Judgment S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. Heard the counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. Felling aggrieved by a decree passed by the Judge Small Causes Court in S.C. Suit no. 294 of 1984 in which a decree of eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute and for recovery of arrears of rent and demages for use and occupation has been passed a revision was filed by him under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act which was dismissed by the revisional Court. Being aggrieved the petitioner tenant has now approached this Court for redress seeking reversal of the decree. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the tenant petitioner was entitled to the protection envisaged under section 20(4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972) which provides that in any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of Sub-section (2) if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders to the landlord, the entire amount of rent and demages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation have calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum and the landlords' costs of the suit in respect thereof, the Court may in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. The submission of the learned counsel is that on the findings recorded by the trial court which have not been disturbed by the revisional court, there was a short fall of Rs. 57.49 p, only which was also deposited though belatedly on 11-4-85. It has been contended that this short fall had occurred on account of the wrong calculation made by the clerk of the defendant's counsel and the delay in making the deposit was liable to be condoned and extending the benefit of the aforesaid provision to the defendant he ought to have been relieved against his liability for eviction. 4. It has been contended that this short fall had occurred on account of the wrong calculation made by the clerk of the defendant's counsel and the delay in making the deposit was liable to be condoned and extending the benefit of the aforesaid provision to the defendant he ought to have been relieved against his liability for eviction. 4. The trial court, however, being of the view that in requirements contemplated under section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 had not been complied with, refused to extend the benefit available thereunder to the defendant. In support of its conclusion the trial court placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Ram Nath v. Angan, 1984 ARC 290. The finding of the trial court on the above question was affirmed in revision. A perusal of the provisions contained in section 20(4) of the U.P. Act on 13 of 1972 clearly indicates that in case the requisite conditions contemplated thereunder are satisfied, the court may in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on the ground envisaged under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 of the Act pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground. The question as to whether the word 'may' as used in the aforesaid provision is to be read as 'shall' came up for consideration in several decisions. However, in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Vijai Laxmi Gangal v. Mahendra Pratap Garg, (1985) 3 SCC 364 wherein the difference in the phraseology used in section 20(4) of the Act and section 39 of the said Act was noticed, it is apparent that the relief contemplated under section 20(4) of the Act, is purely discretionary suggesting thereby that the word 'may' as used therein cannot be read as 'shall' and thus, make the provision mandatory. Although in the aforesaid decision the Supreme Court has observed that it is not possible to lay down any broad and general proposition that the discretionary relief should be denied to the tenant in all cases where he fails to prove his case, regarding the quantum,of rent within the time as required by section 20(4) of the Act yet in another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mangal Sen v. Kanchhid Mal, (1981) 4 SCC 117 , it was clearly observed that in a case where the tenant came up with the plea that there was no default by him in the payment of rent, disputing the existence of any arrears of rent and denying that there had been a default, the deposit even if was made on the date of the first hearing, was not an unconditional tender of the amount for payment to the landlord. 5. In the present case, on the concurrent findings recorded by both the courts below, it is apparent that the defendant tenant had not paid the rent for the period subsequent to 19-2-1991. In the written statement, however, the defendant tenant had came up with a clear case that he was not in arrears of rent and was not a defaulter as no amount of rent was due as claimed by the plaintiff. This contention of the defendant was found by the courts below to be false. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mangal Sen (supra) clearly stands attracted and the deposite of the amount seeking the benefit of section 20(4) cannot be deemed to be unconditional as contemplated therein. 6. Further, on the own showing of the petitioner the re was a short fall of Rs. 57-46 P. while making the deposite required to be made as contemplated under the provisions contained in section 20(4) of the Act by the date stipulated therein This court in its decision in the case of Sri Chand Gupta v. Madan Lal, 1973 ALJ 635, after considering the observations made by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of M/s. Janta Cycle and Motor Mart v. Assistant Commissioner, 1968 ALJ 547 had observed that section 5 of the Limitation Act applies only to those cases where a delay has occurred in filing an appeal or application. Since section 20(4) of U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 does not contemplated the filing of any application was this section requires only a deposit being made within the stipulated time, the question of extending the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot rise, since making of a deposit does not tantamount to the filing of the application. It is therefore obvious that section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be pressed into service to get the delay in making the requisite deposite-envisaged under section 20(4) of the Act condoned. On the reasonings contained in the aforesaid decision even section 151 of the CPC cannot be invoked to circumvent the provision contained under section 20(4) of the Act so far as the deposite of the requisite amount by the date specified therein is concerned. It is, therefore, not open to the Court to extend the period of limitation under section 151 of the CPC for making the requisite deposit. It has to be remembered that the ends of justice ordinarily can never require that a statutory provision be by passed by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. 7. Taking into consideration the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court and this Court I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, on the findings recorded by the court below, the defendant-petitioner was not entitled to the benefit available under section 20(4) of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1972 and there is no such infirmity in the aforesaid finding recorded by the courts below which may justify any interference therein. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that the finding of the court below on the question relating to the service of the notice contemplated under section 213(2) of the Act on the defendant is vitiated, in law. The learned counsel has tried to assail the concurrent finding of the courts below upholding the claim of the plaintiff that the notice in dispute had been duly served in accordance with the law. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the courts below have upheld service of the notice on the basis of the endorsement of refusal made by the postman. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the courts below have upheld service of the notice on the basis of the endorsement of refusal made by the postman. The contention raised is that the defendant had categorically denied the service of the notice asserting that the endorsement of refusal was incorrect and he had never refused to accept the notice. It has further been urged that in fact of such a denial it was incumbent on the plaintiff to produce the postman and his failure to do so was fatal. I have examined above submission and perused the record carefully. 9. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of Shiv Dutt Singh v. Ram Dass, AIR 1980 Alld. 280, Gur Bauhan Singh v. Dharam Samaj Society, AIR 1991 Alld. 209 and Sagar v. V. Additional District Judge Lucknor, 1986 (I) ARC 475. In the case of Shiv Dutt Singh (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court had held that the presumption of service of notice available under the provisions; of section 20 of the General Clauses Act or section 114 of the Evidence Act could be rebutted by the solitary statement on oath by the defendant and it was not necessary that it must always be corroborated by an independent evidence before it could be accepted by the court of law. In the case of Gur Bachan Singh another learned Single Judge of this Court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff in order to prove the endorsement of refusal to produce the postman and even though the postman may not have been produced by the plaintiff the presumption of service of notice and its refusal would be available to the plaintiff under the provisions of section 114 of the Evidence Act and also under section 27 of the General Clauses Act but where the defendant stated on oath that the postman had not served the notice on him and the defendant had not at all been cross-examined on the aforesaid point by the plaintiff. The presumption of service of notice could be deemed to have been rebutted sufficiently and the non-production of the postman or any other evidence to show that the defendant was not deposing the truth was fatal. The presumption of service of notice could be deemed to have been rebutted sufficiently and the non-production of the postman or any other evidence to show that the defendant was not deposing the truth was fatal. The learned Single Judge in this case relied upon the decisions of Hoob Lal v. Bhudeo Prasad Sharma, 1980 ALJ 437, Amarnath v. Smt. Champa Devi, 1978 ALR 90, Ram Nakshatra v. Girdhar Das Kashya, 1979, U.P. RCC 5 for holding that the solitary statement of the defendant containing the denial of tendering the notice and assertion that he never refused it was sufficient to rebut the presumption. In the case of Sagar (supra) another learned Single Judge of this Court expressed a similar opinion observing that the presumption available under section 114 of the Evidence Act or section 27 of the General Clauses Act may be rebutted by the solitary statement of the defendant. 10. It may, however, be noticed that the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of Shiv Dutt Singh (supra) as well as the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Jagat Ram Khullar v. Battumal, AIR 1976 Delhi 111 which decisions were relied upon in the case of Gur Bachan Singh (supra) was challenged before the Apex Court in the case of Anil Kumar v. Nanak Chandra Varma, AIR 1990 SC 1215 . The Honourable Supreme Court in its aforesaid decision did not approve of the view taken in the decisions referred to hereinbefore and observed that there could be no hard and fast rule and the unchallenged testimony of a tenant in certain cases may be sufficient to rebut the presumption but if the testimony of the tenant itself was inherently unreliable the position may be different. It was further observed by the Apex Court that it was always a question of fact in each case whether there was sufficient evidence from the tenant to discharge the initial burden. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) upheld the finding of the trial court wherein the solitary denial of the tenant was not held to be sufficient to rebut the presumption. The Apex Court in its decision in the case of Anil Kumar (supra) upheld the finding of the trial court wherein the solitary denial of the tenant was not held to be sufficient to rebut the presumption. It has been asserted by the counsel for the petitioner that the defendant could not be asked to lead negative evidence and on this view of the matter his bare denial on oath was more than sufficient for rebutting the presumption of service of notice. 11. The Court in its decision in the case of Jagdish Saran Gupta v. II Additional District Judge, Moradabad, 1993 ACJ 222 had clarified that the rule that burden rests on the person who makes the affirmative allegation is not always a true-test. There are many exceptions to this proposition. The burden also rests on a person who has a negative assertion to make. The amount of evidence required to shift the burden, however, depends on the circumstances of each case. Noticing the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K.S. Nanji and Co. v. Jata Shankar Doss, AIR 1991 SC 1474 it was indicated that the burden of proof in the sense of adducing evidence shifts from time to time having regard to the evidence adduced by one party or the other or the presumptions of facts or law raised in favour of one or the other. 12. In the circumstances indicated above once a presumption of law becomes available in favour of the plaintiff a heavy burden of proof in the sense of adducing evidence stands cast upon the defendant. In the case in hand the trial court after appraisal of the evidence and materials on record accepted the oral evidence tendered by the plaintiff to be truthful and worthy of credence and refused to rely upon the testimony of the defendant tenant giving cogent reasons for the same which do not appear to suffer from any legal infirmity. It may further be noticed that the only basis on which the presumptation of service of notice was sought to be rebutted was that on the date when the notice is said to have been tendered and refused the defendant tenant was not at his residence but at his shop. The fact that he was on that particular date at his shop and not at his residence could not be corroborated by any independent evidence. The fact that he was on that particular date at his shop and not at his residence could not be corroborated by any independent evidence. The defendant had admitted that the address on which the notice had been sent was correct and the postman concerned had no enmity with him and all the letters sent to him at the address on which the notice in question had been sent were duly delivered to him. He had also admitted that he had come to know just after four or five days that the postman had returned the notice making an endorsement of refusal thereon. The trial court, as has already been indicated above did not believe the case of the defendant and proceeded to hold on an appraisal of evidence on record that the presumption of service of notice in question had not been rebutted. This finding has been affirmed in revision. As pointed out by the Apex Court in the decision in the case of Anil Kumar (Supra) the finding on this question is a finding of fact. Learned' counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any such legal infirmity in this concurrent finding of fact, that the notice had been refused, which could justify any interference by this court while' exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. In view of the conclusions indicated herein before this writ petition lacks merit and deserves to be and is hereby, dismissed. Petition dismissed.