Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. This is an unfortunate case in which the learned Subordinate Judge, Salem, has exalted form over substance resulting in failure of justice. After having found that Exs. A-1 and A-2, which formed the main plank of plaintiffs case, are true and that the suit is not barred by limitation, the learned Subordinate Judge has denied reliefs to the plaintiff/appellant on technical grounds pertaining to the court-fee payable on the plaint and the form of the prayers made by the plaintiff. 2. The parties would be referred to by their ranks to the suit. The plaintiff was owning a fleet of buses and running the business of stage carriage transport. He had about 18 or 19 buses. As there were talks of a legislation imposing a ceiling on the number of stage carriage permits owned by an individual, in the later part of 1970, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the first defendant on 11-12-1970 under Ex. A-1 for sale of five buses described in Schedule ‘A’ to the plaint along with the route permits. The apparent tenor of the document was that the routes and buses had been transferred to the first defendant by the plaintiff and applications should be made before the Regional Transport Authority for getting the necessary permission for transfer of permits. The agreement also read that till the application for transfer was ordered by the Authority, the plaintiff should pay the necessary taxes and collect the same from the first defendant on production of vouchers thereafter. The document also provided that the first defendant was responsible thereafter for payment of the instalments due under the hire purchase agreements relating to the buses and if there was any necessity for replacement of any bus, it should be done by the plaintiff and the first defendant should undertake the debt which may be incurred for purchasing a new bus. The debts borrowed by the plaintiff for the purpose of the buses and the permits were set put in Schedule ‘B’ to the agreement and the first defendant was to discharge the same. The agreement contained a provision that if there was any default on the part of the first defendant in discharging the debts and if the plaintiff was made to pay the debts, he could have a Receiver appointed for taking over the buses and discharging the debts. The agreement contained a provision that if there was any default on the part of the first defendant in discharging the debts and if the plaintiff was made to pay the debts, he could have a Receiver appointed for taking over the buses and discharging the debts. The last clause in the agreement provided that all the conditions therein were subject to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the order of the Authority on the application for transfer of permit. According to the agreement, the total amount due under the hire purchase agreements as on that date Was Rs. 66,313/- and the total amount due under five promissory notes executed by the plaintiff was Rs. 52,458/-. 3. A joint application was made by the plaintiff and the first defendant in April 1971 for transfer of permits of five buses. It is evident, however from the records that two of the buses mentioned in Ex. A-1, viz., MDS 7114 and MDS 6234 were replaced by MDL 3131 and MDL 3205 on 12-2-1971 and 12-3-1971 respectively. Hence, the joint application filed before the Regional Transport Authority was with reference to five buses, three of which were mentioned in Ex. A-1 and the remaining two were the new buses which replaced the older ones as stated above. The applications were rejected on 5-7-1971 by the Regional Transport Authority Salem on the ground that Tamil Nadu Ordinance VI of 1971 issued by the State Government came into effect on 18-6-1971 fixing a ceiling limit of ten permits to an individual operator and directing surrender of the excess permits. The Authority took the view that the said Ordinance was applicable to all pending applications for transfer or permit. Aggrieved by the said order, the first defendant filed appeals before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. The plaintiff filed W.P. No. 2191 of 1971 in this Court on 14-7-1971 for issue of a writ of declaration declaring Ordinance VI of 1971 as null and void and unconstitutional. The proceedings before the Tribunal were kept stayed till the disposal of the writ petition. The Ordinance was replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act (Tamil Nadu Second Amendment) Act XVI of 1971, which was published in the Gazette on 30-7-1971. Under S. 1(3) of the Act, the Act was deemed to have come into force on the 18th June, 1971, the date on which the Ordinance was published. The Ordinance was replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act (Tamil Nadu Second Amendment) Act XVI of 1971, which was published in the Gazette on 30-7-1971. Under S. 1(3) of the Act, the Act was deemed to have come into force on the 18th June, 1971, the date on which the Ordinance was published. The Act provided for a ceiling on ownership of stage carriage permite by individual operators and also for surrender of permits held in excess of the ceiling limit. S. 62-D introduced in the Principal Act by the amendment provided that if a holder of stage carriage permits in excess of ten, applied to the transport authority for permission to transfer any stage carriage permit under sub-S. (1) of S. 59 of the Act, the Authority shall refuse such permission. Sub-S. (2) of S. 62-D of the Act made the provision applicable to all pending proceedings. S. 62-E enabled the authorities to refuse permission for transfer, if it appeared that the transfer was a benami one. 4. During the pendency of the Writ Petition and the appeals before the Tribunal, the first defendant executed a letter dated 31-1-1972 in favour of the plaintiff. The letter, after referring to the pendency of the proceedings referred to above, stated that the first defendant would pay the price of the buses and the permits as may be ascertained after the passing or an order of transfer of permits and take delivery after salement. The letter also stated that no amount of sale price had been paid by the first defendant to the plaintiff till then. It should be mentioned here that while the first defendant admits his signature in the said letter, contends that the document has been fabricated with the help of blank papers which had been signed by him earlier in connection with another business run by him and the plaintiff. 5. The writ petition was disposed by a Division Bench of this Court and the judgment is reported in Sowdambigai Motor Service, Dharapuram v. State of Tamil Nadu (92 L.W. 565). The Bench declared that Ss. 5. The writ petition was disposed by a Division Bench of this Court and the judgment is reported in Sowdambigai Motor Service, Dharapuram v. State of Tamil Nadu (92 L.W. 565). The Bench declared that Ss. 62-A, 62-B, 62-C, 62-D and 62-E of the Motor Vehicles Act as introduced by the Amendment Act were void and directed the Regional Transport Authorities concerned, as well as, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to dispose of the proceedings relating to approval of transfer of permits and renewal of permits in accordance with law without reference to the above Sections. 6. Thereafter, the Tribunal passed an Order on 12-10-1978 allowing the appeals filed by the first defendant and granting the prayer for transfer of permits. The Secretary, Regional Transport Authority was directed to give effect to the transfer. The order of the Tribunal is marked as Ex. B-12. A consequential order was passed by the Regional Transport Authority under Ex. B-11 on 19-4-1979 and directed the first defendant to produce the registration certificates of the vehicles along with the permits for effecting the transfer. The actual transfer was effected on 21-4-1979. It is common case that the buses were in the possession of the plaintiff till then and he was managing their operations. 7. The first defendant filed a suit on 17-8-1979 in the Court of the District Munsif, Salem for a permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the buses described in the plaint Schedule. The allegation in the plaint was that the first defendant became the owner of the buses on 11-12-1970 under Ex. A-1 and the permits were transferred in his favour on 21-4-1979 on a joint application. It was alleged that there was an unsettled account between the plaintiff and the first defendant in respect of a cinema film distribution company by name Sri Hari Movies and with a view to put the first defendant to hardship, the plaintiff was threatening him with dire consequences and declaring that he would use the signatures of the first defendant obtained some years back in the course of business transaction and would wreak vengeance on him. It was also alleged that the first defendant had preferred a police complaint on 16-8-1979 against the plaintiff, a copy of which was filed along with the plaint. It was also alleged that the first defendant had preferred a police complaint on 16-8-1979 against the plaintiff, a copy of which was filed along with the plaint. It was further alleged that the plaintiff employed goondas on the prior day to prevent the suit buses from plying in their routes and thereby caused inconvenience to the passengers and such attempts were thwarted; but, however, the suit was filed for the relief of injunction as the first defendant was a law abiding citizen. Along with the suit, the first defendant filed I.A. No. 1809 of 1979 for temporary injuction and got an ad interim ex parte order. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant made use of the said order and took forcible control of the running buses with police help. The plaintiff entered appearance in that suit and filed an application in I.A. No. 2484 of 1979 for appointment of Receiver and I.A. 422 of 1980 for an injunction restraining the first defendant from alienating the buses with the route permits. In the latter application, the first defendant gave an undertaking that he would not alienate the permits till the disposal of the suit and the District Munsif recorded the same and passed an order granting an injunction on 13-3-1980. It was, however, made clear in the order that it would not affect the rights of the Authorities to issue pucca permits to the first defendant. 8. The plaintiff filed the present suit on 19-4-1982 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Salem. Originally the first defendant was alone made party to the suit. According to the plaint, the agreement under Ex. A-1 was brought into existence when there were wide rumours that the Legislature would bring in a ceiling on the ownership of stage carriage permits. It is averred in the plaint that there was a justifiable apprehension at that time that the applications for transfer of permits would not be readily and easily considered by the Authorities and there would be much delay before any order was passed on such applications. It is averred in the plaint that there was a justifiable apprehension at that time that the applications for transfer of permits would not be readily and easily considered by the Authorities and there would be much delay before any order was passed on such applications. Hence, it was decided that if there was a concluded contract, it may get frustrated in the event of a refusal of the applications for transfer by the authorities and, therefore, the agreement was entered with a view to get an order of transfer of permits in the first instance and thereafter effect a sale of buses. There was no intention to deliver the buses or receive the price therefor before the Authority passed an order permitting transfer of permits. It was, therefore, agreed that the parties could have the necessary documents executed in such a manner as to enable them to get an order of transfer of permits from the authorities, though in fact the actual transfer would take place after passing of such orders. With that object, the recitals were made in the agreement ostensibly conferring immediate title on the first defendant, though, in fact, there was no transfer of title. It was agreed that the price shall be the price which prevailed in the market at the time when the permits were transferred officially in the name of the first defendant. Reliance was placed on the contents of the letter dated 31-1-1972, which is marked as Ex. A-2. The plaint made a reference to the proceedings before the Authorities, as well as, the writ petition. It was stated that after getting an order of transfer of permits, the first defendant hatched a plan to secure possession of the buses mentioned in the ‘B’ Schedule to the plaint, which were the replaced buses and which were not the subject matter of the agreement dated 11-12-1970 as such. The said buses mentioned in Schedule ‘B’ were owned by the plaintiff, having been purchased by him and he was plying the same with his own employees till 17-8-1979. The first defendant did not approach the plaintiff after getting a transfer of the permits on 21-4-1979, but filed the suit in the Court of the District Munsif, Salem and obtained an order of injunction by the misuse of which he dishonsetly and unlawfully took forcible control of the buses with the police help. The first defendant did not approach the plaintiff after getting a transfer of the permits on 21-4-1979, but filed the suit in the Court of the District Munsif, Salem and obtained an order of injunction by the misuse of which he dishonsetly and unlawfully took forcible control of the buses with the police help. The plaint also referred to the order of injunction obtained by the plaintiff in I.A. No. 422 of 1980 and the pendency of the application for appointment of Receiver in I.A. No. 2484 of 1979. The plaint proceeded to state that the price for the buses had not been fixed and the value thereof may range from Rs. Four to five lakhs for each bus. The plaintiff prayed for a preliminary decree against the first defendant declaring his liability to pay for the buses with the permits set out in the ‘B’ Schedule and for ascertainment of value thereof as on 21-4-1979 by appointment of a Commissioner and for a final decree for the said value. There was also a prayer for declaration of the right of the plaintiff to the profits realised by the first defendant from 17-8-1979 till the date of final decree with interest thereon at 12% per annum. A prayer was also made for a charge over the buses for the amount which may be found due.” 9. The first defendant filed a written statement on 13-9-1982. He contended that he was a relative