V. H. BHAIRAVIA, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition, under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the order of his suspesion and continuation of his suspension period and prayed for writ of mandamus directing the respondents to revoke the suspension order dated 13. 6. 1989 (Annex. B) and further prayed to quash and set aside the said order and to reinstate him on his original post of Police Sub Inspector on the ground that continuation of suspension of the petitioner is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THE short relevant facts emerging from the record are that the petitioner was serving as Police Sub Inspector (PSI for short) in Surat (Rural ). While the petitioner was petrolling along with Circle Police Inspector (CPI for short) Mr. Khan on National highway No. 8 between 4. 1. 89 and 5. 1. 89 from 9. 00 p. m. to 5. 00 a. m. , one person was found in suspicious condition and on search of his person, two Revolvers and 8 Bullets were found from him. Therefore, he was taken into custody and a complaint was filed by the petitioner at Kamrej Police Station. The petitioner thereafter reported to Dy. S. P. Surat Shri Patel, who in turn came to Kamrej Police Station and started beating said person (accused ). The petitioner tried to persuade Dy. S. P. Shri Patel for not beating him more as remand of the accused was granted. Thereupon, Shri Patel got excited and started giving threats to the petitioner and CPI Shri Khan. It is submitted that surprisingly Mr. Patel reported to DSP Surat and a complaint against the petitioner and Mr. Khan, CPI came to be filed involving them in the offences punishable under sections 4 and 5 of the tada Act and under sec. 342, 120 (B), 166,167,193,196,199, 211, 213, 218, 220 and 221 of the I. P. Code and under secs. 7 and 13 of The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and under sec. 25 (1) of the Arms Act. It is submitted that the petitioner was immediately came to be transferred from Surat Rural to Baroda Rural Police Station by the order of transfer dated 30. 5. 1989 and was came to be relieved on the same day pursuant to the transfer order dated 30. 5. 25 (1) of the Arms Act. It is submitted that the petitioner was immediately came to be transferred from Surat Rural to Baroda Rural Police Station by the order of transfer dated 30. 5. 1989 and was came to be relieved on the same day pursuant to the transfer order dated 30. 5. 1989 (Annex. A ). It is submitted that after the transfer order, within 2 days, the petitioner and Mr. Khan (CPI) came to be suspended by the order dated 13. 6. 1989 (Annex. B ). It has been submitted that the petitioner and Mr. Khan (CPI) came to be discharged from the offences under the TADA Act and Corruption Act by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Surat by his order dated 2. 3. 1990 (Annex. D ). It has been observed by the learned Judge, that there is no case against the petitioner under TADA act and Courruption Act It is further submitted that relying on the observations made by the learned Judge in the order dated 2. 3. 1990 (Annex. D), suspension order of Mr. Khan (CPI) came to be revoked by the respondents by the order dated 28. 2. 1992 (Annex. E ). However, in the case of the petitioner, the respondents refused to revoke suspension order by the impugned order/letter dated 16. 3. 1992 (Annex. F) Hence, this petition ( 3 ) MR. P. B. Majmudar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the continuation of the suspension order against the petitioner is discriminatory, capricious and is in colourable exercise of the powers as it denies the equal treatment to the petitioner. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner, along with CPI Shri Khan, have been suspended on the alleged charges as aforesaid. However, the petitioner and Mr. Khan, both were discharged by the designated court by its order dated 2. 3. 1990 (Annex. D) from the offences under the TADA Act and corruption Act. It is further submitted that thereafter, the suspension order of Mr. Khan came to be revoked by the impugned order dated 28. 2. 1992 at (Annex. E) by the respondents. However, die suspension order of the petitioner has not been revoked under the guise of pending criminal case in the court against the petitioner. It is further submitted that thereafter, the suspension order of Mr. Khan came to be revoked by the impugned order dated 28. 2. 1992 at (Annex. E) by the respondents. However, die suspension order of the petitioner has not been revoked under the guise of pending criminal case in the court against the petitioner. ( 4 ) IT is shocking and surprising that without applying mind with respect to the nature of charges against the petitioner, the authorities refused to invoke the order of suspension of the petitioner. I do not see any justification in not revoking suspension order and in continuing suspension order of the petitioner in view of the fact that a similarly situated higher officer viz. Mr. Khan (CPI) has been reinstated by the respondents by revoking his suspension order and different considerations have been applied in the case of the petitioner. In the matter of transfer or suspension of a public officer, under the guise of public interest or in the interest of administration, normally presumed to be bonafide and normally courts do not interfere. But, if some contrary facts are brought to the notice of the court by the delinquent and the court is convinced by the material placed before it proving malafide or arbitrariness, the courts are justified in interfering with such orders. In the case of suspension of a public officer on the ground of some suspicious activities prima facie found to be bonafide, no interference is warranted, but as soon as that suspicion disappears or is removed by the judicial or administrative order, the continuation of the suspension of such public officer is unjustified and is unwarranted. The quest for justice has been as challenging as the quest for holy grail and as illusive. The public officer must act in a judicial spirit and not capriciously or arbitrarily. Further, there should not be any discriminatory treatment in the matter of disciplinary action amongst the persons who are similarly situated, irrespective of his high rank, low position or whether he is influential or non-influential personality. However, the present case is a novel example of arbitrariness, capriciousness as also colourable exercise of powers by the respondents. Two police officers: one PSI-the petitioner herein and another CPI Mr. Khan, both were suspended on the allegations and on the strength of complaint involving them in serious offences under TADA Act and Corruption Act. However, the present case is a novel example of arbitrariness, capriciousness as also colourable exercise of powers by the respondents. Two police officers: one PSI-the petitioner herein and another CPI Mr. Khan, both were suspended on the allegations and on the strength of complaint involving them in serious offences under TADA Act and Corruption Act. However, as stated above, the designated court, by its order dated 2. 3. 1990 (Annex. D), discharged both of them from the offences under TADA Act and Corruption Act. Thereafter, by the order dated 28. 2. 1992 (Annex. E), the suspension of Mr. Khan, CPI came to be revoked, but the request of the petitioner to revoke his suspension order, came to be turned down by the order dated 16. 3. 1992 (Annex. F ). Therefore, the crucial question in this petition is that what were the factors or reasons which weighed in refusing revocation of suspension order in the case of the petitioner more particularly when alleged co-accused of the petitioner i. e. Mr. Khan (CPI)s suspension was revoked ? Is it so that Shri Khan is a high-ranked officer holding the post of CPI and the petitioner is holding lower post in the rank of PSI ? Or first one is more influential and the later is non-influential ? Or is there any different and discriminatory treatment on the basis of cadre or caste ? In my view, this is best example of victimisation, discrimination and colourable exercise of powers by the authorities concerned causing grave injustice to the petitioner. A small police officer who is non-influential and is coming from backward community is made to suffer because of discriminatory treatment in an arbitrary manner. In my view, there is no justification at all for not revoking suspension order of the petitioner and keeping him under suspension when he is discharged from the serious offences under TADA Act and Corruption Act and more particulary when his co-accused is reinstated in service since long back. In my view, therefore, the continuation of suspension of the petitioner is unsustainable and is bad-in-law as it is arbitrary, capricious. As stated earlier, since the order of suspension of mr. Khan, co-accused has been revoked, I see no reasons for the competent authority not to revoke the suspension order of the petitioner. In my view, therefore, the continuation of suspension of the petitioner is unsustainable and is bad-in-law as it is arbitrary, capricious. As stated earlier, since the order of suspension of mr. Khan, co-accused has been revoked, I see no reasons for the competent authority not to revoke the suspension order of the petitioner. It is, therefore, held that the action of the respondents in refusing revocation of suspension order is illegal and bad-in-law and that order of suspension, therefore, requires to be quashed and set aside. ( 5 ) IN the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned order of suspension dated 13. 6. 1980 (Annex. B) hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent no. 3 is hereby directed to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service, within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this court. The respondents are further directed to pay arrears of salary and all other consequential benefits to the petitioner within four weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this court. Rule made absolute. No order as to costs. .