JUDGMENT AMAL KUMAR CHATTERJEE, J. 1. This is an application under s. 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (referred to as the Act for short) arising in the circumstances as under. 2. Stripped of unnecessary detail, the father of the petitioner had instituted a suit being title suit No. 44 of 1971 in the 10th Court of the Subordinate Judge at Alipore against the petitioner, his brothers and of hers for dissolution of a partnership business and accounts. This suit was subsequently transferred to the 8th Court of the Subordinate Judge where it was numbered as title suit No. 20 of 1977 and currently it is pending in the 7th Court of the Assistant District Judge as title suit No. 169 of 1987. In pursuance of a direction given by this Court on the 4th April, 1973 in Civil Rule No. 23 of 1972, the learned trial Judge by an order made on the 2nd June, 1973 appointed Sri Dwipen Dey, a legal practitioner at Alipore as the Receiver and as such he took possession of premises No. 91. Mahatma Gandhi Road within Budge Budge P.S. It is alleged that thereafter the contemners who are opposite parties No. 1 to 12 herein with full knowledge of the aforesaid order of the trial Judge and assumption of possession by the Receiver broke open the padlock of the said premises and removed valuable articles and books of accounts and let it out to different persons who also figure as contemners. The instant application has been filed for issuing a Rule of Contempt for interference with the possession of the Receiver. 3. The application as already noted purports to be one under s. 2(C) of the Act filed in the Criminal Special Jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 3 of the rules framed under the Act. Thus on the face of it, the contention of the petitioner is that the contemners are guilty of criminal contempt but no consent in writing of the Advocate-General is forthcoming which is required for taking cognizance according to the provision of s. 15(1)(b) of the Act. Thus on the face of it, the contention of the petitioner is that the contemners are guilty of criminal contempt but no consent in writing of the Advocate-General is forthcoming which is required for taking cognizance according to the provision of s. 15(1)(b) of the Act. The record reveals that the learned Advocate-General was moved for necessary consent but he took the view that in the circumstances of the case, the application for criminal Contempt should have been made to the subordinate Court concerned under s. 15(2) of the Act for making a reference to this Court. We are not to sit in judgment whether the consent was withheld by the learned Advocate General rightly or wrongly but the hard fact remains that the consent as envisaged in S. 15(1)(b) of the Act is lacking. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has, however, contended that the power to punish for contempt of a Subordinate Court bas been vested in the High Court under s. 10 of the Act and, therefore, this Court is quite competent to issue a contempt rule in the instant case even though the consent of the Advocate-General is not available. This argument is liable to be rejected at once as s. 10 of the Act only empowers this Court to punish for contempt of a Subordinate Court while s. 15 of the Act lays down the procedure to be followed for initiating a contempt proceeding in a case like the instant one. If really, this Court could proceed to punish for contempt of a Subordinate Court on the basis of s. 10 alone, there was no necessity of incorporating a provision requiring the consent in writing of the Advocate-General in case of a motion made by person other than those mentioned in Ss. 15(1)(a) and 15(1)(c) of the Act. Therefore, no cognizance of the criminal contempt of a Subordinate Court alleged to have been committed by the contemners can be taken on the application before us. 4. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has tried to overcome this difficulty by stating that although the application purports to be one for criminal contempt in substance the contumacious conduct constitutes a civil contempt and the instant application can be entertained without any consent of the Advocate-General. This takes us to the question of distinction between a civil and a criminal contempt which though fine is well defined. This takes us to the question of distinction between a civil and a criminal contempt which though fine is well defined. Civil contempt has been defined in the Act itself as willful disobedience to any judgment, decree etc., of a Court or a willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court while criminal contempt means, inter alia, the doing of any act which interferes with or obstructs or tends to interfere with or obstructs the administration of justice. The allegations in the application under consideration as already noted are that the Receiver who had assumed possession of a premises has been dispossessed which was let out to certain persons and some articles were also removed. This is neither a case of disobedience to any judgment decree etc. of a Court nor a case willful breach of an undertaking given to it. A Receiver is an Officer of the Court and the possession of the Receiver is that of the Court and an the goods which the Receiver is put in charge are in custodia legis. As the Court jealously guards the possession of its officer, any interference thereto must be regarded as an interference with the administration of justice dearly falling within the s. 2(c)(iii) of the Act. In other words, whoever interferes with the possession of a Receiver is guilty of criminal contempt. 5. In an old case, Kilachand Devchand & Company vs. Ayodhyaprasad Sukhanand & others, AIR 1934 Bombay 425, Bombay High Court had taken the view that interference with the property in the hands of a Receiver constitutes contempt of a criminal nature and this was quoted with approval by a Division Bench of this Court in Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. vs. S.P. Majoo & others, 68 CWN 693. These decisions were given before the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 was placed on the Statute Book and the former, even before any legislative grant on the subject but still the decisions are quite relevant as there are observations to the effect that taking management of property out of the hands of the Receiver amounts to obstructing the administration of justice. In Jaiprokash vs. Ramsarup, AIR 1958 Punjab 478, also it has been said that the Court appointing a Receiver must be left untrammelled in its administration of property for otherwise orderly administration of justice cannot proceed. In Jaiprokash vs. Ramsarup, AIR 1958 Punjab 478, also it has been said that the Court appointing a Receiver must be left untrammelled in its administration of property for otherwise orderly administration of justice cannot proceed. Since under the Act any act which obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt, there is least difficulty in holding that interference with the possession of property in the hands of a Receiver constitutes contempt of a criminal nature. 6. For reasons indicated above, we hold that the alleged contempt being one of criminal nature, no cognizance can be taken by this Court on the motion made by the present petitioner without the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. The motion is rejected. I agree. Motion rejected.