A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) MR. J. D. Ajmera, learned Additional Central Government Standing counsel, waives service of Rule on behalf of all the respondents. With the consent of and at the request of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the petition is ordered to be heard today. ( 2 ) THE petitioner No. l is a Private Limited Company and petitioner No. 2 is managing Director thereof. Both the petitioners are referred to hereinafter as "petitioner company". ( 3 ) THE petitioner company is engaged in the manufacture of (1) electric wires and cables; (2) aluminium alloyed standard conductors; and (iii) aluminium wires of aluminium not alloyed. The aforesaid final products are classified under sub-headings (i) 8511. 00 (ii) 7614. 90, and (iii) 7605. 19 respectively, of the Schedule to the Central Exicse tariff Act, 1985. The petitioner company was initially manufacturing electric wires and cables since the year 1984. After the coming into force of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, the petitioner company filed a declaration for availing of modvat benefits on december 13, 1988. Some time in March 1990, the petitioner company started manufacturing aluminium conductors and aluminium wires of aluminium not alloyed. In respect of these final products also the petitioner company availed of modvat benefits but did not file separate declaration. The petitioner company believed that since the input required for the manufacture of aluminium conductors and aluminium wires of aluminium not alloyed were same as required for the manufacture of electric wires and cables, it was not necessary for the petitioner company to file separate declaration. However, the petitioner company did make necessary entries in R. G. 23 and R. T. 12 and also mentioned necessary particulars in classification list The department considered that there was breach of appropriate provisions of the rules regarding availing of the modvat benefits. Therefore the department issued a show cause notice dated April 1, 1992 and demanded an amount of Rs. 3,81, 689. 15 ps. from the petitioner company on the ground that the petitioner had availed of the modvat benefits wrongly in respect of the inputs for the final products namely, aluminium conductors and aluminium wires of aluminium not alloyed. The petitioner company filed reply to the show cause notice and register the same on facts as well as on law points. 15 ps. from the petitioner company on the ground that the petitioner had availed of the modvat benefits wrongly in respect of the inputs for the final products namely, aluminium conductors and aluminium wires of aluminium not alloyed. The petitioner company filed reply to the show cause notice and register the same on facts as well as on law points. However, the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and customs, i. e. , respondent No. 2 herein confirmed the demand made in the show cause notice as per his order dated March 31, 1993. The said order was received by the petitioner company on April 28, 1993. After the receipt of the order, the petitioner company preferred an appeal on ,28-5-1993 as provided under Section 35-F of Central excises and Salt Act, 1944, On the same day the petitioner company also submitted an application for dispensing with predeposit of the amount demanded. Despite the application having been made way back on May 28,1993, the same has not been decided so far. On the other hand, the petitioner has received a letter dated August 23, 1993 written by respondent No. 3 herein, that is Superintendent of Central Excise, Himatnagar, district-Sabarkanlha, asking the petitioner company to pay an amount of Rs. 3,81, 689. 15 ps. The petitioner company has been threatened with action as provided under Rule 230 of central Excise Rules, 1944 and Section 11-A of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 if the petitioner company did not pay the aforesaid amount. Hence this petition praying for quashing and setting aside the letter dated August 23, 1993 issued by respondent No. 3 and for appropriate direction to respondent No. 4, that is Collector, Central Excise (Appeals) for hearing and deciding the application for stay of recovery of the amount of duty and also for dispensing with the predeposit of the amount of duty demanded. ( 4 ) IT is not understood, why the appellate authority is not deciding the application submitted by the petitioner praying for stay of the recovery of the amount demanded and also for dispensing with the predeposit of the amount of duty demanded. It is an undisputed position that the application has been filed on May 28,1993 the date on which appeal has been filed. Such applications are required to be taken up for hearing immediately. It is an undisputed position that the application has been filed on May 28,1993 the date on which appeal has been filed. Such applications are required to be taken up for hearing immediately. If the appellate authority is not in a position to take up the application for hearing on the same day, such applications should be taken for hearing atleast within a period of one or two weeks from the date of filing of the same. It is always open to the appellate authority to decide the application in accordance with law. If case is not made out the appellate authority may even refuse to stay the recovery of the amount demanded and may also refuse to dispense with the predeposit of the amount demanded. But the appellate authority cannot sit tight over such applications and leave the assessee to the mercy