S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants in these four Letters Patent appeals are the petitioners in the Special Civil Application, out of which they arise. We propose to refer to the appellants as petitioners in this judgment of ours. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are teachers in Government Colleges. The Government colleges are affiliated to the Gujarat University. There is no dispute that the petitioners are Government servants. As such, they would be governed by the bombay Civil Services Rules, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules", framed under Art. 309 of the Constitution of India. Rule 161 of the Rules prescribes the age of superannuation of Government servants of the category of the petitioners as 58 years. The petitioners, the said Rule governing, cannot be in service beyond the age of 58 years but, they are in the field of coveting the age of 60 years for superannuation on the ground that the Government Colleges, in which they are working are affiliated to the Gujarat University, and as per the conditions of service prescribed by the authority under the Gujarat University Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Act", governing the Gujarat University, the age of superannuation of teachers in the affiliated Colleges would be 60 years. For this purpose, the petitioners place reliance on the Resolution of the Executive council dated 20-8-1977. But for affiliation to the Gujarat University, the government Colleges in which the petitioners are working, service-wise of their staff, teaching and non-teaching, have nothing to do with the Gujarat university. The affiliation is the Jink. It is true that the Gujarat University, could make statutes through the University Court; pass Resolutions and ordinances through Executive Council, and pass Resolutions and Regulations through the Academic Council. It is equally true that under Sec. 20 clause (xx), the Executive Council of the Gujarat University could issue instructions for ensuring proper conditions of service of teaching and non-teaching staff of the affiliated Colleges and under Sec. 20 clause (xxxix), the Executive council could regulate the conditions of service of teaching and non-teaching staff of the affiliated Colleges. But these conditions of service to be prescribed by the Executive Council of the Gujarat University for the staff of the affiliated Colleges, must be made binding on the affiliated-Colleges. That could be done only by way of condition for affiliation. But these conditions of service to be prescribed by the Executive Council of the Gujarat University for the staff of the affiliated Colleges, must be made binding on the affiliated-Colleges. That could be done only by way of condition for affiliation. The provision therefor is found under Sec. 33 (5) (j) of the Act which reads as follows :"33 (5) (J) : that the College shall comply with the Statutes, Ordinances and regulations providing for conditions of service including salary scales and allowances, of the teaching and other academic and non-academic staff of an affiliated College. "but as we could see from the extract, the said provision specifically says that the affiliated Colleges are bound to comply with the conditions of service provided or prescribed by Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations, hence, if the affiliated Colleges are to be made bound by any prescription concerning the conditions of service for their staff made by the Gujarat university, it could be done only through Statues, Ordinances and Regulations, and not by Resolutions. Here we have only a Resolution of the Executive council, speaking on the subject. Obviously, it would not bind the affiliated colleges. ( 3 ) WE are not in the field of finding out as to whether the executive Council of the Gujarat University could act besides through Ordinances. We have already noticed that the Executive council could also make Resolutions and those Resolutions could prescribe conditions of service for the staff of the affiliated Colleges. But, only if the conditions of service for the affiliated Colleges are prescribed through Statues, ordinances and Regulations, they could be made binding on the affiliated colleges. That is the mandate of Sec. 33 (5) (j) of the Act. We cannot undo what the Statute has done, however liberal our mind may proceed to think towards the pleas of the petitioners. Plainly speaking the exercise of power could fruition into a binding result, only if exercised as per the mandate of the Statute. If the authority ewpowered could prescribe conditions of service of the staff of the affiliated Colleges only through the above processes or any of them permissible for it, certainly they must be held to be binding on the affiliated Colleges, be they so Government Colleges. But, this crucial link is lacking. ( 4 ) IN the pronouncement of Ahmedabad Kelavani Trust v. State of Gujarat and Ors. But, this crucial link is lacking. ( 4 ) IN the pronouncement of Ahmedabad Kelavani Trust v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , XIX (1978) GLR 671, to which our attention has been drawn, a bench of this Court opined that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act, which says that the Executive Council cannot act except by Ordinances. As already stated, we are not on the propriety of the Executive Council acting through proceedings other than Ordinances. Whatever power, it has been vested