S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, C. J. ( 1 ) IN these Special Civil Applications, petitioners, who are individuals, on the simple ground they jointly purchased or acquired vacant land, have been treated as a single unk for the purpose of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) act 23 of 1976 (hereinafter refeued to as "the Act" ). When the petitioners challenged this action on the pan of the authorities by preferring the Special Civil Applications, pleading that they are owners holding definite earmarked shares and hence, they must be held to be tenants-in-common and for the purpose of the Act, their definite specified shares in the vacant land, alone could be taken note of, the learned single Judge, even though there is a pronouncement of another learned single Judge of this Court, expressed in Smt. Savitaben Wlo. Shri Shantilal C. Shroff and others vs. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 (1) G. L. H. 186, deemed fit to refer these Special Civil Applications for consideration to a Bench. The main reason, as we could see from the order of reference, which weighed with the learned single Judge is that in the pronouncements of the Apex court, as well as the pronouncements of the High Court of Bombay, though dealing with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, a different note has been struck. ( 2 ) THE petitioners jointly purchased or acquired the vacant lands in question. Each petitioners share is defined and specified and in that view, the petitioners can be said to be only "tenants-in-common". However, on a theory that the petitioners have not got their shares separated by metes and bounds, the authorities proceeded to deal with the petitioners in each case as one unit. The Act defines a person under Section 2 (i) thereof as follows:"2. However, on a theory that the petitioners have not got their shares separated by metes and bounds, the authorities proceeded to deal with the petitioners in each case as one unit. The Act defines a person under Section 2 (i) thereof as follows:"2. Definitions In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires (i) "person" includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;" the learned single Judge in Smt. Savitaben W/o. Shri Shantilal G. Shroff and others, vs. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 (1)G. L. H. 186, dealt with a case arising under the Act, where co-owners held specified shares and after recapitulating the basic proposition "when owners hold definite earmarked shares in a common property, they can be said to be tenants in common", expressed his views as follows: "it is difficult to appreciate how respondent No. 2 persuaded himself to hold that co-owners of well defined shares in a joint property ceased to be individuals holding specified shares of the property on the appointed day. Division by metes and bounds is not the requirement of law for considering holdings of the concerned individuals as per Section 3 of the Act An individual may hold exclusively any vacant land or may hold vacant land in common with other co-owners but in specified shares. Merely because he holds some vacant land in specified shares jointly with other co-owners, he does not cease to be individual qua his holding of vacant land in specified shares. The emphasis put by second respondent on actual division of land by metes and bounds for the purpose of applicability of Section 3 of the Urban Land Act is patently erroneous in law and cannot be justified. "the learned single Judge referred to the following observations in an unreported judgment of a Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 834 of 1978, decided on 14. 7. 1981:"it is well settled that where the property is held by tenants in common having a defined share, then the holders could not be treated as joint holders merely on the ground that the property is not divided by metes and bounds. 7. 1981:"it is well settled that where the property is held by tenants in common having a defined share, then the holders could not be treated as joint holders merely on the ground that the property is not divided by metes and bounds. The assumption of the competent authority that as long as the property is not divided by metes and bounds, it is imperative to consider undivided holding as holding of a body individuals is clearly wrong. On the first principle itself, it is impossible to sustain the conclusion recorded by the competent authority. Apart from that fact, the petitioners could not be termed as a person within the definition of that expression contained in Section 2 (i) of the Act. The expression person includes an individual, a family, a firm, a company or an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. In our judgments, tenants, in common cannot be treated as an association or body of individuals. "in Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kerala vs. R. Valsala Amma, (1971) 82 ITR 828, which though arose in the context of Section 2 (xviii) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958, the implications of holding by Co-tenants were assessed by the Apex Court in the field of general law. There, the assessee and her sister received, under the will of their mother, inter alia, a cinema theatre building with machinery and another building, and each one of them had a half share in the properties. They gifted these properties to their brother by means of a single gift deed and the question arose as to whether the assessee and her sister should be assessed in respect of the gift as individuals or as an association or body of individuals. The Supreme Court held that, in law, each one of them had half the right in the properties that they gifted to their brother; they were holding the property and made the gift as tenants-in-common; each one must be held to have made a gift of her share of the property though the gift was made through one single document; and the question whether they divided the property or not was not material. The relevant discussion runs as follows:"now the question is in what capacity the gift was made by the assessee. Did they do it as an association or as a body of individuals or as individuals. The relevant discussion runs as follows:"now the question is in what capacity the gift was made by the assessee. Did they do it as an association or as a body of individuals or as individuals. The property received by the assessees under the will of their mother was admittedly received by them as co-tenants. Each one of them had half share in that property. The question whether they divided that property or not is not a material question. In law each one of them had half the right in the property that they gifted to their brother. They were holding that property as tenants-in- common and not as joint tenants. Hence they made the gift as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Each one must be held to have made a gift of her share of the property though the gift is made through one single document"it was specifically opined that the Gift Tax Act,1958 does not change general law relating to the rights of property and it really seeks to tax the gift of property owned by a person. It appears that the Bench of the High Court of Bombay in the unreported judgment referred to, by the learned single Judge of this Court in smt. Savitaben Wlo. Shri shantilal G. Shroff and others vs. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 (1) G. L. H. 186, followed the above pronouncement of the Apex Court. The pronouncements taken note of by the learned single Judge in the present case for the purpose of referring these Special Civil Applications to a Bench are as follows : 1. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay vs. Laxmidas Devidas, AIR 1938 bombay 41; 2. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay vs. Dwarkanath Harischandra Pitale and another, AIR 1938 Bombay 353; 3. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, Kutch and Saurashtra, ahmedabad vs. Smt. Indira Balakrishna, AIR 1980 SC 1172; 4. Mohammed Noorulla vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1043 ; 5. Commissioner of Income Tax, Poona vs. Buldana District Main Cloth importers Group, AIR 1961 SC 1261 ; and 6. G. Murugesan and Brothers vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1973 SC 2369 . The above decisions are admittedly, rendered in the context of the Income Tax Law. Commissioner of Income Tax, Poona vs. Buldana District Main Cloth importers Group, AIR 1961 SC 1261 ; and 6. G. Murugesan and Brothers vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, AIR 1973 SC 2369 . The above decisions are admittedly, rendered in the context of the Income Tax Law. Here, we must note a cardinal principle that, while construing or interpreting the provision of a particular statute, recourse to language used in another statute is not proper unless both the statutes are in pan materia. If citations are required, we can refer to the following case law, both at the level of the Supreme Court and High Courts :- (1) Ram Narain vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1957 SC 18 ; (2) The Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan vs. Radha Kishan and others, AIR 1979 SC 289 ; (3) Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal vs. Mohan Lal Punchand Tathed and others, AIR 1982 SC 865 ; (4) Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. vs. Custodian of Vested Forests, palghat and another, AIR 1990 SC 1747 ; (5) Loknath Nathulal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 181; (6) Damodar Mukherjee and others vs. Bonwarilal Agarwalla and others, AIR 1960 Calcutta 469; (7) Begum Shah Hussain and another vs. Attar Singh and others, AIR 1960 jammu and Kashmir 110; and (8) Nathu vs. Dilbande Hussain and others, AIR 1967 Madhya Pradesh 14; the principles discussed in the above pronouncements can be delineated as follows:". . . . . . . IT is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( AIR 1957 SC 18 ). "". . . . . . . IT is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act, and decisions rendered with reference to construction of one Act cannot apply with reference to the provisions of another Act, unless the two Acts are in pan materia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( AIR 1979 SC 289 ). "". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( AIR 1979 SC 289 ). "". . . . . . . . IT is very hazardous to decide cases in which proprietory rights arise for determination on the basis of decisions rendered under taxation laws which have their own peculiarities. The Act is not one levying tax on the income during the previous year, or previous years or of a period other than the previous year in the hands of an assessee but a law imposing a ceiling on the holding of a person or a family as on a specified date. The Act has to be construed in accordance with its scheme and object which, as stated earlier, is equitable distribution of land amongst the landless by taking over surplus in the hands of those who held land in excess of the ceiling limit on the appointed day, or those who would acquire subsequently land in excess of the ceiling or those who own lands which exceed the ceiling limit by reason of their conversion into a different class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( AIR 1982 SC 865 ). "". . . . . . . . JUDICIAL interpretation given to the words defined on in statute does not afford a guide to construction of the same words in another statute unless the Statutes are pan materia legislations. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( AIR 1990 SC 1747 ). "". . . . . . . . . MERELY because in an entirely different context and according to the scheme of a different enactment particular words were construed by a court to mean a certain thing, it will be idle to urge that similar words occurring in another context and in a dissimilar enactment should be given the same construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (AIR 1960 J and K 110 ). "". . . . . . . . . . . . IN the construction of a statutory provision reasons founded upon analogies are scarcely applicable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (AIR 1960 J and K 110 ). "". . . . . . . . . . . . IN the construction of a statutory provision reasons founded upon analogies are scarcely applicable. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( AIR 1967 MP 14 ). "even in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, Kutch and Saurashtra, ahmedabad vs. Smt. Indira Balakrishna, AIR 1960 SC 1172 , while construing the expressions "an association of persons", occurring under Section 3 of the Income Tax act, 1922, it was sounded that the Court must bear in mind that the expressions occurred in a Section, which imposed a tax, and the meaning to be assigned to the expressions must take colour from the context in which they occur. The following observations make the position clear:". . . . . . . IN the absence of any definition as to what constitutes an association of persons, we must construe the words in their plain ordinary meaning and we must also bear in mind that the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on the total income or each one of the units of assessment mentioned therein including an association of persons. The meaning to be assigned to the words must take colour from the context in which they occur. . . . . . . . . . . "hence it is not possible to draw any inspiration for the interpretation to be put on the expression "association of individuals", occurring in Section 2 (1) of the Act, from the pronouncements rendered while construing the Tax Statutes. In Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal vs. Mohan Lal Punchand Talked and others, AIR 1982 SC 865 , the case which arose under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings) Act 27 of 1961, there was an argument for drawing inspiration from the pronouncements rendered under the income Tax Act, 1922 to decide cases in which proprietary rights arise under the maharashtra Act The Apex Court repelled this argument as per extract already made. The said ratio, in our view, completely gives the answer so far as regards this question arising in the present case is concerned. The said ratio, in our view, completely gives the answer so far as regards this question arising in the present case is concerned. The Act is one :"to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good. " ( 3 ) THE definition of person under Section 2 (1) of the Act, is an inclusive one. It includes "an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not". That could only mean that an association or body of individuals as an entity and as an unit could also hold vacant land. In such a case, the individuals, who could go to constitute association or body, do not hold and it is only the association or body, which holds. It is the nature and scope of holding that is decisive on this point If individuals own definite and specified shares, though acquired under or through a single source or transaction or dealing, then, they may not come within the ambit of association or body of individuals holding the land. When individuals hold specified shares, it is only those specified shares with reference to respective individuals that could be the subject matter of assessment and consideration under the Act. Lack of division amongst such individuals by metes and bounds is of no legal consequence at all. In that view, such individuals, being "tenant-in-common", cannot be treated as the association or body as such, holding the vacant land. That there could be a holding by an association or body of individuals as a separate entity has been taken note of and provision therefore has also been made in the act, is clear when we refer to sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, which runs as follows:". . . . . . . . . That there could be a holding by an association or body of individuals as a separate entity has been taken note of and provision therefore has also been made in the act, is clear when we refer to sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, which runs as follows:". . . . . . . . . WHERE any firm or unincorporated association or body of individuals holds vacant land or holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling unit therein or holds both vacant land and such other land, then, the right or interest of any person in the vacant land or such other land or both, as the case may be, on the basis of his share in such firm or association or body shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such person. "as we could see from the extract made above, when an association or body of individuals as an entity holds land, then, the right or interest of the persons, who go to constitute the association or body, in the vacant land for the purpose of calculating the relevant extent of the vacant land as held by such person, is directed to be determined according to his share in the association or body. The share of the person in the association or body is the determining factor and not the share of the person in the vacant land, because the latter question would not arise at all in such a case. It is the association or body of individuals, which holds the vacant land, and it is not a case of individuals, with specified shares, owning the vacant land. This provision, expressed in sub-section (5) of Section 4 of the Act, is in consonance with the concept that there could be a case of an association or body of individuals, as a separate entity holding vacant land, in contrast to individuals jointly acquiring specified shares and holding them in a vacant land. Apart from point out the contrary position expressed in the Act itself, we have no comment to make over it for the present case. The decision of the learned single Judge in Smt. Savitaben Wlo. Apart from point out the contrary position expressed in the Act itself, we have no comment to make over it for the present case. The decision of the learned single Judge in Smt. Savitaben Wlo. Shri Shantilal G. Shroff and others vs. State of Gujarat and others, 1991 (1) G. L. H. 186, has, in our view, struck the correct note on the proposition arising under the Act and we have not found a warrant to take a different view. The result is, these Special Civil Applications are allowed and the decisions impugned are quashed and we remand the matters to the Authorities concerned for them to consider the matters afresh and in accordance with law, avoiding the infirmities noticed by us. We make no order as to costs. .