JUDGMENT This is a petition challenging an order of the S.T.AT., reversing the order of the R.T.A in the matter of grant of a stage carriage permit against which another petition bearing No. 1319/93 (M.P.S.R.T.C. v. S.T.A.T. & Anr.) was heard alongwith this case and is being decided along with this case though by a separate order. The short point involved is whether the petitioners who had objected to the grant of permit to respondent No.3 were necessary parties to be heard in an appeal filed by respondent No.3 against the decision of R.T.A Indore before the S.T.A.T. This point has to be considered in the light of our decision in M.P. No. 730/93 and M.P .No. 969/93 wherein we have held that all those who had objected to the grant of permit before the R.T.A had to be given an opportunity of hearing· before the appellate Authority. All the three petitioners are engaged in the business of passenger Transport by opera ting stage carriages. The respondent No.3 had applied for grant of stage carriage permit for the route Dhamnod-Dhar. This application was notified by the R.T.A and objections were filed to the grant of the permit. The R.T.A after hearing the parties regarded the application for grant of permit filed by respondent No.3. Respondent No.3 filed an application against that decision before the S.T.AT. who decided the appeal without affording any opportunity to the objectors of being heard. Relying on the decision of this Court in M.P. No. 730/93 and 969/93 the petitioners contend that the order of the S.T.AT. deserves, to be set -aside and the case be remanded for a fresh decision after hearing the objection including the petitioners. It is contended on behalf of the respondent No.3 that M.P.S.R.T.C., Guljar Khan-petitioner No.2; M/s. Manchar Travels petitioner No.3 only had filed objections before the R.T.A and, therefore, petitioner No.1-Kalim Mohd. who had not filed any objection had no right to claim any hearing now. It was contended that objection of M/s. Balwant ssingh Chabda Bus Service was filed beyond time specified by the R. T.A and, therefore, no right of hearing can be claimed by that party also. It was further contended that only the objections of M.P.S.R.T.C. and Guljar Khan were upheld by the R.T.A and, therefore, at best these two parties could only be said to be affected. It was further contended that only the objections of M.P.S.R.T.C. and Guljar Khan were upheld by the R.T.A and, therefore, at best these two parties could only be said to be affected. It was further contended that the present case is distinguishable from M. P. No. 730/93 and M. P. No. 969/93 decided by this Court. The petitioners also tried to argue on the merits of the timings fixed by the lower tribunals. It is clear from our decision in M.P. No. 730/93 and M. P. No. 969/93 that while deciding those cases this Court heavily relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg v. U.O.I. ( AIR 1992 SC 443 ) wherein the reason for affording hearing to concerned persons was stated to be the necessity of some one to inform the tribunal deciding grant of permit about the condition of roads, social status of the applicant, possibility of small operators being eliminated by big operators, conditions of hilly routes, fuel availability and pollution control etc., so that the tribunals are able to decide the grant or refusal of permit on objections received. It is for this reason that we held that the rivals· in the trade, competitors would be able to assist the tribunals in this matter, by raising objections and being heard. Viewed from this angle there appears to be no dintinguishing feature in this case setting it apart from M. P. No. 730/93 and M. P. No. 969/93 decided by us. Moreover, we find that the S.T.AT., in the impugned order has granted the permit not on the timings proposed by the respondent No. 3 initially on which objections were invited and heard by the R.T.A but on different timings on which no competitor or any other interested person was ever heard. On saturated routes a small difference in timings may play havoc with the financial viability of the permit as well as public convenience. The S.T.AT. has itself relied on the decision of this Court in para 4 of its order which laid down that when the R.T.A does not find timings suggested by the applicant agreeable, it should not straightway reject the application but should give the applicant an opportunity to suggest new timings. The S.T.AT. The S.T.AT. has itself relied on the decision of this Court in para 4 of its order which laid down that when the R.T.A does not find timings suggested by the applicant agreeable, it should not straightway reject the application but should give the applicant an opportunity to suggest new timings. The S.T.AT. has found that this principle was violated by the R.T.A and, therefore, the only course would have been to send back the case to the R.T.A for giving an opportunity to the applicant to propose new timings, or the S.T.AT., could have given an opportunity to all concerned to have their say on the fresh timings proposed by the applicant/appellant or proposed by the S.T.AT. itself. It becomes all the more necessary in the circumstances of the case to provide for a hearing to all concerned. No distinction can be made in this respect amongst persons objecting to earlier or objecting within time and those who did not object or whose objections were filed beyond the time given by the R.T.A Because even if no objections were filed by party, it could be said that, that party had no objection to the timings proposed by the applicant alongwith the application. That cannot take away the right to object to fresh timings either suggested by the applicant or set out by the authority itself. For the aforesaid reasons this petition is allowed. The impugned order is set-aside. The case is sent back to the S.T.AT. with a direction to issue notice of the appeal to all the parties who had objected before the R.T.A or who being competitors on the route or who have sufficient interest in objecting to the grant of permit or to the timings, proposed to be fixed by it. Parties to appear before the S.T.AT. on 20.9.1993. There shall be no order as to costs. Security be refunded after verification. AIR 1992 SC 443 followed.