Judgment : C. O. 7592 (W) of 1991 relates to a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to absorb the petitioners and other Tahsil-Mohurrirs in the regular establishment. The petitioner No. 1, Paschimbanga Tahsil-Mohurrir Kalyan Samity is a registered society and is an association of persons who worked as Tahsil-Mohurrirs. The respondent No.1 is the State of West Bengal and the other respondents are mostly officers under the department of Land & Land Reforms, Government of West Bengal. Petitioners claim that the Tahsil-Mohurrirs were in the employment of the respondents. Annexure-A to the writ petition purports to be a list, prepared by the petitioner No. 1 of the persons numbering 1274 who, it is claimed, worked as Tahsil-Mohurrirs for a number of years as shown in that list. 2. Tahsil-Mohurrirs find mention in rule 18 of the West Bengal Land Management Manual, 1977. In rule 15 of the said Manual it is mentioned that Tahsildars are part-time Government servants and they are appointed by Sub-Divisional officers. In rule 12 it is mentioned that the main duty of the Tahsildar is to collect land revenue, cesses, etc., loans and surcharge and cess under the Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976. Rule 18, provides that the Tahsildar can employ a Tahsil-Mohurrir for 4 months in a year and a Tahsil-Mohurrir shall draw a fixed/monthly remuneration in addition to commission at a specified rate on the collection of land revenue and cesses and loans of the Tahsildar to whom he is attached subject to a specified minimum collection. It is the contention of the petitioners that the Tahsil-Mohurrirs worked under the Government for a period around 10 years or even more upto 20 years in same cases till 1984 when that system was abolished and anew set-up was brought into existence, It is the-further contention of the petitioners that under the new set-up the existence of Tahsildars as well as Tahsil-Mohurrirs, etc. was abolished and Tahsildars were absorbed in the set-up of the regular establishment of the Government as Bhumi Sahayaks but the Tahsil-Mohurrirs were not absorbed and as such they have been rendered unemployed after 1984. was abolished and Tahsildars were absorbed in the set-up of the regular establishment of the Government as Bhumi Sahayaks but the Tahsil-Mohurrirs were not absorbed and as such they have been rendered unemployed after 1984. It is also the case of the petitioners that they made several representations to different authorities at different times for their absorption in the regular establishment but inspite of assurance of consideration of their representations, given by the authorities from time to time, nothing was done thereby forcing them to approach the court for appropriate relief. On the other hand, it is the contention of the respondents that the Tahsildars and the Tahsil-Mohurrirs do not stand on the same footing and that the Tahsil-Mohurrirs used to be appointed by the concerned Tahsildars for a period of 4 months in a year and the Government had nothing to do with such appointment. It is however the contention of the petitioners that whatever might have been there in rule 18 of the West Bengal Land Management Manual the appointments of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs were given by Government officers and in support of such contention the petitioners have annexed to their affidavit-in-reply xerox copies of a large number of appointment letters issued by either the Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer or Sub-Divisional Officer of different Sub-Divisions of the State of West Bengal in respect of individual Tahsil-Mohurrirs. 3. It is true that under rule! 8 of the said Manual the Tahsildar has been authorised to employ a Tahsil-Mohurrir for a period of 4 months in a year. But the Tahsil-Mohurrir however used to get the fixed remuneration for those 4 months from the public exchequer and of course he also used to get commission on the collection of the Tahsildar to whom he was attached subject to a specified minimum collection, It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the Manual provided for appointment of Tahsil-Mohurrir by Tahsildar for facilitating collection of revenue etc. by the Tahsildar during the peak collection season of the year. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondents that a Tahsil-Mohurrir who might have been appointed in one year might not have been appointed in the next year or other years and the appointment for 4 months in each year is a separate event unconnected with the appointment in other years. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondents that a Tahsil-Mohurrir who might have been appointed in one year might not have been appointed in the next year or other years and the appointment for 4 months in each year is a separate event unconnected with the appointment in other years. As a matter of fact however, as we have found, at least in a large number of cases, the appointments were being given, indeed for 4 months in each case in a year, by the Land Reforms Officers or the Sub-Divisional Officers. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the appointment letters and certificates purporting to have been issued by the Government officials in respect of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs as annexed to the affidavit-in-reply of the petitioners should not be taken into consideration as the respondents did not get any opportunity to meet the same by filing any affidavit and the officers who purportingly issued those appointment letters and certificates are not parties to the writ application. This does not seem to me to be an acceptable plea. If really the respondents or for that matter the Government wanted to deny and dispute those documents they could have filed affidavite in respect of the same with the leave of the court. Again although the officers who issued those appointment letters and certificates, even if not parties to this writ application, are all responsible officers of the Government and the Government is a party to this writ petition. Prima facie therefore there is nothing for which these documents of purporting authenticity should be left out of consideration. Rather they should be taken into consideration for the ends of justice and for appreciation of the real state of affairs. Again even if the appointments of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs were given in some or most cases by the respective Tahsildars and not by the Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officers or the Sub-Divisional Officers, that would not have changed the complexion of the matter because in view of rule 18 the Tahsildar could give appointment not on his own behalf or in his personal capacity but as representing the Government machinery for the particular purpose. 4. 4. Annexure-C to the writ petition is a circular being the Government of West Bengal, Board of Revenue No. 1415(18)-TDR dated the 3rd February, 1978 regarding retention of Tahsil-Mohurrir and Tahsi-Peon consequent on the death, dismissal, resignation or superannuation of Tahsildar to whom they were attached. In the said circular of the Board of Revenue it is recited that in view of earlier letter dated 4.4.77 if any vacancy in the post of Tahsildar occurs consequent upon the death, dismissal, resignation or superannuation of Tahsildar concerned, the block concerned is tagged with the adjoining block and both are managed by the Tahsildar of the said adjoining block. In the said circular it is recorded further that it was representated to the Minister-in-Charge, land Utilisation & Reforms and land and Land Revenue Department by the Paschimbanga Tahsildar Kalyan Samity that in such eventuality the Tahsil-Mohurrir and Tahsil-Peon attached to the erstwhile Tahsildar were thrown out of employment for no fault of theirs and that the Board decided that in such cases the Tahsil-Mohurrir and Tahsil-Peon attached to the erstwhile Tahsildar might continue to be in service being attached to the Tahsildar with whom the block concerned was being tagged. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the said circular thus indicates that the Government was exercising effective control not only in the matter of appointment of Tahsil-Mohurrir but was also providing for continuity of the service of the Tahsil-Mohurrir inspite of death, dismissal, resignation or superannuation of the Tahsildar to whom he was attached. 5. The petitioners' case, as projected, has a dual aspect. One aspect of the matter is that if the Government has utilised the services of the Tahsil-Mohurrir for a number of years in connection with the collection of revenue etc. which is a very important aspect of the functioning of the Government, in that case whether the incumbents concerned can under the general principles of equity or under the currently developed theory of legitimate expectation. claim for consideration of their case for absorption or appointment in the regular establishment of the Govt. in view of the past services rendered by them for a long period covering about 10 years or more Apart from this general aspect the petitioners have also relied upon the Govt. claim for consideration of their case for absorption or appointment in the regular establishment of the Govt. in view of the past services rendered by them for a long period covering about 10 years or more Apart from this general aspect the petitioners have also relied upon the Govt. of West Bengal, Labour Department Memorandum No. 1700-EMP dated the 3rd August, 1979 read with the Memorandum No. 1650-EMP dated the 28th August, 1980 which are Annexures D and E respectively to the writ petition. In the said Memorandum No. 1700-EMP dated the 3rd August, 1979 the Government of West Bengal laid down certain principles to be followed in the matter of absorption of casual and such other categories of workers under the State Government. In paragraph-3 of the said Memorandum No. 1700-EMP it is provided that casual and such other categories of workers who have been engaged in a perennial type of work for a continuous period or more than 3 years may be absorbed in the regular establishment on temporary basis in existing vacancies and if suitable vacancies are not available necessary steps may be taken by the respective authorities to create the requisite number of posts for the purpose of absorption of such categories of workers in consultation with the Finance Department. In paragraph-4 of the said Memorandum provision has been made for keeping reserved certain percentage of vacancies for absorption of those casual and such other categories of workers who are already engaged in perennial type of work and have rendered at least 240 days' service in a year but have not completed 3 years' service as yet. Paragraph-5 of the said Memorandum provides that while filling up vacancies in the regular establishment duly qualified seasonal workers who have worked for 5 years or more in consecutive seasons shall be considered for appointment by the respective Employing Authorities along with the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange. In the subsequent Memorandum No. 1650-EMP dated the 28th August, 1980 the term continuous period of more than 3 years' as contained in para-3 of the earlier Memo No. 1700-EMP was explained to mean 240 days of work in each completed calendar year of service for 3 consecutive years. In the subsequent Memorandum No. 1650-EMP dated the 28th August, 1980 the term continuous period of more than 3 years' as contained in para-3 of the earlier Memo No. 1700-EMP was explained to mean 240 days of work in each completed calendar year of service for 3 consecutive years. In the context of the said earlier Memorandum it was also explained therein that not less than 120 days of work which might be continuous or not, in a season stretching over a period of 6 months would qualify a worker to have worked for one season in a calendar year. The petitioners have annexed to their affidavit-in-reply xerox copies of a good number of certificates issued by the concerned Government officials certifying that the persons mentioned in such certificates have worked as Tahsil-Mohurrir for a number of years mentioned in such certificates. In most of such certificates, appointment for 4 months in a year has been specifically mentioned and in some cases the appointment has been described as seasonal, e. g., the certificate at page-95 of the affidavit-in-opposition. 6. A number of reported decisions have been relied upon at the Bar in connection with the question of regularisation or absorption of employees or workers. The learned Advocate for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in (1) P K Ghosh v. Manager, Sisal Plantation, 93 CWN 431. In that decision, in view of the fact that the petitioners had worked as daily rated workers, they were found to be eligible for absorption in terms of the aforesaid Memorandum dated the 3rd August, 1979 and were directed to be absorbed in a phased manner. The facts in (2) K. S. P. College Stop-gap Lecturers' Association v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 677 were that the college authorities were appointing teachers for 3 months or less repeatedly with a break of a day or two, for years and in that background the Supreme Court directed for absorption, as and when regular vacancies would arise, in respect of temporary teachers who had worked as such for 3 years including the break. In (3) Union of India v. Basant Lal, AIR 1993 SC l88 the petitioners were employed in the posts of casual labour in the Railway in July 1988 and their services were terminated by oral order dated 19.12.88. In (3) Union of India v. Basant Lal, AIR 1993 SC l88 the petitioners were employed in the posts of casual labour in the Railway in July 1988 and their services were terminated by oral order dated 19.12.88. By applying the relevant rules it was found that the petitioners had acquired the status of temporary employee under the rules as they had worked for more than 120 days and as such absorption in regular post was directed. In (4) Daily R.C. Labour, P & T Deptt. v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2342 the petitioners were working as daily rated casual labour in the P & T Department for about 10 years. In that background the Supreme Court directed for preparing a scheme on rational basis for absorbing as far as possible the casual labourers who had been continuously working for more than one year in the P & T Department. Following the sad decision a similar direction was also given by the Supreme Court in (5) U. P. I. T. Deptt. CPSW Assn. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 517 in respect of the contingent paid staff of the Income Tax Deptt. who had been continuously working for more than one year as Class-IV employees. In (6) Tapas Ghosh v. Union of India, Cal L T 1990(1) HC 50 the petitioner was appointed in the Ministry of Defence. Defence Research and Development Unit as casual worker and he was employed for 647 days in course of 36 months and in the facts and circumstances it was held that the petitioner could not be denied regularisation of service in view of the Government circular dated October, 1984, on hypertechnical plea that his case was not sponsored through Employment Exchange, although the petitioner was registered with Employment Exchange and he had duly fufilled all the conditions of regularisation of service. In (7) Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority, AIR 1990 SC 2228 there was appointment by way of stop-gap arrangement and the employees continued in service for tong. The Supreme Court directed inter alia that the services of workers appointed after 4th August, 1984 and possessing the requisite qualifications should be regulated in accordance with Act 19 of 1970 provided they had put in continuous service of not less than one year, ignoring the artificial breaks, if any. The Supreme Court directed inter alia that the services of workers appointed after 4th August, 1984 and possessing the requisite qualifications should be regulated in accordance with Act 19 of 1970 provided they had put in continuous service of not less than one year, ignoring the artificial breaks, if any. The Supreme Court further directed the Kerala Public Service Commission to take immediate steps to regularise their services as a separate block taking the age bar as waive. In (8) Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana, A I R 1987 SC 478 the State Government did not fill up vacancies for 3 to 4 years and was making ad hoc appointment of teachers, terminating their services before summer vacation and again giving appointment after vacation. Such a policy was strongly deprecated and the Supreme Court directed the State Government to take immediate steps to fill up, in accordance with the relevant rules, the vacancies in which the teachers appointed on an ad hoc basis were working giving liberty to such ad hoc teachers also to apply for being appointed regularly in those posts if they had the prescribed qualifications. It was further directed by the Supreme Court that the State Government might also consider sympathetically the question of relasing the qualification of maximum age prescribed for appointment to those posts in the case of those who had been victims of this system of ad hoc appointment. In (9) Rabindranarayan Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1991 SC 1286 the Supreme Court deprecated the practice of appointing teachers on ad hoc basis for 89 days with a break of one day, thereby depriving the teachers of the service benefit during summer vacation. The Supreme Court directed for regularisation of the service of a teacher under section 3 of the Orissa Aided Educational Institutions Appointment of Teachers Validation) Act, 1989 where such teacher had been working with the approval of the authorities for almost 4 years with short breaks and the Managing Committee had been utilising his services and there was no allegation or inefficiency or misconduct against the teacher. In (10) MAMC Employees Unify Centre v. MAMC Ltd., 1991(1)CHN 438 this court directed for preparation of a scheme for absorption of workers who had rendered services continuously for 3 years, virtually without any leave, on daily wage basis. 7. In (10) MAMC Employees Unify Centre v. MAMC Ltd., 1991(1)CHN 438 this court directed for preparation of a scheme for absorption of workers who had rendered services continuously for 3 years, virtually without any leave, on daily wage basis. 7. The next case I would refer to is (11) U.P. Mahavidyalaya T.S.N.A. Samity v. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 1772 . There it was held that adoption of January 3, 1984 as the date for regularisation of services of ad hoc teachers appointed by the Management of affiliated colleges under section 31B of the U. P. Higher Educational Services Commission Act, 1980 was not arbitrary or irrational. It was observed therein that it was quite clear that the cut-off date January 3, 1984 was relatable to the ad hoc appointments made by the management under the Second Removal of Difficulties Order which expired on that date and that it was clearly not in public interest to allow the Management of affiliated colleges to continue nuking such ad hoc appointments indefinitely and a line had to be drawn somewhere, and the Legislature therefore adopted January 3, 1984 as the cut-off date, that being the date of expiry of the Second Removal of Difficulties Order. The petitioners in that case were all appointed after January 3, 1984 as adhoc teachers. Although the Supreme Court in that case declined to interfere with the cut-off date yet observed that some of the petitioners who apparently were highly qualified persons would be faced with unemployment and the Supreme Court expressed the hope and trust that the State Government would sympathetically consider their case for suitable employment commensurate with their experience and qualifications within 3 months from date in case the petitioners made a representation for such employment. The learned Advocate for the respondents, on the other hand, relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court on the point of absorption. The first is (12) Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2049 . In that case the petitioners were appointed as Supervisors by a competent selection committee constituted by the Education Department of Haryana from time to time since October 2, 1978. The first is (12) Bhagwan Dass v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2049 . In that case the petitioners were appointed as Supervisors by a competent selection committee constituted by the Education Department of Haryana from time to time since October 2, 1978. One of the grievances of the petitioners was that they were given a deliberate break of one day after the la»se, of every six months and had thus been treated as temporary Government servants notwithstanding the fact that they had been continuously working ever since the dates of their respective appointment subject to the aforesaid break of one day at intervals of six months instead of absorbing them as regular employees in regular pay scales. Since the petitioners were appointed in the context of a scheme which was by the very nature of things transient and temporary, although this scheme was extended from year to year, the Supreme Court opined that the prayer of the petitioners to absorb them as regular employees on a permanent basis from the date of their initial appointment had no justification. The next case relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents on this point is (13) Delhi Development Horticulture Employees. Union v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1992 SC 789 . That was a case where persons were engaged under the Nehru Rozgar Yojana. The petitioners were given employment under the schemes which had been evolved to provide income for those who were below the poverty line and particularly during the period when they were without any source of livelihood and. therefore, without any income whatsoever. The schmes were rather meant for the rural poor, for the object of the schemes was to start tackling the problem of poverty from that end. Having regard to the nature of the schemes and the object underlying the same the Supreme Court refused to direct regularisation of the persons engaged under the schemes. The learned Advocate for the respondents heavily relied on paragraph 15 at page 796 of the said decision In that paragraph the Supreme Court took note of the pernicious consequences of the directions for regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they had put in work for 240 or more days. The learned Advocate for the respondents heavily relied on paragraph 15 at page 796 of the said decision In that paragraph the Supreme Court took note of the pernicious consequences of the directions for regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they had put in work for 240 or more days. The Supreme Court also inter alia took n0te of the fact that the employment is given first for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of reqularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised, and that a good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. One significant aspect of that case however is that although the Supreme Court for very forceful reason refused to direct regularisation of the petitioners in that case yet for doing the most that could be done for them the Court directed the respondent Delhi Administration to keep them on a panel and if they were registered with the Employment Exchange and were qualified to be appointed to the relevant posts, give them a preference in employment whenever there would occur a vacancy in the regular posts. The ld. Advocate for the respondents also relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in (14) Tota Mia & Ors. V. State of West Bengal & Ors, F.M.A.T. No. 866 of 1990 in which the judgment was delivered on 10th February, 1993. In that case the Division Bench refused to issue any direction for absorption of workers engaged under social forestry project on the ground that the G.O. No. 1700-EMP dated 3.8.79 was applicable only to the workers who were employed in perennial type of work, but the writ petitioners who were working under a temporary time-bound project which had already come to an end, could not be said to have been doing a perennial type of work as contemplated in the said Government Order. Inspite of that the Division Bench however observed in the concluding part of the judgment that the petitioners had worked under the said project for more than three years and it was expected that the Government would frame a suitable scheme for their absorption ill the permanent establishment after condoning the age bar if they were found otherwise suitable for the job on the date of such absorption. 8. From the discussion of the judicial decisions as made above, although it cannot be said that any inflexible judicial policy has: emerged as to what length of service, employment or engagement on ad hoc or casual basis or on stop-gap arrangement, will qualify for absorption or regularisation, yet this much is evident that casual, ad hoc or stop-gap employment for a long period without regularisation has been judicially deprecated in very strong and emphatic terms. We have seen that in many of the decisions regularisation or absorption was directed in the background of the particiular Government circulars or rules applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case with varying lengths of past service. We have also seen that in the case of Delhi Development Horticultural Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration (supra) a judicial trend of directing regularisation on the ground of work for 240 days or more has been taken note of. Again we have seen that in Daily R. C. Labour, P & T Deptt v. Union of India (supra) and U. P. I T. Department, CPSW Assn. v. Union of India (supra) the Supreme Court directed for preparation of scheme on a rational basis for absorbing those who had been working continuously for more than one year. In K. S. P. College Stop-gap Lecturers' Assn. v. State of Karnataka (supra) the Supreme Court directed for absorption in respect or temporary teachers who worked as such for three years including break, as and when vacancies would occur. What have been recorded above illustrate the fact that for directing absorption in a case not covered by any Government circular or rules, there is no judicially evolved fixed period about the precise length of qualifying service which would entitle an incumbent to regularisation, although a judicial trend has been judicially noticed that 240 days of work on casual basis is prone to actuate the court to issue direction for regularisation. But then the expression "judicial trend' indicates that the trend is yet to harden into a judicial policy of universal application. Perhaps that is why in K. S. P. College stop gap Lecturers' Assn. v. State of Kanataka (supra) the Supreme Court directed absorption of teachers who had worked for three years. But in Rattan Lal v. State of Haryana (supra) no such specific direction for absorption was given. As a matter of fact, regularisation has been directed by the court in the background of the facts and circumstances of each individual case. Also ordinarily absorption or regularisation is not ordered where employment is made under temporary scheme or project. But in some cases of schematic employments also or in some of the cases where it did not become possible to give any judicial direction for absorption, the court did not hesitate to take note of the unenforce-able equities even and express its judicious approach in favour of such equities by recommending absorption even while rejecting the claim of the legal right to such absorption. Example, the cases of Tota Mia (supra). Delhi Development Horticultural Employees' Union (supra), U.P. Mahavidyalaya T.S.N.A. Samity (supra). 9. Then again, none of the decisions so far discussed directly dealt with any case of seasonal employment. In our present case the Tahsil-Mohurrirs, as we have seen, were employed seasonally in each year for a period of four months which may be a few days more than 120 days per year. It is, of course, the case of the petitioners that although the petitioners were employed for four months in a year yet they were required to work virtually throughout the year not only for the purpose of collection of land revenue, cesses, etc. during the peak collection season but also for different other purposes such as election duty, enumeration works for the purpose of preparation of voters list, etc. Be that as it may, basically the Tahsil-Mohurrirs were employed only for a period of four months in a year during the peak collection season for facilitating collection of Government land revenue, cesses, etc. They were engaged in connection with a vital function of the Revenue Department of the Government. For the four months of their engagement in each year they used to receive remuneration from the public exchequer. They also used to get commission on collection above a prescribed level. They were engaged in connection with a vital function of the Revenue Department of the Government. For the four months of their engagement in each year they used to receive remuneration from the public exchequer. They also used to get commission on collection above a prescribed level. It is also on record that they were given puja exgratia. We have seen that in the event of death, dismissal, resignation or superannuation of a Tahsildar, the Government took steps for maintaining the continuity of the service of the Tahsil-Mohurrir attached to such Tahsildar. In the circumstances, the argument of the learned Advocate for the State-respondents that the Government had no concern with the appointment or service of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs and had no responsibility in connection with the function discharged by the Tahsil Mohurrirs does not seem tenable. Rather it will not be fair if the Government or for that matter the Stale after utilising the services of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs for long years, seasonally though, turns its back on them for the purpose of disowning all legal and equitable responsibilities in respect of them. The Government of West Bengal Labour Department's No. 1700-EMP dated 3rd August, 1979 is quite relevant in this connection. There also seasonal workers who have worked for five years or more in consecutive seasons have been brought under consideration for absorption. It was argued by the learned Advocate for the respondents that for the application of the State Government Memorandum No. 1700-EMP it must be shown that the incumbents concerned were engaged in perennial type of work which is not the case with the Tahsil-Mohurrirs since they were engaged individually only for four months in a year and therefore their service or work could not be of perennial nature. I however find it difficult to subscribe to this view. The said Memorandum No. 1700-EMP does not speak of perennial service. Its speaks of 'perennial type of work'. Therefore the test is whether the incumbent concerned worked in perennial type of work, even though his work may be of seasonal nature. Now revenue collection is indeed a perennial type of work as much as the existence of the present Governmental system itself is. Therefore collection of revenue cannot but be a perennial type of work and hence Tahsil-Mohurrirs who were engaged in connection with and rather for the purpose of assisting the collection of land revenue etc. Now revenue collection is indeed a perennial type of work as much as the existence of the present Governmental system itself is. Therefore collection of revenue cannot but be a perennial type of work and hence Tahsil-Mohurrirs who were engaged in connection with and rather for the purpose of assisting the collection of land revenue etc. must be held to have been working in a perennial type of work although their individual services might have been seasonal and their appointment also might have been on seasonal basis. It may be noted here that in support of hi, argument that seasonal job is not necessarily an antithesis of perennial nature of work, the learned Advocate for the petitioners appropriately relied upon the decision of Orissa High Court in (15) M/s. Orissa Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 1993 Lab I C 515. 10. The learned Advocate for the respondents relied upon an earlier decision over the self-same matter as involved in the present proceeding, that earlier decision being the judgment dated the 7th May, 1990 passed on a writ petition by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. In Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 (16) Tarak Ch. Mandal & 85 Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Others. That was a writ petition filed by 68 Tahsil-Mohurrirs for themselves and on behalf of all the Tahsil-Mohurrirs in the State of West Bengal. Subsequently some other Mohurrirs also joined the writ petition as petitioners. Obviously that was a representative proceeding. That writ petition for absorption of Tahsil-Mohurrirs was however rejected by the Learned Judge on the ground that the writ petitioners had no right to be, permanently absorbed as the petitioners' services were not of perennial nature and the letter of appointment also did not suggest that the petitioners' services were of perennial nature. As we have seen, in view of the Labour Department Memorandum No. 1700-EMP dated the 3d August, 1979 the matter for consideration in this connection is whether the incumbent was engaged in a perennial type of work and not whether the service of the incumbent is of perennial nature. The question whether the petitioners were engaged in perennial type of work was however not considered in the said decision in Civil Rule No. 2678(W) of 1987. The question whether the petitioners were engaged in perennial type of work was however not considered in the said decision in Civil Rule No. 2678(W) of 1987. That decision however would have a binding effect on the parties to the proceeding as well as on those who would have been otherwise bound under law by that decision. The learned Advocate for the petitioners argued that so far as the constitutional or fundamental rights of an individual are concerned the same cannot be defeated by a decision in an earlier representative proceeding, particularly in respect of the persons who were individually not parties to that proceeding. Although the plea of res judicata is not taken in the affidavit-in-opposition, it is contended by the learned Advocate for the respondents at the time of hearing of this writ petition that the earlier decision of this court in the said Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 which was a representative proceeding operates as res judicata in the present proceeding and the question whether the petitioners as Tahsil-Mohurrirs are entitled to be absorbed or regularised in virtue of the Government Memorandum No. 1700-EMP, etc. or otherwise cannot be re-agitated in a fresh proceeding when the self-same claim for absorption or regularisation was earlier rejected on merits by this court. There is no doubt that there is apparent force in this contention of the learned Advocate for the respondents. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the respondent also relied upon a number of decisions as mentioned hereafter. 11. In (17) Daryao v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 it has been held by the Supreme Court that the principle of res judicata applies to application under Article 226 or under Article 32 where the matter has been earlier decided on merits. Indeed this decision is an authority for the proposition that even a proceeding for the enforcement of fundamental rights is amenable to the principles of res judicata. In (18) Forward Construction v. Prabhat Mondal, AIR 1986 SC 391 it has been held by the Apex court that the principle of res judicata, even constructive res judicata, applies to writ petition and also to public interest litigation. In (19) Direct Recruit Class-II Engineers Assn. In (18) Forward Construction v. Prabhat Mondal, AIR 1986 SC 391 it has been held by the Apex court that the principle of res judicata, even constructive res judicata, applies to writ petition and also to public interest litigation. In (19) Direct Recruit Class-II Engineers Assn. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1990 SC 1607 the Supreme Court has held that the principle of res judicata, both direct and constructive, applies to writ petition including representative writ petition. In (20) Supreme Court Employees Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 334 it has been held by the Apex court that the doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties and that when a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Article 14. The decision of the Supreme Court in (21) R. Venugopal Naidu v. V. N. Charities, A I R 1990 SC 444 projects the proposition that the decision in a representative suit may also operate as res judicata not only against the persons who were named in the suit-title but also against the entire body of interested persons on whose behalf the representative suit was instituted. In the context of res judicata the decision of the Supreme Court in (22) Junior Telecom Officers v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 787 shows that where the issue directly and substantially involved has been decided in an earlier special leave petition the same cannot be reopened under the garb of employees' 'forum'. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the petitioners attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (23) Workman C.P. Trust v. Board of Trustees, AIR 1978 SC 1283 wherein it has been held that from the order dismissing the special leave petition under Article 136 in limine it cannot be inferred that all matters agitated in the subsequent writ petition under Article 226 were either explicitly or implicitly decided and that the technical rule of res judicata cannot be stretched too far to bar the trial of identical issue in separate proceeding merely on an uncertain assumption that the issues must have been decided. The said decision of the Supreme Court is obviously not applicable to the present case because in the earlier writ petition, being Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987, the self-same question of the right of absorption or the Tahsil-Mohurrirs was answered in the negative on merits. In connection with res judicata the learned Advocate for the petitioners also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (24) Bir Bajrang Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 SC 1345 . Of the two petitions under Article 226 involving identical point, one was admitted and the other was dismissed by the same High Court. The Supreme Court in that case held that such action creates an anomalous position with the possibility of two contradictory judgments being rendered by the High Court and that the order dismissing the second petition was liable to be set aside. The said decision of the Supreme Court also for obvious reason is not applicable in the present case because the facts and circumstances of the two cases are patently different. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court so far discussed it is evident that the principle of res judicata applies to writ petition and that the principle of constructive res judicata also applies to such petition. It is further evident and clearly settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court that res judicata also applies to representative writ petition in appropriate circumstances. In view of the settled position of law as decided by the Supreme Court that the principle of res judicata applies even to a proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right and also to a representative writ petition in appropriate circumstances, the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the constitutional or fundamental rights of a petitioner cannot be defeated by application of the principle of res judicata on the basis of a decision in a representative writ petition is not tenable. 13. In this connection, relying on the 'Explanation' to section 141 C. P. C. the learned Advocate for the petitioners also asserted that by application of rule 53 of the Writ Rules of this court the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code including the provisions of Order-l Rule 8 and section 11 cannot be made applicable to writ proceedings. 13. In this connection, relying on the 'Explanation' to section 141 C. P. C. the learned Advocate for the petitioners also asserted that by application of rule 53 of the Writ Rules of this court the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code including the provisions of Order-l Rule 8 and section 11 cannot be made applicable to writ proceedings. He also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this court in (25) State of West Bengal v. Hariprawul Singh, 1989(2) CLJ 43 . Rule 53 of the Writ Rules of the Calcutta High Court runs thus : "53. Save and except as provided by these rules and subject thereto, the procedure provided in the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908) in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings for issue of a writ." 14. Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure runs thus :- "141. Miscellaneous proceedings- The procedure provided in this code in regard to suits shall be followed as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation,- In this section, the expression 'proceeding' includes proceeding under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution," Left to myself, I am inclined to hold that what the explanation to section 141 C. P. C. in this connection, means is that the section by its own force shall not apply to any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of making the procedure prescribed in the Code automatically applicable to such proceeding. But then the said bar of the explanation is not intended to be a bar of the nature of a trade mark nor is it intended to create any hurdle of the nature of a copyright so that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code may not be adopted or reframed for application in a different sphere in exercise of the rule making power of a competent authority, particularly where such rule making power is derived not from the Civil Procedure Code but from some other source. Under Article 225 of the Constitution the High Court has the power and jurisdiction to frame rules including the rules of procedure relating to a writ proceeding. Under Article 225 of the Constitution the High Court has the power and jurisdiction to frame rules including the rules of procedure relating to a writ proceeding. In doing so the High Court has power to frame such rules as may be considered necessary and proper, even if some of such rules or all of them may happen to be the same or similar as those contained in the Civil Procedure Code. If similar provisions as are there in the Civil Procedure Code can be enacted by the High Court in exercise of its rule making power under Article 225, there is no reason as to why by making an express rule the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be adopted. Therefore to my mind section 141 C.P.C. although it docs not apply perforce to writ proceeding by reason of the explanation to the section, there is no bar of making the same applicable to writ proceeding by making specific rule to that effect in exercise of the rule making power of the High Court and that is what has been precisely done by rule 53 of the Writ Rules of the High Court. The provisions of the C.P.C. are required to be followed as far as the same can be made applicable in writ proceedings not by virtue of section 141 C.P.C. but by virtue of rule 53 of the Writ Rules of the High Court framed ill exercise of the power conferred under Article 225 of the Constitution. It may be again noted here that the rule nuking power under which the Writ Rules have been framed has not been derived by the High Court from the Civil Procedure Code. Had that been so, there could have been a scope for argument that any rule made in exercise of such rule making power cannot supersede any provision of the Code from which the rule making rower is derived. But here the rule making power of the High Court is derived not from the Civil Procedure Code but from Article 225 of the Constitution and therefore this power is not circumscribed by anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code. Considered from the angle of view discussed above there is virtually no rivalry or contradiction between section 141 C. P. C. and Rule 53 of the Writ Rules. Considered from the angle of view discussed above there is virtually no rivalry or contradiction between section 141 C. P. C. and Rule 53 of the Writ Rules. But of course my above view in the matter is faced with a contrary view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Hariprasad Singh (supra) where it has been held that notwithstanding the provisions or rule 53 of the Writ Rules, in view of the provisions of section 141 of the C P C., the provisions of the said Code will not have any application to the writ cases under Article 226 of the constitution. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the petitioner also attracted my attention to rule 12 of the Writ Rules where it is stated inter alia that where leave is asked for making an application in a representative capacity, there must be a distinct prayer to that effect. In this connection it is further submitted by him that even rule 12 of the Writ Rules does not contain any provision similar to the provision of Order 1 Rule 8(6) CPC, which expressly provides that a decree passed in a representative suit shall be binding on all persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit was instituted or defended. It is argued that in the absence of such provision in rule 12 of the Writ Rules and in view of the Division Bench decision in State of West Bengal v. Hariprasad Singh (supra), the Civil Procedure Code stands eclipsed in respect of writ proceedings, and therefore any decision in a representative writ proceeding is not binding on the persons who were not directly added as parties to such proceeding and such decision cannot operate as res judicata against them. This argument, I must say, is wholly unacceptable. As we have seen, whatever may be the procedure applicable, in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court as discussed earlier the conclusion is inescapable that representative writ proceeding is permissible and any decision in a representative writ proceeding may also operate its res judicata in appropriate cases even against the persons who were not parties to the proceeding by individual name but whose interests in the matter were properly represented in the proceeding. 15. 15. There is no doubt that the earlier decision dated the 7th day of May 1990 of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 was a decision in a representative writ proceeding as would appear from the cause title of the said judgment where the first 68 petitioners have been described as for self and on behalf of all Tahsil-Mohurrirs in the State of West Bengal. The self-same question regarding the absorption of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs was also involved in that writ proceeding and the learned Judge negatived the claim of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs for absorption on merits. That decision was definitely capable of operating as res judicata in any subsequent writ proceeding where the self-same claim for absorption was raised by any group of Tahsil-Mohurrirs irrespective of the question whether they were parties to the earlier representative writ proceeding by individual name or not. 16. We however find that after that decision in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 a group of Tahsil-Mohurrirs obtained an order in their favour on 1st October, 1991 from Mahitosh Majumdar, J. (as his Lordship then was) in Civil Order No. 7964 (W) of 1990 (26) Satkari Goswami and Others v. State of West Bengal & Others. By that order the learned Judge upheld on merits the claim of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs, who were petitioners in that writ petition, for absorption and inter alia directed the respondents to enforce the circular of the August 1979 and the Circular dated February 1984 and effect absorption of the petitioners in service in a phased manner, preferably within 18 months from the date of communication of the order. Similar direction was also given by the same learned Judge on 20th December, 1991 in Civil Order No. 1625 (W) of 1991 (27) Taraprasad Banerjee & Others v. State of West Bengal & Other, in connection with the writ petition filed by another group of Tahsil-Mohurrirs. 17. The aforesaid decision of Mahitosh Majundar, J. was followed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Order No. 12468 (W) of 1992 (28) Sunil Kumar Chakraborty & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. 17. The aforesaid decision of Mahitosh Majundar, J. was followed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Order No. 12468 (W) of 1992 (28) Sunil Kumar Chakraborty & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. and by order dated 12th August, 1992 the learned Judge disposed of a writ petition filed by another group or Tahsil-Mohurrirs with a direction upon the respondents to consider the case of the petitioners and pass appropriate order in the light of the judgment delivered by Mahitosh Majumdar, J. as referred to in the said order. A similar order was again passed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. on 11th November, 1992 disposing of another writ petition (Basudev Nayak & Anr. v. State of West Bengal). We thus find that as against the first decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. dated the 7th May, 1990, in Civil Rule. No. 2678 (W) of 1987 rejecting the prayer of absorption of Tahsil-Mohurrirs on merits, there are as many as four subsequent contrary decisions including two decisions of the same learned Judge, all granting relief to the Tahsil-Mohurrirs regarding absorption on consideration of the self-same matter on merits. In the present case naturally the question arises as to whether the first decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. or the subsequent four contrary decisions of the two learned Judges including the self-same learned Judge Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. should be given precedence in deciding the present writ petition where also the self-same question is involved, namely, whether the Tahsil-Mohurrirs are entitled to absorption. 18. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the respondents argued that since the decision in first writ petition decided by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 is binding on the parties the present writ petition in respect of the self-same question is barred by the principles of res judicata. It is however to be noted here that although the said decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. dated the 7th May, 1990 in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 has been mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents yet no specific plea of res judicata has been taken therein. It is however to be noted here that although the said decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. dated the 7th May, 1990 in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 has been mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents yet no specific plea of res judicata has been taken therein. It is the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondents however at the time of hearing that the subsequent four decisions on the same matter are to be ignored in view of the first decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No, 2678 (W) of 1987. He developed his argument in this way that in view of the said decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 which was operating as res judicata, the learned Judges who rendered the four subsequent decisions on the self-same matter had no jurisdiction to decide the same again and as such those subsequent decisions cannot operate as res judicata in the present proceeding nor can the same be taken into consideration in the present proceeding. In support or his such argument the learned Advocate for the respondents relied upon the Full Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in (29) Pritam Kaur v. Stale of PEPSU, AIR 1963 Punjab 9. Whatever may be the import of the said decision of the Punjab High Court we have however two Division Bench decisions of our High Court on the point and obviously the decisions of our High Court will apply to this matter in preference to the said decision of the Punjab High Court. In (30) P. C. Ray & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Cat 512 a Division Bench of this court had to consider inter alia the question as to whether res judicata in fact ousts the jurisdiction of a court. In that connection the Division Bench observed that the plea of res judicata is not a plea touching the jurisdiction of a court in the total or absolute sense and that the court has to go into the said plea as any other plea of law, as for example, limitation and then decide whether the issue or the claim is barred by res judicata or principles analogous thereto. It was observed by the Division Bench in paragraph-15 of the said decision thus : "15. It was observed by the Division Bench in