Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. -these appeals by the plaintiffs and defendant No.3 arise out of a suit for partition. They have been heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The common ancestor of the parties Baijnath Lal had five sons darshan Lal, Shep Prasad Lal, Surjan Lal, Bhagwati Sahai and Mathura prasad. The plaintiffs represent the branch of Mathura Prasad, who in fact, was the original plaintiff but died sometime after the institution of the suit. Defendent Nos 1 and 2 represent the branch of Darshan Lal. There is a head on controversy about the parentage of defendant No.3 radha Rani, since dead. According to defendant Nos.1 and 2, she was the daughter of Bhagwati Sahai while according to the plaintiffs, Bhagwati sahai died issueless and she was the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal. 3. According to the plaintiffs case, Bhagwati Sahai died in state of jointness with his four brothers. There was partition in the family in 1932. Surjan Lal and Mathura Prasad got 1/4 share each in the joint-family properties. Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lal, however, decided to live together, perhaps, because their wives were full sisters. They together got the rest 1/2 share. According to the plaintiffs, they constituted a joint family themselves. According to the plaintiffs further, the items of property detailed in Schedule I of the plaint which are the suit properties were left joint between the parties for the sake of convenience. It is said that Shep Prasad Lal and Darshan Lal too separated in 1934. Sheo Prasad lal is said to have died in 1942 leaving behind his widow Mandodari kuer and Radha Rani defendent No.3. Mandodari Kuer came in possession of the estate of Shep Prasad. After her death in 1957, defendent no.3 being her only heir inherited the property. According to the plaintiffs, Mathura Prasad had in the meantime purchased the entire l/4th share of Surjan Lal under sale deed dated 12-9-47 and thus his share in joint-family property became half. They experienced inconvenience in joint possession and management of the suit property and in the circumstances instituted the suit claiming 1/2 share in the property. The rest half, according to them, belongs to equally to Darshan Lai and defendants 1 and 2 on the one hand and defendants 2 and 3 on the other. 4. Defendent No.3 supported the plaintiffs case. The rest half, according to them, belongs to equally to Darshan Lai and defendants 1 and 2 on the one hand and defendants 2 and 3 on the other. 4. Defendent No.3 supported the plaintiffs case. The contest came from defendent Nos.1 and 2. Apart from the formal objections regarding maintainability of the suit and defect in the frame of the suit, the defendants denied the plaintiffs case of separation between Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad in 1934. According to them, the two brothers remained joint throughout. According to them further, Mandodari had predeceased her husband Sheo Prasad who died in 1942 in state of jointness of Darshan lal. As regards defendant No.3, they took the plea that she is not necessary party for the purpose of the instant suit inasmuch as she being daughter of Bhagwati Sahai, who had died in 1926, cannot claim any right, int erest or share in the property which upon his death had devolved on the four surviving brothers by survivorship. The defendants asserted that 1932 partition was complete in all respects and nothing was left joint between the parties. According to them, three separate lists containing items of property allotted jointly to Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad and separately to Surjan Lal and Mathura Prasad were prepared by way of memorandum of partition. The suit property was allotted exclusively to the defendants share except portion of plot No 797 which the plaintiff got in exchange of land which they had got in that partition but gave to the plaintiffs in exchange. They claimed to be in possession of the entire suit property described three lots in the Schedule I. The details of their case itemswise will be stated later at the appropriate place in the judgment. Thus, the defendants asserted that there is no unity of title and possession between the parties in respect of the suit property and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any decree of partition. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed six issues, the material issue being (a) whether Radha Rani is the daughter of Sheo prasad Lal and whether Mandodari Kuer predeceased Sheo Prasad Lal and (b) whether the parties have unity of title and possession over the properties in suit. 6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective case. 6. The parties led evidence in support of their respective case. On consideration of the evidence-oral as well as documentary the trial court held that Radha Rani was daughter of Bhagwati Sahai and not Sheo Prasad lal. It also held that Mandodari Devi had predeceased Sheo Prasad lal and that no partition inter se between Sheo Prasad Lal and Darshan lal took place and, therefore, even if it be assumed that she was daughter of Sheo Prasad Lai she would not be entitled to any share in the suit property. The trial court further held that the suit property also was the subject-matter of the partition of 1932 and there was no unity of title and possession over the same. On these findings, inter alia, the court dismissed the suit giving rise to the present appeals. 7. Counsel for the parties have advanced long-sustained argument on the point of parentage of Radha Rani, Arguments were also made regarding the nature and extent of partition of 1932 and whether there was separation between Darshan and Sheo Prasad in 1934. However, in view of the admitted position that Bhagwati Sahai died in 1926 in state of jointness with his four brothers that agreed that if the case of the plaintiff and defendant No.3 about her parentage is found to be false, the question as to whether there was further separation between the two brothers in 1934 would become insignificant in so far as her claim of separate share is concerned because in that situation the estate of Bhagwati Sahai would be inherited by four surviving brothers constituting a joint family. I will, therefore, first take up the question of parentage of defendant No.3. It would appear that the claim of defendant No.3 as to her separate share in the property Is buttressed on three premises (a) she was the drughter of Sheo Prasad Lal (b) Sheo Prasad Lal separated from Darshan lal in 1934 and (c) Mandodari died in 1957 i e. after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. 8. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel for the plaintiffs however, submitted that irrespective of date of death of Mandodari (found by the trial court to have predeceased her husband) Radha Rani was entitled to a share in her own right as daughter (of Sheo Prasad Lal ). 8. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel for the plaintiffs however, submitted that irrespective of date of death of Mandodari (found by the trial court to have predeceased her husband) Radha Rani was entitled to a share in her own right as daughter (of Sheo Prasad Lal ). Counsel in this connection referred to para 43 of Mullas commentary on Hindu Law laying down the order of succession among sapindas, according to which, in absence of son, grandson (sons son) and great-grandson (sons sons son)and, after 14-4-1937, widow, predeceased sons widow, and predeceased sons widow, the daughter comes next in the line of succession. It was pointed out that heirs place above in order of having preference admittedly not. being available, Radha Rani as the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal was entitled to a share as an heir in her own right. Pointed reference was made to illustration (a) appended to Para 31 of the commentary. 9. In view of the stand of Mr. Thakur Prasad it is not necessary to go into the question whether Mandodari Kuer died in 1957 as asserted by the plaintiffs and defendant No.3 or she had pre-deceased her husband sheo Prasad Lal who admittedly died in 1942, asserted by the contesting defendants. The issues which, therefore, are required to be decided as regards entitlement of defendant No.3 are (i) whether defendant No.3 was the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal and (ii) whether separation between darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lal was effected in 1934. It is, however, conceded at the Bar that the second issue will require answer only if the first issue is decided in favour of defendant No.3 and it is held that she was the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal. 10. The plaintiffs have pleaded that defendant No.3 was the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal and they have also led evidence on the point. This aspect of their case, in my opinion, has no significance so far as their claim of half share in the suit property is concerned. This half share, as noted above, consists of their l/4th share in the joint-family property and the rest by purchase (of l/4th share of Surjan Lal ). This aspect of their case, in my opinion, has no significance so far as their claim of half share in the suit property is concerned. This half share, as noted above, consists of their l/4th share in the joint-family property and the rest by purchase (of l/4th share of Surjan Lal ). Leaving aside the question whether there is unity of title and possession as regards the suit property (Schedule I) to which I shall advert latter in this judgment, neither the plaintiffs own l/4th share nor their purchase of l/4th share surjan Lal is in dispute. In partition suit, the partities have composite status being both the plaintiff and the defendant. Defendant No.3, thus alone appears to be person interested in the outcome of the issue regarding her parentage As a matter of fact, she has actively participated in the suit in a fill-fledged manner examining as many as 11 witnesses including, herself to substantiate her ciaim. There can be no doubt that onus of proof also lay on her. Thus, it may not be necessary to scan the plaintiffs evidence on the point. 