C. L. CHAUDHRY ( 1 ) THE respondent/landlady filed a petition for eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question invoking provisions of Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Act ). The case of the respondent was that she was a widow and the premises let out by her were required by her for her own residence. By the impugned order dated 5th September, 1992 the Additional Rent Controller allowed the petition and passed an order of eviction against the petitioner under Section 14-D of the Act. The petitioner has approached this Court by invoking the provisions of Section 25-B (8) of the Act by filing this revision petition. ( 2 ) THIS petition is contested on behalf of the respondent. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Section 25-B (8) of the Act provides that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit. ( 3 ) IN the case ofhelper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadra and others reported as AIR 1987 SC 1782 , the Supreme Court dealt with the question of revisional powers of the High Court under Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act. Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act is pari materia with Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was observed by the Supreme Court as under:- "we must take note of a decision in the case of Kasturbhai Ramchand Panchal and Brothers v. Firm of Mohanlal Nathubhai, AIR 1969 Guj 110 upon which the High Court had placed great reliance in the judgment under appeal. There the learned Judge relying on S. 29 (2) of the said Act held that the revisional power with which the High Court was vested under S. 29 (2) was not merely in the nature of jurisdictional control. It extended to corrections of all errors which would make the decision contrary to law. The legislature, the learned Judge felt, further empowered High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to pass such order with respect thereto as it thought fit. It extended to corrections of all errors which would make the decision contrary to law. The legislature, the learned Judge felt, further empowered High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to pass such order with respect thereto as it thought fit. The power according to the learned Judge was of the widest amplitude to pass such orders as the Court thought fit in order to complete justice. He dealt with the human problem under Section 13 (2) of Bombay Rent Act considering the relative hardships of the landlord and the tenant and to arrive at a just solution he was of the opinion that the court should have such wide field. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to correct all errors of law going to the root of the decision which would, in such cases, include even perverse findings of facts, preverse in the sense that no reasonable person, acting judicially and properly instructed in the relevant law could arrive at such a finding on the evidence on the record. In this view in our opinion the ambit of the power was expressed in rather wide amplitude. As we read the power, the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived at taking all material and relevant facts in mind. It must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. We must, however, guard ourselves against permitting in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view. If a possible view has been taken, the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction to substitute its own view with that of the courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant. Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction. " ( 4 ) THE first contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Controller was not right in holding that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Judged by that standard, we are of the opinion that the High Court in this case had exceeded its jurisdiction. " ( 4 ) THE first contention raised by the counsel for the petitioner is that the Rent Controller was not right in holding that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The trial court did not appreciate the evidence produced by the parties in a proper perspective. I have gone through the impugned judgment as well as the record of this case. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not well founded. The trial court properly appreciated and considered the matter placed on the record; I" find no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller. ( 5 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter. The landlady filed a suit for recovery of arrears of electricity and water charges against the petitioner in the Court of Judge, Small Cause. The suit was contested by the petitioner inter alia on the ground that the respondent/landlady has no locus standi to file the suit. However, during the course of the arguments in that suit, the petitioner did not challenge the stand of the respondent for filing the suit. The suit was decreed. In view of this, I have no hesitation in holding that the decision of the learned Trial Court is correct and according to law. ( 6 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the landlady did not bona fide require the premises for her own use. I have gone through the finding of the trial court on this point. The trial court held that the respondent/landlady was residing with her son in a DDA flat owned by her son. The flat is comprised of only two bed-rooms besides a living room. The trial court also observed that issueless widow sister of the respondent was also residing in the flat. Besides the respondent and her widow sister, the son of the petitioner is having seven family members i. e. son himself, his wife and five grown up children. It is also in evidence that the children are pursuing higher studies and one of his son is a practising advocate. The trial court held that there was no sufficient accommodation in the flat of her son where she could live comfortably. It is also in evidence that the children are pursuing higher studies and one of his son is a practising advocate. The trial court held that there was no sufficient accommodation in the flat of her son where she could live comfortably. ( 7 ) IN my considered opinion there is no space in the DDA flat where landlady can live comfortably. She wants to shift to the premises in question alongwith her widow sister. The need of the landlady seems to be genuine and bona fide. It has also been observed by the trial court that the petitioner is hale and hearty and would feel no difficulty in climbing stairs to the second floor. It has also been observed by the trial court that the ground floor of the premises is not available to the petitioner. The Rent Controller, after taking into consideration all the relevant and material facts, arrived at a conclusion that the need of the landlady was genuine and bonafide. The finding is purely a finding of fact and is based on the material placed on record by the parties. In my opinion the order does not suffer from any legal infirmity. The revision petition filed by the petitioner is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. However, the petitioner is given two months time to vacate the premises.