of the plaintiff and his father and he joined the services of the plaintiffs father in or about 1949 and he was taken more or less as a member of the family. There was no stipulation for payment of any salary and he was being paid monies as and when required with a view to give him a good status in life. With the same view, the plaintiff, after the death of his father, executed some sale deeds in his favour conveying title over certain lands. On the advice of the plaintiffs father, he sold the five buses mentioned in the plaint ‘A’ Schedule under Ex. A-1 to the first defendant. The said document is not an agreement, but a record of a contract of sale of the buses along with their route permits. On the advice of the plaintiffs father, he sold the five buses mentioned in the plaint ‘A’ Schedule under Ex. A-1 to the first defendant. The said document is not an agreement, but a record of a contract of sale of the buses along with their route permits. The consideration was that the first defendant should discharge the debts due by the plaintiff under the hire purchase agreement and the promissory notes set out in the document. The ownership of the buses along with the permits passed to the first defendant even before the execution of the document, though the physical delivery of the vehicles was postponed till after the permits were transferred to him. On the transfer of the permits by the Authority, the plaintiff gave actual physical delivery of the buses also. During the interim period, the plaintiff was looking after the running of the buses as agent and trustee of the first defendant and in the course of management, the debts due under the hire purchases agreement and the promissory notes were discharged by the plaintiff on behalf of the first defendant and the relevant documents were taken possession by the plaintiff. The buses were also replaced whenever necessary in accordance with the terms and conditions of the document. By the time the permits were transferred to the first defendant on 21-4-1979, all the debts had been discharged from out of the collections and thus, the ontire price due for the buses and routes had been paid to the plaintiff. The letter dated 31-1-1972 was not executed by the first defendant. As his signatures were required often for the business of Sri Hari Movies, they were taken in several blank papers by the plaintiff and one such paper had been used for fabricating the said letter. The plaintiff ought to have filed the suit for recovery of possession in specie of the said buses and he cannot sue for the price of the buses, having alleged that possession thereof was taken forcibly by the first defendant. The suit was not maintainable as it was not valued properly and adequate court fee had not been paid. There cannot be a suit for a declaration in the terms prayed for by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is liable to account to the first defendant for the collections from the buses between 11-12-1970 and 21-4-1979. The suit was not maintainable as it was not valued properly and adequate court fee had not been paid. There cannot be a suit for a declaration in the terms prayed for by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is liable to account to the first defendant for the collections from the buses between 11-12-1970 and 21-4-1979. The sale of bus permits is illegal and opposed to public policy. In any event, the plaintiff cannot claim the value of the permits. 10. The plaintiff filed O.P. No. 135 of 1982 on the file of the District Court, Salem for transferring O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 from the file of the District Munsif to the file of the Subordinate Judge to be tried along with the present suit. That application was ordered on 10-3-1983. Challenging the said order, the first defendant filed C.R.P. No. 2566 of 1983 in this Court. In that revision petition, he filed C.M.P. No. 8459 of 1983 for stay of operation of transfer. This court passed an order on 1-7-1983 granting stay pending the disposal of the revision petition. The suit was actually transferred to sub Court arid numbered as O.S. No. 237 of 1983, on the file of Sub Court. It was posted to 2-7-1983. The first defendant filed a memo in the Sub Court on that date stating that this Court had passed an order of stay on 1-7-1983. On 8-8-1983, the first defendants advocate made an endorsement on the plaint in O.S. No. 237 of 1983 that the suit was not pressed in view of O.S. No. 261 of 1982 (the present suit). On the basis of the said endrosement, the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as not pressed on that date itself. According to the plaintiff, he had no notice of the said endorsement or the dismissal of the suit. 11. On the very next day, i.e., 9-8-1983, the first defendant and defendants 4 to 6 filed joint application for transfer of permits of the buses described in plaint ‘B’ Schedule. Each application related to one permit. It was stated in those applications that the first defendant found it very difficult to maintain the vehicles and wanted to dispose of the same with their permits, if the authority allowed transfer of permits. Each application related to one permit. It was stated in those applications that the first defendant found it very difficult to maintain the vehicles and wanted to dispose of the same with their permits, if the authority allowed transfer of permits. Along with each application, the first defendant filed a letter addressed to the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, stating that there was an order of injunction in I.A. No. 422 of 1980 restraining him from alienating the buses till the disposal of the suit O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 and the suit had been dismissed by the Subordinate Judge of Salem as not pressed as per orders in O.S. No. 237 of 1983. It was further stated that, as such, there was no injunction order restraining him from alienating his buses. A photostat copy of the decoretal order was enclosed with the said letter. The decretal order contained the endorsement made by the advocate of the First defendant that the suit was not pressed in view of O.S. No. 261 of 1982. There was another application on the same day by the first defendant and one T. Sundararajan with reference to one of the buses. His application contained similar averments and similar enclosures were filed along with it. The said Sundararajan had later transferred his permit in favour of the seventh defendant in the suit. The Regional Transport Authority passed orders on all the applications permitting transfers even on 10-8-1983. In those orders it is stated that the suit O.S. No. 237 of 1983 having been dismissed, there was no question of any injunction restraining transfers. Getting scent of the proceedings for transfers, the plaintiff sent a letter of objection to the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, on 10-8-1983. An endorsement was made thereon by the Regional Transport Authority on 16-8-1983 that the joint applications had been allowed and the transfer of permits were also given effect to from 12-8-1983. 12. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed I.A. No. 276 of 1983 for impleading defendants 2 to 7 as parties and the same was ordered. Defendants 2 and 3 are the Regional Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Officer, Salem respectively. Defendants 4 to 7 are the transferees. Consequently, amendments to the plaint were also made pursuant to an order in I.A. No. 973 of 1987. Paragraph VIII-A was introduced in the plaint. Defendants 2 and 3 are the Regional Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Officer, Salem respectively. Defendants 4 to 7 are the transferees. Consequently, amendments to the plaint were also made pursuant to an order in I.A. No. 973 of 1987. Paragraph VIII-A was introduced in the plaint. It was stated therein that the transfers were hit by lis pendens and not binding on the plaintiff. 13. Defendants 4 to 7 filed written statements claiming to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice and questioning the maintainability of the suit. 14. In the reply statement filed by the plaintiff on 12-2-1989 it was alleged that the first defendant with the active connivance and support of defendants 4 to 6 and one Sundararajan had the suit O.S. No. 237 of 1983 withdrawn behind his back and immediately filed joint applications for transfer. It was further stated that the defendants were fully aware of all the proceedings in the matter and they were not bona fide transferees of the permits for consideration. A reference was made to an application for contempt filed against the first defendant in C.A. No. 127 of 1985 in this Court for having withdrawn the suit behind the back of the plaintiff and transferred all the permits in the teeth of the order of the High Court granting stay of transferring of the permits in C.M.P. No. 8459 of 1983. The application was dismissed by this Court on 20-9-1985 holding that there was no contempt as such. The said order is subject matter of a Special Leave Petition pending before the Supreme Court. The order impleading defendants 4 to 7 was challenged by them in Civil Revision Petitions in this Court, but ended in dismissal. A reference was made in the reply statement to the observations made in the said order that the strenuous pleas put forth by the defendants to, resist impleadment clearly showed that the proposed parties had been quite aware of what had happened and in spite of it, obtained permits. It was further averred that the fact that the authority had transferred the permits in their favour would not mean that the ownership of the vehicles was also transferred and that the question could not be decided by the civil Court. 15. The trial Court framed ten issues. Issue No. 7 related to the correctness of the court-fee paid. It was further averred that the fact that the authority had transferred the permits in their favour would not mean that the ownership of the vehicles was also transferred and that the question could not be decided by the civil Court. 15. The trial Court framed ten issues. Issue No. 7 related to the correctness of the court-fee paid. That was taken up as preliminary issue at the instance of the defendants and by order dated 4th May, 1985, the Court held in favour of the plaintiff that the court-fee paid was correct. That was challenged by the first defendant in C.R.P. No. 2817 of 1985. The revision was dismissed on 5-12-1986 by this Court. However, the Court set aside the finding given by the trial Court and directed it to try the said issue along with the other issues and observed that if any balance of court fee was payable on the basis of the findings on the other issues, that would become payable by the plaintiff. Thereafter, the parties went to trial. The plaintiff examined himself and two other witnesses, one of them being the attestor to Ex. A-2. He filed 25 documents in support of his case. Even before the plaintiff entered the witness box, the first defendant filed I.A. No. 480 of 1989 praying for an order directing the plain tiff to elect one of the mutually contradictory stands (a) whether title to the buses mentioned in ‘A’ Schedule to the plaint had passed to the defendants and the plaintiff was entitled to the price thereof, or (b) whether title to the buses had not passed to the defendants and the plaintiff continued to be the owner. That application was being adjourned from time to time and it was dismissed on 22-8-1990 for default, as by then, the first defendant had remained absent and set ex parte . After the plaintiff, closed his evidence, the first defendant prayed that he should be permitted to examine himself after the other defendants had let in evidence. That application was dismissed by the trial Court and a revision against the order in C.R.P. No. 1345 of 1990 was dismissed by this Court on 21-6-1990. After the plaintiff, closed his evidence, the first defendant prayed that he should be permitted to examine himself after the other defendants had let in evidence. That application was dismissed by the trial Court and a revision against the order in C.R.P. No. 1345 of 1990 was dismissed by this Court on 21-6-1990. The other defendants examined their witnesses and the first defendant filed an application I.A. No. 918 of 1990 for permitting him to participate in the proceedings and examine himself and other witnesses before the 7th defendant let in her evidence. That application was also dismissed by the trial Court and the first defendant filed C.R.P. No. 2198 of 1990 in this Court. That was dismissed on 22-8-1990. Thus, the first defendant remained absent from the witness box. 16. The trial Court held the Exs. A-1 and A-2 were true and executed by the first defendant and that they were valid. The trial Court also held that the suit was not barred by limitation as contended by the defendants. However, the trial Court found against the plaintiff on the other issues including issue No. 7 relating to court-fee. It is held that defendants 4 to 7 are bona fide purchasers for value without notice and that the prayers in the plaint are not properly framed and they cannot be granted to the plaintiff. It is held that the agreement Ex. A-1 is against public policy and, therefore, the Court cannot help the plaintiff. It is held that the suit had been deliberately undervalued and proper court fee has not been paid. It is also held that the plaintiff is not entitled either to a preliminary decree as prayed for or a charge over the buses in ‘B’ Schedule or for rendit ion of accounts of the income. Consequently, the suit has been dismissed in toto. 17. In this appeal, it is submitted, on behalf of the plaintiff, that the Court having found Exs. A-1 and A-2 to be true and valid, ought to have granted the appropriate reliefs to the plaintiff and if the Court is of the view that proper court fee had not been paid, it should have directed the plaintiff to pay the court fee due by granting him time therefor. A-1 and A-2 to be true and valid, ought to have granted the appropriate reliefs to the plaintiff and if the Court is of the view that proper court fee had not been paid, it should have directed the plaintiff to pay the court fee due by granting him time therefor. It is submitted that the plaintiff is prepared to pay the requisite court fee, if this Court decides that the same has not been paid and determines the court fee payable on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal. It is contended that the relevant evidence on record has been completely ignored by the trial Court while considering the question whether defendants 4 to 7 are bona fide transferees for value without notice. It is submitted that there is no illegality whatever in the agreement and it is not against the public policy. It is contended that a trust is created by operation of law and the defendants are liable to pay the price of the bases and permits and also account for the income therefrom. It is argued that title to the buses never passed on to the first defendant as he had not fulfilled the terms of Exs. A-1 and A-2 and there was no delivery of buses by the plaintiff to him. It is submitted that even so, the plaintiff is entitled to elect his remedies and choose to have the value of the buses instead of the return of buses in specie. It is submitted that the defendants cannot be allowed to enrich themselves unjustly and the Court must exercise its equitable jurisdiction and grant appropriate reliefs to the plaintiff and not throw out the suit on technicalities. 