with, certainly it can exercise that power. We are here squarely on the question concerning the prescriptions of conditions of service of staff of the affiliated colleges getting burdened or made binding on the affiliated Colleges, in a manner known to law. Section 33 (5) (j) is the law speaking on the subject. In Ahmedabad Kelavani Trust v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , XIX (1978) GLR 671, the factual position taken note of by the Bench of this Court was that the Management through the Association, of which it was a member invited the Government to formally declare the guidelines for the specified purposes and there was recommendation by the Academic Council and pursuant to it, the Government formulated the guidelines and they were adopted by the executive Council, which issued the instructions. Under those circumstances, the Bench held that there was no substance in the contention of the management that the Executive Council cannot enforce guidelines. We have no occassion to deal with a case, like the one dealt with by the Bench in ahmedabad Kelavani Trust v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , XIX (1978) GLR 671. In the present case, we are left only with the Resolution of the Executive council. That would not plainly come within the purview of Sec. 33 (5) (j) of the Act so as to be made binding on the Government Colleges, in which the petitioners are working, and which colleges are, of course, affiliated to the Gujarat University. ( 5 ) PRACTICALLY, the above discussion settles the issue and negatives the pleas of the petitioners to insist for the age of superannuation happening only on their completing 60 years. However, we must advert to another line of thinking put forth before us by Mr. Girish Patel, followed by mr. ( 5 ) PRACTICALLY, the above discussion settles the issue and negatives the pleas of the petitioners to insist for the age of superannuation happening only on their completing 60 years. However, we must advert to another line of thinking put forth before us by Mr. Girish Patel, followed by mr. B. P. Tanna, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, that the resolution of the Executive Council prescribing the age of superannuation as 60 years for the staff of the affiliated Colleges having been made pursuant to the powers vested in the Executive Council therefor under sec. 20 - Clauses (xx) and (xxxix) of the Act, it must take charge of the field as a provision made in that behalf under the Act enacted by the State of Gujarat under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution of india and the Rules prescribing the age of superannuation at 58, must give way to this Resolution. There is a fallacy in this line of thinking. It is true that what happened at the hands of the Executive Council by way of the resolution is traceable to the statutory provisions, as noted above. But, the question that relevantly arises for our consideration is, is the Act a piece of legislation governing to regulate recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State. The Rules are those made under the Proviso to art. 309 to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of such persons. There is no dispute that the petitioners will fall within the category of such persons only. The Act, certainly, would not come within the purview of an Act to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of such persons. We have no ambiguity in our mind that the Act is not a piece of legislation governing this subject, namely, State Public Services. The Act is one concerned with the subject of Education including university. There is ample discussion on this issue in the order of the learned single Judge and we fully endorse and adopt it. A similar question arose before the Apex Court in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of rajasthan and Ors. The Act is one concerned with the subject of Education including university. There is ample discussion on this issue in the order of the learned single Judge and we fully endorse and adopt it. A similar question arose before the Apex Court in Dr. Ram Pal Chaturvedi v. State of rajasthan and Ors. , 1970 (1) SCC 75 and there, the distinction has been succinctly brought out that the Ordinance, constituting or incorporating the university of Rajputana, the name subsequently changed into University of rajasthan, would not be a provision under an Act, regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed under the Rajasthan Medical service, as contemplated by Art. 309 of the Constitution and Rajasthan medical Service (Collagiate Branch) Rules alone will hold the field on the question of teaching experience of the personnel governed by the said Rules, as against the Ordinance. The endeavour to advance a contrary theory so as to bring the subject within the ambit of Entry 41 in List II of the seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which deals with the subject, inter alia, of State Public Services was repelled by the Apex Court. It was pointed out that the subject of the Ordinance would fall only under entry 11, as it stood then, in List II, which Entry dealt with the subject of education, including University. It must be noticed that Entry 11 has been deleted from List II with effect from 3-1-1977 and has been incorporated in Entry 25 in List III. The pronouncement of the Apex Court speaking on the subject and guiding us in the manner noted above does not enable us to accept