P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) THIS petition is directed against order of the Rentcontrol Tribunal dated 9/04/1991, by which he had dismissed the appealfiled against the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 7/02/1991, by which he had passed an interim order under Section 15 (1) of thedelhi Rent Control Act, requiring the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent forthe period 1/04/1987, at the rate of Rs. 500. 00 per month, uptodate withinone month and continue to deposit month to month rent at the same rate tillthe disposal of the petition brought on the ground of non-payment of rent. ( 2 ) UNDISPUTED facts of the case are that Respondent No. 1smt. Suraj Kumari had let out the premises in question to Shri Chander Bhanaggarwal who died in the year 1973 and after his death his son Shri Vinodaggarwal was accepted as tenant and thereafter in 1974 the petitioner, aprivate limited company, was accepted as tenant, it appears that agreementfor sale dated 5/10/1974, was entered into between Smt. Suraj Kumarias vendor and Smt. Urvashi Aggarwal and her two sons, namely, Rajivaggarwal and Sanjeev Aggarwal, minors, as prospective vendees in respect ofthe property in question. The whole of the property including the demisedpremises was agreed to be sold to them for a consideration of Rs. 1,85,000. 00. The said sale price was to be paid in instalments and the first instalment ofrs. 20,000. 00 was to be paid on signing of the agreement and the secondinstalment of Rs. 50,000. 00 was to be paid on or before 31/10/1974 andthe balance amount was to be paid at the rate of 7,000. 00 per month commencing from first week of January, 1975 onwards. ( 3 ) THE petitioner has set up in the written statement that by virtueof this agreement to sell the Respondent-Smt. Suraj Kumari owner-landladyhad given the rights to the prospective vendees for recovering the rent fromthe tenants. There were two tenants in the property, namely, Shri A. C. Deb. Principal Cambridge School, on a monthly rent of Rs. 450. 00 for the groundfloor whereas the petitioner is occupying the first floor and paying rent ofrs. 500. 00 par month. According to the petitioner, this agreement for sale isbinding on Respondent No. 1 and relationship of landlord tenant ceased between Respondent No. 1 and the petitioner when this agreement was actedupon and a sum of Rs. 70,000. 450. 00 for the groundfloor whereas the petitioner is occupying the first floor and paying rent ofrs. 500. 00 par month. According to the petitioner, this agreement for sale isbinding on Respondent No. 1 and relationship of landlord tenant ceased between Respondent No. 1 and the petitioner when this agreement was actedupon and a sum of Rs. 70,000. 00 (of the first two instalments) already stoodpaid and notice of demand was issued by Respondent No. 1 in the year 1989claiming arrears of rent. A suit for specific performance of the agreement tosell has been brought by the prospective vendees against Respondent No. 1which is pending in the Civil Court. This suit is stated to have been broughtin the year 1987. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued thatrespondent No. 1 had ceased to be landlady vis-a-vis the premises in questionon execution of the agreement to sell which had been acted upon and thepetitioner has attorned to the prospective vendees and the petitioner has beeneven paying rent to the prospective vendees. He has referred to the copy ofthe reply sent in response to the notice of demand where such a plea hasbeen taken. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that agreement to sellhad been entered with the wife and sons of Vinod Chander Aggarwal, whowas the erstwhile tenant in the premises in question. He has also referred tothe share-holding of the said private limited company which is enumerated inpara 5 of the petition. So, it is urged that petitioner is the family concern ofvinod Chander Aggarwal and if the veil is lifted it would show that in factrespondent No. 1 had agreed to sell the property to the said family. ( 5 ) COUNSEL for respondent No. 1 has vehemently argued that petitioner is a separate legal entity and it is not disputed by the petitioner thatpetitioner continues to be the tenant in the demised premises and that therehas been no attornment by the petitioner in favour of anyone as respondentno. 1 had never asked the petitioner in any manner whatsoever to attorn infavour of the prospective vendees. 1 had never asked the petitioner in any manner whatsoever to attorn infavour of the prospective vendees. It is also argued that the agreement tosell was not acted upon and is not binding and there continues to exist relationship of landlady tenant between respondent No. 1 and the petitioner andthus, as arrears of rent becoming due have not been paid despite service ofnotice of demand, the impugned orders are liable to be sustained. ( 6 ) THE questions arising for decision, after the trial in the evictioncase takes place, would be whether the agreement to sell continued to subsistand had been acted upon or not and if so, whether respondent No. 1 byconduct in any manner had agreed to attornment of the petitioner in favourof the prospective vendees or not and whether the same would result in wiping out the relationship of landlord tenant between respondent No. 1 and thepetitioner. It is not proper to give any considered view on these complicated questions of facts and law while deciding whether any interim order undersection 15 (1) should or should not be passed. At any rate, it is evident thatthe petitioner is the tenant in the demised premises and the petitioner disputes the status of respondent No. 1 as the landlady and is setting up theprospective vendees as the landlord. So, the interim order under Section 15 (4)was called for and the impugned orders are liable to be modified to thatextent. ( 7 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner has prayed that as the civil suit wouldhave ample bearing with regard to the existence of relationship of landlordtenant between the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner, it would be in theinterest of justice that eviction case is stayed till the disposal of the civil suit. I think the interests of justice would require that a final decision is made inthe civil suit at first which would settle the disputed questions of facts andlaw with regard to existence or non-existence of relationship of landlordtenant between the parties. Counsel for the petitioner under takes that thepetitioner would apply to become a party in the civil suit as well. Counselfor the petitioner may move an application for becoming a party in the civilsuit and the civil Court will decide that application on its own merits. Counsel for the petitioner under takes that thepetitioner would apply to become a party in the civil suit as well. Counselfor the petitioner may move an application for becoming a party in the civilsuit and the civil Court will decide that application on its own merits. ( 8 ) I, hence, allow this petition and modify the impugned orders andinstead the order would be deemed to have been passed under Section 15 (4 ). The parties are left to bear their own costs in this petition. ( 9 ) THE rent which has been already paid as per orders made undersection 15 (1) be also deposited back with the Additional Rent Controller byrespondent No. 1 and the rent would be disbursed in accordance with finalorder which would be made by the Additional Rent Controller. The proceedings would revive before the Additional Rent Controller after the civil suitis finally decided. ( 10 ) CM. (M) No. 60193i may mention that this petition has been also filed by the sametenant praying that the orders of the Rent Control Tribunal and the Additional Rent Controller be set aside and the eviction petition filed on theground of eviction covered by Clause (k) of proviso to Sub-section (1) ofsection 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act be stayed. ( 11 ) FOR the reasons given above, interests of justice require that thiseviction petition be also stayed till the disposal of the civil suit. ( 12 ) SO, this petition C. M. CM) No. 60/93 is also allowed and settingaside the impugned order I direct that the eviction petition be stayed till thedisposal of the civil suit.