JUDGMENT - N.P. CHAPALGAONKER, J.:--Applicant, who is in service of the State of Maharashtra and was working as Chief Officer of the Municipal Council at Parali Vaidyanath at the relevant time, has filed this application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class at Parali Vaidyanath praying for quashing the process issued against him for offence punishable under sections 166, 192 and 218 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Complainant claims to be owner of Municipal House No. 204 situated at Ward No. 7 at Parali Vaidyanath. He had filed a suit claiming rent from some persons including accused No. 5 to 7 namely; Maruti Memaji Shinde, Kerba Memaji Shinde and Bhikulal Baburam Pardesi who were in actual possession of said property. This suit, in which Municipal Council was not a party, was decreed. Later on Municipal Council through its Chief Officer (Applicant) had filed a civil suit against Maroti Memaji Shinde, Kerba Mamaji Shinde and Bhikulal Baluram Pardeshi in respect of the same property claiming declaration of ownership. A compromise was entered into in this Regular Civil Suit No. 7 of 1986 since defendants admitted the title of the Municipal Council. According to the complainant-respondent No. 1 Shrinivas Shaligram Totla, Applicants act of entering into a compromise is an offence punishable under sections 166, 192 and 218 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code. It is his case that Municipal Council is aware that he is owner of the said house. It has issued permission of the construction in favour of the complainant- respondent and had also accepted property tax of this property from him. According to the complainant, filing of the suit and entering into a compromise in it amounts to creation of false record and all the accused persons are guilty of the offence alleged. Then President of the Municipal Council, present Applicant-Chief Officer, two Clerk of the Municipal Council namely; Zazir Ahmad and Ganpat Choudhari and three occupants of the premises namely; Maroti, Kerba and Bhikulal were impleaded as accused in Criminal Case No. 1 of 1991 filed by the complainant respondent. Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ambajogai was pleased to issue process against all the accused for offence punishable under sections 166, 192, 218 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ambajogai was pleased to issue process against all the accused for offence punishable under sections 166, 192, 218 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. President of the Municipal Council - Accused No. 1 - in this case - had filed a Criminal Application No. 321 of 1991 before this Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this Court (Kamat, J.) was pleased to quash the process issued against him. Subsequent to it, present Applicant-Chief Officer of the Municipal Council has filed this application for the same prayer. 4. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that plain reading of the statement of the complainant recorded for the verification of the complaint does not make out any offence and, therefore, learned Magistrate erred in law in issuing process against accused persons. Shri Deshmukh, relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab)1, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866, submitted that if it is pointed out to the Court that even assuming that all the allegations made in the complaint are true, they do not disclose an offence or it is merely an abuse of process of law, the High Court should interfere and quash the process issued. 5. Shri B.A. Darak, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent - complainant, submitted that since learned Magistrate was satisfied about existence of grounds to believe that the accused have committed offence alleged and ordered the issue of process which should not be interferred by this Court. Shri V.B. Nayak, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State was also heard. 6. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the courts can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice. Though, to quote Supreme Court, it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule, which would govern exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, guidelines have been provided by different judicial pronouncements. Though, to quote Supreme Court, it is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule, which would govern exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, guidelines have been provided by different judicial pronouncements. When a criminal proceeding is total abuse of process or when the cognizance could not have been taken because of any legal impediment or all the allegations made in the complaint even if taken to be true do not constitute any offence, the continuation of the criminal proceedings would be harassment and when brought to the notice, it would not only be proper but it would also be just for the High Court to quash these proceedings. Pointing out these 3 categories, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of R.P. Kapur cited supra, also pointed out that some cases which fall outside the above referred categories may also require interference of the High Court in the exercise of inherent power and these are cases where allegations made against accused persons do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence in its support or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. Learned Judges had a word of caution for High Courts dealing with cases falling in this category. They said : "In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly or clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561-A, the High Court would not embark upon an inquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Courts inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained." Relaying on the above quoted observation of the Supreme Court, Shri Darak contended that the learned Judge thought the evidence sufficient and, therefore, issued process and High Court interferring it, would be reappreciation of the evidence, not permissible under the exercise of inherent powers. 