paragraph-15 of the said decision thus : "15. It has been held that the plea of res judicata may be waived by a party to a proceeding. In the premises the plea of res judicata can never be a jurisdictional question. For jurisdiction can be conferred neither by waiver nor even by consent of the parties". The Division Bench in the said decision also quoted and relied upon an earlier decision of another Division Bench of this court in (31) Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajmaddin Bhuiya, 48 Cal L J 577: AIR 1929 Cal 163 where the facts were such that a decision in a suit brought in 1909 would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suits brought in 1918 and 1921. But the plea of res judicata was not taken in the suit of 1918 and the result was that the Court took a decision on merits. In the subsequent suit of 1921 also the decree of 1909 was not brought to the notice of the Court. Then another suit was brought in 1924 in respect of the self-same matter but the Division Bench held that the subsequent suit under consideration on the face of the decree passed in 1921 was incompetent. In the said decision in Rajani Kumar Mitra (supra) the Division Bench observed thus : "......... the effect of not pleading the previous decree in answer to the plaintiff's claim in a suit stands on the same footing as if the defence was raised by the defendant and disallowed by the Court. It cannot be placed on a higher footing on any reasoning based upon common sense or law. The bar of res judicata is one which does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court but is a plea in bar which a party is at liberty to waive. If a party does not put forward his plea of res judikata in a suit he must be taken to have waived it or it must be taken to be a matter which ought to have been made a ground of attack and deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the suit under explanation (IV) of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The party omitting to plead resjudicata intentionally invites the court to decide the case on the merits and having railed to secure a decision in his favour he should not be allowed to go behind the last adjudication and ask for the trial of an issue which he could have raised at the previous trial." 19. It was further observed thus in the said decision : ".........as a broad proposition of law when there are two conflicting decrees the last should prevail on the ground that in the eye of law it is binding between the parties and the previous decree should be taken as pleaded in the latter suit and not given effect to or must henceforth be regarded as dead." I am quite clear in my mind that following the above two Division Bench decisions of this court, I must hold that (1) the bar of the principles of res judicata does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court and the plea of res judicata can never be a jurisdictional question, (2) that a plea of res judicata can be waived and if a party does not put forward the plea of res judicata in a suit or proceeding he must be taken to have waived it, and (3) in the case of conflicting decrees, orders or decisions between the parties occasioned by the non-raising of the plea of res judicata in the subsequent suit or proceeding, the last of the two conflicting decrees or decisions shall prevail on the ground that in the eye of law the last one is binding between the parties. 20. In this connection, I am tempted to quote the following observation of the. Division Bench in Rojani Kumar Mitra (supra) :- "The position at the worst in this case is that there are two conflicting decrees. By one decree the plaintiff's right as occupancy raiyat was established. By another decree that right was negatived. The point that arises in these circumstances is as to which decree should prevail. The trend of authorities is that the last decree ought to prevail. By one decree the plaintiff's right as occupancy raiyat was established. By another decree that right was negatived. The point that arises in these circumstances is as to which decree should prevail. The trend of authorities is that the last decree ought to prevail. If finality is not given to the last decree there would be no end of the litigation which it is the object of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure to secure." In (32) Sukhni v. Sukhbasi, Al R 1967 Allahabad 423 the Allahabad High Court held that if res judicata is not expressly pleaded it will be deemed to have been waived. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court in (33) Sham Sunder Singh v. Dhirendra Nath, AIR 1950 Patna 465 observed thus in paragraph-6 : "If the rule of res judicata can be applied to execution cases, in my opinion, it would pre-eminently apply to this case. It is well settled that the doctrine of constructive res judicata is applicable to execution proceedings and where a judgment-debtor fails to raise all his objections to the execution which he might or ought to have raised and the execution is ordered to proceed, all such objections will be deemed to have been impliedly decided against him and he will be precluded from raising the same objections at a later stage of the same execution proceeding or in a subsequent execution of the same decree." 21. In view of the decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. dated the 7th May, 1990 in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 the respondents should have taken the plea of res judicata in the subsequent writ proceeding brought by the Tahsil-Mohurrirs but that was not done and accordingly Mahitosh Majumdar, J. by the decision dated the 1st, August, 1991 in Civil Order No. 7964 (W) of 1990 decided the matter afresh on merits and this time the decision went against the respondents. Subsequently three other decisions were also given in three other writ petitions and all these decisions on merits also went in favour of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs and against the respondents. Following the law propounded by the different decisions as discussed above it must be held that the respondents in the subsequent writ proceedings waived the plea of res judicata and those decisions cannot be held to be without jurisdiction because res judicata is not a jurisdictional question. Following the law propounded by the different decisions as discussed above it must be held that the respondents in the subsequent writ proceedings waived the plea of res judicata and those decisions cannot be held to be without jurisdiction because res judicata is not a jurisdictional question. Again in view of the position of law as discussed above, in the case of conflicting decisions existing between the parties the last one must prevail and therefore in view of the authority of the Division Bench decision of this court in Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajmaddin Bhuiya (supra), the first decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. dated the 7th May, 1990 between the parties should be regarded as dead. 22. The waiver of the plea of res judicata in the four writ proceedings as mentioned above brought subsequent to the decision in the first writ proceeding in the matter has also another dimension in a case like this where waiver operates against the State. As we have seen, in the earlier four writ proceedings the State-respondents waived their plea of res judicata which they could have taken on the basis of the first decision in the matter that went in their favour. It is by this time a settled principle of constitutional implication that the State must act• fairly and. nor arbitrarily and that the State must act without undue discrimination. Now, if the State, has waived its plea of res judicata in the four earlier writ proceedings brought by four different sets of Tahsil-Mohurrirs, it will now be invidiously discriminatory on the part of the State to take the plea of res judicata in the present proceeding against the present set of petitioners/Tahsil-Mohurrirs by advancing any contention that although the State had waived the plea of res judicata in the four earlier writ proceedings yet it has now decided to press that plea in the present proceeding against the present writ petitioners. This will definitely be a capricious stand on the part of the respondents bringing in highly discriminatory consequences visiting upon the present petitioners vis-a-vis the petitioners in the four earlier writ proceedings. This will definitely be a capricious stand on the part of the respondents bringing in highly discriminatory consequences visiting upon the present petitioners vis-a-vis the petitioners in the four earlier writ proceedings. If the State has waived something in favour of some persons it will not be open to the State to take the stand that it will not waive the same in respect of certain other persons although similarly circumstanced as those in whose favour the waiver earlier operated. In respect of waiver the State cannot make a discrimination between persons similarly circumstanced unless such discrimination is sustained or justified by the test of reasonable classification or unless there exists some valid factual or circumstantial distinguishing feature between the two situations where, in one case, something has been waived and in another the benefit of waiver is sought to be denied. At the same time I however must say that waiver on the part of the State or of the executive authorities in favour of some person or persons will not necessarily entitle the others even if similarly circumstanced to be treated with the benefit of such waiver where such waiver and non-waiver is the product of sound exercise of a discretion conferred by law or where such waiver has the desired or undesired consequence of the commission of an illegality or an infraction of law or an act of impropriety. The benefit of waiver cannot be claimed for the purpose of repetition of an illegality, infraction of law or an act of impropriety. A thing which is illegal or which is not permissible under the law cannot be asked to be repeated on the ground that such illegality was indulged in or allowed to occur earlier by reason of waiver or for any other reason. Under law a plea of res judicata can be waived by the party entitled to take the plea and if such plea is waived there is no question of any illegality, infraction of law or impropriety in the matter. Nor is there any question of sound exercise of discretion in this matter in extending waiver to some and denying to others. Nor is there any question of sound exercise of discretion in this matter in extending waiver to some and denying to others. Therefore the Slate cannot now in this proceeding base its claim on the plea of res judicata after waiving that plea in the four earlier writ proceedings in respect of similarly circumstanced persons as the petitioners, namely, the Tahsil-Mohurrirs when there is apparently or professedly no justifiable ground for sustaining such discriminatory action or approach on the part of the State in the matter. Consequently the first decision of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 is no more available to the State respondents for using the same as a shield in the present writ proceeding against Tahsil-Mohurrirs when that decision as already lost its efficacy by reason of waiver of the plea of res judicata in the four subsequent proceedings. 