JUDGMENT 1. - The above three writ petitions are disposed of by one common order since common questions of law are involved in these writ petitions. 2. Petitioner Amit Bohra was appointed as Project Officer by the Rajasthan Rajya Bunkar Sahkari Sangh Ltd., where the petitioner was working as Supervisor, Marketing. On account of certain complaints the Board of Directors in its meeting held on 7th April, 1993 constituted 3 members committee to enquire into the charges. The Committee has submitted its report on 7.5.1993 and found that petitioner guilty in respect of number of charges. The order of suspension was passed on 10th May, 1993. 3. In the present writ petition and in the stay application it has been submitted that Shri Abdul Latif who has passed the order was removed by the General Body in its meeting held on 29th May, 1993 and he has acted in an arbitrary and mala fide manner. 4. An objection has been taken by Mr. Mathur that the writ petition is not maintainable as the Rajasthan Rajya Bunkar Sahkari Sangh Ltd. is not the State. It is submitted that it was not the Administrator but the elected body and the Chairman of the Sangh has taken action in accordance with law. Reliance has been placed on the decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Satish Kumar v. Punjab State Co-operative Bank Ltd., AIR 1981 P & H 282, wherein it was held that were a Corporation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government, it must be held to be an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and hence subjected to same obligations to obey the fundamental rights as the Government. In this context it is immaterial whether the Corporation is created by a Statute or under a Statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agent of Government and not as to how it is created. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a Corporation created by a Statute but is equally applicable to a Company or Society. It was held that the Society registered under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act per se cannot be treated an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and, therefore, not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It was held that the Society registered under the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act per se cannot be treated an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, and, therefore, not amenable to writ jurisdiction. Six factors which were taken into consideration were : (i) Neither entire nor major share capital was owned by the Government; (ii) The Government did not spend any money on the working of the Bank; (iii) The Co-operative Banks did not have monopoly in the sphere of banking business; (iv) The Government had no control over the day to day working of the bank and did not exercise deep pervasive control over the bank; (v) Some of the objects of the Bank might be of relative public importance but its primary function is banking which cannot be termed of public importance so as to make it an instrumentality or agency of the State; (vi) No department of the Government or its working has been transferred to the Bank since its inception. 5. In the light of the various principles which were considered by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, the Rajasthan Rajya Bunkar Sahkari Sangh Ltd. also cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered to be an instrumentality of the State and therefore, this judgment is fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 6. The above judgment and other judgments were also taken into consideration by the Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Pritam Singh Gill v. State, AIR 1982 P & H 228, wherein the Punjab State Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank was held not an instrumentality or agency of the State. It was held that deep and pervasive State control, which is the determining factor, is missing. 7. Reliance has also been placed on the Full Bench Decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Konaseena Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Scotharama Raju (AIR 1990 Andhra Pradesh 171) wherein it was held that contractual obligation which is not statutory cannot be enforced by way of writ petition. In this case it was also observed that where there is statutory obligation or public duty is established then the Court may interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. Stress was laid on the enforcement of statutory public duty. In this case it was also observed that where there is statutory obligation or public duty is established then the Court may interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. Stress was laid on the enforcement of statutory public duty. Various principles which were laid down by the Apex Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 , were also taken into consideration and it was held that if the action of the State is related to contractual obligation or obligation arising out of the contract, the Court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some law character attached to it. 8. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of Dehra Grain Seva Sahkari Samiti Sangh Ltd. v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Ltd. & Ors., 1992(3) WLC (Raj.) 237, wherein the judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the IFFCO was held not the State within the term of Article 12 of the Constitution of India was upheld. It was observed in this case that it is true that IFFCO discharges functions of great public importance. It cannot however be said by any stretch of imagination that its functions are closely related to the Government functions. The production and distribution of chemical fertilisers to agriculturists at economic rate may be a matter of concern for the Government, but by its very nature, it is not a Government or quasi-governmental function. In the case of IFFCO the public nature of the function is not impregnated with governmental character. The Government, through its agency or instrumentality, has not itself entered into the carrying on of commercial activity. The entire share capital of IFFCO is not subscribed by the Government of India. It is not obligatory for the Government of India to subscribe to the share capital of IFFCO and Government is only eligible for allocation of share of the face value of rupees one lac each, alongwith other co-operative bodies. IFFCO does not enjoy monopoly status-State conferred or State protected-in the matter of production and distribution of chemical fertilisers and its products. There is no deep and pervasive State Control of the Government over the IFFCO which might afford an indication that it is State agency or instrumentality. IFFCO does not enjoy monopoly status-State conferred or State protected-in the matter of production and distribution of chemical fertilisers and its products. There is no deep and pervasive State Control of the Government over the IFFCO which might afford an indication that it is State agency or instrumentality. The mere fact that the Government of India has given impetus to the production and distribution of chemical fertilisers in co-operative sector, is not pointer of any deep and pervasive State Control over the affairs of the IFFCO. There is no veil covering the IFFCO needing to be seen through or to be treated to see behind it. The relevant factors to constitute a corporation as an agency or instrumentality of Government as laid down by hosts of decisions of the Supreme Court are not present. 9. Examining in the light of the aforesaid D.B. decision, it is evident that Rajasthan Rajya Bunkar Sahkari Sangh Ltd. is a registered society under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act and the various tests which could be applied for considering Bunkar Sangh as the State are missing. The various clauses of the objects which have been produced before me numbering 21 would not by any stretch of imagination be considered attributing characteristic of 'State'. The D.B. decision is fully applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case and, therefore, I am of the view that the respondent Rajasthan Rajya Bunkar Sahkari Sangh Ltd. is not a State and is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. 10. I am of the view that besides the point mentioned above, even against the order of suspension, the petitioner has no right to approach directly to this Court and for this reason the writ petition is not maintainable. 11. In the result, the writ petition has no force and is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******