Judgment :- 1. In these batch of Writ Petitions, the challenge is to the Declaration under S. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) in G.O.Ms. No. 685, Industries (MIE-1) dated 8.12.1992 and published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 16.12.1992. The respective owners of the lands which are sought to be acquired under the said Declaration are the Petitioners. The points raised in all these Writ Petitions are one and the same and the arguments of senior counsel Mr. N.R. Chandran for some of the Writ Petitioners has been adopted by the other counsel. I therefore, proceed to deal with all the Writ Petitions by this common order. 2. The lands are in Pottaneri Village, Mettur Taluk, Salem District. By a notification under S. 4(1) of the Act in G.O.Ms. No. 184 Industries (MIE-I) dated 15-5-1992 the lands were notified for acquisition as being “needed for public purpose” to wit, for the Pig Iron Project to be set up by Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited, a new Company formed by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited (TIDCO) in association with Messrs. Lakshmi Machine Works Limited, Coimbatore as Co-promoter. To put it in a nutshell the acquisition is or a Private Company, registered under the Companies Act, of which the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited, which is a Government Company is a co-promoter. This aspect of the case is later elaborated in the counter affidavit of the respondents. The Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 20.5.1992. It is stated that the substance of the Notification was published in dailies on 23.5.1992 and 26.5.1992. The petitioners were also served with notice under R. 3(a) of the Rules framed under the Act. The substance of the Notification was published in the village by tom-tom and by affixture in the Village Administrative Office, Sub-Registrars office and the Police Station. The objections of the petitioners were communicated to the requisitioning body in August, 1992 and the remarks of the requisitioning body were conveyed to the writ petitioners on 7.9.1992. Thereafter another opportunity was given to the owners of the land by serving notice under R. 3(b) of the Rules, requesting them to appear for an enquiry on 28.9.1992, 29.9.1992 and 30.9.1992. Some of the owners or the land did participate in the enquiry on 28.9.1992. Thereafter another opportunity was given to the owners of the land by serving notice under R. 3(b) of the Rules, requesting them to appear for an enquiry on 28.9.1992, 29.9.1992 and 30.9.1992. Some of the owners or the land did participate in the enquiry on 28.9.1992. The objections of the owners of the land were rejected and the Land Acquisition Officer recommended the acquisition of the lands and forwarded his report to the Government and the respective owners were also informed about the same by a letter dated 28.9.1992. It is thereafter that the Government after considering the report decided to issue the impugned Declaration under S. 6 of the Act. 3. The points that are raised in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petitions can be summarised as follows:— “(i) The acquisition is for a Private Company and no part of the compensation is being paid out of public funds. Consequently, the acquisition can be undertaken only by fallowing the procedure prescribed in Part VII of the Act Admittedly Part VII of the Act had not been followed and therefore, the acquisition is liable to be struck down. (ii) The procedure prescribed in R. 3(b) has not been strictly followed. (iii) Individual notices were not served on all the joint owners of the land.” 4. In the Writ Petitions only the State of Tamil Nadu and the Land Acquisition Officer have been arrayed as parties. W.M.P. Nos. 8190 to 8195 of 1993 have been filed by the Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited seeking to implead themselves as party/respondent in the Writ Petitions 3861 to 3863 of 1993. In support of the Miscellaneous Petitions it is stated that a number of small foundries are situate in Tamil Nadu and they depend on steel plants situate in North India for the supply of Pig Iron. It is stated that the Government of Tamil Nadu examined the requirements of such small industries and applied through the Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter called “TIDCO”) for a licence to produce 1,50,000 tonnes of pig iron per annum. For this purpose TIDCO, which is a Government Company sought to co-opt a suitable industrial partner. They accordingly invited a private company called Lakshmi Machine Works Limited, Coimbatore, to enter into a partnership for the implementation of the project. For this purpose TIDCO, which is a Government Company sought to co-opt a suitable industrial partner. They accordingly invited a private company called Lakshmi Machine Works Limited, Coimbatore, to enter into a partnership for the implementation of the project. As a result of this arrangement a new company was incorporated called, Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited, with effect from 11.9.1991. It is slated to be in the associate sector and the share capital is made up of 40% from Lakshmi Machine Works Limited, 11% from TIDCO and the remaining from public financial institutions. Certain places near Katpadi and Arakonam were considered for the establishment of the project, but were rejected on technical grounds. Ultimately, the promoters decided that the subject lands at Pollaneri and M. Kalipatti Villages near Mccheri Road Railway Station were the best situate for the project. Thereafter, third-party petitioners set out the facts relating to the acquisition proceedings and submit that they are necessary parties to the Writ Petitions. These impleading petitions were opposed by the Writ Petitioners on the ground of maintainability. They also filed petitions to vacate the stay granted in all the Writ Petitions. When these petitions came up for orders, I directed the Miscellaneous Petitions to be posted along with main petitions for final disposal at an early date. Respondents 1 and 2 were represented by the learned Advocate-General, and his arguments were heard elaborately. After his argument Mr. R. Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the third party-petitioner also argued the case fully and completely. Therefore, it cannot be pretended that the third party petitioners have not been heard and there is no purpose in deciding the maintainability of the Miscellaneous Petitions W.M.P. Nos. 8190 to 8195 of 1993. Consequently, those petitions are ordered and third party company is directed to be impleaded in the main Writ Petitions. Since they have filed affidavits in support of the impleading petitions and petitions to vacate the order of stay, learned counsel for the third party-petitioners did not seek to file any fresh counter affidavits, and rested his arguments on the basis of the averments in those affidavits. 5. I will now briefly refer to the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 in W.P. Nos. 3861 to 3863 of 1993. The circumstances leading to the acquisition proceedings as set out by the Writ Petitioners and the third party Company are not disputed. 5. I will now briefly refer to the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 and 2 in W.P. Nos. 3861 to 3863 of 1993. The circumstances leading to the acquisition proceedings as set out by the Writ Petitioners and the third party Company are not disputed. However, certain details have been supplied by respondents 1 and 2 with reference to the person who pays the compensation for the acquired lands. The total investment in the project is stated to be about Rs. 142.65 crores. It is categorically stated that the Government of Tamil Nadu has rightly proceeded to acquire the lands under Part II of the Act and at each and every stage the procedure contemplated in the Act under Part II of the Act were strictly followed. Their definite case is that the acquisition is for a public purpose. The Government owned Company TIDCO had entered into an agreement with Messrs Lakshmi Machine Works Limited and the new Company was incorporated on 11.9.1991. The new private company has 40% share from another private company namely, Lakshmi Machine Works Limited, 11% from the TIDCO and the remaining from public financial institutions. It is stated that the procedures are in accordance with the industrial policy and guidelines of the Government of Tamil Nadu. Apparently the counter affidavit is trying to project the case of the Government contribution for the payment of compensation to the respective owners of the lands. So far as the other points are concerned, namely, the procedure prescribed under R. 3(b), it is contended that the same has been carefully adhered to. It is their specific claim that portion of the cost of acquisition is from public funds and the balance is out of funds of the third-party company, Therefore, it is contended that the procedure under Part VII of the Act need not be followed. It is again stated that the acquisition is not for a company simpliciter, but it is for a public purpose and the cost of the acquisition is borne partly by the Government of Tamil Nadu and even if portion of the Government contribution is small the same cannot make the acquisition illegal. 6. A separate counter affidavit has been filed in the other batch of Writ Petitions. It is not necessary to notice the other facts which are not disputed. 6. A separate counter affidavit has been filed in the other batch of Writ Petitions. It is not necessary to notice the other facts which are not disputed. It is only necessary to notice the averments regarding the contribution by the Government in respect of the compensation payable for acquisition of the lands. In this counter affidavit it is also stated that the award enquiry in respect of three blocks of lands had been conducted and the awards have also been passed on 31.3.1993. I will do well to quote some passages in the counter affidavits which will have a bearing on the relevant crucial issues. They are as follows:— “As stated earlier, the said project is an associate sector project wherein the Government contribution through TIDCO is 11% of the total equity of the project. The acquisition is wholly for a public purpose.” “Since the acquisition is for a public purpose and part of the compensation is paid by the Public Exchequer, the application of procedures contained in Part II is perfectly in order. In as much as a portion of the cost of acquisition is from the Public funds and the balance out of the funds of the Company it is not essential to comply with the requirement of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act because in such a case the acquisition is not for a company simplicitor but also for a public purpose and essential conditions for acquisition for a public purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne wholly or part out of the Public funds.” 7. Mr. N.R. Chandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the cases, has reiterated the points taken in the affidavits filed in support of the Writ petitions. The substantial point that is urged before me is with reference to the procedure to be followed in this particular case, namely, whether it is procedure under Part II or procedure under Part VII. Instead of relying on the averments in the affidavits and counter affidavits of the parties, I will do well to refer to the statutory Notification and Declaration for the purpose of understanding the purpose of acquisition, namely, whether it is for a company or for a public purpose and whether the compensation is being paid by the pa Company or part of the compensation flows from the Public Exchequer. A decision on the above points will decide the fate of the case. The Declaration under S. 6 of the Act is as follows:— (G.O.Ms. No. 685, Industries (MIE-I) 8th December 1992) No. 11(2)/IND/6100/- The Government of Tamil Nadu having been satisfied that the lands specified in the Schedule below have to be acquired for a public purpose and it having already been decided that the entire amount of compensation to be awarded for the lands is to be paid out of the funds controlled and managed by the Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited, Coimbatore, a company promoted by Tamil Nadu Industrial Development Corporation Limited (a State Government Undertaking in the associate sector) . The following Declaration is issued under S. 6 of the I and Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894):— DECLARATION: Under S. 6 of the I and Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894), the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby declares that the lands specified in the Schedule below and measuring 24.27.5 hectares, are needed for a public purpose, to wit, for establishing a Pig Iron Project in No. 33, Pottaneri Village, Mettur taluk, Salem district. A plan of the lands is kept in the Office of the Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), No. I, Pig Iron Project, Mettur and it may be inspected at any time during office hours.” In my opinion the words ‘to the effect that the entire amount of compensation to be awarded for the lands is to be borne by a private company promoted by TIDCO’ has to be kept in mind through out the discussion. The fact that the third party private company is promoted by TIDCO which is a Government Company is strongly relied on by the respondents to suggest that part of the compensation flows from the Public Exchequer 8. There are a number of decisions on this aspect of the case, most of which relate to acquisitions initiated before the amendment of the Act 68 of 1984. A strong plea was made on behalf of the respondents to suggest that the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has changed entire complexion with reference to the manner in which the Government can contribute to the acquisition proceedings. A strong plea was made on behalf of the respondents to suggest that the Land Acquisition Amendment Act 68 of 1984 has changed entire complexion with reference to the manner in which the Government can contribute to the acquisition proceedings. It is therefore, sought to be argued that some of the decisions rendered prior to the Amendment Act 68 of 1984 m ay not continue to have force after the said amendment. With this background, it will now be convenient to refer to the provisions of the Act, at the same time taking note of the amendment incorporated by the Act 64 of 1984. S. 3 of the Act contains the definitions of important words used in the Act. We have to take note of the definition of the words “Corporation owned or controlled by the State”. It is defined in S. 3(cc) of the Act. Any body corporate established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Government including a Government Company as defined in S. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 will be a “Corporation owned or controlled by the State”. I have omitted the other portions of the definition Clauses because the same is not necessary for this case. A company is defined in S. 3(e) of the Act and it excludes a Government Company referred torn S. 3 (cc) of the Act. The words “public purpose” have been given an inclusive definition containing eight sub clauses. Prior to the amendment there was only the definition of the word ‘Company’ in S. 3(e) of the Act. S. 4 of the Act says that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for “any public purpose or for a company”, a Notification may be issued in accordance with the said provisions of law. After providing for an enquiry under S. 5 of the Act we come to the important Section, namely, S. 6 of the Act. It commences by saying that subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report under S. 5-A of the Act, that any particular land “is needed for a public purpose or for a Company” a Declaration shall be made in accordance with the said Section. It commences by saying that subject to the provisions of Part VII of the Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report under S. 5-A of the Act, that any particular land “is needed for a public purpose or for a Company” a Declaration shall be made in accordance with the said Section. The first Proviso to this Section refers to the period of limitation within which the Declaration should be made. The second Proviso is important and is therefore, quoted:— “Provided further that no such Declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation 1 - In computing any of the periods referred to in the first Proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the Notification issued under S. 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2 - Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. Explanation 2 is a new addition relatable to the definition in S. 3(cc) of the Act, namely, “a Corporation owned or controlled by the State.” The second Proviso which I have quoted above has not undergone any change in the amendment Act 68 of 1984. The only change is based on Explanation 2 which seems to suggest that if the compensation to be awarded to the property is paid out of the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out o f public revenues. In this case I must straightway point out that the impugned Declaration under S. 6 of the Act, in categorical terms, says, that compensation is to be paid by the third party private company and not by TIDCO, a Government Company. If it is established that a part of the compensation is paid by TIDCO a Government Company. In this case I must straightway point out that the impugned Declaration under S. 6 of the Act, in categorical terms, says, that compensation is to be paid by the third party private company and not by TIDCO, a Government Company. If it is established that a part of the compensation is paid by TIDCO a Government Company. Then Explanation 2 will automatically come to the aid of the respondents and it can be assumed that the compensation is paid out of the public revenues and consequently the acquisition will be deemed to be for a public purpose and the procedure prescribed in Part VII of the Act need not be followed. In other words, in such a case the acquisition can be under Part II of the Act. 9. A reference to the various decisions arising out of the Proviso to Section 6 of the Act will clearly demonstrate (i) that Part II can be invoked where a land is sought to be acquired for a public purpose, and the compensation is paid out of public funds, (ii) that Part II can be invoked even in the case of an acquisition for a private company, if the Government contributes to the payment of compensation, wholly or partly from out of public revenue or from a fund controlled or managed by a local authority, (iii) That Part VII alone should be followed where an acquisition is for a private company and the entire compensation is paid by the said private company. 10. Before referring to the decisions, a few more provisions of law in Part VII of the Act can also be noticed. If an acquisition is to be undertaken for a company, the Government must be satisfied that the acquisition is for any of the purpose mentioned in Cls. (a), (aa) or (b) of S. 40 of the Act. A separate procedure is prescribed for undertaking an acquisition for a private company. S. 44-B of the Act is important and I am therefore, quoting the same. “44-B. Land not to be acquired under this Part except for certain purpose for private companies other than Government companies. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no land shall be acquired under this Part, except for the purpose mentioned in Cl. (a) of sub-Section (1) of S. 40, for a private company which is not a Government company. “44-B. Land not to be acquired under this Part except for certain purpose for private companies other than Government companies. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no land shall be acquired under this Part, except for the purpose mentioned in Cl. (a) of sub-Section (1) of S. 40, for a private company which is not a Government company. Explanation - “Private company” and Government company” shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956). 11. I will now refer to the various decisions on the point and the impact of the amendments introduced by the Central Act 68 of 1984. Somawanti v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1963 S.C. 151 ) is an authority for the proposition that an acquisition for a company can be undertaken even under Part II of the Act, even if only small portion of the contribution is made out of State funds, towards compensation payable to the acquired lands. Whether a token contribution by the State towards cost of the acquisiton will be sufficient compliance or not, has to be decided in each and every case. However, the Apex Court has made it clear that part does not necessarily mean a substantial part and it will be open to the Court in every case to examine whether the contribution made by the State satisfies the requirements of law. In that case a private limited concern requested the State of Punjab for the allotment of appropriate site for the location of its factory. The Declaration under S. 6 of the Act was to the effect that the land specified in the Notification was required by the Government “at the public expenses” for public purpose, namely, for setting up a factory for the manufa cture or refrigirator, compressor and other ancilliary equipments. Some time after the Declaration Under S. 6 of the Act, the Government of Punjab sanctioned the expenses of Rs. 100/- for the purpose of acquisition of the land. The Supreme Court after considering all the aspects of the case, has held that the said contribution of Rs. 100/- by the State of Punjab was sufficient to hold that the acquisition was for a public purpose and part of the compensation was being paid out of public Exchequer and accordingly upheld the acquisition proceedings. The Supreme Court after considering all the aspects of the case, has held that the said contribution of Rs. 100/- by the State of Punjab was sufficient to hold that the acquisition was for a public purpose and part of the compensation was being paid out of public Exchequer and accordingly upheld the acquisition proceedings. The second important case which in my opinion, is closer to the facts of the present case, is Valjibhai v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1963 S.C. 1890 ). In that case a piece of land was sought to be acquired for constructing a bus depot for the State Transport Corporation. One of the arguments advanced in that case was that the State Transport Corporation was a company and the failure to follow the procedure prescribed under Part VII of the Act vitiated the entire acquisition proceedings. In that case the Declaration under S. 6 of the Act stated that “the land was needed to be acquired for the purpose of and at the expenses of the State Transport Corporation.” It was first held that the State Transport Corporation was a Company within the meaning under Section 3(e) of the Act. The scope of Section 6 of the Act, has been explained in that judgment and it will be very instructive to refer to the same. “The Proviso clearly precludes the Government from making a Notification under sub-Section (1) of section 6 unless (a) the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company or is to come (b) wholly or partly out of (i) public revenues or (ii) some fund controlled or managed by a Local authority. It is no doubt true that it has been the appellants case throughout that the State Transport Corporation is a company. It is also a fact that the entire compensation is to come out of the funds of the State Transport Corporation. If, therefore, we accept the contention of the appellants on this point the terms of the Proviso will be said to have been satisfied. On the other hand it has been the case of the respondent that the State Transport Corporation is not a company but a local authority. If, therefore, we accept the contention of the appellants on this point the terms of the Proviso will be said to have been satisfied. On the other hand it has been the case of the respondent that the State Transport Corporation is not a company but a local authority. The reason why this contention is raised on behalf of the respondent is that the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not been complied with here and, therefore, if, in fact, the acquisition is on behalf of a company it will have to be said to be bad on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of Part VII.” The Apex Court proceeded to hold that since the entire compensation was being paid by the State Transport Corporation and since it was held to be a company, the failure to follow Part VII, vitiated the acquisition proceedings. The concluding part may also be noticed. “In our view the acquisition impugned in this case having been made for the benefit of a Corporation, though for a public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues and the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with.” 12. P. Iyah Nador v. State of Madras (A.I.R. 1965 Madras 50) is a case where the acquisition was for a company, but in the Declaration under S. 6 it was stated that the “lands were required for a public purpose they having decided already to contribute out of the public revenue a sum of Rs. 0.05 N.P. towards compensation to be awarded for the acquisition of the land.” On facts it was found that the agreement between the Company and the Government provides for repayment of all the expenses incurred by the Government. The Court was of the o pinion that even the contribution of 5 naya paise could have been recovered by the Government from the Company. Still the Court did not set aside the acquisition on that ground alone, but proceeded to set aside the acquisition on different grounds with which we are not concerned. In State of West Bengal v. P.N. Talukdar (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 646 (1966) I S.C.J. 28) the acquisition was undertaken under Part VII because the entire compensation was being paid by a company within the meaning of S. 3(e) of the Act. In State of West Bengal v. P.N. Talukdar (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 646 (1966) I S.C.J. 28) the acquisition was undertaken under Part VII because the entire compensation was being paid by a company within the meaning of S. 3(e) of the Act. No other principle of law different from what the Supreme Court had laid down in the earlier decisions was laid down. Jage Ram v. State of Haryana ( 1971 (3) S.C.R. 871 ) is a straight case where the Government contributed towards the cost of acquisition and it was held that it was not necessary to proceed under Part VII of the Act. In Baithhalimabu v. State of Gujarat (1978 S.C.J. 430) a contribution of Re. 1/- was held to be sufficient in an acquisition for a company under Part II of the Act. In State of Punjab v. Raja Ram (A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1694) the acquisition was for the Food Corporation of India and Notification stated that the acquisition was for a public purpose at public expenses. There was no reference to any contribution by the Government. Consequently, it was held that the Food Corporation of India being a Company and the entire compensation being borne by the Company, the acquisition could not have been made without following the procedure under Part VII of the Act. The following passage reiterates the proposition of law already referred to by me:— “The Corporation being a “Company”, compliance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Land Acquisition Act had to be made in order to lawfully acquire any land for its purpose. It is not denied that such compliance is completely lacking in the present case.” 13. There is one other recent judgment of our High Court in a batch of Writ Petitions decided on 25.10.1991 which has also been upheld by a Division Bench. This case need not detain us any longer because of the facts of the said case reported in R. Devendran & Others v. The Government of Tamilnadu etc. (1993 Writ L.R. 432), Govindasamy, J. observed as follows: “Learned Advocate General also contended that the contribution for payment of compensation is from the State funds, apart from the contribution made by the MRL which is a Government company in which 85% of its shareholdings belong to the Central Government. Learned Advocate General further contended that paragraph 3 of G.O.Ms. (1993 Writ L.R. 432), Govindasamy, J. observed as follows: “Learned Advocate General also contended that the contribution for payment of compensation is from the State funds, apart from the contribution made by the MRL which is a Government company in which 85% of its shareholdings belong to the Central Government. Learned Advocate General further contended that paragraph 3 of G.O.Ms. No. 648 Industries (MIDI) Department, dated 16.9.1989 clearly states that out of the total extent of land ordered for acquisition, the expenditure towards the cost of an extent of 1015 acres of land including establishment charges thereto may be collected from MRL and in respect of other organisations as per the present land policy, lease rent may be collected from the industries to whom the lands are allotted. Learned Advocate General contended that it is clear from the above that the compensation is being paid by the MRL and the Government and no other third party is under an obligation to pay compensation and hence Part VII of the Act will not apply to the present case.” This judgment of Govindasamy, J. has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in Mathur Village Residents Welfare Association (Regd. No. 295090 etc.) v. State of Tamilnadu (1992 I.L.W. 383). The same principles have been referred to by me in Muthu Chemicals (firm), v. State of Tamilnadu and 2 others (1993 Writ L.R. 374). 14. Coming to the facts of the present case I have already referred to the Declaration under S. 6 of the Act. It is worthwhile to notice the Declaration once over again with particular reference to the judgments above cited. The Declaration says that the entire amount of compensation to be awarded for the lands is to be paid out of the funds controlled and managed by the private company, which in turn is said to be promoted by a Government company, namely, TIDCO. We must at once refer to the changes brought about by the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The significant amendment which has relevance to the facts of the present case are the introduction of S. 3(cc) and Explanation 2 to the Proviso to S. 6 of the Act. S. 3(cc) of the Act, defines a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. On the basis of the definition the Government Company TIDCO will certainly be a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. S. 3(cc) of the Act, defines a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. On the basis of the definition the Government Company TIDCO will certainly be a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. But the private company which has been added as a party respondent namely, the Southern Iron and Steel Company Limited is only a private company within the meaning of S. 3(e) of the Act. Now the well accepted principle of law as deduced from the above judgments is that an acquisition for a company can be undertaken under Part II of the Act if part of the compensation comes out of public revenues or from a fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation 2 says that where the compensation is to be paid out of the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of the public revenues. In this case the compensation is to be paid by the private company in which the Government Company TIDCO has a percent share. Therefore, anxious consideration, I find that the conclusion cannot be escaped that the compensation which is paid by the private company comprises partly of the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State (TIDCO). Therefore, one cannot get away from the fact that part of the compensation comes out of the public revenues. To hold otherwise, would be to ignore Explanation 2 which has been introduced by the Amendment Act. 15. The argument of the petitioners that the Supreme Court in Valjibhai v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1890 - cited supra) has rejected a similar contention, cannot be accepted. In the case before the Supreme Court, the argument was that the funds of the company had themselves come out of public revenue in as much as they consist of moneys provided by the State of Bombay. Therefore, it was argued when the Company paid the compensation, part of it came from public revenue. No doubt, this argument was rejected by the Apex Court by stating that the funds belong to the company as such and that they cannot therefore, be regarding as public revenue in any sense. But as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, Explanation 2 to the Proviso was not available at the time when the Apex Court rendered the said judgment. But as rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate-General, Explanation 2 to the Proviso was not available at the time when the Apex Court rendered the said judgment. In my opinion Explanation 2 makes all the difference because, it says that if part of the compensation is paid out of the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State it must be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues. Admittedly, TIDCO has a 11% share in the private company for whose benefits the lands are sought to be acquired. It therefore, cannot be denied that the Corporation owned or controlled by the State Government, TIDCO contributed part of the compensation, and it is deemed to be public revenue. In my opinion, therefore, the ratio of all the above judgments that if part of the compensation is paid out of public revenue, then an acquisition can be undertaken even for a company under Part II of the Act is satisfied. The first and foremost contention of the petitioner therefore, fails. 16. Let me now advert to the second point urged by Mr. N.R. Chandran. According to him R. 3(b) of the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu) Rules have not been strictly followed in the matter holding the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act. The Rules themselves nave since been amended by G.O.Ms. No. 392, Revenue dated 11.6.1991, It would be more appropriate to refer to the amended Rules. Under the amended Rules the relevant Rule is Rule 4. The crucial requirement of R. 4 as adumberated by this Court in a Division Bench judgment reported in (1987 Writ L.R. 182) is to fix the date of enquiry after the objections of the requiring Department are forwarded to the owner of the land. This is clear from R. 4(c) which contemplates that on the dates fixed for enquiry, the Collector shall hear the objectors and the representative of the requiring department or company. The argument in this case is that the petitioners submitted an objection in pursuance of the notice under R. 3(b) on 7.9.1992 and this objection was not forwarded to the requisitioning company. It is however, admitted that earlier the petitioner participated in the enquiry on 28.9.1992 held at the Office of the Revenue Inspector, Pottaneri. The argument in this case is that the petitioners submitted an objection in pursuance of the notice under R. 3(b) on 7.9.1992 and this objection was not forwarded to the requisitioning company. It is however, admitted that earlier the petitioner participated in the enquiry on 28.9.1992 held at the Office of the Revenue Inspector, Pottaneri. The answer of the respondent is that R. 3(b) or R. 4(b) as the case may be had strictly been followed in this case. The objections of the petitioners had been communicated to the requisitioning body on 20.8,1992, 25.8.1992, 26.8.1992 and 27.8.1992. Thereafter the remarks of the re-quisitioning body were in turn conveyed back to the Writ Petitioners in the letter dated 7.9.1992. It is thereafter that enquiry was held on 28.9.1992, 29.9.1992 and 30.9.1992. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument of the petitioners that the procedure prescribed under the relevant Rules have not been followed. The objections sent in answer to the notice dated 7.9.1992 was far subsequent to the earlier objections which had in fact been forwarded to the requisitioning body. In any event, the enquiry was held after the second objection and both the land owners and the requisitioning body had participated in such an enquiry. The land owners cannot invalidate an acquisition proceeding by filing repeated objections and complaining that each objection had not been forwarded to the requisitioning body. I therefore, reject the second contention urged by the petitioners. 17. The third and last argument urged on behalf of the petitioners is that all the joint owners had not been served with notice and this will vitiate the acquisition proceedings because of the judgment or this Court in Thanikavelu, P.C. v. The Special Deputy Collector for Land Acqusition, Madras (1989 Writ L.R. 89 - F.B.). In the Full Bench judgment it has been reiterated that individual notice is mandatory only to those persons whose names are found in the records or who are found by the Collector as persons interested, on information received through reliable sources. The ratio of the said judgment is only that if the Collector receives reliable information that persons other than those mentioned in the Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act are also interested in the acquisition proceedings, then it was the duty of the Collector to send notice to such other persons and hear their objections. The ratio of the said judgment is only that if the Collector receives reliable information that persons other than those mentioned in the Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act are also interested in the acquisition proceedings, then it was the duty of the Collector to send notice to such other persons and hear their objections. That situation does not arise on the facts of the present case. Nowhere have the petitioners stated that in the enquiry under S. 5-A of the Act they gave information to the Collector about certain other persons being interested in the acquisition proceedings. Notice had been given to all those whose names were found in the land Records. Consequently, this objection also fails. 18. The net result of the above discussion is that none of the arguments advanced by the petitioner can be accepted. Consequently, all the Writ Petitions fail and they are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.