7. 7. It appears from the record available in this Court that the Municipal Council, Parali Vaidyanath was granted sanad under the Land Revenue Code, wherein Survey Officer, after enquiry, said that the property mentioned in the Sanad is owned by Parali Vaidyanath Municipal Council. Municipal Council appears to have filed civil suit sometime in the year 1983 claiming title to certain property. When the defendants admitted ownership, compromise was recorded on 29-6-1989. This act, according to the complainant, constitutes criminal offence punishable under sections 166, 192, 207 and 218 of the Indian Penal Code and the learned Magistrate was pleased to issue process under sections 166, 192 and 218 read with 34 of Indian Penal Code. Section 166 is attracted when a public servant disobeys any direction of the law with intent to cause injury to any person. Section 192 of I.P.C. speaks about fabricating false evidence. Section 218 is framing incorrect record by public servant. By any stretch of imagination filing of the suit or entering into compromise by municipal authorities cannot be construed to be an offence under any of these sections. Chief Officer or his subordinates have not entered into compromise in the suit in disregard to the direction of law or with intent to cause injury to anybody. On the contrary, it is the duty of the Chief Officer to protect the property of the Municipal Council claimed by somebody and he would be failing in duty if he does not file a suit to protect municipal interest. Complaint does not disclose that the Chief Officer or any of the municipal authorities have made false entries and, therefore, there cannot be any offence under section 192. Section 207 is miles away from the allegations in the complaint. There is no seizure, forfeiture or any danger of loosing property in execution and to prevent that no false claim is made by the accused persons. Therefore, rightly no process was issued under this section. Section 218 has also no application since it is not alleged that any of the accused have prepared a false record. The word record which occurs in section 218, has a specific meaning and the record means a public record maintained by that public officer. Filing a compromise in a suit is not the preparation of the record as contemplated by section 218. 8. The word record which occurs in section 218, has a specific meaning and the record means a public record maintained by that public officer. Filing a compromise in a suit is not the preparation of the record as contemplated by section 218. 8. If the complainant has got any claim over the property, Civil Suit would be a proper remedy and he can establish title as against Municipal Council. But if the Municipal Council files a suit against some persons in possession of the said property, to interpret this to be a criminal offence would be to deter local bodies and its officials from performing their duties. Whenever such allegations are made and criminal cases are filed, Magistrates have bounden duty to examine allegations and be cautious in issuing process in such cases. It is not only harassment of the public servants who are not at fault but have a demoralising effect on the public administration. It is not necessary to express any opinion about the claim of the ownership of the complainant or by the Municipal Council over the disputed property and it can well be decided by the Civil Court. Nevertheless, no offence is made out in the complaint and there are no grounds to believe that any of the accused person has committed the offence alleged. This Court has also quashed the process issued against President of the Municipal Council was said to be instrumental in having compromise in the suit. Apprehension of the complainant appears to be that the compromise in the suit filed by the Municipal Council may be used as a piece of evidence against him. If the complainant has title to the property, needless to say, it shall not be any way affected by any compromise entered into an a suit in which he was not a party. 9. This takes us to another question as to whether this Court should quash the process against the petitioner only or should quash the complaint itself and the process issued against all the accused. When in a complaint different parts are alleged to have been played by different accused persons, it would be necessary to find out as to whether the grounds are there to proceed against any of them. When in a complaint different parts are alleged to have been played by different accused persons, it would be necessary to find out as to whether the grounds are there to proceed against any of them. But when the general allegations are made that all the accused have committed this offence and if the High Court finds that there are no grounds to proceed against any of the accused even if all facts alleged are taken to be true, then the process will have to be quashed in respect of all the accused persons irrespective of the fact whether they have approached to this Court or not. When an abuse of process of Court is brought or comes to the knowledge of the High Court, it can act in exercise of its inherent powers. It is not necessary that every affected person should come before this Court praying to invoke these powers. The High Court has all the powers to set the things right by quashing process issued against all the accused and it is not necessary that every one of such accused should also approach to High Court. I find that complaint does not disclose that any of Accused Nos. 1 to 7 have done such acts which may constitute offence punishable under section 166, 192 and 218 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, Therefore, process issued against all these accused will have to be quashed and I order accordingly. 10 The order dated 4-1-1991 of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ambajogai issuing process against Accused Nos. 2 to 7 in Regular Criminal Case No. 1 of 1991 is hereby quashed. The order against Accused No. 1 is already quashed by this Court. Complaint is dismissed. Criminal Application is allowed. Rule absolute. Criminal application allowed.