23. Apart from waiver as discussed above and also apart from the four subsequent decisions as mentioned above, even on merits also there is no reason why the Tahsil-Mohurrirs should not come within the purview of the Government of West Bengal Labour Department's No. 1700-EMP dated the 3rd August, 1979 and the subsequent No. 1650-EMP dated the 20th August, 1980 as referred to earlier. I have already discussed why collection of land revenue, cesses etc. falls within the ambit of 'perennial type of work'. The Tahsil-Mohurrirs having been seasonally engaged in each year for a period of not less than 120 days in a year for a consecutive period of 5 years or more would definitely, come within the purview of the said Government of West Bengal Labour Departments No. 1700-EMP read with Memorandum No. 1650-EMP. In paragraph-5 of the said Memorandum No. 1700-EMP it is provided that while filling up vacancies in the regular establishments duly qualified seasonal workers who have worked for 5 years or more in consecutive seasons shall be considered for appointment along with the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges. In the subsequent Memorandum No. 1650-EMP it has been clarified that 120 days of work, whether continuous or not, in a season will qualify a worker to have worked for one season in a year. The Government's intention as reflected in the said Memo Nos. 1700-EMP and 1650-EMP is clear. In the subsequent Memorandum No. 1650-EMP it has been clarified that 120 days of work, whether continuous or not, in a season will qualify a worker to have worked for one season in a year. The Government's intention as reflected in the said Memo Nos. 1700-EMP and 1650-EMP is clear. Having regard to the long service rendered by seasonal workers the Government thought it just and proper to consider the seasonal workers also who have rendered service for 5 years or marc for absorption in the regular establishment. The Tahsil-Mohurrirs who have rendered service in connection with the collection of Government land revenue and cesses etc. seasonally for not less than 120 days in each year for a continuous period of not less than 5 years deserve absorption under the said Memorandum No. 1700-EMP subject to their having requisite qualifications. It is needless to say that when the Government expresses an intention through a declared and formulated policy with the object of implementing the same, it also has to be seen by the Government and its functionaries, concerned with the matter, that the intention as reflected through the declared policy is made meaningful and effective through proper implementation, instead of keeping it as mere show piece for window dressing or of reducing it to a mere tentalising illusion The Government's intention is clear that the Government thinks it just and equitable to consider the seasonal workers for absorption in view of their long past service. Absorption is the implementation of that intention and non-absorption is frustration thereof. 24. In the Annexure-A to the writ petition the petitioner No. 1 has given a list of 1274 Tahsil-Mohurrirs describing the period during which each of them worked as Tahsil-Mohurrirs and giving other particulars, Since 1985 the engagement of Tahsil-Mohurrirs has been dis-continued. Thereafter the Tahsil-Mohurrirs, as I shall discuss later, went on moving the authorities concerned and at times made demonstration, for their absorption but with no effective result. From some of their representations as annexed to the writ petition it also appears that their representations were channelled at the official level for consideration and while they personally met the concerned Minister they were told that their matter of absorption or service would be considered. From some of their representations as annexed to the writ petition it also appears that their representations were channelled at the official level for consideration and while they personally met the concerned Minister they were told that their matter of absorption or service would be considered. There is an Annexure at page-211 of the affidavit-in-reply which is Memo No. 1271(10) EST dated the 14th July, 1981 written by the Collector, 24-Parganas, Alipore to the Junior Land Reforms Officer asking him to furnish names of Tahsil-Mohurrirs who were being engaged for a certain period of every year and who have passed SF/Higher Secondary/Equivalent examination and have worked for 5 years or more in consecutive seasons for consideration for appointment in regular establishment. This also reflect's that the top, Government officials at district level felt that in view of the past service rendered by the Tahsil-Mohurrirs it would be just and proper to absorb them in the regular establishment in keeping with the intention of the Government as reflected by the policy formulated in the matter. In view of the particular facts and circumstances obtaining in the matter including the sizable number of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs as named in the list, Annexure-A to the writ petition and the time that has already elapsed without any fruitful development after the Tahsil-Mohurrirs have been jettisoned even from the seasonal employment which was their slender source of sustenance, it will be unjust now to keep the matter at the level of consideration for appointment in the regular establishment along with the candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchanges. It is now rather only fit, proper and just that the Government should frame a scheme for absorption of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs in the regular establishment for a meaningful and productive implementation of paragraph-5 of the said Government Memo No. 1700-EMP so far as the seasonally engaged Tahsil-Mohurrirs are concerned. The learned Advocate for the respondents also argued that the Court should not pass any direction or order incapable of implementation I however do not find the argument tenable inasmuch as an order for preparing a scheme for absorption cannot be said to be an order incapable of implementation. 25. The learned Advocate for the respondents also argued that the Court should not pass any direction or order incapable of implementation I however do not find the argument tenable inasmuch as an order for preparing a scheme for absorption cannot be said to be an order incapable of implementation. 25. Although no plea of delay was taken in the affidavit-in-opposition, yet the learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, besides reiterating all the points earlier raised in the first writ petition decided by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987, also argued that in view of the delay in bringing the writ petition the same should be rejected on that ground alone. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the petitioners are out of employment since 1985 and they have filed the present writ petition in 1991. In this connection, he has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (34) V. N E. P. P. Assn. v. Under Secretary, Delhi Admn., AIR 1990 SC 849 where the rejection of a writ petition by the High Court on ground of delay and laches was upheld by the Supreme Court. There, acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 was sought to be challenged in the writ petition. The Supreme Court found that the delay remained unexplained. He also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in (35) Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 852 . There also it was found that there was no valid explanation for the delay and the petition was dismissed on the ground of lachcs. That was also in connection with a proceeding under the Land Acquisition Act In both the cases, even after the publication of notifications under section 4 and section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act the petitioners did not promptly file any writ petition and the Government went ahead with the acquisition proceeding. The petitioners also could not explain the delay. In our present case the picture is however different. Unlike the two cases mentioned above where by reason of their inaction the petitioners allowed the land acquisition proceeding to continue, here in our present case the delay did not contribute anything towards any positive action on the part of the Government in respect of any matter. In our present case the picture is however different. Unlike the two cases mentioned above where by reason of their inaction the petitioners allowed the land acquisition proceeding to continue, here in our present case the delay did not contribute anything towards any positive action on the part of the Government in respect of any matter. Here in the present case the Government virtually practised inaction rather than action in respect of the matter under consideration. Therefore the factual perspective between the present case on the one hand and the two others cases cited by the learned Advocate for the respondents on the other hand being totally different, the said two decisions are not applicable to the facts of the present case where, as we shall presently find, the delay has been rather explained. It was also argued by the teamed Advocate for the respondents that the petitioners were rather sitting on the fence during all this time and it was only after the decision of Mahitosh Majumdar, J. that they have filed the present writ petition. 