11. The claim of defendant No.3 rests on two alternative premises (i) that she is the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal and Mandodari and (ii)that she cannot be daughter of Bbagwati Sahai. There is indeed plethora of oral evidence without any supporting documentary evidence on the point. Having regard to the fact that at least in this part of the country there is a general tendency in the witnesses to over-state or under-state the case of the party for whom they appear as witness the task of taking out the grain from the chaff appears at the first instance to be somewhat difficult particularly because most of the witnesses for either side have made parrot-like statement saying either that defendant No.3 was the daughter of sheo Prasad Lal or that she was the daughter of Bhagwati Sabai. The thrust of oral evidence of defendant No.3 on the point is that there is no evidence that Bhagwati Sahai was married prior to 1906 when defendant no.3 was born and that defendant No.3 and Bhagwati Sahai were, in fact, married simultaneously one after the other and, therefore, defendant No.3 could not be his daughter. 12. There is virtually no dispute between the parties that Bhagwati sahai died in 1926. 12. There is virtually no dispute between the parties that Bhagwati sahai died in 1926. No less a person than defendant No.3 herself in paragraph 5 of the evidence as DW 23 said so. In paragraph 9 of her evidence she further stated that Bhagwati Sahai was 20-27 years older in age than her. She also stated that she was 10 years old when he died. DW 16 Bhaju Lal, brother-in-law (wifes brother) of Bhagwati Sahai, stated vide paragraph 5 of his deposition that at the time of his death Bhagwati sahai was 40 years old. Counsel for the contesting defendants submitted that besides defendant No.3 (DW 23) and her husband Ganesh Lal (DW 18)the other relatives examined on the point on her side are DW 16 and DW 19. The trial court has delivered the evidence of DW 16 as being evidence of an interested person observing that as brother-in-law (wifes brother) of bhagwati Sahai he would certainly like his niece to get a share in the property. Likewise DW 19 Rajendra Prasad is the cousin of wife of mathura Lal, who was the original plaintiff. The observation of, the trial court cannot be brushed aside summarily. 13. On the other hand, the contesting defendants examined D. W.7 manki Devi, D. W.11 Rajeshwar Prasad, D. W.15 Ram Chandra Prasad. They are respectively own sister of Mandodari Kuer, grandson of Sheo prasad Lais sister and nephew (wifes sisters son) of Sheo Prasad Lal and also, naturally, Darshan Lal. Counsel submitted that if defendant No.3 was the daughter of Sheo Prasad Lal these three persons would have most readily come forward supporting her case of being his daughter but they have unequivocally controverted her claim. I find much substance in the submission. If defendant No.3 were the daughter of Sheo Prasad, D. Ws.7, 11 and 15, respectively, would be aunt (Mausi), nephew and first cousin. I see no reason why they would hide the fact that defendant No.3 was the daughter of Sheo Prasad and depose falsely against her. I find much substance in the submission. If defendant No.3 were the daughter of Sheo Prasad, D. Ws.7, 11 and 15, respectively, would be aunt (Mausi), nephew and first cousin. I see no reason why they would hide the fact that defendant No.3 was the daughter of Sheo Prasad and depose falsely against her. If the evidence of these three witnesses is weighed against the evidence of D. Ws.16, 18, 19 and 23 besides D. Ws.17, 21 and 22, whose evidence also was pointedly referred to during course of hearing, I have no manner of doubt that qualitatively the evidence led on behalf of the contesting defendants is far superior to that of defendant No.3 or, for that matter, the plaintiffs. 14. Admittedly, Mathura Prasad was the youngest of the five brothers. P. W.18 in paragraph 14 stated that Mathura Prasad was married prior to defendant No.3. In this background it is difficult to accept, having regard to the common practice prevalent in the joint, at least in those days, that the younger brother would be married earlier than the younger brother would be married earlier than the older one without any cogent or convincing reason. 15. Counsel for the parties referred to Sec.50 of the Evidence Act and submitted that evidence of the aforementioned witnesses as also others having special means of knowledge about the relationship between defendant no.3 on the one hand and Sheo Prasad Lal or Bhagwati Sabai on the other should be accepted as relevant. Counsel for the parties referred to the leading case on the point, namely, Dolgobinda Paricha V/s. Nimai Charan Misra air 1959 SC 914 . There can be hardly any dispute that in case falling under Sec.50 of the Evidence Act the opinion of the person having special means of knowledge whether as member of the family or otherwise is a relevant fact on the question of relationship of one person to another. Such an opinion, however, has to be expressed on the basis of conduct. A mere bald assertion in Court that a particular person is or is not related to so and so, even if it be assumed that he or she had special means of knowledge, cannot come withiu the ambit of Sec.50. In my considered view. Such an opinion, however, has to be expressed on the basis of conduct. A mere bald assertion in Court that a particular person is or is not related to so and so, even if it be assumed that he or she had special means of knowledge, cannot come withiu the ambit of Sec.50. In my considered view. there is a preponderance of evidence in favour of defendants case on the point of parentage of defendant No.3 and, therefore, I am inclined to agree with the trial court and to hold that she was the daughter of Bhagwati sahai. 16. Having reached this conclusion, perhaps, it may not be necessary to go into the question as to whether Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lal separated in 1934. How does it matter to defendant No.3, being daughter of Bhagwati Sahai, whether the two brothers separated in 1934 or not so far as the question of inheritance of estate of Sheo Prasad is concerned In fact, as indicated at the outset, the counsel for the parties very fairly stated that the aforesaid question would be relevant only if she is found to be daughter of Sheo Prasad. In that view of the matter, I do not think it necessary to consider the argument of Mr. Thakur Prasad that the status of the two brothers after 1932 petition was that of tenants-in-common nor to consider the plea by Mr. Madan Mohan on behalf the contesting defendants that there was re-union between the two brothers. Nevertheless, in order to consider the entitlement of the plaintiff it may be necessary to go into that aspect of the matter. Because if Sheo Prasad Lal is found to have separate from Darshan Lal in 1934, and died later in a state of separation in 1942, his estate could be said to have devolved upon all his surviving brothers. 17. At this stage, it would be worthwhile to refer to the relevant averments of the parties as set forth in the plaint and written statement. The pleading of the plaintiff on the point is contained in paragraph 3 of the plaint which reads:- "in the year 1932, there was actual separation in mess and properties between the plaintiff and his brothers and each of the four brothers got l/4th share in the properties under partition. The plaintiff remained at one place. Sri Durjan Lal remained at another place. The plaintiff remained at one place. Sri Durjan Lal remained at another place. Sri Darshan Lal and Shri Sheo Pd. Lall remained at one place Shri Sheo Pd. Lall separated from Sri darshan Lall in 1934. " The contesting defendants stated their case on the point in paragraphs 7 and 12 of their written statement in the following words : "darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lall always lived and messed together and lived joint all along and the wife of Sheo Prasad Lal and subsequently Sbeo Prasad Lal died in a state of jointness The statement in the plaint that Sheo Prasad Lal separated from darsban Lal in 1934 is designedly false and made with ulterior motive to harass there defendants. . . . . . Shri Darshan Lal and Sheo prasad Lal remained joint as members of a joint Hindu family with the right of survivorship. " Tt would, thus, appear that even according to the plaintiffs Darshan Lal and sheo Prasad Lal remained joint even after 1932 partition both in mess and property. Another separation between them, according to them, took place in 1934. Of course, the defendants denied the plaintiffs case of separation. On the pleadings of the parties, thus, there was no occasion for the defendants to make out a case of re-union. The plaintiffs have pleaded separation between the two brothers in 1934 and it is they who have to prove it. It should be kept in mind that wives of the two brothers were full sisters and, perhaps, that provided enough ground to them to remain joint. If the assertion of the defendants that Mandodari had predeceased Sheo Prasad Lal prior to 1934 earthquake is believed, as has been done by the trial court, it is difficult to visualise why Sheo Prasad Lal, a widower then, would chose to separate from the other brother in 1934. The controversy about the parentage of defendant No.3 having been resolved as above, it is no more a matter of dispute that Sheo Prasad Lal was issusless. 