R. A. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) LEAVE to add State as a respondent. The petitioner-school management challenges an interim order of the Primary Education Tribunal passed in Application No. 24 of 1991. By that interim order the Tribunal has directed the school management to pay to the 1st and 2nd respondents (original applicants before the Tribunal) according to the Government pay scales by account payee cheque every month by 10th of the month. This order came to be passed when the application was fixed for final hearing. Though the school management was served and was granted more than one adjournment they did not remain present and therefore instead of finally deciding the matter in the absence of the school management the Tribunal thought it proper to pass the aforesaid interim order on 2/04/1992 Against that interim order Review Application No. 12 of 1992 was filed. That was also dismissed on 24/06/1992 These orders have been challenged in the present petition. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised in the petition some factual background is necessary. ( 3 ) APPLICATION No. 108 of 1987 was filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 before the said Tribunal. However that was challenged by the school management by filing Special Civil Application No. 4066 and further proceedings in that application were stayed. ( 4 ) IN Special Civil Application the contention of the school management is that when that Application No. 108 of 1987 was filed and entertained by the Tribunal; the Tribunal was not properly constituted and therefore on that ground further proceedings in that application are stayed by the High Court. Another Application No. 96 of 1990 was also filed in the Tribunal for similar reliefs and that was also pending. Thereafter Application No. 24 of 1991 (the subject-matter of the present petition) was filed. As the Tribunal was having some doubt about the effect of the High Courts stay of further proceedings Civil Application No. 349 of 1992 in Special Civil Application No. 4066 of 1988 was filed in this Court and by an order dated 15/01/1992 interim stay of further proceedings was modified and it was directed that the Tribunal would be free to decide the Application No. 24 of 1991 afresh on merits and not on the basis that the previous application has been stayed or not granted. It was also observed that no application for interim relief was decided on merit by the Tribunal and therefore the Tribunal was directed to decide the Application No. 24 of 1991 afresh without being influenced by an earlier application having been made and by any order passed thereon. Therefore the Tribunal was directed to proceed with the Application No. 24 of 1991 on merits. The Tribunal proceeded to hear the matter finally and issued notices accordingly. However in spite of service of the notice and granting of the time the school management failed to appear and therefore the Tribunal has passed the interim order directing the school management to pay to the first and second respondent according to the Government pay scales. ( 5 ) IT may be noted that the present school management had also challenged the vires of the Government Resolution dated 25/09/1987 whereby the private school management were directed to pay Government pay scales to their teachers. That Special Civil Application has been decided and dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court and therefore the petitioner is even otherwise bound to pay according to the Government pay scales in accordance with the Government Resolution upheld by the High Court. ( 6 ) IN this petition the contentions raised are that the Tribunal could have decided the matter finally and could not have passed the interim order. It is submitted that the High Court had stayed further proceedings and that interim order of the High Court was modified by only directing that the Application No. 24 of 1991 be decided on merits. Instead of deciding that application on merits finally the Tribunal has passed the interim order in that application. It is therefore submitted that this is in violation of the stay granted by the High Court. Secondly it is contended that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass any interim order. ( 7 ) AS far as the first contention is concerned it is clear that there was no stay of further proceedings of Application No. 24 of 1991. The stay of proceedings granted in Special Civil Application No. 4006/1988 was in respect of Application No. 108 of 1987. Since there was some doubt to the Tribunal the High Court had clarified that there was no stay in respect of Application No. 24 of 1991 and that could be decided on merits. The stay of proceedings granted in Special Civil Application No. 4006/1988 was in respect of Application No. 108 of 1987. Since there was some doubt to the Tribunal the High Court had clarified that there was no stay in respect of Application No. 24 of 1991 and that could be decided on merits. That direction to decide the application on mertis did not mean that the Tribunal was restrained from passing any interim order on merits. There is no warrant for holding that the High Court had permitted the Tribunal only to go on with the final hearing and not to pass any interim order on merits. The ground in Special Civil Application No. 4006 of 1988 was that Application No. 108 of 1987 could not have been entertained by the Tribunal because the Tribunal was not duly constituted at that time. There was no such ground with regard to Application No. 24 of 1991 because by that time the so called defect in the constitution of the Tribunal had been cured. The first contention that because of the stay granted by the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 4006 of 1988 the Tribunal could not have passed any interim order has therefore no merits. The second contention that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass any interim order is based on the provisions of Section 40f (5) of the Bombay Primary Education Act 1986 read with Cause 7 of the Gujarat Primary Education Tribunal (Procedure) Order 1987 Section 40f (5) provided that the Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the State Government may by general order directs In exercise of that power the procedure order has been issued by the Government and Clause 7 of that procedure order reads as follows :7 Stay of execution of order : (1) Pleading a decision of an appeal or an application made to the Tribunal the Tribunal may direct the execution of any order against which the appeal or application is made to be stayed on such conditions as it thinks fit. (2) An order made under sub-clause (1) may be vacated by the Tribunal : provided that before such order is vacated a notice shall be given to the party in whose favour such order has been made to show cause why it should not be vacated and an opportunity shall be given to such party of being heard. (2) An order made under sub-clause (1) may be vacated by the Tribunal : provided that before such order is vacated a notice shall be given to the party in whose favour such order has been made to show cause why it should not be vacated and an opportunity shall be given to such party of being heard. It is submitted that under this provision the Tribunal could stay execution of an order against which an appeal or application has been made and there is no other provision for granting any other kind of interim relief. This provision is only providing for a procedure for stay of execution of an order under appeal. However this provision cannot be read to mean that the Tribunal could not have passed any interim order in an application. Under Section 40e the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide any dispute between the Manager of a recognised private primary school and a teacher in service of such a school and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide the matter finally and grant relief finally. The Tribunal necessarily has incidental jurisdiction to grant the same relief or relief of similar nature by way of interim order. That power is necessary and incidental to the power of granting final relief and deciding the dispute. When the teacher claims that he is to be paid his salary every month according to the Government pay scales from 1986 and if the Tribunal is satisfied that the petitioner has a prima facie case and should be granted relief by an interim order there is nothing in the Act or the Rules or the Procedure Order prohibiting the Tribunal from granting such interim relief and therefore the second contention also must fail. ( 8 ) THE challenge to the vires of Clause 7 of the Procedure Order is made alleging that it is arbitrary and without guideline. This ground is elaborated in ground (i) on page 13 of the petition. There is no merit in this contention. Granting vacating or refusing interim relief in a judicial proceeding is well recognised and is based on settled principles of prima facie case irreparable injury and balance of convenience and therefore it is impossible to hold that this power has been conferred on the Tribunal arbitrarily and without any guidelines. There is no merit in this contention. Granting vacating or refusing interim relief in a judicial proceeding is well recognised and is based on settled principles of prima facie case irreparable injury and balance of convenience and therefore it is impossible to hold that this power has been conferred on the Tribunal arbitrarily and without any guidelines. Even if the ex parte interim relief is granted other side has an opportunity to get it vacated by ex-parte hearing and it is not necessary that any time limit should be prescribed by the Legislature. Any party who feels hurt by granting of the interim relief by the Tribunal ex parte can get it vacated and there can be bi-parte hearing. There is no reason to fix the time limit and the Tribunal would decide all such applications according to the relative urgency and priority of the matters in its best judicial discretion and having regard to requirements of judicial administration and judicial time. Therefore there is no merit in the contention that the provision is ultra vires. ( 9 ) THESE were the only contentions. All them fail and hence the petition is dismissed. .