26. As regards the delay, the petitioners have explained the same in paragraphs 16 to 25 of the writ petition and in support of that they have also enclosed various representations they made to the concerned authorities including the Minister-in-charge at different times. It will appears therefrom that the petitioner No. 1 made various representations from time to time to the authorities concerned for their absorption or employment, met the Minister-in-Charge and obtained assurance of consideration and arranged demonstration, etc. It is also claimed by the petitioners that it was because of their persuasion the Government issued the Memo No. 461/5629-45 dated 16/19th June, 1989 calling detailed report with particulars of casual workers other than casual chain-peon from the District Land and Land Reforms Officers functioning under the integrated set up of land reforms administration in West, Bengal, vide, Notification No. 727 dated 21st July, 1988, Annexures O and H to the writ application, But all these things went abortive because the respondents did not absorb or give appointment to the Tahsil-Mohurrirs. As regards the explanation the petitioners have offered for the delay in paragraphs 16 to 25 the respondents in paragraph 18 of their affidavit-in-opposition while dealing with the same only state that they do not want to make any comment over the statements at the present. As regards the explanation the petitioners have offered for the delay in paragraphs 16 to 25 the respondents in paragraph 18 of their affidavit-in-opposition while dealing with the same only state that they do not want to make any comment over the statements at the present. Therefore in their affidavit-in-opposition the respondents not only did not raise the plea of delay but also even did not try to controvert the elaborate explanation regarding the delay as offered by the petitioners in their writ petition. Be that as it may, I however find that the delay has been explained by the petitioners. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the petitioners have relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (36) Ramchandra Sankar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 295 where it has been observed that it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition and that each case must depend on its own facts. It is further observed in the said decision that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. In (37) G. P. Dopal v. Chief Secretary, Govt. of U. P., A I R 1984 SC 1527 also the Supreme Court turned down the plea of delay and laches as the Court found that the petitioners went on making representations after representations which did not yield any response, reply or relief and that the petitioners belonged to the lower echelons of service and it was not difficult to visualise that they might have found it extremely difficult to rush to the Court. In that case also the Supreme Court rather found that the delay was explained as the petitioners went on making representations after representations without any result. In that case also the Supreme Court rather found that the delay was explained as the petitioners went on making representations after representations without any result. From the decisions discussed above, the law that crystalizes is that the proposition that ordinarily delay will defeat writ petition is a proposition not of a rule of law but of a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inflexible rule that whenever there is delay there must necessarily be an order of rejection of the petition on that ground alone. The question whether the delay will defeat the writ petition rather depends on the facts and circumstances of each case; The delay will be rather inconsequential if it has been reasonably explained and no right has in the mean time accrued to others which is likely to be disturbed if the petition is entertained In the present case, as we have seen, the delay has been explained. It is also needless to mention that the question of accrual of any rights in favour of others by reason of the delay does not arise in the present case. The plea of delay as taken by the respondents at the stage of hearing is therefore overruled. 27. It was also submitted on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner No. 1 purporting to be a representative association is not, entitled to move the Court by writ petition. This argument is not tenable. Firstly, there are also other individual Tahsil-Mohurrirs who are petitioners in this writ petition. Secondly, there are also certain decisions of the Supreme Court in view of which it must be held that the association of Tahsil-Mohurrirs which the respondent No. 1 is entitled to move this Court by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for vindicating any right or claim on behalf of and common to the Tahsil-Mohurrirs. In (38) A. B. S. K. Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 298 a writ petition filed on behalf of a non-recognized association was found maintainable. That the present writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the respondent No 1, the association of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs is also evident from the decision of the Supreme Court in (39) D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 . That the present writ petition is maintainable at the instance of the respondent No 1, the association of the Tahsil-Mohurrirs is also evident from the decision of the Supreme Court in (39) D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130 . Accordingly I find that the• present writ petition is not liable to be assailed on ground of locus standi of the petitioner No.1. 28. The learned Advocate for the petitioners also advanced another line of argument that the first decision of Patitosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 has to be ignored as that is a decision per incuriam in view of the fact the several decisions of the Supreme Court regarding absorption of casual or ad hoc employees went unnoticed in the judgment of Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee J. On the subject of decision per incuriam he also referred to a Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in (40) Krishna Chandra Pallai v: Union of India, AIR 1992 Orissa 261 as well as to the decision of the Supreme Court in (41) A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531 . The learned Advocate for the petitioners also relied upon the doctrine of legitimate expectation in connection with the claim of the petitioners and referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (42) F. C. I. v. Kamdhanu Cattle Feed Industries, (1993) 1 SCC 71 . In view of my findings and decisions already recorded above I find it redundant now to embark upon a consideration of the aspects of the legitimate expectation and decision per incuriam as raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. 29. It has been pointed out by the learned Advocate for the respondents that the petitioner No. 2 in the present petition was himself a petitioner in the first writ petition which was dismissed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. (Civil Rule No. 2678(W) of 1987). He also pointed out that the names of the several other Tahsil-Mohurrirs have been included in the list of Tahsil-Mohurrirs annexed to the writ petition as Annexure-A, although those Tahsil-Mohurrirs were petitioners in the said petition. He also attracted my attention to paragraph 30 of the present writ petition where it is stated inter alia the petitioners have not moved any other Court for seeking same or identical relief or reliefs. He also attracted my attention to paragraph 30 of the present writ petition where it is stated inter alia the petitioners have not moved any other Court for seeking same or identical relief or reliefs. This is definitely a mis-statement, at least so far as the present petitioner No.2 is concerned as he was a party to the earlier writ petition as well as the other Tahsil-Mohurrirs who were parties to the said earlier writ proceeding, even if it is assumed that the Tahsil- Mohurrirs who were not parties to the said earlier writ proceeding by individual name as well as the respondent No.1 who was also not directly a party to the, said earlier writ petition were not aware of the same. In the circumstances, the present petitioner No.2 as well as the others who were parties by individual name in the said earlier writ petition arc not entitled to get any relief that may be granted in the present writ proceeding because of their non-disclosure of the fact of the earlier proceeding to which they were directly parties by individual name which fact was all through in their knowledge. 30. In paragraph-21 of the affidavit-in-reply the petitioners have sought for a direction to absorb and employ the petitioners and the Tahsil-Mohurrirs named in Annexure-A in the, regular establishment I have already mentioned that the Annexure-A to the writ petition contains a list of 1274 Tahsil-Mohurrirs on whose behalf the present representative writ petition has been filed. Since many of the persons named in that list may not be any more interested for their own reasons to be absorbed or employed in the regular establishment and since relief is being denied, for reasons discussed earlier, to, those Tahsil-Mohurrirs who were parties to the first writ petition in Civil Rule No. 2678 (W) of 1987 by name, it is hereby directed that the Tahsil-Mohnrrirs who were not directly parties by individual name in the said Civil Rule, No. 2678(w) of 1987 but, whose names are included in the list Annexure-A to the present writ petition and who. worked as Tahsil-Mohurrirs at least for five consecutive years and have the requisite educational qualification will be at liberty to apply individually, giving necessary particulars, to the respondent No. 3, the Secretary, Government of West Bengal Department of Land & Land Reforms, Writers' Buildings, Calcutta for absorption/employment in the regular establishments of the Government of West Bengal. Such individual application to the respondent No.3 shall be made within two months from this date and, the respondent No. 3 shall make arrangement for acknowledging such applications. After the expiry of the said period of two months the respondent No. 3 shall prepare a list of such applicants and thereafter the respondents including the respondent No. 3 shall prepare, without undue delay, a scheme for absorption or employment of such applicants who are entitled to the benefit of this order, in regular establishments, waiving the age bar, and shall absorb them accordingly, as early as possible, desirably within a period of 18 months from date. The other writ petitions being C. O. No. 5543(W) of 1991, C. O. No. 5500(W) of 1991, C. O. No. 7591(W) of 1991, C. O. No. 5499(W) of 1991 and C.O. No. 5544(W) of 1991 which have been separately filed by certain Tahsil-Mohurrirs claiming absorption/employment will also be governed by this order and the petitioners of the said writ petitions will also be entitled to apply for absorption/employment as directed above within two months provided they were not parties to the Civil Rule No. 2678(W) of 1987 by individual name. The petitioners of those writ petitions, who may apply for absorption/employment as directed above shall also be included in the scheme to be prepared by the respondents for absorption/employment in compliance with the direction given hereinabove. All the writ petitions stands disposed of accordingly. There will however be no order as to costs.