18. The presumption of jointness under the Hindu Law is well known. As has been held in the case of Mst. The controversy about the parentage of defendant No.3 having been resolved as above, it is no more a matter of dispute that Sheo Prasad Lal was issusless. 18. The presumption of jointness under the Hindu Law is well known. As has been held in the case of Mst. Rukhmabai V/s. Lala Laxminarayan, AIR 1960 LC 335, there can be a division in status among the members of a joint hindu family by definement of shares which is technically called "division in status or an actual division among them by allotment of specific property to each one of them which is described as division by metes and bounds. Even if a member renounces his interest in the joint estate. His renunication merely extinguishes his interest in the estate but does not affect the status of the remaining members vis-a-vis the family property. That happens only when there is actual division or allotment of property to each of them by metes and bounds. No doubt, partition has the effect of dissolution or coparcenary with the result that separating members thereafter hold their respective shares as their separate property passing on their death to their heirs It is also true that at that at the time of separation it is open to the coparcener to remain joint retaining the character of coparcenary property as regards male issues. The difference but can coparcenary property and ioint-family property is well known. The concept of coparcenary property is much narrower than that of joint family property. It is open to the coparcener to form physical coparcenary with his own male issue at the time of partition. The two persons who formed coparcenary earlier may despite disruption of copareenary decide to remain joint, In that case their status will be that of members of the joint family possessing joint property. Mulla in his celebrated commentary on Hindu Law (15th Edition) in para 342 had opined, following judicial pronouncements on the point, that a re union in estate, property so called, can only take place between persons who were parties to the original petition. 19. Mulla in his celebrated commentary on Hindu Law (15th Edition) in para 342 had opined, following judicial pronouncements on the point, that a re union in estate, property so called, can only take place between persons who were parties to the original petition. 19. A close reading of the plaint as well as written statement does not make out a case of inter te partition between Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad lal It is an admitted position that in the partition that took place in 1932 sirjan Lal and Mathura Prasad separated and were allotted l/4th share each in the estate, the rest having remained joint between Darshan Lal and Sheo prasad Lai. Although a partition of sorts took place in the family, there was no inter se partition between these two brothers. Since the two brothers never separated between themselves any question of re-union between them does not arise. No document has been produced showing that the two brothers at any stage possessed properties separately. The plaintiffs have failed to prove their case of separation between the two brothers in 1934. I accordingly, hold that no separation took place between Darshan Lal and sheo Prasad Lal in 1934 as asserted by the plaintiff. 20. The only question that remains to be considered is whether as regards the suit property Schedule I of the plaint, there was unity of title and possession. According to the plaintiffs, these items of property, were left joint in the 1932 partition for the sake of convenience. According to the defendants, on the other hand, the 1932 partition was complete and inclusive of the suit property as well. In Ramnagina Sah, V/s. Harihar Sah AIR 1966 patna 179, a Division Bench of this Court has held that: "when a partition is admitted or proved, the presumption is that all the properties were divided and a person alleging that family property in the exclusive possession of one of the members after the partition, is joint and is liable to be partitioned, has to prove his case. " Thus in the instant case, as in the reported case, the plaintiffs have to prove that despite partition of 1932, the property in suit continued to be joint. 21 According to the defendants, separate lists of in the nature of memorandum of partition showing the details of the specific property allotted to the four brothers were drawn. " Thus in the instant case, as in the reported case, the plaintiffs have to prove that despite partition of 1932, the property in suit continued to be joint. 