ANIL DEV SINGH ( 1 ) BY this writ petition the petitioner challenges the order of his detention dated October 20,1992 passed by respondent No. 2 under Section 3 (1) read with section 2 (f) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,1974 (for short "cofeposa ). ( 2 ) THE allegations as revealed from the grounds of detention are as follows: ( 3 ) ON May 19, 1992 the petitioner was intercepted at IGI Airport when he was leaving for Dubai. As a result of the search of his luggage foreign currency valued at Rs. 11,89,384. 55 was recovered. Pursuant to the notice under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 the petitioner admitted the recovery of the aforesaid currency from his luggage. On the same day the petitioner was arrested in connection with the incident. On May 20, 1992 the petitioner was produced before the ACMM Patiala House, New Delhi who remanded him to judicial custody. Thereafter on July 6, 1992 after completion of the investigation, a complaint was filed against the petitioner under Section 132 and 135 (1) of the Customs Act in the court of ACMM, Patiala House,new Delhi. The Additional Sessions Judge by his order dated August 7,1992 granted bail to the petitioner. In view of this development, the detaining authority on October 20,1992 passed the detention order against the petitioner. It is this order of detention which has been challenged before me. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has taken two points: 1. The first point is that there was a delay in passing the detention order. He points out that the incident was of May 19,1992 while the detention order was passed on October 20,1992. He also points out that though the detention order was passed on October 20,1992 it was executed on November 27,1992 after about a period of one month. According to the learned counsel delay in passing and executing the detention order makes the order illegal. 2. The second point urged by the learned counsel is that when the detention order was passed against the petitioner he was already in judicial custody, having been taken into custody pursuant to the orders of the learned ACMM dated November 16,1992. According to the learned counsel delay in passing and executing the detention order makes the order illegal. 2. The second point urged by the learned counsel is that when the detention order was passed against the petitioner he was already in judicial custody, having been taken into custody pursuant to the orders of the learned ACMM dated November 16,1992. It is the contention of the learned counsel that before the detention order was served, the detaining authority should have again examined the question as to whether it would serve any purpose in executing the detention order on the petitioner, he being already in judicial custody. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the second respondent submits that there was no delay in passing the detention order and even if there was any the same has been adequately explained in the counter-affidavit filed by the Deputy Secretary (Home) on behalf of the said respondent. He further submits that there was no delay in serving the detention order on the petitioner. With regard to the point whether the Detaining Authority should have again applied its mind to the desirability and necessity of executing the detention order, he submits that the Detaining Authority was not aware of the fact that the petitioner had already been taken into judicial custody on November 16,1992. ( 6 ) COMING to the first point raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it must be noted that the proposal to detain the petitioner was sponsored on August 27,1992 i. e. after about 20 days of the release of the petitioner on bail. This proposal culminated in the order of detention after fifty three days. The detaining authority should have been mindful of the fact that in the intervening period the petitioner could have indulged in the same activities for which the order of detention was passed. If the object of the detention order was to prevent the petitioner from indulging in activities relating to smuggling of goods, then it was necessary that the detention order should have been passed immediately. There is no plausible and worthwhile explanation as to why the detaining authority took about two months time in passing the detention order from the date when the petitioner was granted regular bail. Intervening period is very crucial for the purpose of seeing whether the detention order should be allowed to stand or not. There is no plausible and worthwhile explanation as to why the detaining authority took about two months time in passing the detention order from the date when the petitioner was granted regular bail. Intervening period is very crucial for the purpose of seeing whether the detention order should be allowed to stand or not. The live connection between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention may be snapped in case there is a gap in passing the detention order. In detention matters the Detaining Authority is required to act without any delay. ( 7 ) IN Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar Vs. Shri S. Ramamurthi and others, JT 1992 (3) SC 261 the Supreme Court held as follows: "13. COMING to the case on hand, the detention order was passed after 5 months and 8 days from the date of the registration of the last case and more than 4 months from submission of the proposal. What disturb our mind is that the statements from the witnesses A to E were obtained only after the detenu became successful in getting bail in all the prohibition cases registered against him, that too in the later part of March 1991. These statements are very much REFERRED TO to in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority alongwith the registration of the cases under the Act. " ( 8 ) THE Supreme Court in Rabindra Kumar Ghosel alias Buli Vs. The State of West Bengal (1975) 4 SCC 111 , while considering the delay of three months in passing the detention order, observed as follows: "the Superintendent of Police, according to the counter-affidavit, placed the case for detention before the District Magistrate on November 30,1973. We find that the actual order of detention was passed only around three months thereafter. The whole purpose and object of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act is that persons who are likely to imperil public order are not allowed to be free to indulge in this dangerous activity, we cannot understand the District Magistrate sleeping over the matter for well nigh three months and then claiming that there is a real and imminent danger of prejudicial activity affecting public order. The chain of connection between the dangerous activities relied on and the detention order passed is snapped by this long and unexplained delay. The chain of connection between the dangerous activities relied on and the detention order passed is snapped by this long and unexplained delay. If there were some tenable explanation for this gap we would have been reluctant to interfere with the detention order but none has been stated in the counter affidavit filed today many months after time was taken for filing a return. In these circumstances, we are not satisfied that there is any justification for the claim of subjective satisfaction put forward by the District Magistrate". ( 9 ) IN the present case there has been not only a delay in passing the detention order but also there has been a delay in executing the same. It took about one month for the said respondent to execute the order of detention after the same was passed. ( 10 ) IN view of the above discussion, I have no hesitation in holding that the order of detention is vitiated because of the delay in passing and executing the same. Having held that the order of detention to have been vitiated, it is not necessary to examine the other point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY rule is made absolute. The order of detention is quashed and the petitioner is directed to be released forthwith if he is not wanted in any other case.