18. Learned counsel for the first defendant contends that the trial Court ought to have collected the requisite court fee due on the plaint before rendering a judgment, though it was against the plaintiff. He argues that the first defendant was erroneously deprived of an opportunity to enter the witness box and let in evidence in support of his case. He contends that the suit was not maintainable as framed and, if at all, the plaintiff could only claim the price of the buses and not for the route permits. He proceeds to argue that the finding of the trial Court that Ex. He contends that the suit was not maintainable as framed and, if at all, the plaintiff could only claim the price of the buses and not for the route permits. He proceeds to argue that the finding of the trial Court that Ex. A-2 is true and valid is erroneous and a perusal of the evidence of P.W. 1 would prove that it is a fabricated document. He contends that the first defendants counter claim in his written statement has not been considered properly by the trial Court and the finding on issue No. 9 is unsustainable. He submits that the suit was barred by limitation as the transfer of permits was ordered on 12-10-1978 by the Tribunal and the suit was filed beyond the period of three years therefrom. The first defendant has also filed C.M.P. No. 9452 of 1993 for making as additional evidence a certified copy of the joint application filed by the plaintiff and the first defendant before the Regional Transport Authority for transfer of permits along with the questionnaire form. Learned counsel submits that the document was put to P.W. 1 in the course of cross-examination and as he pleaded ignorance of the contents, the trial Court refused erroneously to mark it and the document should be accepted as additional evidence. He also draws our attention to the fact that summons was issued at his instance by the trial Court to the Regional Transport Authority to produce the original records but the records were never produced. According to learned counsel, a perusal of the joint application would show that the plaintiff has come forward with a false case as he had admitted in the said application that the buses were transferred to the first defendant pursuant to a family arrangement. 19. Mr. Sampathkumar appearing for defendants 4 to 7, while adopting the arguments of learned counsel for the first defendant, adds that his clients had no chance at all to have had any knowledge of the agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant or the disputes between them. According to him, the permits stood in the name of the first defendant, who was the lawful owner thereof under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and his clients were, therefore, entitled to negotiate with him and purchase the buses and permits. According to him, the permits stood in the name of the first defendant, who was the lawful owner thereof under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and his clients were, therefore, entitled to negotiate with him and purchase the buses and permits. According to him, the plaintiff cannot claim any right over the buses in Schedule B to the plaint and he had already waived his rights, if any, under the agreement. He also relies on the documents of conveyance of certain lands between the plaintiff and the first defendant and submitted that they prove that the case of the plaintiff that the buses were forcibly taken away by the first defendant on 17-8-1979 is not true. According to him, his clients came on the scene only in 1983 and they were not aware of any prior proceedings and they were bonafide transferees for value. 20. The following questions arise for consideration:— 1. Is Ex. A-2 a genuine document? 2. Did title to the buses pass on to the first defendant and from him to defendants 4 to 7? 3. Is the contract between the plaintiff and the first defendant illegal? 4. Are defendants 4 to 7 liable to the plaintiff in any manner? 5. Is the suit as framed maintainable? 6. Is the suit properly valued and has the correct court fee been paid? 7. Is the suit barred by limitation? 8. Is the first defendant entitled to an account from the plaintiff by way of counter claim? 9. Is the plaintiff entitled to any relief? 21. Before considering the aforesaid questions seriatim, we shall dispose of the petition for admission of additional evidence in the appeal filed by the first defendant. We have already referred to the reasons given by the first defendant as to why the document should be marked as additional evidence in the appeal. In the counter affidavit filed by the plaintiff, the allegations made by the first defendant in his affidavit are categorically denied. The plaintiff has stated that the certified copy of the joint application was never shown to him in the course of cross-examination as alleged. It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the document now produced along with the petition as additional evidence has come to Court for the first time in this appeal and it was never disclosed in the trial Court. It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that the document now produced along with the petition as additional evidence has come to Court for the first time in this appeal and it was never disclosed in the trial Court. It may not be necessary to decide the controversy whether the document was actually shown to the plaintiff in the course of cross-examination. We find that there is no explanation whatever on the side of the first defendant as to why he did not get into the box and prove the document by giving evidence. The version given, by the first defendant that he was waiting for the original records to be produced by the Regional Transport Authority is hardly acceptable. If really the trial Court had refused to mark the document when it was shown to the plaintiff, counsel for the first defendant would nave requested the Court to make a record of it. There is nothing at present on record to show that the document was actually put to the plaintiff in the cross-examination. At any rate, the requirements of O. 41, R. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not in any way satisfied in this case. The document cannot be brought even under cl. (1)(b) of the Rule. Further, there is a more serious objection to the making of the document produced along with the petition. It purports to be a certified copy issued by the District Munsif, Salem. But, there is no seal of the Court, nor a certificate of endorsement containing the number, date of application, date of calling for stamps, date of furnishing of stamps and date of delivery. On the face of it, it is a copy of a true copy issued by the Regional Transport Officer, Salem, on 28-2-1980. It reads as if the true copy issued by the Transport Authority was filed in the District Munsifs Court on 29-2-1980 in I.A. No. 2484 of 1979 in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 and proved or admitted by P.W. 1 on 3-4-1982 and marked as Ex. B-1 in that proceeding. The document now produced before Court will be of no value as it is only a copy of a copy and it does not bear the seal or certificate of endorsement of the Court which purports to have issued it. B-1 in that proceeding. The document now produced before Court will be of no value as it is only a copy of a copy and it does not bear the seal or certificate of endorsement of the Court which purports to have issued it. Hence, we have no hesitation in rejecting the document and dismissing the petition for additional evidence. 22. QUESTION No. 1: According to the first defendant, this document is a fabricated one. It is his case that there was another partnership business in which himself and the plaintiff were together interested and in connection with the said business, he had signed number of blank papers, one of which has been used by the plaintiff to fabricate Ex. A-2. This contention has not been substantiated by the first defendant entering the witness box and giving evidence in this case. He has studiously avoided the same by giving lame excuses. We have already referred to the applications filed by him for permission to examine himself after the other witnesses are examined and the dismissal thereof. The reasons given in those applications for not examining himself as the first witness are hardly acceptable. The trial Court rightly found that his prayer could not be granted and the order of the trial Court has already been affirmed by this Court. It is argued on behalf of the first defendant that a reading of Exs. A-1 and A-2 along with the evidence of P.W. 1 would clearly prove that Ex. A-2 is not a genuine document. According to learned counsel, while the terms of Ex. A-1 are to the effect that the routes and buses had already been sold by the plaintiff to the first defendant and the consideration therefor was only the discharge of debts owed by the plaintiff, Ex. A-2 provided for determination of the price on a later date and payment thereof as against delivery of buses. It is contended that the genuineness of Ex. A-1 not being questioned by the plaintiff, the version given by him for getting a letter under Ex. A-2 from the first defendant is wholly unbelievable. Some portions of the deposition of P.W. 1 are also read out and it is submitted that he is not having a consistent case. We are unable to accept the above contentions. The circumstances under which the execution of Ex. A-2 from the first defendant is wholly unbelievable. Some portions of the deposition of P.W. 1 are also read out and it is submitted that he is not having a consistent case. We are unable to accept the above contentions. The circumstances under which the execution of Ex. A-2 was necessitated are clearly pleaded and spoken to by the plaintiff. We have already adverted to the relevant facts that Ex. A-2 was executed after the Regional Transport Authority rejected the applications for transfer of permits and during the pendency of the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and the Writ Petition in this Court challenging the validity of the State Ordinance and the Act. Naturally, the plaintiff thought that the proceedings would take a lone time to come to a close and he should safeguard his interests by taking an appropriate document. Thus, Ex. A-2 was executed by the first defendant. As the signature is not denied, the burden is on the first defendant to prove that it was a fabrication. The attestor to the document has been examined as P.W. 2. We do not find any reason whatever to reject evidence. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to warrent the same. Much is said about the typing of the word (Witnesses). It is contended that it was originally attested by two witnesses and later the bottom part of the document was torn. We are unable to appreciate this contention. If according to the first defendant the document was fabricated with the aid of a blank paper, containing his signature, how did he come to know that the document was attested by two witnesses and the signature of one attestor has been removed by tearing off the bottom portion? We do not accept the contention that the bottom portion of the document has been torn off. Just because the typist who typed the document assumed that there will be more than one witness and typed the word in plural, it does not mean that there were, in fact, two witnesses and the signature of one witness has been removed. If the document is a fabricated one, there is no reason why the plaintiff should remove the signature of one attestor. On the other hand, his case would have been more strenthened by having the signatures of two attestors and both of them as witnesses in the suit. 23. If the document is a fabricated one, there is no reason why the plaintiff should remove the signature of one attestor. On the other hand, his case would have been more strenthened by having the signatures of two attestors and both of them as witnesses in the suit. 23. It is too well settled that it is the bounden duty of the party personally knowing the whole circumstances of the case, to give evidence on his own behalf and to submit to cross-examination and his non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance going to discredit the truth of his case. (Vide (1) Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Gurdial Singh and another (53 M.L.J. 392), (2) Martand Pandharinath Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh (A.I.R. 1931 Bombay 97), (3) Irudayam Ammal & Others v. Salayath Mary (86 L.W. 122 = 1972 T.L.N.J. 416) and (4) Ramanathapuam Market Committee v. East India Corporation Ltd. Madurai (AIR 1976 Madras 323 = 89 L.W. 426). The trial Court has rightly drawn the necessary adverse inference against the first defendant and held that Ex. A-2 is a true and valid document. We affirm the said finding. 24. QUESTION No. 2: Once the genuineness of Ex. A-2 is found, it goes without saying that it should be read along with Ex. A-1 and that Ex. A-1 cannot be read in isolation. It is seen from Ex. A-2 that the price for the permits and buses was not fixed either on the date of Ex. A-1 or on the date of Ex. A-2 and the parties agreed that the same should be fixed after an order for transfer of permits is issued by the authorities. The relevant recital in Ex. A-2 reads thus:— Tamil The first defendant has thus admitted that he has not paid any amount for sale consideration and after the transfer of permits is ordered, the price can be fixed and he would pay the same and take delivery of the buses. The intention of the parties is, therefore, very clear that title to the buses and the permits would pass on to the first defendant only after he pays the price therefor and takes delivery of the buses. Reliance is placed by the first defendant on the recital in Ex. The intention of the parties is, therefore, very clear that title to the buses and the permits would pass on to the first defendant only after he pays the price therefor and takes delivery of the buses. Reliance is placed by the first defendant on the recital in Ex. A-1 that the routes and buses belonging to the plaintiff were sold to the first defendant and in pursuance of the said transfer, the terms of the agreement were agreed. The plaintiff has explained that the said recital was introduced in Ex. A-1 in order to obtain an order for transfer of permits and he was advised that unloss such a recital is found in Ex. A-1, the authorities would not grant the application for transfer. The plaintiff wanted to escape the rigour of the proposed legislation for ceiling on the holding of permits and reduce the number of permits which he had. Admittedly, he had about 19 permits at that time and he arranged for transfer of five buses to one K. Ramanujam and another five buses to the first defendant herein. There is no reason as to why he should transfer the buses without any consideration or for inadequate consideration. The first defendant relies upon the averment in the affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiff in W.P. No. 2191 of 1971 marked as Ex. B-10. It is recited therein that inpursuance of a family arrangement the plaintiff allotted five route buses in favour of one K. Ramanujam and another five route buses in favour of the first defendant. It is contended that the first defendant is a relative of the plaintiff and he was treated by the plaintiffs father as a member of the family. It is submitted that the first defendant was not employed under the plaintiff or his father for any salary and the plaintiffs father used to pay money whenever the first defendant wanted. The first defendant has not let in any evidence to prove the same. He wants to rely only upon the averment in the affidavit filed in the writ petition. According to him, a similar averment was made in the joint application filed before the Regional Transport Authouty for transfer of permits. It is for the purpose of providing that, the additional evidence was sought to be filed. He wants to rely only upon the averment in the affidavit filed in the writ petition. According to him, a similar averment was made in the joint application filed before the Regional Transport Authouty for transfer of permits. It is for the purpose of providing that, the additional evidence was sought to be filed. Assuming that there was a similar averment in the joint application filed before the Regional Transport Authority as found in the affidavit filed in W.P. No. 2191 of 1971 it would only amount to a statement made by the plaintiff and at best it may amount to an admission. But, it is well settled that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matters stated therein and it is only a piece of evidence, the weight to be attached to which must depend on the circumstances under which it is made. It can always be shown to be erroneous or untrue. (Vide Nagubai v. B. Shamra Rao ( AIR 1956 S.C. 593 )). In the present case, the plaintiff has explained the circumstances under which such recitals were made by him. We find that the explanation given by the plaintiff is quite acceptable. The case of the first defendant that he is a relative of the plaintiff has not at all been proved. Significantly, the first defendant has nowhere stated how exactly he is related to the plaintiff. In the written statement, there is a vague averment that he is a relative. When P.W. 1 was in the witness box, a suggestion has been made that the first defendant is the son of the plaintiffs eldest sisters father-in-laws brother. The plaintiff has answered the question by saying that he does not know any such relationship. In the absence of any evidence on the side of the first defendant, we cannot accept the case that there was a family arrangement in which the first defendant was allotted the buses in question. 25. In support of his contention that the title to the buses and the permits did not pass on to the first defendant, leaned counsel for the plaintiff invited our attention to Ss. 2(7), 2(10), 4(2), 9, 19, 31, 33 and 35 of the Sale of Goods Act. 25. In support of his contention that the title to the buses and the permits did not pass on to the first defendant, leaned counsel for the plaintiff invited our attention to Ss. 2(7), 2(10), 4(2), 9, 19, 31, 33 and 35 of the Sale of Goods Act. S. 2(7) defines “goods” as every kind of moveable property other than actionable claims and money, including stock and shares, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale. S. 2(10) defines “price” as the money consideration for a sale of goods. S. 9 reads that the price in a contract of sale may be fixed in manner thereby agreed or may be determined by the course or dealing between the parties. We have already seen that as per the terms of Ex. A-2, the price was agreed to De determined after the passing of the order of transfer of permits. Under S. 19, the property in the goods is transferred to the buyers at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. We have no doubt that under Exs. A-1 and A-2 read together, the title was intended by the parties to be transferred to the first defendant only after the fixation of the price, the payment thereof and the delivery of buses. S. 31 enjoins the seller to deliver the goods and the buyer to accept and pay for them in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale. S. 33 provides that delivery may be made by doing anything which the parties agreed shall be treated as delivery or which has the effect of putting the goods in the possession of the buyer or of any person authorised to hold them on his behalf. Under S. 35, apart from any express contract, the seller of goods is not bound to deliver them until the buyer applies for delivery. In the present case, there was neither payment of price nor delivery of goods. Under S. 35, apart from any express contract, the seller of goods is not bound to deliver them until the buyer applies for delivery. In the present case, there was neither payment of price nor delivery of goods. According to the first defendant, the only consideration for the transfer was discharge of debts incurred by the plaintiff earlier and the plaintiff had himself discharged the same with the aid of the income by the operation of the buses, which according to him was being carried on by the plaintiff on his behalf after 11-12-1970. There is nothing in Ex. A-1 to show that the plaintiff agreed to operate the buses on behalf of the first defendant. As per the terms of Ex. A-1, the first defendant shall pay the accounts due under the hire purchase agreements and the promissory notes executed by the plaintiff. The recitals of Ex. A-1 read as if the first defendant is to take over the five buses mentioned therein and operate the Same. Admittedly, possession of the buses was not given to the first defendant after Ex. A-1. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant took possession of the buses forcibly on 17-8-1979 after getting an order of injunction in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 on the file of the District Munsif, Salem. In the written statement of the first defendant, there is a vague averment that on the transfer of the permits by the Regional Transport Authority, Salem to the first defendant, the plaintiff gave actual physical delivery of the buses also. Deliberately the first defendant has omitted to give the relevant particulars such as the date, time and place of the alleged delivery of the buses. Nowhere else has the first defendant mentioned the date of the alleged delivery. Even the plaint in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 is completely silent on this aspect of the matter. In fact, there is no averment therein that possession of the buses was given to the first defendant. The plaint is marked as Ex. A-5. After referring to the order the Transport Authorities and the transferred permits in his favour, it is alleged by him that except himself nobody has got right, ownership or possession over the buses from the date of purchase. The plaint is marked as Ex. A-5. After referring to the order the Transport Authorities and the transferred permits in his favour, it is alleged by him that except himself nobody has got right, ownership or possession over the buses from the date of purchase. The first defendant has not chosen to put forward the case that the plaintiff was in management of the bus on his behalf till the permits were transferred in his favour. A perusal of the said plaint as well as the written statement in that case filed by the plaintiff herein and marked as Ex. B-19 would prove that the plaintiff never gave possesion of the buses to the first defendant. The case of the plaintiff that the first defendant took possession of the buses forcibly on the strength of the interim order of injunction appears to be probable and true. In Ex. B-19, the plaintiff has stated in paragraph 2 as follows:— “The plaint is discreetly silent as to when the plaintiff paid the price for the buses and got delivery and when he became the purchaser of the vehicles from the defendant.” In spite of this express averment in Ex. B-19, the first defendant has not put forward a definite or clear case in his written statement filed in the present suit. Ex. A-3 shows that it is only the plaintiff who has been in possession of the buses and operation thereof even on 17-4-1979. Hence, we hold that the price for the buses or permits has not been fixed between the parties and the first defendant has not been paid even a pie towards consideration for the same. The plaintiff has not delivered possession of the buses to the first defendant, but on the other hand; the latter has taken them forcefully by misusing the order of interim injunction passed by the District Munsif, Salem. 26. The order of transfer of permits passed by the Authorities will not by itself confer title on the first defendant to the buses. 26. The order of transfer of permits passed by the Authorities will not by itself confer title on the first defendant to the buses. In M. Moorthy v. Drivers and Conductors Bus Service Private Ltd. (1990-2 L.W. 123), a Division Bench of this Court has held that mere approval of the transfer by the Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot transfer title to the buses and route permits from the owner, which was a company in that case, to the alleged transferees. 27. QUESTION No. 3: In paragraph 23 of its judgment, the trial Court has held that Ex. A-1 is against the public policy and no relief can be obtained by the plaintiff on the basis of the said document. The trial Court has taken the view that the agreement was brought into existence for the purpose of defeating a proposed legislation and it was, therefore, against the public policy. In the written statement of the first defendant, the plea raised is that the agreement being one of sale of bus permits, is illegal and opposed to public policy. It is contended before us also that the contract between the plaintiff and the first defendant under Exs. A-1 and A-2 would amount to trafficking in permits and it is illegal. We do not agree. Ex. A-1 came into being long before Ordinance VI of 1971 came into force. At that time, there was no prohibition in the Motor Vehicles Act as against transfer of permits as such. The Act, however, prescribed a procedure for effecting transfer or permits and provided that the same shall be done only with the permission of the authorities. Ex. A-1 itself contains a clause that the terms thereof would be subject to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the order of transfer which may be passed by the authorities under the Act. The parties did not contemplate anything unlawful or illegal under Ex. A-1 or Ex. A-2. The fact remains that the legislation which came into force after Ex. A-1 prescribing a ceiling limit on the holding of permits was struck down in so far as the relevant provisions were concerned. Hence, there can be no question of any illegality whatever in Exs. A-1 and A-2. 28. It has been held in several cases that there could be a transfer of permits for consideration. A-1 prescribing a ceiling limit on the holding of permits was struck down in so far as the relevant provisions were concerned. Hence, there can be no question of any illegality whatever in Exs. A-1 and A-2. 28. It has been held in several cases that there could be a transfer of permits for consideration. In G. Vtjayaranga Mudaliar v. Commissioner of Income-tax ((1963) 47 I.T.R. 853), a Division Bench of this Court upheld the fixation of value of the route rights in a permit by the income-tax authorities and apportionment of the total consideration on that basis. The Bench held:— “A permit is defined under S. 2(xx) of the Motor Vehicles Act as a document issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage or as a stage carriage, S. 59 of the Act states that a permit shall not be transferable from one” person to another except with the permission of the transport authority which granted the permit and it also states that no person to whom the permit is transferred shall have any right to use the vehicle without such permission. The procedure for transferring a permit is governed by the Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act. The transferor and transferee should make a joint application for transfer and that application will be notified by the Regional Transport Authority calling for objections, if any, and eventually the transfer prayed for may either be granted or refused, Neither the provisions of the statute nor the rules framed there under actually prohibit the receipt of consideration for a transfer of perm it. It may be that the competent authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act may not allow a permit to be transferred for value lest it should encourage trafficking in permits. Buses have little value shorn of their permits to ply on particular routes. It is an open secret that when buses are transferred the consideration paid by the purchaser of the vehicles is only commensurate with their “earning capacity which is intimately connected with the routes on which they operate. But nevertheless no transferer admits having received any consideration for transfer of the permits and the transferee also never acknowledges that he paid any amount for annexing the routes along with the buses. But nevertheless no transferer admits having received any consideration for transfer of the permits and the transferee also never acknowledges that he paid any amount for annexing the routes along with the buses. We must observe that this pretence of non-payment of consideration for transfer of permits is nothing short of sheer hypocrisy. We can almost take judicial notice of the fact that whenever a bus with a permit is transferred a fair portion of the consideration would represent the value attributable to the pecuniary gain derived by operating on the route. In the instant case we cannot say that the department went wrong in allowing depreciation only on the amount of Rs. 85,000 as representing the value of the vehicles deducting Rs. 40,000 representing the “route value” from the total consideration of Rs. 1,25,000.” 29. In N. Krishnaswami Reddiar v. T. Sivagnanam Piilai in C.S. No. 46 of 1961 Venkataraman, J. by his judgment dated 20-12-1963 held that neither the Sections of the Motor Vehicles Act nor the Rules framed thereunder prohibited transfer of permits as such. He referred to several earlier decisions including that of the Bench in Vijayaranga Mudaliars case ((1963) 47 I.T.R. 853). It was also held by him that transfer of a permit was not opposed to public policy. It was also laid down that though the transfer can become effective under S. 59(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act only when it is sanctioned by the authority, there is nothing illegal in the parties agreeing to transfer so long as they make it clear that such transfer will not be effective in any way till such sanction is accorded. A perusal of Ex. A-1 shows that in the present case the parties agreed that the transfer will not be effective unless the authority approved of the same. 30. In Viswanatha v. Shanmugham (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 493) it was held that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, does not expressly or by implication bar benami transactions or persons owning buses benami applying for permits on that basis. 31. In Sowdambigai Motor Service, Dharapuram v. State of Tamil Nadu (92 L.W. 565) while striking down the Amendment Act XVI of 1971, the Bench held that a holder of a permit has a right to transfer it as it is a property. The question has been discussed in detail in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the judgment. 32. 31. In Sowdambigai Motor Service, Dharapuram v. State of Tamil Nadu (92 L.W. 565) while striking down the Amendment Act XVI of 1971, the Bench held that a holder of a permit has a right to transfer it as it is a property. The question has been discussed in detail in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the judgment. 32. In Brij Mohan Parihar v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation ( AIR 1987 S.C. 29 ), relied on by learned counsel for the first defendant, the Court held that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and in particular Ss. 42 and 59 debarred holders of permits from indulging in unauthorised trafficking in permits. The ruling will not help the defendants in the present case, as there is no unauthorised trafficking in permits here. 33. QUESTION NO. 4: We have already found that the title to the buses and the permits never passed on to the first defendant. It is a general rule that a person cannot confer on another a higher title than what he possesses. Defendants 4 to 6 are transferees from the first defendant and the 7th defendant is a transferee from a transferee of the first defendant. Normally, they cannot have any better title than the first defendant, unless they bring themselves under the statutory exceptions to the general rule. One such exception is found in S. 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. The said Act would apply to both moveable and immoveable properties as could be seen from the languages of S. 8 thereof. Under S. 19(b), specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced against a transferee for value, who has paid money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. A similar exception is provided in S. 30 and 53 of the Sale of Goods Act. In those Section also, the requirements of good faith, payment of consideration and absence of knowledge are provided. A similar provision is found in S. 96 of the Indian Trusts Act. It has been held in several cases that the burden is on the subsequent transferees to prove that they are purchasers in good faith for value without notice. (Vide Veeramalai v. Thadikara (A.I.R. 1968 Madras 388) and Vejanla Piothi Raju v. Vuppalapatti Butchi Raju ((1969) II S.C.W.R. 200) 34. It has been held in several cases that the burden is on the subsequent transferees to prove that they are purchasers in good faith for value without notice. (Vide Veeramalai v. Thadikara (A.I.R. 1968 Madras 388) and Vejanla Piothi Raju v. Vuppalapatti Butchi Raju ((1969) II S.C.W.R. 200) 34. On the facts of this case, we find that defendants 4 to 7 are not bona fide purchasers. We have already referred to the fact that the joint applications for transfer of permits were filed by the first defendant and defendants 4 to 6 and one Sundararajan from whom the 7th defendant has purchased, on the very next day after the suit O.S. No. 237 of 1983 was dismissed as not pressed by the Subordinate Judge, Salem. The sequence of facts shows that the parties had already agreed upon the plan to withdraw the suit and immediately apply for transfer of the permits. Along with the applications for transfer, certified copies of the decretal order in O.S. No. 237 of 1983 were filed. The decretal order contained the endorsement made by the first defendants counsel that the suit was not pressed in view of the present suit O.S. No. 261 of 1982. That has put the transferees on notice of the pendency of the present suit. In spite of that, they proceeded with the applications for transfer and obtained orders of transfer on the very next day. The undue haste with which the entire proceeding has taken place proves that the first defendant and his transferees have colluded among themselves and played a fraud on the Court as well as the plaintiff by withdrawing the suit, thereby bringing to an end the order of injunction which was in force till the disposal of the suit. The Regional Transport Authority, who passed the orders of transfer, made a reference to the order of injunction which was in force till the disposal of O.S. No. 237 of 1983 and observed that as the suit had been dismissed the injunction was no longer there. He ought to have taken note of the fact that the withdrawal of that suit was only due to the pendency of the present suit O.S. No. 261 of 1982 and he ought to have sent for the records in the present suit before passing any orders in the applications for transfer. He ought to have taken note of the fact that the withdrawal of that suit was only due to the pendency of the present suit O.S. No. 261 of 1982 and he ought to have sent for the records in the present suit before passing any orders in the applications for transfer. He should have atleast issued notice in those proceedings to the plaintiff. Even after receipt of the plaintiff objection on 10-8-1983, the Officer who could have stopped the proceedings at that stage, proceeded to effect the transfer on 12-8-1983 and intimate the same to the plaintiff by a communication dated 15-8-1983. A perusal of the relevant files marked as Exs. A-16 to A-25 proves the collusion among the first defendant and his transferees. 35. The fifth defendant as D.W. 1 has stated that the first defendant did not inform him about the order of injunction passed in I.A. No. 422 of 1980 in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 restraining him from transferring the permits till the disposal of the suit. However, he admitted that a copy of the decree in the suit was presented by him along with the application for transfer of permit before the authority. He stated that he read the decree in the suit about seven years prior to his deposition and he did not remember the contents thereof. He stated that he did not enquire the first defendant about the suit O.S. No. 261 of 1982 mentioned in the decree. He is unable to explain the correction of the date found at page 21 of Ex. A-24 from 8-8-1983 to 9-8-1983. It is obvious therefrom that the papers were prepared for filing the application for transfer of permits even before 8-8-1983 and they were intended to be presented on 8-8-1983 on which date the suit was withdrawn. The plaintiff has marked Exs. A-7 to All which are copies of the public notices published in the newspapers “Malai Murasu”, “Dhina Thanthi”, “Malai Malar”, “Dhina Malar” and “The Hindu” that he had obtained an order of injunction in I.A. No. 422 of 1980 in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979 on the file of the District Munsif, Salem restraining the first defendant from transferring the permits relating to the five buses mentioned therein. The publications were made on 28.3.1980, 1980, 29-3-1980, 7-4-1980 and 11-4-1980. The defendants conveniently denied knowledge of those publications. The publications were made on 28.3.1980, 1980, 29-3-1980, 7-4-1980 and 11-4-1980. The defendants conveniently denied knowledge of those publications. The fifth defendant also admitted that he did not enquire the first defendant as to how he got title to the buses and the permits. He admitted that he knew the details of the present suit, when he purchased a bus from the first defendant and yet he did not obtain any legal advice. In the re-examination he has stated that he did not know about the present suit at the time of transfer of permit. His version in the re-examination runs directly counter to the admission made in the cross-examination and, therefore, it has to be rejected. The evidence of D. Ws. 2, 4 and 5 is in no way better. The Regional Transport Authority, who passed the orders of transfer has been examined as D.W. 3. He has admitted that some of the papers in the files are missing. He has admitted that he did not call for the particulars of the present suit O.S. No. 261 of 1982 even after seeing the decree in O.S. No. 237 of 1983. According to him, be used to sign papers on the very day on which he received them. A perusal of his evidence creates an impression that he is not speaking the truth. 36. It is to be noted that the transfers in favour of defendants 4 to 7 admittedly took place during the pendency of the present suit O.S. No. 261 of 1982. No doubt it is conceded that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act embodying the doctrine of lis pendens will not apply as such to movable properties. In Wigram v. Buckley ((1984) 3 Ch. 483), Lindley, L.J., observed:— “If the doctrine of lis pendens were applicable to personal property generally, bankers and others could not safety make advances on ships or goods and that which represents them in commerce — for example, bills of lading, dock warrants, wharfingers receipts, nor upon stock and share certificates, nor upon debentures or policies nor even on negotiable securities, without making searches in the Judgment Registry Office. Such a doctrine would paralyse the trade of the country, and there is no warrant for it either in the statute relat ing to lis pendens or in the decisions of the Courts.” That view has been accepted and followed on this country in Punithavelu Mudaliar v. Bhashyam Aiyangar (12 M.L.J. 282), Govind Babu v. Jijibai (36 Bombay 189), Velayudha Mudali v. Co-operative Rural Credit Society (38 L.W. 880 = A.I.R. 1934 Madras 40), Official Receiver, Guntur v. Sait Lalchand Khushalchand Firm (A.I.R 1943 Madras 94), Kunhikoya v. Ahmed Kutty (AIR 1952 Madras 59) and Josna Bank v. Asian Bank (AIR 1962 Kerala 309). But, in all those cases, the question has been considered only as to whether the doctrine of lis pendens as such would apply to movables. As could be seen from the language of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, the doctrine does not exclude from its purview even bonafide transferees without knowledge of the pending proceedings. A plea that a transferee had no notice of the proceeding will be of no avail if the doctrine is applicable. The doctrine has its origin in the maxim “ut lite pendents nihil innovetur”. The principle on which the doctrine rests is explained by Turner, L.J., in Bellamy v. Sabina ((1857) 1 De G. & J. 566) in the following words:— “It is as I think, a doctrine common to the Courts both of Law and Equity, and rests, as I apprehend, upon the foundation — that it would plainly be impossible that” any action or suit could be brought to a successful termination, if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The Plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by the Defendants alienating before the judgment or decree, and would be driven to commence his proceedings de novo subject again to be defeated by the same course of proceeding.” 37. If that is the basis of the doctrine and it is common to Courts of Law and Equity, there is no reason to hold that the principle Underlying the same would not apply to movables even if the purchaser has knowledge of the pending proceedings. If that is the basis of the doctrine and it is common to Courts of Law and Equity, there is no reason to hold that the principle Underlying the same would not apply to movables even if the purchaser has knowledge of the pending proceedings. If a person purchases with open eyes the subject matter of a pending litigation and if he is allowed to remain unaffected by the result of the litigation, it would tantamount to giving a licence to the parties to the suit to alienate the subject matter of the suit just because it comprises movables. There maybe some practical difficulties in enforcing the right to the movables in specie. But, in cases where there will be no difficulty in identification of the movables and where the subject matter is not movable property simplicitor, there is no justification for excluding the applicability or the principle if the transferee has knowledge of the pending proceedings. This view has been expressed by Sadasiva Aryar, J. in Talari Kavoli Ndgadu v. Viswanatham redda Govindappa and others (A.I.R. 1915 Madras 502). While sitting in Bench with Tyabji, J. he made an observation, which, no doubt, appears to be obiter on the facts of the case, as follows:— “I might however be permitted to say that the fact that S. 52. Transfer of Property Act, relates only to immovable property should not make us bind to the consideration that the legal principle underlying it might appropriately be applied to movables also in cases where the alienee of the moveables is proved to have had notice of the pending litigation at the time of the alienation. It is not unconditionally extended to movables because (among other reasons) it is considered that while a pending litigation as regards immovables might very well be presumed to be inquired into” by intending purchasers pendente lite , the same cannot be presumed as regards the pending litigation about moveables, which usually pass from hand to hand and the litigation about which does not usually end in a decree, for the return of specific moveables but in the award of pecuniary damages and compensation, either as the only relief or an adequate alternative relief.” Tyabji, J. did not express any opinion on this question, as he held that the property in that case was an immovable property. 38. 38. In Banke Behari Lal v. Raghubar Dayal (A.I.R. 1930 Allahabad 380), Sulaiman, J. sitting in Bench with Sen, J. observed;- “Even though S. 52 Transfer of Property Act, would not apply to the case of the transfer of a decree which is not an immovable property, the principle underlying that Section would, in my opinion, be applicable and the mere fact that an assignment has been would not prevent the decree-holder from prosecuting the proceedings till its final conclusion.” Sen, J. said it was unnecessary to invoke the aid of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act in that case. 39. In the present case, We are not concerned with movable properties simpliciter. They are motor buses and permits are issued by statutory authorities. If it is a case of a mere transfer of a bus, unconnected with any permit, the principle that the doctrine of lis pendens will not apply to the moveables, will come into play. But, when it is combined with a permit, which creates an incorporeal right, we do not find any reason to exclude the operation of the principle of lis pendens, particularly when the transferees have knowledge of the pending proceedings. A Court of equity should necessarily give effect to the said principle and prevent abuse of process of Court and miscarriage of justice. A litigant shall not be allowed to snap his fingers at the Court and defeat the right claimed in a pending proceeding by simply, alienating the subject matter to a third party, who is fully aware of the said proceeding. In this connection, the reasoning of the Karala High Court in Josna Bank case (AIR 1962 Kerala 309) referred to above, is Worthwhile considering. The relevant passage in the judgment reads thus:— “(13). I do not propose to delve into the reasons behind the doctrine of lis pendens. It appears to be a rule of “necessity, and it does not appear to depend, for its operation, on notice, actual or constructive, of the pending lis. In the case of movables, at any rate, normally possesion is considered to be the basis of title. I do not propose to delve into the reasons behind the doctrine of lis pendens. It appears to be a rule of “necessity, and it does not appear to depend, for its operation, on notice, actual or constructive, of the pending lis. In the case of movables, at any rate, normally possesion is considered to be the basis of title. In equity an innocent transferee for value of a movable from a person in possession has id be protected, and there may be instances where this principle of equity comes into conflict with the rule of necessity, namely, the doctrine of lis pendens, Rightly or wrongly the English Courts and the courts in India have taken the view that in the case of movables the rule of equity, that an innocent purchaser from b person in possession without police of the pendency of a lis regarding the property should be protected, should prevail over the rule of necessity, namely, the doctrine of lis pendens.” The learned Judge has rested his conclusion that the Courts have as a rule of equity taken the view that an innocent purchaser from a person in possession without notice of pendency of a lis regarding a property should prevail over the rule of necessity. With respect, we are unable to accept the reasoning that the doctrine of lis pendens is a rule of necessity. As pointed out by Turner, L.J., it is a much a rule of equity as a rule of law. Hence, that rule of equity has to prevail when the purchaser is not entitled to claim any equity, in view of his knowledge of the lis. In the present case, we have held that defendants 4 to 7 had knowledge of the pendency of this suit and, therefore, they cannot claim any right on the basis of the transfers in their favour as against the plaintiff in the event of his claim being upheld. Having regard to the nature of the property involved in this case and the fact that the transfer of such property is governed by the provisions of a statute and the fact that the defendants have knowledge of the proceedings, we bold that the principle of lis pendens would apply. 40. Having regard to the nature of the property involved in this case and the fact that the transfer of such property is governed by the provisions of a statute and the fact that the defendants have knowledge of the proceedings, we bold that the principle of lis pendens would apply. 40. QUESTION No. 5: It is the contention of the defendants that the suit should have been filed only for the recovery of the value of the buses, if at all, as one for money and not for passing of a preliminary decree as prayed for in the plaint. It is contended that there cannot be any declaration that the defendants are liable to pay for the buses with the routes set out in ‘B’ Schedule. According to the defendants, the plaint is based on two mutually inconsistent claims, one on the basis of the contract as evidenced from Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-2 and the other on the basis of a tort viz., wrongful possession of the buses with the defendants. It is also argued that the plaintiff cannot claim any relief with regard to the buses set out in Schedule ‘B’ to the plaint as they do not find a place in Ex. A-1 or Ex. A-2. It is also contended that there is no question of accounting with respect to the profits realised by the defendants and in any event, there cannot be a charge over the ‘B’ Schedule buses. We have already held that the plaintiff did not give delivery of the buses to the first defendant and the latter took forcible possession of the same. He proceeded to alienate the buses and the permits relating thereto. It is a recognised principles of law that when a person wrongfully takes possession of a property, the owner thereof can waive the tort and claim the value of the property, He has got a right to elect one of the two reliefs and the election is open to him tiff the judgment in the action is satisfied. In Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. In Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 41, the law is stated in paragraph 631 at page 574 in these words:— “When one person has wrongfully obtained possession of or dealt with the goods of another, the owner of the goods may waive the tort and recover the value of the goods as on a sale by himself to that person.” In Vol. 9 of the Fourth Edition of Halsburys Laws of England, in paragraphs 685 to 688, the rule is stated as follows:— “685, There are many circumstances in which a plaintiff may “waive” a tort committed against him by the defendant and instead bring a quasi-contractual claim against the defendant to recover money. Before the abolition of the forms of action, many factors combined to render in debitatus assumpsit a more convenient form of action than an action in trespass or an action on the case, and the fiction was developed that the defendant was the plaintiffs agent, and that the plaintiff might “ratify” the defendants “tortious act and sue to recover from the defendant the proceeds of his tort. There remain today certain advantages in suing in quasi contract rather than tort, namely the possibility of proof in the defendants bankruptcy or winding up, and the avoidance of the necessity of proving the actual loss suffered by the plaintiff. Although this choice between an action in tort or an action in quasi contract remains for the plaintiff, it is clear that the old expression “waiver of tort” is misleading. A claim in tort may be waived, as where the plaintiff makes a genuine ratification of the unauthorised act of his purported agent, or by acceptance of the proceeds obtained by the defendants tortious dealing with the plaintiffs property; and thereafter, the plaintiff cannot sue the defendant in tort. The choice between an action in tort or an action in quasi contract is, however, not really a waiver of tort because the plaintiff does not condone the wrong, he merely chooses one of two alternative remedies in respect of that wrong. 686. Where the facts and circumstances are such that a plaintiff has the right, arising from those facts and circumstances, to bring an action for money had and received or to sue in tort, he may elect between those two alternative remedies. 687. 686. Where the facts and circumstances are such that a plaintiff has the right, arising from those facts and circumstances, to bring an action for money had and received or to sue in tort, he may elect between those two alternative remedies. 687. Formerly, it was thought that when a plaintiff began to pursue his quasi-contractual remedy he had thereby “waived” the tort. It is new clear, however, that the plaintiff does not elect one remedy merely by commencing an action in which he claims it; no question of election arises until judgment is entered. Up to that stage the plaintiff may pursue both remedies together, or pursuing one may amend pursue the other; but he can take judgment only for the one, and both causes of action will then be merged in the judgment. Thus, where a cargo belonging to the plaintiff was improperly sold, the plaintiffs were not debarred from proceedings against the purchasers for money had and received merely Because they had recovered an unsatisfied judgment against the shipowners in an action in tort, and, a fortiori, no election is made either by the commencement of an action discontinued before final judgment or by the mere lodging of a “proof in bankruptcy or the winding up of a company. Further more, where the damage to the plaintiff has been caused by the acts of more than one tortfeasor, election to waive the tort with respect to one tortfeasor will not bar proceedings in tort against another tortfeasor provided that the later action is in respect of a wrong separate from that committed by the tortfeasor in relation to whom the election was made. An election which bars the alternative cause of action is made, however, where the plaintiff receives satisfaction under a judgment. Thus, ones the plaintiff obtains damages from the defendant on the footing that the defendant is a wrongdoer, the plaintiff cannot subsequently maintain a claim from that defendant for money had and received. Conversely, once the plaintiff has received satisfaction from a defendant of a judgment in quasi contract, he cannot subsequently sue him in tort. 688. Thus, ones the plaintiff obtains damages from the defendant on the footing that the defendant is a wrongdoer, the plaintiff cannot subsequently maintain a claim from that defendant for money had and received. Conversely, once the plaintiff has received satisfaction from a defendant of a judgment in quasi contract, he cannot subsequently sue him in tort. 688. Apart from the case of money obtained by fraud on the plaintiff or his agent, or services obtained from the “plaintiff by fraud, the most usual circumstance in which a plaintiff is faced with the problem of electing between the two remedies is where the defendant has converted the plaintiffs goods and later sold them; for the plaintiff may either sue in tort for conversion and obtain damages, or he may affirm the transaction and sue for the proceeds of sale as money had and received to his use. The extent to which a plaintiff is bound by an election made when all the relevant facts were not before him has net yet been determined. The election by a plaintiff to sue for money had and received operates only to extinguish his right to sue for damages for conversion, and does not affirm the tortious act so as to treat it as a rightful one or put the defendant in the same position with regard to claims made by him in respect of the goods as if the conversion had been lawful. The right of the plaintiff to elect occurs in the case of torts other than conversion. Where the original taking of foods or assets is a trespass he may nevertheless sue for money ad and received. Thus where minerals have been “wrongfully raised and sold he may recover the proceeds of sale in that form of action, but where they have been so raised and sold under a bonafide claim of right and the owner elects to sue for money had and received, the defendant may set off a sum incurred in the cost of raising the minerals. The right to elect has also been held to exist in the case of enticement of an apprentice.” 41. In Pollock & Mulla on the Sale of Goods Act, 5th Edition at page 69, the law is stated thus:— “Walver of tort — It is open, moreover, to the owner of the goods sto waive a tort if he wishes. The right to elect has also been held to exist in the case of enticement of an apprentice.” 41. In Pollock & Mulla on the Sale of Goods Act, 5th Edition at page 69, the law is stated thus:— “Walver of tort — It is open, moreover, to the owner of the goods sto waive a tort if he wishes. So if a person buys goods From one who has no right to sell them, the true owner may treat the transaction as a sale by himself to the person who has obtained the goods and recover the price from him; or, as against the person who wrongfully sold the goods, he may recover the proceeds of the sale in an action for money had an received. An election of this kind, once made is final. If, therefore, the owner brings “an action for the price or the proceeds or the sale and recovers judgment, he cannot afterwards, even though the judgment remains wholly unsatisfied, treat the transaction as tortious and sue for damages for conversion or for the recovery of the goods; for by his own act he has admitted the lawfulness of the sale. Occasionally, however, his act may be ambiguous, and it will then be a question of fact whether it amounts to an election or not.” 42. Even if the suit is based on a contract, as an unpaid seller, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover the money due to him. According to the plaintiffs case, the price had not been fixed under the contract and the time for fixation was agreed to be the transfer of permits. We have also found that the title will pass only when the price is paid as fixed by the partties and the buses are delivered. Dealsing with the rights of an unpaid seller, Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edition, vol. 41 says in paragraphs 861 and 862 and follows:— “861. Where property has passed: Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and he wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods. 862. Where property has passed: Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and he wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods. 862. Where property has not passed: Where, under contract of sale, the price is payable on a day certain irrespective of deliver and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller any maintain an action for the price, although the property in the goods has not passed and the goods have not been appropriated to the contract.” 43. Learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff rightly contends that under S. 91 of the Indian Trusts Act, defendants 4 to 7 having acquired the property with notice that the plaintiff had entered into a contract affecting that property of which specific performance could be enforced, must bold the same for the benefit of the plaintiff to the extent necessary and give effect to the contract. Thus, an obligation in the nature of trust is created by law and the defendants are bound to render an account as such. 44. In Srish Chandra Nandy v. Supravat Chandra (AIR 1940 Calcutta 337) it is held that a suit for accounts can he brought by the cestuique trust against the trustee; but where his case is that money is due to him, the trustee can as plaintiff ask the Court to take accouns and to have a decree for such balance as may be found due to him, and if a suit for account is however brought by the cestuique trust against the trustee, the latter can get a decree for payment in that very suit if he is in surplusage. 45. There is no substance in the contention that the plaintiff cannot have any relief as against the buses described in the ‘B’ Schedule. Exs. A-1 and A-2 contemplate replacement of buses as and when necessity arises. Ex. A-2 has stated specifically that the price has to be fixed for the buses which are running in the routes at the time when orders are passed for transferring the permits. In the written statement filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979, marked as Ex. Ex. A-2 has stated specifically that the price has to be fixed for the buses which are running in the routes at the time when orders are passed for transferring the permits. In the written statement filed by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 1769 of 1979, marked as Ex. B-19, a schedule is given clearly tracing the replacement of buses from time to time. A perusal of the same will show that at the time when the orders of transfer of permits were made, the buses which were operating on the relevant routes are the buses described in Schedule ‘B’ to the present plaint. Consequently, the plaintiff will be entitled to proceed against those buses and the buses which have subsequently replaced them. We do not find any infirmity in the frame of the suit. In view of the fact that that contract has not fixed the consideration for the transfer and the parties have agreed that the value of the buses and permits should be fixed as on the date of transfer of permits, the plaintiff has necessarily to seek the aid of the Court for getting the value fixed by appointment of a Commissioner. In the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff has made the most appropriate prayers for the passing of preliminary decrees declaring the liability of he defendants to pay the value of he buses and the permits and also the right of the plaintiff for profits realised by the defendants from the date on which they took wrongful possession of the buses till the ascertainment thereof. We hold that the suit is maintainable as framed. 46. Learned counsel also relied on the principle of substituted security as contemplated in S. 73 of the Transfer of Property Act. He places reliance also on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Ranga Rao v. State of Madras (AIR 1953 Madras 185), in which the universal principle that conversion would not alter the nature of the estate, was applied. Having regard to the facts referred to by us and the express provisions in Exs. A-1 and A-2 it is not necessary for us to invoke the aforesaid principles. 47. Having regard to the facts referred to by us and the express provisions in Exs. A-1 and A-2 it is not necessary for us to invoke the aforesaid principles. 47. QUESTION No. 6 It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the defendants that the plaintiff ought to have been made by the trial Court to amend the value of the plaint on the basis of the averment contained in paragraph 8 of the plaint itself and pay court-fee on that basis. In paragraph 7 of the plaint, it is stated that it is not possible to fix the value of the buses and the routes, which may range from Rs. 4 to 5 lakhs for each bus. Hence, it is argued that the plaintiff ought to have been directed to value the plaint at Rs. 20,00,000/- at least and pay court fee thereon before the judgment was rendered in the suit. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Abdul Hamid Shamai v. Abdul Majid and others (A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1150). The Court held that in a suit for accounts, though the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after taking all the accounts, he is not permitted to choose an unreasonable and arbitrary figure for that purpose. It was held that if a plaintiff chooses whimsically a ridiculous figure, it is tantamount to not exercising his right in that regard and in such a case, it is not only open to the Court but its duty to reject such a valuation. On the facts of the case it was found that the valuation given by the plaintiff was arbitrary and unacceptable. 48. In the present case, we have already set out the circumstances under which the plaintiff has given the estimated valuation in a sum of Rs. 31,000/- for the buses and the routes. No doubt, he has averred that the value of each bus would be Rupees four to five lakhs. But, in the very same sentence he has stated that it is not possible to fix the value of the buses and the routes. The defendants in their joint applications for transfer before the Regional Transport Authority valued the buses around Rs. 1,00,000/- and less. The prayers in the suit are for passing of preliminary decrees and appointment of a commissioner to fix the value of the buses. The defendants in their joint applications for transfer before the Regional Transport Authority valued the buses around Rs. 1,00,000/- and less. The prayers in the suit are for passing of preliminary decrees and appointment of a commissioner to fix the value of the buses. The plaintiff has undertaken to pay the necessary court-fee as soon as the value is ascertained. Even in this Court, counsel appearing for the plaintiff assured that such court-fee as would be fixed by the Court will be paid by the plaintiff. 49. We are of the view that this is an anomalous suit which will not fall under any particular category, so as to fix the court-fee straightaway. In Meenakshisundaram Pillai v. Ponnu (69 L.W. 1006 = 1956-2-M.L.J. 599), a property was sold with a contemporaneous agreement that the vendee should, before some future date fixed, convey the property to any one nominated by the vendor and take the price paid by him out of the sale-proceeds and pay the balance to the vendor. It was agreed that if, however, the sale to such nominee was for an amount less than the price paid by the vendee, the vendor will have to make good the deficit to the vendee and if within the specified time the vendor was not able to procure a purchaser, the vendee himself should sell the same to a person of his choice and retain the price paid by him out of the sale proceeds and pay the balance to the vendor. Again it was provided that if the price fetched was less than the price paid by the vendee, the vendor should make good the difference. The lower Court held that the plaintiff should pay court-fee on the sale price paid under the deed of sale, as the suit was in effect one for reconveyance of the property or one for redemption of the property from the burden of the sale price. This Court set aside the order of the lower Court and held that the case was an anomalous one which did not fall under any category of reconveyance or redemption or account. It was held to be sui genesis to be decided on its own facts. This Court set aside the order of the lower Court and held that the case was an anomalous one which did not fall under any category of reconveyance or redemption or account. It was held to be sui genesis to be decided on its own facts. The Court observed:— “Courts in modem times have to construe the pleadings reasonably and not extravagantly and see the real substance of the relief asked for taking away all the froth and foam, the exaggerations and contradictory claims. Learned counsel for the plaintiff says that the plaintiff does not want to pay Court-fee on any sum higher than Rs. 8,000 now and will pay Court-fee on Rs. 8,000 as man accounts suit, to case a higher amount than Rs. 8,000 is ultimately found to be payable to the plaintiff the equitable order would be to direct the plaintiff to pay Court-fee on any such excess amount as in an accounts suit before decree is given for any excess. On “payment of the Court-fee on the excess he will be entitled to get the excess. Of course, all the contentions of the parties in the suit are left intact.” We respectively agree with the principle laid down in that case and hold that the same would apply to the present case. 50. In V.K.S. Mohamed Yassin Rowthar, in re. ( (1958) 1 M.L.J. 21 ) the Court held that the substance of the plaint has to be ascertained for the purpose of fixing the Court-fee payable thereon, in Lakshmi Ammal v. K.M. Madhuvdkrishnan (91 L.W. 121 (S.C.) (S.N.) = AIR 1978 SC 1607 ), the Court held that the question of court-fee must be considered in the light of the allegations made in the plaint and not in the light of either in the pleas in the written statement or by the final decision of suits on merits and all the material allegations in the plaint should be construed and taken as a whole. 51. In Meenakslusundaram v. Venkatachalm (92 L.W. 57 (S.C.) (S.N.) = AIR 1979 S.C. 989 ), on which both sides place reliance, the Court held that in a suit for accounts, the plaintiff is required to state the amount at which he values the relief sought and it is not possible for the plaintiff to estimate correctly the amount which he may be entitled to. The Court also observed that the plaintiff cannot arbitrary and deliberately undervalue the relief. Learned counsel for the plaintiff draws our attention to the facts of the case. The plaintiff was a partner in a firm and had executed a general power-of-attorney authorising the defendant to transact all his business, sell his properties etc., The plaintiffs share in the firm was taken over by one A who paid the defendant as agent of the plaintiff a sum of 6.50,000 dollars equivalent to Rs. 16,12,000. The plaintiff filed the suit for directing the defendant to render a true and correct account of all the transactions made by the defendant as agent of the plaintiff from the date of power-of-attorney. In the plaint it was alleged that the defendant had sent to him Rs. 6,37,401.65 and was to account for Rs. 9,74,598.35 being the balance. The suit was valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 12,000 under S. 35 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees Act. The trial Court accepted the valuation but dismissed the suit on merits. On appeal, a Division Bench of this Court held that the estimate made by the plaintiff was sham, nominal and dishonset and the plaintiff had quantified the amount due to him at Rs. 9,74,598.35. The Bench directed the appellant to value the suit for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction on that amount and pay the deficit court-fee. The order of the Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court and it Was held that on a consideration of the facts and circumstances, the Court was not satisfied that the estimate of the relief as given by the plaintiff was inadequate or unreasonable or a deliberate under-estimation as held by the High Court. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the matter back to the High Court for disposal of all the issues arising in the appeal 52. In Neelavathi v. N. Nataraian (93 L.W. 47 (S.C.) (S.N.) = (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 691), it was held that all allegations in the plaint must be taken as a whole and construed for the purpose of deciding the Court fee. 53. On the facts of this case, we hold that the plaint has been valued properly and the Court-fee paid is correct. 53. On the facts of this case, we hold that the plaint has been valued properly and the Court-fee paid is correct. The finding of the trial Court that the suit is not valued properly and correct court-fee is not paid is erroneous and vacated. 54. QUESTION No. 7: The plea of limitation was not raised in the written statement. The suit was filed on 19-4-1982. According to learned counsel for the first defendant, the suit should have been filed within three years from the date of the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal dated 12-10-1978 directing the Regional Transport Authority to transfer the permit standing in the name of the plaintiff to the first defendant. We do not agree. The permit was actually transferred only on 21-4-1979, after the Regional Transport Authority passed on order on 19-4-1979. The buses were wrongfully taken away by the first defendant only on 17-8-1979. Hence, the suit filed on 19-4-1982 is well within the time prescribed by law and the suit is not barred by limitation. 55. QUESTION No. 8 Learned counsel for the first defendant contends that in the written statement the first defendant has made a counter claim that the plaintiff should render an account to the first defendant for his management of the suit buses from 11-12-1970 to 21-4-1979. It is seen that a Court-fee of Rs. 75.50 has been paid on a valuation of Rs. 1000/- under S. 35 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees Act. Issue No. 9 framed by the trial Court is whether the plaintiff is liable to render accounts to the first defendant for his management of the buses. While considering the said issue, the trial Court held that for the reasons stated earlier, defendants 1 and 4 to 7 were not liable to render any account to the plaintiff as prayed for in the plaint and issue No. 9 was found against the plaintiff. Thus, the trial Court has failed to consider the issue at all. Instead it considered the liability of the defendants to render account to the plaintiff. Learned counsel is justified in his contention that there is no finding given by the trial Court on Issue No. 9 in so far as the first defendant is concerned. But, the first defendant has not preferred any appeal or cross-objections as against the decree of the trial Court. Learned counsel is justified in his contention that there is no finding given by the trial Court on Issue No. 9 in so far as the first defendant is concerned. But, the first defendant has not preferred any appeal or cross-objections as against the decree of the trial Court. Hence, we cannot entertain the present claim of the first defendant that a decree should be granted in his favour directing the plaintiff to render an account. Even otherwise, the claim is unsustainable in view of our findings in favour of the plaintiff on the other questions. The management of the plaintiff during the period 11-12-1970 to 21-4-1979 for which the defendant prays for an account was not On behalf of the first defendant, as he had no title to the buses or permits at that time. The management was only by the plaintiff himself on his own behalf and he is not liable to render any account to the first defendant. 56. QUESTION No. 9 Learned counsel for defendants 4 to 7 contends that the plaintiff had entered into some arrangement with the first defendant after 17-8-1979 and given up his rights, if any, over the buses and permits, According to him, the first defendant has conveyed to the plaintiff certain lands under Exs. B-5 to B-9 between 6-9-1979 and 19-9-1979 which proved that the disputes between them, if any, were settled. We cannot agree. As rightly pointed put by learned counsel for the plaintiff Exs. B-5 to B-9 were executed by the first defendant to reconvey the lands which were transferred to him under Exs. B-1 to B-4 in 1970 and 1971. P.W. 1 has categorically deposed that no consideration passed under Exs. B-1 to B-9. There is no evidence centra. The transaction under those documents has nothing to do with the suit dispute. Exs. B-3 and B-4 refer to the agreement for reconveyance. Exs. B-5 to B-9 refer to the business run in the name and style of “Sri Hari Movies” by the plaintiff, the first defendant and others. The written statements do not contain a plea of any such arrangement or settlement. Hence, we reject this contention. 57. It is rightly contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the doctrine of unjust enrichment would apply and the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff must be granted. The written statements do not contain a plea of any such arrangement or settlement. Hence, we reject this contention. 57. It is rightly contended by learned counsel for the plaintiff that the doctrine of unjust enrichment would apply and the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiff must be granted. Our attention is drawn to the judgments of this Court in Govindarajulu Naidu v. S.S. Naidu ((1958) II M.L.J. 148) and Nellie Wapshare v. Pierce Leslie & Co. (AIR 1960 Madras 410). The law is discussed in extenso in the former judgment at pages 150 to 152. In the latter judgment, the principle is stated succinctly in paragraph 26, which reads as follows:— “26. The doctrine of Unjust Enrichment” has been dealt with in recent cases of this Court such as Govlndarajulu Naidu v. S.S. Naldu , 1958-2 Mad L.J. 148, where a succinct history of this doctrine, particularly in relation to English and American systems of jurisprudence, will be found set forth. Reference may also be “made to the Full Bench decision in Muppudathi Pillai v. Krihnaswami Piliai, 1959-2 Mad L.J. 225: ( AIR 1960 Mad 1 ). The doctrine was originally based in English Law upon the principle of assumpsit or “had and received”, and was declared by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macfarlan, (1760) 2 Burr. 1005. It underwent certain changes through judicial interpretation, and came to be based More and more on the doctrine of restitution. In the United States of America, the same principle evolved through concepts of assumes it and then of quasi or implied contract, to the final form of a doctrine of restitution (American Re-statement). In this country, the principle was developed under Ss. 69 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act and, as observed in Mahallngam Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (App. No. 665 of 1948) (Mad). “It is generally recognised that these Sections (Ss. 69 and 70) are much wider in scope than the, doctrine as applied in England, and go far beyond it.” Goolab Chand v. M.J.V. Miller, 1938-2 Mad L.J. 688: ( AIR 1938 Mad 966 ) is an instance of the application of this doctrine, and a recent instance is Nityananda Mudaliar v. Arunachalam Chettiar 71 Mad L.W. 50(2), where the doctrine “has been applied to the facts, and the contributions of Lord Mansfield and of American Jurisprudence have been explained in detail. For our present purposes, we may take the doctrines of ‘constructive fraud’ and ‘unjust enrichment’ as complementary to each other, if we find that, in effect and substance, the first defendant company was unjustly enriched to the extent of about two lakhs, by means of a transaction with the plaintiffs (appellants), to whom the first defendant company stood in a fiduciary capacity, even if the form of the transaction was different in outward semblance as a transaction between the legal entities of the ‘old company’ and the ‘new company’, we would be justified in piercing through these forms to the reality, and in holding that the first defendant held their shares or interest in the new company constructively in trust for the appellants. That would be all the more so, where, as in this case, the classic signs and symptoms of ‘constructive fraud’ are present. That is where the fiduciary relationship is undeniable, where the context of a conflict between interest and duty is equally undeniable, where the plaintiffs (appellants) had no disinterested advice, legal or private, and where the analysis of fuels discloses an “unjust enrichment” of the ‘constructive’ trustee.” 58. Reliance is placed by the plaintiffs counsel on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal ( AIR 1962 SC 527 ) in support of his contention that the Court has an inherent power to appoint a Commissioner in circumstances pot covered by S. 75 and O. 26, Code of Civil Procedure. Referring to S. 151, Code of Civil Procedure, the Court said:— “(21) A similar question about the powers of the Court to issue a commission in the exercise of its powers under S. 151 of the Code in circumstances not covered by S. 75 and O. 26, arose in Padam Sen v. Stale of Uttar Pradesh, 1961-1 SCR 884; ( AIR 1961 SC 218 ), and this Court held that the Court can issue a Commission in such circumstances. It observed at page 887 (of SCR): (at p. 219 of AIR) thus; “The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. It observed at page 887 (of SCR): (at p. 219 of AIR) thus; “The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in S. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.” These observations clearly mean that the inherent powers are not in any way controlled by the provisions of the Code as has been specifically stated in S. 151 itself. But those powers are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. (22) In the above case, this Court did not uphold the order of the Civil Court, not coming under the provisions of O. 26, “appointing a Commissioner for seizing the accounts books of the plaintiff on the application of the defendants. The order was held to be defective not because the Court had no power to appoint a commissioner in circumstances not covered by S. 75 and O. 26, but because the power was exercised not with respect to matters of procedure but with respect to a matter affecting the substantive rights or the plaintiff. This is clear from the further observations made at page 887 (of SCR): (at p. 219 of AIR). This Court said:— “The question for determination is whether the impugned order of the Additional Munsif appointing Sri Raghubir Pershad, Commissioner for seizing the plaintiffs books of account can be said to be an order which is passed by the Court in the exercise of its inherent powers. The inherent powers saved by S. 151 of the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the cause before it. The inherent powers saved by S. 151 of the Code are with respect to the procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the cause before it. These powers are not powers over the substantive rights which any litigant possesses. Specific powers have to be conferred on the Courts for passing such orders which would affect such rights of a party. Such powers cannot come within the scope of inherent “powers of the Court in matters of procedure, which powers have their source in the Court possessing all the essential powers to regulate its practice and procedure.” 59. It is argued that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to pass an order on 8-8-1983 dismissing the suit O.S. No. 237 of 1983 as withdrawn on the basis of an endorsement made on the plaint by the first defendant herein. It is pointed out that on 1-7-1983 this Court had stayed the operation of the order of transfer passed by the District Judge in O.P. No. 135 of 1982. The consequence of the said order was that the suit could not proceed further in the Sub Court until the disposal of C.R.P. No. 2566 of 1983. Hence, the Subordinate Judge was not entitled to dismiss the suit or for that matter any order in that suit, as all proceedings were required to be kept stayed in view of the stay of the order of transfer. It is submitted that the genesis of jurisdiction to the Subordinate Judge was the order of transfer and when that had been stayed, the resultant effect was to stay all further proceedings in the suit itself in the Sub Court. We agree with this contention. Hence, the dismissal of the suit on 8-8-1983 did not by itself have the effect of bringing to an end the order of injunction which was in force as against the first defendant restraining him from alienating the buses or permits. In any event, it did not have the effect of terminating the undertaking given by the first defendant in the Court of the District Munsif, based on which, the order of injunction was passed. It is only after the Sub Court dismissed the suit as not pressed, the Civil Revision Petition was withdrawn in this Court by the first defendant. In any event, it did not have the effect of terminating the undertaking given by the first defendant in the Court of the District Munsif, based on which, the order of injunction was passed. It is only after the Sub Court dismissed the suit as not pressed, the Civil Revision Petition was withdrawn in this Court by the first defendant. Thus, he played a fraud on the Court to carry out his sinister scheme of transferring the buses and permits in order to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. As rightly pointed out by learned counsel, Courts in this country are primarily Courts of equity. (Vide Indira Bai v. Nand Kishore (1991-1-L.W. 5 (S.C.) = AIR 1991 S.C. 1055 )). 60. In Roshanlal Nuthiala v. R.B. Mohan Singh Oberai ( AIR 1975 SC 824 ), the Court said that our equitable jurisdiction is not hide-bound by tradition and blinkered by precedent, though trammelled by judicially approved rules of consciousness. In Mulraj v. Murti Raghunathji ( AIR 1967 S.C. 1386 ), the Court pointed out the difference between an order of stay and an order of injunction and helod that even in cases where the executing court had carried on execution without knowledge of the order of stay, it could in the interests of justice, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, pass appropriate orders setting aside the interim proceedings within a reasonable time. 61. In Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram ( AIR 1989 SC 2285 ). an order of eviction was passed against a firm and it was confirmed by the Supreme Court. It was ordered that the order of eviction should not be executed for a period of six months on the firm filing usual undertaking in the Court. The order was not complied with and Undertaking was not filed. But the sons and grandsons of the partners of the firm filed a suit for permantent injunction against landlords and one of the partners restraining them from ejecting the said plaintiffs and obtained an order of temporary injunction. The Court held that assuming that the firm and its partners could not be found guilty of violating any undertaking as there was none, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court should ensure compliance with its order and see that vacant and peaceful possession is given to the landlord in the interest of justice. The Court held that assuming that the firm and its partners could not be found guilty of violating any undertaking as there was none, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Court should ensure compliance with its order and see that vacant and peaceful possession is given to the landlord in the interest of justice. Learned counsel for the plaintiff relies upon the said judgment and submits that the Court is entitled to grant reliefs to the plaintiff as prayed for by him. 62. We have already found that the first defendant took wrongful possession of the buses and in collusion with the order defendants has transferred the same along with the permits during the pendency of this suit. Hence, the plaintiff will be entitled not only to the value of the buses and the routes as on 21-4-1979 but also to the profits realised by defendants 1 and 4 to 7 from 17-8-1979 till the date of final decree. Naturally, the plaintiff will be entitled to interest on the amount so ascertained at t he rate of 12% per annum as prayed for by him. The plaintiff will also be entitled to a charge over the buses set out in the ‘B’ Schedule to the plaint or the buses which have replaced the same by the defendants. 63. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the suit is decreed as prayed for with costs throughout against defendants 1 and 4 to 7. C.M.P. No. 9452 of 1993 is dismissed.