21 According to the defendants, separate lists of in the nature of memorandum of partition showing the details of the specific property allotted to the four brothers were drawn. The items of property allotted jointly to the share of Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lal are said to have been mentioned in the list of memorandum, marked an Ext. D. According to the defendants, all items of suit property (Schedule I of plaint) are covered by this document. It may be mentioned here that the said document was exhibited without objection although, at later stage, the plaintiffs sought to object to its admissibility on the ground of its being unregistered. The trial court has dealt with this matter and concluded that the document being only a memorandum of partition of properties which had already taken place and not effecting partition by itself, was admissible in evidence The approach of the trial court is in accordance with law which is settled on the point. 22. According to the contesting defendants, the suit property is covered by Ext. D. According to the plaintiffs, however, the document does not contain the details of the property, of even indication thereof, so as to link it with the suit property as described in the schedule of the plaint. During hearing of these appeals, it must be said, on account of its non-descrpti character, there was some initial difficulty in deciphering the document. However, it must be said to the credit of Mr. Hadish Mohan that he was able to explain the documents to my satisfaction. The document dated 16-10-92, as the very opinion, or heading. Lays, is described as memorandum of private partition which had already been effected earlier, containing a schedule of properties allotted jointly to Sheo Prasad Lal and Darshan Lal. It is true that complete details of the property such as plot numbers or Khata numbers have not been mentioned. However, these numbers or other such details are only means to identify the land. It cannot be said that in their absence, the particular land cannot be identified. It is common knowledge that in villages, the lands are known and described by their location. The question for consideration, thus, is whether Ext. However, these numbers or other such details are only means to identify the land. It cannot be said that in their absence, the particular land cannot be identified. It is common knowledge that in villages, the lands are known and described by their location. The question for consideration, thus, is whether Ext. D contains adequate description of the lands, or indications thereabout, on the basis of which they can be identified as linked with the suit lands, vide schedule to the plaint. It would not be out of place to state here that as per the evidence of D. W.12 (husband of defendant No.3), amongst others, Yaddest had been prepared in respect of partition of joint properties, 23. Schedule I comprises of three lots of properties, Lot 1 consisting of plot No.1338 described as house and Plot No.1345 described as Khana measuring 0.10 acre and 0.03 acre, respectively. Lots 2 and 3 comprise of orchard bearing plot No.1095 measuring 0 61 acre and Kest Kaimi land bearing plot No, 1494 measuring 0.13 acte respectively. Mr. Madan Mohan submitted that there are enough materials on record to establish link between items of the suit property with those mentioned in Ext. D. Plot Nos.1338 and 1345 are sought to be linked with Plot No.797. According to the defendants out of total area of 12 Kathas, kathas of Plot No.797 only was allotted to the share of Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lal which would be evident from the last item of the Schedule in Ext. D. According to the defendants, at the instance of the plaintiffs who bad by then got the rest of the land of No.797 (after purchase of the share of Surjan Lal) the aforesaid portion of Plot No.797 was given to them in exchange for the suit land. Counsel stated that the story of exchange is established by the fact that after the said lands in the area were acquired by the State, the plaintiffs received compensation in respect of the entire area of 12 kathas. Counsel in this connection draw my attention to the kbatian (Ext.9) in which plot No.797 is described as Bansdih having area 0.04 acre equivalent to 12 kathas. He also referred to Ext. E/2 showing payment of compensation in respect of the entire area in favour of Mathura Prasad. Counsel on the basis of the other documents of Ext. Counsel in this connection draw my attention to the kbatian (Ext.9) in which plot No.797 is described as Bansdih having area 0.04 acre equivalent to 12 kathas. He also referred to Ext. E/2 showing payment of compensation in respect of the entire area in favour of Mathura Prasad. Counsel on the basis of the other documents of Ext. I series stated that parties came in possession over the lands of their respective shares and received compensation from the State for the respective area. In this manner the plaintiffs received the compensation in respect of the lands covered by Exts. E/2, E/3 and E/5. The defendants also, likewise, received compensation in respect of the land covered by Exts. E/1 and E/4. Counsel also referred to the oral evidence of D. W.23, amongst others, stating that the parties had received compensation in respect the lands allotted to them. Another important circumstance referred to by the learned counsel is that after exchange of lands in the aforesaid manner mathura Prasad constructed separate house and lived at another place along with his family member, which would be evident from the evidence of D. W.21 and Ext. D.1/1 showing sanction of a plan for construction of the house. 