Y. K. Sabharwal ( 1 ) THE applicant Vijay Kumari has filed this application under Section 378 Code of Criminal Procedure seeking leave to appeal against the order of acquittal made by Shri H. P. Sharma,additional Sessions Judge,delhi. ( 2 ) THE applicant was serving as a teacher in Queen Mary School and was given a room within the premises of Victoria Girls Sr. Secondary School at 6 Rajpur Road,delhi. She claims to be a tenant. The case of the applicant is that once she went to a relation and on return she found that her room had been locked at the instance of accused Mrs. S. M. Rao, as a result of conspiracy hatched between the school management. The applicant claims that Bhullan is the maid servant who had illegally obeyed orders of Mrs. Rao and he took law in his own hand and was an accomplice with the main accused Mrs. Rao. Mrs. S. M. Rao, Bhullan and the State are respondents before us. ( 3 ) THE applicant had initially approached a civil court praying for permanent mandatory injunction including direction to Victoria Girls Sr. Secondary School to open the lock in question. Her application was dismissed by Civil Court and appeal filed against the said order was also dismissed. Thereafter, a report was lodged by her with the police. After investigation the police filed a report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. for offence under Section 341 of I. P. C. The challan was filed against Mrs. Rao and Bhullan. The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance and summoned both the accused. By Judgment dated 3rd December, 1990, Mrs. Rao was convicted but benefit of probation was given to her. Bhullan was, however, acquitted. The State did not file any appeal against the judgment of the Metropolitan Magistrate. The judgment of Metropolitan Magistrate dated 3rd December, 1990 and order of Sentence dated 9th January,1991 were challenged by Mrs. Rao before the Court of Session. The applicant also preferred TO an appeal before Court of Session against the aforesaid judgment and order inter alia contending that Bhullan was wrongly acquitted and Mrs. Rao was leniently dealt with and benefit of probation was wrongly given to her and she should have been severely punished. ( 4 ) MRS. RAO succeeded before Court of Session. The applicant also preferred TO an appeal before Court of Session against the aforesaid judgment and order inter alia contending that Bhullan was wrongly acquitted and Mrs. Rao was leniently dealt with and benefit of probation was wrongly given to her and she should have been severely punished. ( 4 ) MRS. RAO succeeded before Court of Session. The judgment and consequently the order of sentence passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate has been set-aside by Shri H. P. Sharma,leamed Additional Sessions Judge,delhi by impugned judgment dated 19th September,1992. The appeal filed by the applicant has been held to be not maintainable and has been summarily dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge. The applicant is challenging before us the correctness of the judgments passed by Additional Session Judge. ( 5 ) ON 19th November,1992 the Criminal Appeal was filed by the applicant in this Court challenging the impugned judgments passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge,delhi acquitting Mrs. Rao and dismissing the appeal of the applicant. Along with the appeal, the applicant did not file an application under Section 378 Cr. P. C. seeking grant of leave to appeal. That application (Crl. M. 29/93) seems to have been filed on or about 10th December,1992, after expiry of period of limitation. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 1 has contended that the present application is not only barred by limitation but even otherwise it is not maintainable in law. We suggested to the applicant that she should take legal assistance and we can also direct that free legal aid should be provided to her as she may not be able to understand the implications of legal points involved in the case and being urged on behalf of the respondents but the applicant refused to take any legal assistance or free legal aid and insisted that she would like to argue the petition in person. Thus inspite of requests made by us the applicant could not be persuaded to be assisted by a lawyer and we accordingly heard the petitioner and counsel for the respondents. ( 7 ) REGARDING the objection that the application has been filed after expiry of prescribed period of limitation, on facts there is no dispute. The Criminal Appeal was filed without filing any application seeking leave to appeal. The present application was later filed when period for filing the application had already expired and. ( 7 ) REGARDING the objection that the application has been filed after expiry of prescribed period of limitation, on facts there is no dispute. The Criminal Appeal was filed without filing any application seeking leave to appeal. The present application was later filed when period for filing the application had already expired and. the applicant has also not filed any application seeking condonation of delay. However, in view of peculiar facts and circumstances and the fact that the applicant is appearing in person we deem it fit not to dismiss the application only on the ground that it is barred by law of limitation and we have thus examined the other aspects of the case as well. ( 8 ) REGARDING maintainability of the application it has to be kept in view that the cognizance of the case was taken by the Magistrate on the police report. It was a State case. The State has not filed any application for leave to appeal. Under Section 378 Cr. P. C. in a State case, only the State can file the appeal. In such a case the applicant has no right to file appeal against acquital or an application seeking leave to appeal. If the applicant was aggrieved against the impugned judgments, being a State case, at best she could have filed a revision petition though the scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited. The revisional jurisdiction is exercised only in exceptional cases when there is some glaring defect in the procedure and there is manifest error on the point of law and there is flagrant miscarriage of justice. It is not necessary to examine the scope of revisional jurisdiction any further as the applicant has not preferred TO the revision petition and insists that the present application is maintainable. The applicant has no such right. (See Khetra Basi Samal and another etc. Vs. The State of Orissa etc. ,air 1970 Supreme Court 272 and Ahamadkutty Vs. Johnson and another 1989 Crl. LJ. 2462 Kerala High Court.) ( 9 ) WE have also examined the merits of the case. Even the Metropolitan Magistrate in her order convicting Mrs. Rao has held that the applicant was a trespasser in the disputed premises but Mrs. Rao was convicted holding that even a trespasser cannot be restrained from again trespassing into premises in question. LJ. 2462 Kerala High Court.) ( 9 ) WE have also examined the merits of the case. Even the Metropolitan Magistrate in her order convicting Mrs. Rao has held that the applicant was a trespasser in the disputed premises but Mrs. Rao was convicted holding that even a trespasser cannot be restrained from again trespassing into premises in question. This view of the Magistate has not found favour with learned Additional Sessions Judge. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment of Additional Sessions Judge holding that a trespasser cannot be allowed to enter the property for which even a reasonable force can be used. The applicant claims to be a tenant. The disputed premises were in a hostel. It has come in evidence and was also admitted before us by the applicant that she had received the notice dated 1st October,1982 requiring her to vacate the room provided to her in the hostel within one week. Admittedly to that notice reply dated 4th October,1982 (Exhibit D. B.) was sent by her. She has admitted in the reply that the room is in a hostel though she has stated that she has been living in the hostel for last seven years and had asked for further time to vacate the hostel room. The applicant contended that she did not know the correct procedure when she wrote. exhibit D. B. and submits that she has been a. tenant in the premises and was illegally not permitted to enter the said premises. We are unable to agree. The stand of tenancy was not even accepted by the Metropolitan Magistrate. It was also not accepted by the Court of Session. We have perused the material on record and do not find any merit in the case. There is no infirmity in the impugned judgment The application is, accordingly, dismissed.