JUDGMENT 1. The appellant is the writ petitioner in O.P. No. 8507 of 1989. He was appointed originally in the service of the State Government in the Excise Department as a driver under Ext. P-1 order dated 15th November 1982. He assumed duty on 16th November 1982. The appointment, being provisional in the Government service, was subject to the condition of the appellant being replaced by regular hand recruited through the Public Service Commission. Admittedly the appellant took the chance of getting selected by direct recruitment in 1976 and 1982 as a driver through the Public Service Commission, but got a lower rank in the ranked list, and so he could not be advised for appointment. By the year 1989, he became over aged, and could not apply for the post. On 15th March 1989 . the appellant absented himself from duty, though on that day he was supposed to assist the authorities in conducting a raid under the provisions of the Abkari Act. As he abstained from duty on 15th March 1989, the raid could not take place. He, however, reported for duty on 16th March 1989, but was not allowed, according to the appellant, to rejoin duty. Thereupon he made Ext. P-4 representation, dated 17th March 1989 seeking permission to rejoin duty. Thereafter Ext. P-5 memo dated 22nd March 1989 was issued to him. in Ext. P-5 it is alleged that even though he has been specifically asked to be present on 15th March 1989 for conducting a raid, he has absented himself on that day, and that a question arose whether the appellant has done that purposefully. It is also stated that on 14th March 1989 after getting the vehicle repaid from the workshop, he is said to have driven the vehicle in a drunken state and behaved in such an unruly way towards the staff. It is further stated in Ext. P-5 that the appellant by his alleged misbehaviour at the Adoor Bus Stand has allegedly created a bad impression about the staff of the department. It is further alleged in Ext. It is further stated in Ext. P-5 that the appellant by his alleged misbehaviour at the Adoor Bus Stand has allegedly created a bad impression about the staff of the department. It is further alleged in Ext. P-5 that no excise staff will be allowed to rejoin duty without the permission of the authority concerned, and the appellant has been asked to show cause why action should not be taken against him for his unauthorised absence on 15th March 1989 and for the aforesaid alleged misbehaviour, on that day itself, failing which it will be presumed that the appellant has no explanation to offer, and action may be taken on that basis. The fact remains that these are only allegations. The appellant submitted Ext. P-6 explanation dated 13th April 1989 denying the various allegations in Ext. P-5 and stating that he was not well on that day and he was enclosing a medical certificate. In as much as Ext. P-6 representation dated 13th April 1989 did not result in allowing him to rejoin duty, he filed the present writ petition on 6th October 1989 for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to dispose of Ext. P-4 representation, for a declaration that the refusal to allow him to continue in service for his absence on 15th March 1989 was illegal and arbitrary, and for a direction to allow him to rejoin duty as driver with full backwages, etc. 2. A counter affidavit was filed by the first respondent, the Circle Inspector of Excise, stating that the appellant's initial appointment on 15th November 1982 was subject to his replacement by direct recruits through the Public Service Commission, that the appellant who appeared for the examination Conducted by the Public Service Commission in 1976 and 1982 could not secure a higher rank, that the appellant unauthorisedly absented himself on 15th March 1989, and his explanation to the show cause notice is not satisfactory. Of course, it is not stated that the allegations in the charge memo are found to be true. It also stated that the day on which the appellant absented himself was very important in view of the fact that he was instructed specifically to be present for a raid, under the Abkari Act. Of course, it is not stated that the allegations in the charge memo are found to be true. It also stated that the day on which the appellant absented himself was very important in view of the fact that he was instructed specifically to be present for a raid, under the Abkari Act. It is also stated that the appellant was appointed only for a period of 180 days, and he had no right to continue thereafter. It is also stated that the Public Service Commission had already conducted selection, and one Sri. Thampan had been advised by the Public Service Commission, and he joined duty on 4th November 1989. 3. Another counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the third respondent, the State of Kerala. It was stated that the absence of the appellant on 15th March 1989, the date on which the department wanted to conduct a raid, was unauthorised and the proposal for conducting a raid was defeated because of the appellant's absence. It was also stated in Para.4 that this Court may also take into consideration, while exercising discretion under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, ' that the appellant usually behaved unruly in a state of drunkenness, and was given several warnings. It was then stated finally that 'it is made clear that the denial of employment to the petitioner was not for requesting leave on 15th March 1989, but for unauthorised absence and hence no declaration sought for by the petitioner is warranted'. 4. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition by judgment dated 13th November 1992. The learned Single Judge held that while it was true that the appellant continued in service for a period of seven years, the appellant did not have any vested rights to continue in service. This was because of the fact that the appellant was appointed provisionally, and was liable to be replaced by Public Service Commission candidate. It was also pointed out that the Public Service Commission hand later came and joined duty in November, 1989. The learned Single Judge also observed that the appellant was absent on a very important day, though he was specifically asked to be present on that day. It was also pointed out that the Public Service Commission hand later came and joined duty in November, 1989. The learned Single Judge also observed that the appellant was absent on a very important day, though he was specifically asked to be present on that day. The failure of the appellant to turn up for duty was grave and the subsequent application for leave on medical grounds shows that the appellant, was not very careful in discharging his duties. It is this judgment that is questioned in this appeal. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised three contentions. The first one is that once the appellant is allowed to continue beyond the period specified in the initial order of appointment, he could continue rill he is Replaced by a Public Service Commission candidate. For this purpose, reliance is placed upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sasidharan v. Kerala State Electricity Board 1991, We may here point out that the observations of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the above said decision have since been overruled by a Division Bench of this Court consisting one of us (Jagannadha Rao, C.J.) and John Mathew, J. in Rajan v, Kerala State Electricity Board 1992 (1) KLT 96, wherein it has been held that even if a person appointed under R.9(a)(i) of the K. S. and S.S.R. continued beyond the specified period mentioned in the order of appointment, his services can be subsequently terminated, even before any Public Service. Commission candidates are appointed. In that view of the matter, the refusal to permit him to rejoin duty on 16th March 1989 even before a Public Service Commission candidate joined duty cannot be said to be invalid. It is then argued that temporary hands cannot be replaced by temporary hands. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh JT 1992 (5) SC 179. We fail to see how this decision can be applied. Though the appellant's service came to an end on 16th March 1989, the fact remains that the vacancy was filled up by a regular candidate, advised by the Public Service Commission in November, 1989. We fail to see how this decision can be applied. Though the appellant's service came to an end on 16th March 1989, the fact remains that the vacancy was filled up by a regular candidate, advised by the Public Service Commission in November, 1989. Even otherwise, this Court has considered the special provision in R.9(a)(i) in Kerala and has come to the conclusion in a number of cases that Piara Singh's Case JT 1992 (5) SC 179 is not applicable to appointments governed by R.9(a)(i) of the K. S. and S. S. R. in Kerala. It has been pointed out that the said rule contains a specific and positive provision prohibiting re-employment of persons who have been appointed for a specified period: see Reji Joseph v. K.S.E.B. 1993 (1) KLT 393 , which has been followed by us in K. Sankaran v. State of Kerala W. A. No. 1056 of 1992, dated 13th July 1993 and in V. Raveendran v. State of Kerala W. A. No. 1338 of 1992, dated 14th June 1993. We have again reiterated the same thing in another decision in C. Letha v. State of Kerala W.A. No. 989 of 1993 dated 3rd August 1993. In view of the aforesaid decisions, the contention based on the Piara Singh's Case JT 1992 (5) SC 179 cannot be accepted. 6. It was then argued placing reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Commodore Commanding, Southern Naval Area v. V. N. Rajan AIR 1981 SC 965 and Champaklal v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 1854 that the termination must be treated as punitive and containing a stigma. In our view, this contention cannot be accepted. Firstly, no order of termination in writing was issued to the appellant. All that happened was that when he reported for duty on 16th March 1989, one day after his unauthorised absence, he was not allowed to rejoin duty. He made a representation on 17th March 1989, as per Ext. P-4. Thereafter a memo dated 22nd March 1989 was issued to him, and according to the appellant he received the same on 3rd April 1989, as per Ext. P-5 mentioning certain allegations, which according to the respondents, were motive for the refusal to rejoin the appellant into duty. No doubt, an explanation was also asked for, and the same was received as per Ext. P-6, dated 13th April 1989. P-5 mentioning certain allegations, which according to the respondents, were motive for the refusal to rejoin the appellant into duty. No doubt, an explanation was also asked for, and the same was received as per Ext. P-6, dated 13th April 1989. Thereafter no order was passed in relation to charges. If any finding had been given pursuant to the said charges, and the said findings were given without conducting any enquiry under Art.311 of the Constitution of India, then the appellant could contend that the termination of his services was penal in nature. But, in the present case, no such findings were arrived at by the authorities. The question then is whether the termination could be said to be penal. 7. In this context it is necessary to bear-in-mind, the fundamental distinction between a termination of service on the basis of certain allegations which are merely the 'motive', and a termination where not only the allegations, but also the acceptance of the correctness thereof becomes the 'foundation' for the termination of service. In the former case, where the allegations were only kept in mind, but no finding is arrived at either in the note file or in the order of termination of service in regard to truth of allegations, the allegations remained merely a motive for . the termination. In the latter case, where the motive file shows that the employer, without giving an opportunity to the employee, accepted the truth of the allegations, and gave findings and came to the conclusion that the allegations were true, then the acceptance of the allegations as true would become the foundation for the termination, and it would violate the principles of natural justice. 8. Initially there was considerable doubt in the mind of the Supreme Court as to the difference between the word 'motive' and 'foundation'. In Samsher Singh's case AIR 1974 SC 2192 , Krishna Iyer, J. observed: "In some cases, the rule of guidance has been stated to be the substance of the matter' and the 'foundation' of the order. When does 'motive' trespass into 'foundation'? When do we lift the veil of form to touch the 'substance'? When the Court says so? These 'Freudian' frontiers obviously fail in the work a day world and Dr. Tripathi's observations in this context are not without force." The Supreme Court then referred to the observations of Dr. Tripathi. 9. When does 'motive' trespass into 'foundation'? When do we lift the veil of form to touch the 'substance'? When the Court says so? These 'Freudian' frontiers obviously fail in the work a day world and Dr. Tripathi's observations in this context are not without force." The Supreme Court then referred to the observations of Dr. Tripathi. 9. Keeping the above said doubts in mind, Krishna Iyer, J. himself explained the matter in a very significant and beautiful passage in .Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Its Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1930 SC 1896 at 1911 in Para.54 as to when the allegations for termination could be treated merely as a 'motive' not requiring any inquiry either under Art.311 of the Constitution of India or following the principles of natural justice. It was observed: "54. On the contrary, even if there is suspicion of misconduct the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious record of reasons or punitive pecuniary cut - back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, mis conduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge. .." 10. However, where termination is based upon 'satisfaction' of the correctness of the allegations of misconduct, and the said satisfaction is arrived at without any enquiry and / or following the principles of natural justice, the termination would be vitiated. This is clear from the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Para.53 which reads as follows: "53. .... To put it slightly differently, a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the consequent desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Whether, in such a case the grounds are recorded in a different proceeding from the formal order does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the enquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non injurious terminology is used." (emphasis supplied) Therefore, whenever it is alleged that the Court can lift the veil and go into the question whether the order of simple termination even without any express stigma is in fact punitive, the Court would have to consider whether the allegations against the employee were the motive or the foundation. They would be a mere motive making termination valid, if the order of termination of service or the other record pertaining to the matter does not disclose any satisfaction as to the truth or correctness of the allegations made against the employee. It would be open to the employer to say that he docs not wish to bother about the truth of the allegations against the temporary employee, but he may not feel like keeping a man against whom there are certain allegations. In such an event, where the employer has not recorded his satisfaction about the correctness of the allegations, then the termination could be merely treated as based on a motive, and would be valid, even if no reasonable opportunity in regard to the said allegations had been given to the employee. However, where the order of termination contains a finding as to the guilt of stigma or where the other records of the case contain such a finding relating to satisfaction as to the correctness of the allegations, then notwithstanding that the termination is by way of an order simpliciter, it would be open to the Court to lift the veil and come to the conclusion that it was punitive, and that the absence of enquiry and violation of principles of natural justice required the termination to be struck down. 11. 11. In the present case, no order of termination was served and no stigma was contained in any order or file, The record merely shows that certain charges were made against the employee, and after explanation was given by the employee, no finding was arrived at by the employer either in any written communication to the employee, or in the file that the allegations were true. We are, therefore, satisfied that on the facts of the present case, the allegations were merely the motive and not the foundation. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no violation of principles of natural justice or Art.311 of the Constitution of India. In any event, if the appellant has unauthorisedly absented himself from duty on a day when the department contemplated a raid under the Abkari Act, and because of this, his temporary services stood terminated, the case is not one where this. Court should exercise its discretion under Art.226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the appellant writ petitioner. We therefore dismiss the appeal.