A. R. TIWARI, J. ( 1 ) SHRI G. Desai, learned Dy. Govt. Advocate for the applicant-State. Shri Seetarain Saraf, learned counsel who is special Public Prosecutor. Shri Jai Singh, learned counsel for the non applicants-accused. The application is perused. The N. As-accused are produced under proper custody. They be sent back to jail. ( 2 ) THIS is an application under section 407 of the Cr. P. C. seeking transfer of a part-heard Sessions Trial No. 162/91 (State v. Raja and another), pending in the Court of VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Indore to an other Court of equal jurisdiction in the same Sessions Division, on the ground that the case has been hibernating there since 8. 6. 1992 with no profluence in the matter due to the absence of Presiding Officer in that Court. ( 3 ) PARTIES are heard. ( 4 ) IT is urged that the trial of the case has commenced making the case part heard in as many as eleven prosecution witnesses have already been examined. It is submitted that no progress could be made after 8. 6. 1992 as the presiding officer of this Court was transferred without naming any successor to it. It is also stressed that even the accused persons are suffering prolonged incarceration as under trial prisoners. It is in these circumstances, that the prayer is made seeking transfer of the case so that the trial, halted hitherto, could be resumed without further loss of time. ( 5 ) PARTIES do not seem to be in a mood of offering any oppugnation to this issue. ( 6 ) IT seems that the sessions Judge stood divested of the jurisdiction in view of section 409 Cr. P. C. as the trial had commenced. It is pointed out that the provise as reproduced hereunder, of section 407 (2) of Cr. P. C. provided no fetters in view of the position envisaged by Section 409 Cr. P. C. 407 (2 ). Provided that no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one criminal Court to another Criminal court in the same sessions Division, unless an application for such transfer has been made to the sessions Judge and rejected by him. P. C. 407 (2 ). Provided that no application shall lie to the High Court for transferring a case from one criminal Court to another Criminal court in the same sessions Division, unless an application for such transfer has been made to the sessions Judge and rejected by him. The High Court of Kerala in State of Kerala v. Reny George and others, after surveying the relevant provisions, took the view as under: The prohibition in the proviso to sub- Section (2) of Section 407 will have application only in cases where the Sessions Judge has the power to transferer. In a case where the sessions Judge has no power of transfer no question of moving the Sessions Judge for a transfer arises. So, it goes without saying that an application for transfer, of a sessions case made over to an Additional Sessions Judge, can be entertained by the High Court under Section 407 as the same will not be hit by the proviso to section 207 (2 ). ( 7 ) IT is rightly argued that the power conferred under section 408 Cr: P. C. or the bar enacted by the proviso to Section 407 (2) of the Cr. P. C. has to be understood and appreciated harmoniously with the provision of section 409, of the Cr. P. C. In view of this, I hold that the present application is maintainable here and is not clogged by the proviso pointed out above. It may also be observed that to my mind even otherwise appropriate order in such cases can be made in exercise of the inherent powers under section 482 of the Cr. P. C. ( 8 ) NOW coming to the merits of the matter, it is noticed that the accused persons are languishing in Jail and are being denied speedy trial as implicity mandated by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Section 309 of the Cr. P. C. itself iuculently insists upon expeditious trial. It is apt to make a reference to Hussainaras case (Hussainara Khatton and others v. Home secretary, State of Bih. Section 309 of the Cr. P. C. itself iuculently insists upon expeditious trial. It is apt to make a reference to Hussainaras case (Hussainara Khatton and others v. Home secretary, State of Bih. (Patna) which succinctly laid down as under: We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad- sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 597 ). We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental rights on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not reasonable fair or Just. such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable fair or just Unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or Just and it would fail foul or Article 21. ( 9 ) IT is equally significant to note that even in the United States, speedy trial is one of constitutionally guaranteed rights. The Sixth Amendment to its Constitution mandated that- In all Criminal Prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. ( 10 ) THE matter is beyond any pale of controversy, the prayer is holy, not hallow. What is explicit there is implicit here. The concept of speedy justice to the parties is thus, the basic requirement which deserves to be assiduously adhered to. The delay as noted above yields the procedure which cannot be termed as reasonable, fair or just. The vacancy thus posed the problem which merited proper solution. What is explicit there is implicit here. The concept of speedy justice to the parties is thus, the basic requirement which deserves to be assiduously adhered to. The delay as noted above yields the procedure which cannot be termed as reasonable, fair or just. The vacancy thus posed the problem which merited proper solution. In these peculiar facts the prayer on merits of the case is found to be ex facie irrecusable and proper answer would salubriously seem to be Tam mieux. I must also act so as to save the criminal case from the situation as was indicated by the Apex Court in P. N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker and others, in the following words: Justice Cries in silence for long, far too long. ( 11 ) IN these circumstances, the order of transfer, as claimed, seems necessary as it is cogently made to appeal to me that it is expedient for the ends of justice. It is accordingly ordered that the Sessions Trial No. 162/91, pending in the Court of VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, shall stand withdrawn and made over to IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Indore as suggested by the parties for trial in accordance with law. ( 12 ) THE parties are consequently directed to appear in the Court of VIIth Additional Sessions Judge, Indore on 19. 1. 1993, the date already fixed in the trial court when the learned Sessions Judge, Indore or the learned Judge holding current charge of this court for urgent work shall send the aforesaid sessions case to the Court indicated herein (IVth Additional Sessions Judge, Indore) and fix the date for appearance of the parties in that Court to take further orders in the matter. ( 13 ) IT is placed on record that the parties do not desire de novo trial in that court and opt only for further trial of the case. The aforesaid Court shall thus, be free to act on the evidence already recorded as noted above. ( 14 ) THE application thus, stands allowed with directions as above. ( 15 ) LET copies of this order be endorsed to the learned sessions Judge, Indore as also both the learned Additional Sessions Judges as particularised above. Application allo wed. .