landlord. On these grounds the notice under Sec. 12 (2) of the bombay Rent Act is bad, illegal and, therefore, the condition precedent to the filing of the suit has thus not been satisfied and, therefore, no decree for possession can be passed. ( 22 ) MR. D. U. Shah, learned Advocate for the petitioner, at the last moment has also drawn my attention to the judgment of Justice y. B. Bhatt delivered in Civil Revision Application No. 1715 of 1979 where the plaintiff is common and the defendants are different and similar notice was given. ( 22 ) MR. D. U. Shah, learned Advocate for the petitioner, at the last moment has also drawn my attention to the judgment of Justice y. B. Bhatt delivered in Civil Revision Application No. 1715 of 1979 where the plaintiff is common and the defendants are different and similar notice was given. He also pointed out in the said similar notices were held to be valid in the said judgment. It may be mentioned that on perusal of the said notice it appears that the said notice was also conditional notice not accepting Parmar Kanji Bhanjj, applicant, as tenant and it was also alleged that his possession was illegal. It was also averred that for any reason if he is declared tenant then, he was in arrears of rent of 51 months at the rate of Rs. 51 per month and accordingly Rs. 153 were demanded from him. Alongwith demand of rent there was also demand of other amount due from him for the earlier period and the notice was also given to him in the alternative. Now that notice was at Exh. 36. In the said case referring to the said notice the learned Judge at para 7 observed as under :"i am unable to accept the contention on behalf of the petitioner that the suit must fail inasmuch as the suit notice was illegal and bad in law since it was vague in three aspects. It was contended that it was vague because it did not clearly set out or assert that the defendant had been accepted as a tenant by the plaintiff in support of the suit property. Secondly, it was vague in so far as it did not mention the date of commencement of the tenancy and in the third instance it was vague in so far as the point of time as regards the termination of the tenancy has not been specified with sufficient clarity. I am afraid, even these contentions cannot be sustained in view of the clear and logical findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. This notice, and its legality and validity has been examined in considerable detail by the lower appellate court, and the said Court has rightly come to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the suit notice is vague in any material particulars. This notice, and its legality and validity has been examined in considerable detail by the lower appellate court, and the said Court has rightly come to the conclusion that it cannot be said that the suit notice is vague in any material particulars. I am in complete agreement with the observations of the lower appellate Court that the fundamental rules regarding statutory notices is that they must be fairly clear, that it should give an idea to the recipient as to what the allegations are, and as to what is expected of the recipient in regard to the claim made in the notice. I have myself perused carefully the suit notice in question at Exh. 36, a copy whereof has been placed on record of this revision by the learned Counssi for the petitioner. On a total consideration of this notice I ana in complete agreement with the findings of the appellate Court to the effect that the Slid notice cannot be said to be illegal, bad in law or is such which does not comply with the requirement of Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act. " ( 23 ) RELYING on this observation, Mr. Shah submitted that in this case also the notice should be held to be legal and valid. It is merely a decision or finding on the point of the notice in the case. It does not lay down a law or ratio which can work as a precedent in subsequent case. It may be stated that before the said learned Judge the judgments which are referred to hereinabove and particularly that of the Division Bench were not placed. The judgment delivered by the Division Bench as well as other judgment reported in 18 GLR 77 are equally binding to the single Judge. I have considered the legality of the notice in the light of those judgments and accordingly it cannot be said that, though the notice is similar to that of the notice issued in CRA 1715 of 1979, the same is a valid notice as required under Sec. 12 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act for the reasons stated earlier. ( 24 ) NO other arguments are advanced. Hence, the revision application is dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. .