JUDGMENT Nagendra Rai, J. This application is being disposed of at the stage of admission with the consent of the parties. 2. The petitioners have filed the present application for quashing the prosecution under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The present case arises out of a complaint case filed by Manju Devi (opp. party no. l) against the petitioners. Petitioner no. 2 Om Prakash Singh is the husband of Manju Devi, petitioner no. 1 Jay Prakash Singh and petitioner no. 3 Sri prakash Singh are brother in law and petitioner no. 4 Rani Singh is the wife of Sri Prakash Singh. 4. The allegation against the petitioners in the complaint petition is that the complainant Manju Devi was married to accused petitioner Om Prakash Singh in June, 1983 at village Motipur in the district of Muzaffarpur and after marriage she came to her husband's place in village Basuchak, District Gazipur (U.P.) For a period of about three years the husband and his other family members behaved properly with her. Thereafter the husband his younger brother Sri Prakash singh (petitioner no. 3) and his wife Rani Singh, at the behest of petitioner Jay Prakash Singh indulged in torturing her and even did not provide food to her. The husband and her Devar Sri Prakash Singh were putting pressure on her to bring rupees one lac from her father for purchasing Car and on refusal she was beaten up by fists and slaps. On 23-8-92 petitioner Sri Prakash Singh and his wife Rani Singh brutally assaulted her and asked her to leave her Sasural When she proceeded for her Naihar, on the advice of the villagers, Sri prakash Singh brought her to Motipur, Muzaffarpur, and left her at the Railway Station. There also he gave out a threat that if she would not bring rupees one lac from her father for purchasing the Car she would be killed. 5. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before whom the original complaint was filed took cognizance, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and thereafter ordered for an enquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure during which two witnesses were examined and thereafter the order dated 28-9-1992 has been passed issuing processes against the petitioners. 6. 5. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before whom the original complaint was filed took cognizance, examined the complainant on solemn affirmation and thereafter ordered for an enquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure during which two witnesses were examined and thereafter the order dated 28-9-1992 has been passed issuing processes against the petitioners. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that according to the allegation in the complaint petition the offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, if any, was committed at the place of complainant in, laws at village Basuchak in the district of Gazipur (U. P), the court at Muzaffarpur has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case and, accordingly, the order taking cognizance and issuance of process is vitiated in law. He also contended that the allegations in the complaint petition even if accepted on its face value do not constitute an offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 7 Learned counsel appearing for the complainant opposite party, on the other hand submitted that the court at Muzaffarpur has jurisdiction to try the offence, as due to cruel behaviour of her husband and other family members the left her husband's place and came to her Naihar and as such the consequence of the offence of cruelty ensued at Motipur in Muzaffarpur district and, in that view of the matter, Muzaffarpur court has power to try the offence in view of the provisions of section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In support of his submission he has relied upon a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court, reported in 1992 BLJ (Vol I) 271 (Sardar Harpal Singh & ors. v. Balbinder Pal Kaur & anr). He also contended that the allegations on its face value constitute an offence under section 498A of the India Penal Code and there is no material at this stage to doubt the allegations made in the complaint as well as the evidence brought on the record during the enquiry. 8. Crime is local in the sense that a criminal case instituted against an offender is to be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the crime is committed. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, under Chapter XIII, incorporates this principle. However, this rule is subject to exceptions. 8. Crime is local in the sense that a criminal case instituted against an offender is to be enquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the crime is committed. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, under Chapter XIII, incorporates this principle. However, this rule is subject to exceptions. These exceptions are contained in other sections of Chapter XIII of the Code. This apart, special law or local law prescribes a different procedure for the trial of offences. 