of enforcing agencies. It is unfortunate that, during the course of two Sittings, we have come across few such matters in which grievance is raised by assessee that the appellate authority is not deciding application for stay and/or for dispensing with the predeposit of the amount demanded. Such applications are required to be treated as urgent matters and should be decided immediately within a period of one or two weeks from the date of filing of the same. ( 5 ) THERE need not and should not be any apprehension as to the power of the appellate authority with regard to the grant or refusal of stay of recovery of the amount demanded. The appellate authority is ofcourse a creature of the statute which cannot exercise any power other than which has been expressly granted. However, the appellate powers expressly granted upon him by necessary implication grants the incidental and ancillary powers also. These incidental and ancillary powers are necessary to make fully effective the expressed grant of statutory powers. In this connection, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. , reported in 1990 (49) E. L. T. 322 (S. C. ). In that case, the question arose with regard to the powers of appellate Tribunal constituted under the appropriate provisions of Customs Act, 1962 where in also similar provisions are made as regards the first appeal and further appeals as are made in Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In that case, the question arose with regard to the powers of appellate Tribunal constituted under the appropriate provisions of Customs Act, 1962 where in also similar provisions are made as regards the first appeal and further appeals as are made in Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. In para 8 of the decision, the supreme Court has, inter alia, observed as follows:"there is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction. It has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised. The powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited. Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonabl necessary to make the grant effective. As stated in maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, (eleventh edition) "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. "the aforesaid view is reiteration of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in its earlier decision in the case of Income Tax Officer vs. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi, reported in AIR 1969 S. C. Page 430. In that case, the question arose with regard to the powers of income Tax Appellate Tribunal. In Para 4 of the decision, the Supreme Court has, inter alia, observed that it is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. In Para 4 of the decision, the Supreme Court has, inter alia, observed that it is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. The aforesaid principle has been followed by this Court in the case of Minish K. Sheth and others vs. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in AIR 1985 gujarat Page 56. It was a case under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The question arose as to whether the Government had powers to pass interlocutory orders when it exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 34 of Urban Land (Ceiling and regulation) Act, 1976. Thus, it is well settled principle of law that the appellate authority has powers to pass interim orders so as to make the express grant of power effective. In this view of the matter, there should not be any misapprehension in the mind of the appellate authority exercising powers under the appropriate provisions of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It should also be realised that such powers are required to be exercised immediately on filing of the applications for stay. If such applications for stay are kept pending, it would create several complications and the assessee would be put to untoward hardship. Therefore, it is the bounden duty of the appellate authority to decide such applications immediately on the filing of the same and preferably within a period of 15 days from the date of filing. Earlier decision on such applications is in the interest of revenue also However, whether it is in the interest of Revenue or not is immaterial. The question is with regard to the statutory duty of the appellate authority. It is the duty of appellate authority to see that such applications are decided at the earliest. Viewing from; this point of view the appellate authority cannot and should not delay the decision on such stay applications. ( 6 ) IN the instant case, in our opinion, the petition can be disposed of by giving following directions;1. In the result, the petition is partially allowed. Viewing from; this point of view the appellate authority cannot and should not delay the decision on such stay applications. ( 6 ) IN the instant case, in our opinion, the petition can be disposed of by giving following directions;1. In the result, the petition is partially allowed. Respondent No. 4, that is collector, Central Excise (Appeals), Ahmedabad, is directed to hear and decide the application for stay of the recovery of the amount demanded and for dispensing with the predeposit, submitted under Section 35-F of Central excises and Salt Act, 1944, latest by October 1,1993. 2. The respondents are further directed not to take any coercive steps for recovering the amount pursuant to order dated March 31, 1993 produced at annexure. c to the petition. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .