Honble JAIN, J.—This special appeal has been filed by Dr. S.P. Vyas u/s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 against the order of Learned Single Judge dt. 23.7.93 whereby the writ petition filed by him challenging his transfer order has been dismissed. (2) The facts which are necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this special appeal as alleged by the appellant in brief are that after passing M.B.B.S. in the year 1973, he acquired a degree of M.S. in 1977. He was selected by the R.P.S.C. and was initially appointed as C.A.S. in 1979 thereafter as lecturer in 1980. The appellant while working as Asstt. Professor at J.L.N. Medical College, Ajmer was temporarily appointed as Associated Professor and was relieved from Ajmer to join S.P. Medical College, Bikaner vide order dt. 4.1.91 (Anx.1). Thereafter the D.P.C. recommended the petitioner for promotion on the post of Associate Professor on regular basis and he was promoted as such on 28.5.93 (Anx. 3) and he was posted at Bikaner. The petitioner was transferred on 15.7.93 vide Anx. 5 from Medical College, Bikaner to Jodhpur, against which he preferred a writ petition. The learned Single Judge by his order dt. 23.7.93 dismissed the same. Hence, this special appeal. (3) Mr. Purohit, learned-counsel for the petitioner appellant has submitted that the learned Single Judge has erred in not interfering with the transfer order Anx. 5 which has been passed with malice with a view to accommodate the respondent no.3. He has submitted that the petitioner was Head of Department at Bikaner and remained there for a short period of two years where as the respondent No.3 has remained at Bikaner for more than 14 years. Under the circumstances equity demands that the petitioner should have been retained at Bikaner and the learned Single Judge has not considered the facts in proper perspective and has erred in not interfering in transfer order which has been passed with malice with a view to accommodate the respondent No.3 and the same is liable to be set aside in this special appeal. (4) We have given our earnest consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the order of the learned Single Judge as also the material on record and case law. (5) The first limb of the contention of Mr. (4) We have given our earnest consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the order of the learned Single Judge as also the material on record and case law. (5) The first limb of the contention of Mr. Purohit is that the transfer order has been passed out of malice and in this respect he relied on a decision rendered in Smt. Kanchan Bhansali vs. State & Ors. bearing (1) and a similar matters decided on 27.5.1993 and a Single Bench decision of this Court rendered in Jagat Prakash vs. State (2). (6). In Smt. Kanchan Banshali vs. State (supra), despite directions given by this Court in earlier identical case Surender Kumar Vyas vs. State ,the authorities neither gave effect to the transfer policy nor the authorities acted in consonance with the orders passed by this Court and yet the petitioners were transferred to distant rural areas or their postings in urban areas were cancelled. It was in this back ground that this Court again directed the officers of the Education Department to take steps to examine all the cases of employees keeping in view the length of service as well as other conditions specified in the transfer policy like accommodation of husband and wife at the same place of posting or cases involving serious ailments. (7). In Jagat Prakash Yadav vs. State (supra), wherein petitioner was transferred, retaining the other person in contravention of declared policy of the Government. A writ petition was filed in which specific allegations of mala fide against specific persons were alleged. The learned Single Judge after considering the orders placed on record observed that the transfer order has been passed only to make room for the person having protection of the functionaries and while interfering with the impugned transfer order, it has been held that "I am more than convinced that this order has been passed for collateral purposes and for extraneous consideration." (8). It is no doubt true that if any transfer has been actuated by any mala fides, dishonesty malice or has been made in colourable exercise of power for extraneous purposes or considerations or for accommodating the third party, the same can be interferred. It is no doubt true that if any transfer has been actuated by any mala fides, dishonesty malice or has been made in colourable exercise of power for extraneous purposes or considerations or for accommodating the third party, the same can be interferred. In the instant case the only ground shown by the petitioner-appellant in support of the contention of malice is that the impugned order is single order of transfer and has been made on the request of the respondent No.3, which is clear from the endorsement of a copy of the order to the Private Secretary to the Advisor of the Governor. In this regard suffice it to say that these are no grounds to show malice on the part of the authorities as there is no bar to pass a single transfer order and further in the absence of any averment of malice and substantial proof thereof by direct or circumstantial evidence, merely because copy of the transfer order has been endorsed to P.S. to the Advisor to His Excellency the Governor, it cannot be said that the transfer order has been actuated by malice. Under these circumstances, the cases cited by the petitioner has no application for the reason that in Smt. Kanchan Bhansalis case (supra) the transfers were made in lots without following any norms and the directions issued by this Court as also in contravention of the transfer policy of the State itself whereas in the case in hand the petitioner has not been able to make out such a case. Likewise the case of Jagat Prakash (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of present case for want of Specific allegations and proof of malice or mala fides against specific persons or authorities. (9). The second limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the transfer order of the petitioner deserves to be quashed on the ground of equity as the respondent No.3 has remained at Bikaner for longer period than the petitioner. (10). In Ramana vs. I.A. Authority of India (3), wherein the tenders were invited by hoteliers having certain qualifications that a person running registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and having experience of 5 years as such should be eligible to submit tenders but person with lesser experience was considered. (10). In Ramana vs. I.A. Authority of India (3), wherein the tenders were invited by hoteliers having certain qualifications that a person running registered IInd Class hotel or restaurant and having experience of 5 years as such should be eligible to submit tenders but person with lesser experience was considered. In these facts their lordships of the Supreme Court held that this was a condition of eligibility and it is difficult to see how this condition could be said to be satisfied by any person who did not have five years experience of running a IInd Class hotel or restaurant. (11). The principle laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case that the democracy is governed by the rule of law and the very essence of rule of law is that all authorities concerned even while performing their executive duties must act fairly and reasonably and not arbitrarily. It has been held in catena of authorities by this Court as also by their Lord ships of the Supreme Court this transfer as a normal incidence of the service and the courts are very sceptical in interfering with the orders of transfers. The ground taken by the petitioner that the respondent No.3 has remained at Bikaner for longer period cannot be accepted as there is an initial presumption in law that such a transfer has been made for administrative reason and it is for the concerned authorities to consider the same. In this view of the matter, the aforesaid case of Ramana is not helpful to the petitioner as that was a case of tenders. Moreso, in the case in hand the petitioner as well as respondent no.3 are holding same post carrying same pay scale, and the petitioner appellant has himself served at Bikaner for more than 2-1/2 years, on the higher post of a Reader in Opthomology, which is evident from Anx. 4 dt. 4.1.91. This period spent on a higher post cannot be compared with the period spent on a lower post simply because a person has been accommodated at Bikaner at his own request for the reason best known to the Administration, without any further allegation does not make the order malicious or mala fide transfer. (12). 4 dt. 4.1.91. This period spent on a higher post cannot be compared with the period spent on a lower post simply because a person has been accommodated at Bikaner at his own request for the reason best known to the Administration, without any further allegation does not make the order malicious or mala fide transfer. (12). As regards the contention of M. Purohit that this order has lowered that status of the petitioner by depriving him of the post of Head of Department, we are firmly of the view that it does not lower his status in any way either cadre wise or pay-wise. (13). In Vice Chancellor, Lalit Narain Mithila University vs. Dayanand Jha "(supra), wherein the respondent was earlier holding post of Principal. The Vice Chancellor transferred him from that post of Principal, to the post of a Reader in another college. The High Court while allowing the writ petition hold that although the two posts of Principal and Reader carry the same scale of pay, it cannot be said that the post of a Reader is equivalent to the post of the Principal of a college in the legal sense. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while interpreting S. 10(4) (as inserted in 1982) of the Bihar State Universities Act (23/1976) observed that although the Reader and Principal have same pay scale except allowances and privileges of the post of Principal but the post of Principal undoubtedly has higher duties and responsibilities. Apart from the fact that there are certain privileges and allowances attached to it, the Principal being the head of the College has many statutory rights, such as (i) He is the ex-officio member of the Senate. (ii) He has the right to be nominated as the member of the Syndicate, (iii) As head of the institution, he has administrative control over the teaching and non-teaching staff. Therefore, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the post of Render could not be regarded as an equivalent post as that of Principal in the legal sense and consequently rejected the appeal. (14). In the present case the petitioner is a Associate Professor, which is a cadre post. Admittedly at the new place of posting he has been transferred as a Associate Professor. (14). In the present case the petitioner is a Associate Professor, which is a cadre post. Admittedly at the new place of posting he has been transferred as a Associate Professor. The petitioners case merely is that he will not remain as Head of Department at Jodhpur, new place of posting but without showing any change for worse in the pay scale/allowances, perks attached to the two posts, difference in the nature of duties/responsibilities, or existence of any rule that once the incumbent becomes Head of Department he can only be transferred to a place where he is posted as a Head of Department alone, he can not claim that his status has been lowered. Thus, the said case of Vice Chancellor (supra) is of no help particularly when the petitioner has not been able to show that he has been specially selected to the cadre post of Head of Department In absence of all these facts it is simple case of transfer of a person who holds the post of Associated Professor in one Medical College as Associated Professor to another Medical College. Holding the post of a Head of Unit at one place where no other senior person is available is only a fortituous circumstances which confers no right to hold a particular post. (15). To sum up, on the basis of material on record Mr. Purohit has not been able to satisfy us that the impugned order of transfer Anx. 5 is made in violation of any mandatory statutory rules or with malice or mala fides and in no circumstances it violates the legal rights of the appellant. (16) In view of the above discussion, in our opinion, the learned Single Judge has not erred in not interfering with the transfer order in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge has already observed that the petitioner may make a representation before the authorities and the authorities shall consider the matter sympathetically. In view of this, the impugned order calls for no interference. (17). In the result, this special appeal has no force, so it is hereby dismissed.