9. In this case moot question for determination is as to whether the Muzaffarpur court has jurisdiction to try the case or not? 10. Firstly, I will take up the point raised on behalf of the opposite party that the offence can be tried at Muzaffarpur by virtue of Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 179 of the Code provides that when an act is an offence by reason of any thing which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued. 11. From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, It is clear that the case can be tried at both the places where an act being ingredient of au offence has been done or the consequence which is also the ingredient of the offence has ensued. If the consequence is not the ingredient of the offence charged then section 179 has no application. In this connection reference may be made to a Full Bench judgment of Bombay High Court, reported in AIR 1930 Bombay 490 (In re Jivandas Savchand), wherein it was held as follows :- “What S. 179 provides is that when a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of two things : by reason, first, of any thing which has been done, and secondly of any consequence which has ensued, then jurisdiction is conferred on the Court where the act has been done of the consequence has ensued. The offence therefore must be charged by reason of the two things, the act done and the consequence which ensued and the consequence therefore forms the necessary part of the offence. The offence therefore must be charged by reason of the two things, the act done and the consequence which ensued and the consequence therefore forms the necessary part of the offence. S. 179 does not refer to an offence charged by reason of an act done, from which act any consequence has ensued.” Thus, it is clear that section 179 has application in case where offence consists of an act and consequence. If the offence is complete by the act itself and consequence of the act is not an essential ingredient of the offence this section has no application and in such cases happening of a consequence within a jurisdiction of the particular court does not confer jurisdiction on it to try the offence. 12. The offence of cruelty by the husband and relatives of the husband is defined under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. It was inserted in the Penal Code by Criminal Code (second amendment) Act, 1983 (46/83). According to the said provision whoever being tae husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. The cruelty his been defined in the explanation appended to the said section : Explanation : For the purpose of this section. "cruelty" means- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman: or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that cruelty is of two types. From the aforesaid provisions it is clear that cruelty is of two types. In one case the nature of the wilful conduct of the husband or relatives of husband should be such as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) Second type of cruelty is defined in explanation (b) which causes harassment with certain purposes namely, to coerce the woman or any person related to her to meet unlawful demands for any property or valuable security or to coerce her on account of her or her relative not fulfilling the unlawful demands. If the wilful conduct by the husband or his relatives is of the type which is likely to result in any of the eventualities to the woman as mentioned in explanation (a) or where the husband or his relatives causes harassment with any of the objects mentioned in explanation (b) the offence of cruelty as defined under section 498-A of the Penal Code is complete. 13. The question for determination is as to whether the leaving the place of her in laws by the complainant and residing at the place of her father can be said to be consequence of the act of harassment and forming one of the ingredients of the offence of cruelty? Learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party relied upon a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Sardar Harpal Singh (supra), wherein it was held as follows :- “The whole scheme of the Act is to provide relief to the weaker section and it is never expected that she is required to file a case at the place where in-laws are residing from where she is alleged to have been driven out which will frustrate the nature of the relief which she is likely to get in the event of her success in the case. Therefore, leaving of the place at Rourkella and residing at Jamshedpur can be taken to include within even the word 'consequence' which resulted in parting company' from her wedded life and residing at Jamshedpur in her father's house. Therefore, leaving of the place at Rourkella and residing at Jamshedpur can be taken to include within even the word 'consequence' which resulted in parting company' from her wedded life and residing at Jamshedpur in her father's house. In this view of the matter, Jamshedpur Criminal Court had jurisdiction to try such nature of offence and dispose of the same” I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners. As mentioned above, the court where consequence ensued gets jurisdiction to try and enquire an offence only if the consequence is an ingredient of an offence. Residing at her father's place due to harassment caused to the complainant at the place of her in laws cannot be said to be an ingredient of an offence of cruelty, as defined under section 498A. In my view, section 179 has no application in this case. However, the court at Muzaffarpur has jurisdiction to try the offence on a different ground to be stated hereinafter. 14. Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure falling under Chapter XIII provides the place for trial of offences triable together. It is apt to quote the aforesaid provision; which runs as follows :- “(a) Where the offences committed by any person are such that be may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each such offence by virtue of the provisions of section 219 or section 221, or (b) Where the offence or offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with and tried together by virtue the provisions of section 223, The offences may be inquired into or tried by any court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences". (underline is mine) Therelevant provision for the purpose of this case is Section 184 (b) and as such it is useful to quote the provision of section 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which runs as follows :- The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely :- (a) persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction. (underline is mine). 15. (underline is mine). 