P. K. Babri ( 1 ) THIS regular second appeal has been broughtagainst judgment and decree dated 5/10/1976, of an Additional Districtjudge by which he had dismissed the appeal brought by the appellant againstthe judgment and decree dated 15/03/1974, of Sub-Judge, 1st Class,delhi, by which the suit of the respondent brought against the appellant inrespect of recovery of possession of two plots measuring 136 x 176 and155 x 43 as per plans Ex. P-3 and P-4 was decreed. There was another plotmeasuring 150 x 155 depicted in plan Ex. P-6 which was also let out to theappellant separately and a separate suit was brought for getting eviction ofthe appellant from that plot and that suit was also decreed by the samejudgment. No dispute remains in respect of the said plot. This appealpertains only in respect of the decree passed in respect of the two plots. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are that these two vacant plots hadbeen let out to the appellant at the yearly rental of Rs. 300. 00 and Rs. 100. 00respectively on 21/03/1954 and the tenancy in respect of these two plotsstood terminated by giving a notice of termination dated 16/08/1966. Inthe simple suit seeking ejectment from the two plots after termination of thetenancy of the appellant which was prior to the enforcement of the Transferof Property Act in Delhi, the appellant came up with the plea that the saidplots had been let out to him for agricultural purposes inasmuch as he hadbeen given permission to cultivate the land for growing flowers and for keeping the flower pots and thus, in view of the provisions of the Punjab Tenancyact, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. ( 3 ) THE respondent in the plaint has not specified any letting purposeof the said plots and in replication the respondent took the plea that in factthese plots had not been let out for the aforesaid purpose mentioned in thewritten statement still the respondent did not in the replication make it clearas to if the plots were not let out for growing flowers, for what purpose thesaid plots had been let out, The appellant had taken various other pleas inresisting the suit but having failed in both the Courts below, in this appealthe learned Counsel for the appellant has challenged the impugned judgmentand decree only on the ground that the plots having been let out for agricultural purposes, the provisions of Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887, as applicableto Delhi, were applicable and the plots were covered by the definition of landgiven in Section 4 (1) of the said Act and thus, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for eviction of the appellant. ( 4 ) THE first question to be decided in the present appeal is as to forwhat purpose the plots had been let out to the appellant and secondly, if theplots are proved to have been let out for agricultural purposes, whether theplots are covered by the definition of land given in Section 4 (1) of the saidact. ( 5 ) AS far as letting purpose is concerned, the finding is so obviousfrom the pleadings that I have not been able to appreciate the finding of thelearned Sub-Judge that the plots had not been let out for growing flowersand had been let out only for keeping flower pots. In my opinion, it wasincumbent upon the respondent to have taken a specific plea in the pleadingas to for what purpose actually the plots had been let out. Mere saying andpleading that the vacant plots had been let out would not have the effect ofcontroverting the plea of the appellant taken in the written statement thatthe plots had been let out for growing the flowers which is an agriculturalpurpose. Mere saying andpleading that the vacant plots had been let out would not have the effect ofcontroverting the plea of the appellant taken in the written statement thatthe plots had been let out for growing the flowers which is an agriculturalpurpose. At any rate, both the Courts below have held that the plots havebeen used for growing the flowers at all times and if that is so, the lettingpurpose was so obvious in absence of any written agreement of lease havingbeen executed in favour of the appellant showing the letting purpose that infact, the plots must have been let out for growing flowers and keeping theflower pots which is a nursery business and the finding of the learned Sub-Judge to the contrary cannot be sustained as it is based on mis-interpretingthe pleadings of the parties. ( 6 ) AS a matter of fact, the first Appellate Court has not endorsed thisfinding of the lower Court that the plots had been let out only for keepingflower pots although in one sentence the lower appellate Court had mentionedthat there is evidence with regard to the same but still after noticing that theplots have been used for growing flowers the lower Appellate Court had leftthe matter at that and had not given any definite finding either way. Thejudgment of the lower Appellate Court is mostly based on the interpretationof the land as given in Section 4 (1) of the said Act. Be that as it may, Ihold that the plots in question had been let out for growing flowers. If that isso, the legal inference is obvious that growing of flowers being a part ofhorticulture is included in the definition of "agriculture". The earliest judgment given on this point is of Division Bench of Madras High Court in thecase of Pavadai Pathan and Anr. v. Ramaswami Chetti and Ors. , AIR 1922madras 351. In this judgment the definitions of "agriculture" appearing inwebster s dictionary and Oxford dictionary and other dictionaries have beentaken note of. The question which arose for decision before the Divisionbench was whether the lease of land granted for growing casuarina treescould be termed as an "agricultural lease" or not within the purview ofsection 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this judgment the definitions of "agriculture" appearing inwebster s dictionary and Oxford dictionary and other dictionaries have beentaken note of. The question which arose for decision before the Divisionbench was whether the lease of land granted for growing casuarina treescould be termed as an "agricultural lease" or not within the purview ofsection 117 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was held that the "agriculture" connotes the raising of useful or valuable products which derive nutriment from the soil with the aid of human labour and skill and it was heldthat the rearing of casuarina plantation is covered by the definition of"agriculture" which requires prepartion of the ground and subsequent careby watering the plants. ( 7 ) A Division Bench of Lahore High Court in Ujagar Singh and Anr. v. Bhagwana, AIR 1936 Lahore 780. was considering the question whethera garden could be termed as a land for purpose of Punjab Tenancy Act. Itwas held that a fruit garden is a land within the meaning of the definitiongiven in that Act. The East Punjab High Court in the case of Dr. Daultsiting v. Hazard Singh and Ors, AIR 1950 East Punjab 90, considered thequestion whether a particular agricultural land which has been used for agriculture purposes earlier ceases to be land covered by definition of Section 4 (1)if it is subsequently included as part of Village Abadi, It was held that thecharacter of the land being agricultural would not cease to remain so on themere fact that the same has been included in Village Abadi. ( 8 ) COMMISSIONER of Income-tax v. Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, AIR1957 SC 768, was dealing with the definition of "agricultural income" asappearing in the Income-tax Act. That definition has a different connotationand would not be of any help in deciding whether the land in question canbe treated as let out for agricultural purposes. The Supreme Court, however,has expressed that the term "agriculture" in various dictionaries has beenused both in the narrow sense of cultivation of the filed and the wider senseof comprising all activities in relation to the land including horticulture,forestry, breeding and rearing of livestock, dairing, butter and cheese-making,husbandry, etc. Whether the narrower sense of the term "agriculture"should be adopted or not in a particular case depends upon the provisions ofthe various statutes in which the definition occurs. Whether the narrower sense of the term "agriculture"should be adopted or not in a particular case depends upon the provisions ofthe various statutes in which the definition occurs. In para 95 of the judgment the Supreme Court has held that the primary sense in which the term"agriculture" if understood is agar, i. e. field and cultivation, which mean thecultivation of the field and the term is understood only in that sense, agriculture would be restricted only to cultivation of the land in the strict sense ofthe term meaning thereby, tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planitngand similar operations on the land. If we go by this definition of "agriculture" given in this judgment, it is evident that growing of flowers wouldrequire tilling of the land and plantation of seeds and after the flower plantssprout, they require weeding, digging the soil around the growth, removal ofundesirable under-growths and all operations which foster the growth andpreserve the same not only from insects and pests but also from depradationfrom outside. The growing of flowers would also include tending, pruning,cutting, harvesting and rendering the produce fit for the market. So, by nostretch of reasoning it can be held that growing of flowers as a nursery wouldnot amount to agriculture purpose. I hold that in the present case the plotshad been let out to the appellant for agricultural purpose. ( 9 ) THE most material question to be decided is whether the plots inquestion could be deemed to be covered by definition of land given insection 4 (1) of the Punjab Tenancy Act. Section 4 (1) reads as follows : "land means land which is not occupied as the site of anybuilding in a town or village and is occupied or has been let out foragricultural purpose or for purposes subservient to agriculture or forfoster and includes the sites of buildings and other structures of suchland. If a particular plot is occupied as a site of any building evenif it is used for agriculture purpose, the same would not be coveredby the definition of land given in Section 4 (1 ). " ( 10 ) THE plots in question are part of a 7. 5 acres of land given to therespondent at first under agreement for lease dated 8/10/1945 andthereafter under a regular perpetual lease-deed dated 19/05/1969, whichwas effective from 10/08/1943. " ( 10 ) THE plots in question are part of a 7. 5 acres of land given to therespondent at first under agreement for lease dated 8/10/1945 andthereafter under a regular perpetual lease-deed dated 19/05/1969, whichwas effective from 10/08/1943. The agreement for lease, certified copyof which is proved in the Trial Court Ex. PW-4/1, shows that the lease isintended to be granted for the purpose only for building and executing worksfor the purpose of constructing residential blocks of flats. Clause 7 of thesubsequent lease deed Ex. PW-4/3 also makes it clear that the said landcould not be used for trade or business or for any purpose other than that ofblocks of residential flats. So, the terms of the said two documentsabundandly make it clear that the whole of the land including the plots inquestion were given in the urban area for purposes or constructing residentialflats. So, it cannot be held that the plots in question are not occupied as thesite of any building in a town. If that is so, the plots in question though letout for agricultural purposes, yet are not covered by the definition of landgiven in the said statute. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that may be thesaid land had been given as a site for constructing residential blocks yet afterthe building had been constructed on the basis of the agreement for lease,the President of India had granted a lease deed in 1969 when the plots inquestion had been already let out to the appellant by the respondent foragricultural purposes and he would like me to hold that the plots would notbe deemed to be occupied as the site for building in a town. I do not findany merit in this contention. The terms of the agreement for the lease andthe subsequent lease-deed make it evident that the whole of the land including these plots was meant as a site of building in a town of Delhi even priorto the letting in question. Hence, the ratio in the case of Dr. Daulat Singh (supra) is not applicable in the present case. If that is so, it is evident thatthese plots are not covered by the definition of land given in Section 4 (1) ofthe Punjab Tenancy Act. ( 12 ) IN view of the above discussion, I find no merit in this appealwhich I, hereby, dismiss with costs. Daulat Singh (supra) is not applicable in the present case. If that is so, it is evident thatthese plots are not covered by the definition of land given in Section 4 (1) ofthe Punjab Tenancy Act. ( 12 ) IN view of the above discussion, I find no merit in this appealwhich I, hereby, dismiss with costs. The appellant is given one month timefor complying with the decree.