24. The plaintiffs also produced documents, such as, municipal receipts in respect of the disputed house in respect of the period 1960-61 to 1966-67. The trial court accepted the explanation of the defendants about the grant of receipts with respect to the municipal taxes in the names of the plaintiffs on the ground that names of the parties were not mutated as per terms of the partition. The court has drawn inference from that fact that payment of tax and rent was not continuous. Be that as it may, in my opinion, in the face of the documentary evidence showing that exchange of lands has been acted on between the parties and the parties had even received compensation in respect of the land as per the exchange, it is not possible to rely on the municipal receipts. Rent receipts and/or municipal receipts are not documents which can create or extinguish ones title. They can only be used for collateral purpose to circumstance and in the face of Ext. E-2 series much reliance cannot be placed on the same. 25. As requires lot 2 property, it would appear from Ext. Rent receipts and/or municipal receipts are not documents which can create or extinguish ones title. They can only be used for collateral purpose to circumstance and in the face of Ext. E-2 series much reliance cannot be placed on the same. 25. As requires lot 2 property, it would appear from Ext. D that 14 mango kalas tree and two hiju mango trees over an area 10 kathas from mouth was allotted to the share of Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad. The total area of orchard (plot No.1095) described in lot No.2 is 0.61 acre or 20 kathas. Half of the area comes to 10 kathas. These description of the orchard given in Ext. D also fully tallies with the defendants case. The description and the recitals regarding the property is substantiated by the evidence of defendant No.3 herself in paragraph 11 wherein the stated that portion of the orchard belongs to Surjan Lal though of which was allotted to Nathura and extreme south portion was allotted jointly to Darshan Lal and Sheo Prasad Lal. The aforesaid statement of defendant No.3 leaves no room for doubt that the orchard had also been subjected to the partition amongst the brothers in 1932 which was acted upon and therefore, the same was not available for partition as joint-family property in the instant suit. 26. The last item of the suit property nearly lot 3 comprises of 0.13 acre land of plot No, 1494. Counsel for the defendants submitted that the land had been described as moriar in the memorandum being the 7th item of the property in the schedule of Ext. D. The document shows that 4 kathas out of the total area was allotted jointly to the share of Darshan Lal and sheo Prasad. Counsel submitted that the land has been mentioned an dih. in the Khatian (Ext.9) but Dih is also called moriar in local parlance. It was submitted that the identity of the land is well established as plot No.1494 as given in the khatian. It appears that the defendants case regarding particular land being described as Moriar land has not been controverted by the plaintiffs by adducing any rebuttal evidence. in the Khatian (Ext.9) but Dih is also called moriar in local parlance. It was submitted that the identity of the land is well established as plot No.1494 as given in the khatian. It appears that the defendants case regarding particular land being described as Moriar land has not been controverted by the plaintiffs by adducing any rebuttal evidence. Once it is found that moriar is the same thing as Din being plot No.1494 it becomes clear that the same had also been partitioned amongst the brothers in 1932 and, therefore, that too cannot be subjected to further partition over again. 27. The trial court on consideration of the evidence-oral and documen tary has found that alt items of the suit property had been partitioned and, thus, as regards them, there was no unity of title and possession between the parties. In view of the decision of this court in Ramnagina Sah V/s. Harihar Sah air 1966 Patna 179 (supra), the onus lay on the plaintiffs to show that although other items of the joint property had been partitioned, the particular items mentioned in the schedule of the plaint were left out and had remained joint. The plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus. 28. In the result, I do not find any merit in these appeals. They are, accordingly, dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.