Research › Browse › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

1993 DIGILAW 444 (MAD)

K. PADMAVATHY v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

1993-08-13

ARUNACHALAM, RAJU

body1993
Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER Padmavathi, claiming herself to be the mother of Johnson, aged about 1/2 years, has prayed for issue of a habeas for his production by the second respondent, S. N. Arasu Raja, before this Court, so that the minor child could be set free from illegal custody and handed over to her, who is legitimately entitled to hold its custody. ( 2 ) IN the affidavit sworn to in support of the prayer in the main habeas corpus petition, petitioner has stated that she was married to one Jayaraman on 25/5/1989. She did not have any issue out of this marriage. She was working as a Shop Assistant in a Video Lending Library in Ashok Nagar Shopping Complex from January, 1990. Second respondent, S. N. Arasu Raja, was working in an adjacent shop. Both of them became friendly. On one particular visit to the house of the second respondent he forced her for sexual union. She became pregnant. The consequence was she was driven away from her marital home. Sometime later, second respondent agreed to marry her. They continued to live together. Minor child Johnson was born on 8/4/1992. Obviously Johnson is an illegitimate child, since both parties agree that they have not entered into matrimony, much less valid. According to the petitioner, since the child was illegitimate second respondent was anxious to do away with the child. In the process, he inflicted physical torture on her. In or about September, 1992 second respondent snatched away minor Johnson from her younger sister, who was then taking care of the child. Three days later, on intervention of well-wishers, child was restored to her. Thereafter, child was in her custody till about April, 1993. On 8/4/1993 she happened to meet the second respondent by accident at Jaffarkhanpet. He asked her to hand over the child to him. When his request was not acceded to, the brother of the second respondent snatched the child. She was also beaten in public road by the second respondent. Even then the child was being breast-fed. Inspite of her efforts taken through common friends to have the child restored, such steps did not yield any result. Second respondent was evading. Thereafter, petitioner preferred a complaint on 17. 6. 1993 before the first respondent, Inspector of Police, Thiruvanmiyur. The child could yet not traced. Even then the child was being breast-fed. Inspite of her efforts taken through common friends to have the child restored, such steps did not yield any result. Second respondent was evading. Thereafter, petitioner preferred a complaint on 17. 6. 1993 before the first respondent, Inspector of Police, Thiruvanmiyur. The child could yet not traced. Hence, she had chosen to invoke the petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, to plead for the relief she has now asked for. ( 3 ) ON notice, second respondent appeared before us in person along with minor Johnson. He is represented by his Counsel Mr. S. M. Pandian. Counter affidavit sworn to by the second respondent shows that he had entered into matrimony with the petitioner on 10/4/1991 at Tirunelveli. He has further stated that minor Johnson was born on 8/4/1992. According to him, petitioner voluntarily surrendered the child to him and chose to marry one Rajendran, residing at Dindigul. He has also pinpointed the fact of the petitioner having already married one Jayaraman before he came into contact with her. That fact of prior marriage was suppressed. He has further stated in his Counter, that welfare of the child is paramount and since he has means to take care of the minor child, the child must be allowed to be retained by him. He has further stated that his mother was anxious to take care of her grand-son. ( 4 ) WE have heard Mr. P. Venkatasubramaniam, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. S. M. Pandian, representing the second respondent. ( 5 ) THERE cannot be a second opinion, that ultimately the welfare of the minor child will be the decisive factor in arriving at a conclusion about the best-suited custody for the minor child. The facts placed for our scrutiny by both parties indicate, at least prima facie that even if matrimony had been entered into between the petitioner and the second respondent that cannot be valid in the eye of law, since the earlier marriage of the petitioner with Jayaraman appears to be in subsistence, or, in any event, such marriage does not appear to have been dissolved in accordance with law. Both parties have their own stories to offer, regarding the manner in which at present the custody of the minor child is with the second respondent. Both parties have their own stories to offer, regarding the manner in which at present the custody of the minor child is with the second respondent. We do not want to go into these details, for evidence may have to be properly recorded, and opportunities afforded to both parties to challenge the same. Both parties have chosen to present their case to substantiate their contention for interim custody. Either of the parties must approach the Guardianship and Wards Act Court for ultimate decision about the custody of minor Johnson. Prima facie, we need not have to go into the question, if Johnson is a Hindu or a Christian, for even according to the Counter filed by the second respondent, he has stated in paragraph 7 that he is the natural guardian of the minor child in law as per Section 6 (a) of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and there are absolutely no reasons for depriving him of his legal right. Under Section 6 (a) of the Act, the natural guardian, in respect of the minorts person as well as in respect of minorts property; in the case of an illegitimate boy or an illegitimate unmarried girl, is the mother and after her the father. Section 6 (b) can be contradistinguished from Section 6 (a) of the Act, which refers to legitimate children. ( 6 ) WHILE holding that ultimately the Guardianship and Wards Act Court will have to decide about the person entitled to the custody of the minor, be it the petitioner or the second respondent, on the basis of the facts available in the light of Section 6 (b) of the Act, taken along with the welfare of the minor child, we are of the opinion that interim custody of Johnson should be with the petitioner, mother of the minor child. Guardianship and Wards Act Court will independently consider the right to custody of either of these parties on the evidence placed before it without being obsessed by any of the observations made in this habeas corpus petition or the fact of handing over of interim custody to the mother. Both parties will be entitled to place evidence before the said Court. Second respondent is directed to hand over custody of the minor child to the petitioner before this Court as an interim measure. Both parties will be entitled to place evidence before the said Court. Second respondent is directed to hand over custody of the minor child to the petitioner before this Court as an interim measure. As stated earlier, this order is subject to the ultimate decision to be arrived at by the Guardianship and Wards Act Court. This habeas corpus petition is disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed of accordingly.