the theory put forth by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Resolution of the Executive Council of the Gujarat university, referred to above, must hold the field and the Rules must give way for it. ( 6 ) THERE was also an endeavour on the part of the learned Counsel for the petitioners to say that merely because the petitioners are Government servants working in Government Colleges, they could not be denied the benefit of the provisions, which got enacted under the Act covering the staff of the affiliated Colleges as a whole. A parity was ought to be drawn between cases, which held that Labour Law Legislations would also apply to Government servants. A parity was ought to be drawn between cases, which held that Labour Law Legislations would also apply to Government servants. In this behalf, our attention was drawn to the following pronouncements : (i) The State of Rajasthan v. Kailash Chandra Jain and Anr. , 1973 Lab. IC 221; and (ii) The State of Bihar v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna and Ors. , 1977 0 Labic 803 . We do not think that we could draw any inspiration from these pronouncements. In those cases, the applicability of the Labour Law legislations was upheld and the matters were proceeded with on that basis. Such is not the position here. The very applicability and enforceability of the Resolution have been found against. ( 7 ) BEFORE we part with the case, we must here record the submissions made by Miss Rekha M. Doshit, learned Counsel for the respondents, that the Government Colleges though affiliated to the Gujarat University have been consciously kept out of the provisions of the Act in many fields and viewed in that background also, the teachers in the Government Colleges though affiliated to the Gujarat University clamouring and coveting for the condition of service regarding age of superannuation, set forth in an inefficacious resolution do not deserve any encouragement. In this connection miss Rekha M. Doshit, learned Counsel for the respondents, drew our attention to Sec. 33 (5) (a) and (i), whereunder Government College or a college maintained by the Government has been excluded from the obligations of having a Governing Body, and having the Principal and members of teaching staff recruited through a Selection Committee. Under Sec. 33a, which speaks about affiliated Colleges to be under the Management of governing Bodies and having Selection Committees, a Government College or college maintained by the Government stands excluded. There are ordinances made, obviously, by the Executive Council under the Act; and ordinance 97, speaking on the subject of recruitment, has kept out of its purview Government Colleges or Colleges maintained by the Government. Ordinance 172 enacting "the College/institution Teachers Conditions of service (Conduct and Discipline) Rules Ordinance, 1985 has by its very preamble, excluded from its purview Government Colleges/institutions or colleges/institutions maintained by the Government. Clause (15) thereo , which speaks about the age of retirement has also excluded Governmen colleges. Ordinance 172 enacting "the College/institution Teachers Conditions of service (Conduct and Discipline) Rules Ordinance, 1985 has by its very preamble, excluded from its purview Government Colleges/institutions or colleges/institutions maintained by the Government. Clause (15) thereo , which speaks about the age of retirement has also excluded Governmen colleges. Here, we must note that there is a doubt which has not been larified by either side as to when exactly Ordinance 172 came to be en cted. But, that does not alter the position, because even if Ordinance 1 2 was there earlier, it could not be availed of by the petitioners, becau e Government Colleges or colleges maintained by it stand excluded from its purvie as noted above. Our attention was also drawn to Sec. 59a, excludin the provisions of Sec. 51a concerning dismissal, removal and reduction nd termination of service of staff of college, etc. and Sec. 52a conc rning reference of dispute from recognised or approved institution or it staff members to Tribunal of Arbitration from their application to government Colleges. There is a special enactment: called "the Gujarat Affi iated Colleges Tribunal Act, 1982" and we find that Sec. 82 has excluded the application of the provisions of that Statute to the employees of the college owned by the Government. We are asked to take note of these features only for the purpose of saying that nothing unusual has happened for the petitioners, who are Government servants working in Government colleges though affiliated to the Gujarat University. But the major hurdle has been already noted, namely, there is no Statute, Ordinance or Regulation speaking on the subject of superannuation for the teaching staff of the affiliated Colleges, be they so Governmental, so as to be binding on the affiliated Colleges under Sec. 33 (5) (j) of the Act. ( 8 ) THE learned single Judge, in his order, subject-matter of these Letters patent Appeals, has taken a very arduous way in arriving at the same conclusion, as we have done. But de hors the method of reasoning, we have also reached the same conclusion and we have not found a warrant to accept the pleas of the petitioners to have their age of superannuation fixed at 60. ( 9 ) THUS, concurring with the decision of the learned single Judge, we dismiss these Letters Patent Appeals. We make no order as to costs. .