15. From reading of the provisions of Section 223(a) and section 184(b) together, it is clear that the persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction may be charged with and tried together and such offence may be inquired into and tried by any court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences. The word 'same transaction' has not been defined under the Code and even the apex Court has not given any definite definition to the said word In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao & anr. (AIR 1963 S C. 1850) the apex Court at page 1860 para 27, held as follows :- “.....What is ment by “same transaction” is not defined any where in the Code Indeed, it would always be difficult to define precisely what the expression means. Whether a transaction can be regarded as the same would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of each case and it seems to us to be a difficult task to undertake a definition of that which the Legislature has deliberately left undefined. We have, not come across a single decision of any Court which has embarked upon the difficult task of defining the expression. But it is generally thought that where there is proximity of time or place or unity of purpose and design or continuity of action in respect of a series of acts, it may be possible to infer that they form part of the same transaction. It is, however, not necessary that everyone of these elements should co exist for a transaction to be regarded as the same. But if several acts committed by a person show a unity of purpose or design that would be a strong circumstance to indicate that those acts form part of the same transaction. The connection between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction.” 16. Thus, it is neither advisable nor necessary to define the word same ‘transaction’, Whether several acts form part of the same transaction or not is to be determined from the facts of each case. The connection between a series of acts seems to us to be an essential ingredient for those acts to constitute the same transaction.” 16. Thus, it is neither advisable nor necessary to define the word same ‘transaction’, Whether several acts form part of the same transaction or not is to be determined from the facts of each case. If there is continuity of action and unity of purpose in doing several acts or offences then it can be inferred that the acts or the offences form the part or the same transaction. However, in a given case the presence of those elements may not be treated as sufficient to hold that the acts form the part of the same transaction and in such a situation the court may take into consideration Some other elements such as proximity of time in doing several acts for holding that the said acts form part of the same transaction. 17. The facts of this case have to be considered to find out as to whether the several acts of harassment committed upon the complainant at her in laws place in the district of Gazipur and at Motipur which falls within Muzaffarpur district form part of the same transaction thus conferring jurisdiction at the court at Muzaffarpur to try the offence under section 498A of the Penal Code. From narration of the facts of this case it is evident that the complainant was harassed and tortured by the accused persons continuously for the purpose of bringing dowry at her in-laws place as well as at Motipur, though at Motipur it was only accused petitioner Sri Prakash Singh who tortured her. There is continuity in their action in doing several acts of harassment by the accused person to the complainant There is unity of purpose or design amongst the accused persons as with the object of forcing the complainant to bring dowry she was being assaulted and harassed in her in law's place and was threatened of being killed at Motipur The acts committed by all the accused persons at her in-laws place; as well as harassment caused to her by the petitioner Sri Prakash Singh at Motipur are so inter connected that it involves continuity of action and purpose and, in my view, forms part of the same transaction. The offence of cruelty was committed not only at her father-in-law's place but also at Motipur by one of the accused In view of the provisions of section 223(1) all the accused persons can be tried together as the offence of cruelty committed by them is m course of the same transaction. By virtue of section 184(b) the offence of cruelty may be inquired into and tried by any court competent to inquired and try any offences. In other words, the offence under section 498A can be inquired into and tried by the court at Gazipur (U. P.) or by the court at Muzaffarpur. In view of the aforesaid reasons it is held that the court at Muzaffarpur has jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the offence u/s 498A of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. 18. So far as second point is concerned. It is clear from perusal of the records of the case that there is specific allegation against petitioners no. 2 to 4. So far as petitioner no 1 is concerned, who is elder brother of the husband of the complainant a vague allegation has been made in the complaint that at his behest the accused persons have committed the crime. The said assertion in complaint has not been reiterated by the complainant in her solemn affirmation. It is asserted in the application filed in this Court that the petitioner no. 1 Jay Prakash Singh is an advocate practicing at Bairakpur court at Calcutta since 1974. On the basis of the vague allegation not supported by the com plainant in her solemn affirmation, the court below should not have summoned petitioner no 1. In my considered opinion no prima facie case is made out against petitioner no. 1 at this stage. Accordingly, his prosecution is quashed. 19. In the result, the application of petitioner no. 1 Jay prakash Singh is allowed, so far as other petitioners are concerned, their application is dismissed, Application allowed in part.