Judgment :- K.A.Swami, CJ. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 8. 1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P.No. 14364 of 1993. The petitioner/ appellant sought for quashing the order dated 11. 1992 bearing S.M.R.1/92 passed by the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (Admn.) Department, on the ground that the Commissioner has passed the aforesaid order in exercise of his suo motu powers after a lapse of 10 years from the date of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Learned single Judge has rejected the contention of the petitioner that the exercise of suo motu power by the Commissioner is arbitrary and he should not have exercised it after a lapse of 10 years. Learned single Judge has held that there is no time limit prescribed by Sec.69(2) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and as such, it cannot be said that the Commissioner has acted without jurisdiction in exercise of suo motu jurisdiction under Sec.69(2) of the Act. It has also been pointed out by the learned single Judge that the matter has now been remanded without any condition, and the Deputy Commissioner has been directed to render a fresh finding as to whether the petitioner can be recognised as a hereditary trustee, no harm or prejudice can be held to have been caused to the petitioner/ appellant by reason of the order passed by the Commissioner. Accordingly, Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition. Hence, the petitioner has come up in appeal. 2. It is contended before us that the Deputy Commissioner passed an order on 9. 1983 on taking into consideration several documents and the oral evidence adduced in the case and recognised the petitioner/ appellant as the hereditary trustee of the Temple in question, that no person aggrieved by the order of the Deputy commissioner preferred an appeal against the order dated 9. 1982, that after a lapse of 9 years, the Commissioner has chosen to exercise power of Revision suo motu under Sec.69(2) of the Act and has passed an order on 11. 1993, that it is not permissible for the Commissioner to exercise the power of revision suo motu after a lapse of 10 years. 1982, that after a lapse of 9 years, the Commissioner has chosen to exercise power of Revision suo motu under Sec.69(2) of the Act and has passed an order on 11. 1993, that it is not permissible for the Commissioner to exercise the power of revision suo motu after a lapse of 10 years. In support of the last contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India, (1976)37 S.T.C. 425. 3. The suo motu proceedings were started by the Commissioner on 13. 1992. He issued a notice to the petitioner/ appellant and afforded him an opportunity and considered all the contentions urged before him. In the course of the order dated 11. 1993, the Commissioner has pointed out the deficiencies in the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The grounds stated by the Commissioner for exercising the suo motu power in his order are as follows: “(i) The 7th respondent herein was never holding office as hereditary trustee within the meaning of Sec.6(ii) of the Act. (ii) The 7th respondent herein was only a servant of the temple and was also writing accounts and his father Ayyam perumal was never trustee in the institution in question. (iii) The 7th respondent herein did not file the agreement dated 12. 1921 between the then trustees of the temple in the year with that of the poojari of the temple. That the document dated 12. 1921 filed in this case clearly indicates that in the year 1921, the 7th respondent’s family was not in management as trustees in the temple much less as hereditary trustees so as to attract Secs.6(2) and 63(b) of the Act. .(iv) The Deputy Commissioner without properly analysing Exs.A-1 to A-16 had erroneously granted the declaration. The petitioner/ 7th respondent herein has not established the management of his family for the last 3 generations in an unbroken line of succession from father to son. .(v) The Deputy Commissioner has failed to see that the budget sanction orders produced as exhibits in this case no doubt related to the temple sincc the 7th respondent has come into possession as a person writing accounts of the temple in question. .(v) The Deputy Commissioner has failed to see that the budget sanction orders produced as exhibits in this case no doubt related to the temple sincc the 7th respondent has come into possession as a person writing accounts of the temple in question. .(vi) So also, as an accountant of the temple, the 7th respondent was in possession of contribution receipts which he has filed as documents in that case and obtained the declaration. (vii) The Deputy Commissioner has failed to see that the agreement dated 3. 1915 etc., filed as Exs.A-1 to A-ll do not relate to the institution in question.” Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the Commissioner has arbitrarily exercised the suo motu power. He has given full opportunity to the petitioner/ appellant and has also given the reasons for interfering with the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The matter relates to a temple. The question is as to whether the petitioner/ appellant should be recognised as a hereditary trustee or not. In the scheme of the act, the hereditary trustee of a temple plays an important role. Therefore, one of the objects of the Act is to ensure that hereditary trustees are recognised only on due inquiry and based upon proper and acceptable evidence. In addition to this, in order to ensure that the right of a person claiming to be a hereditary trustee is not easily taken away, a right to suit has also been given against the order of the Commissioner passed under Sec.69(2) of the Act. Therefore, it is open to the petitioner/ appellant even now to file a suit to establish that he is a hereditary trustee of the Temple/or else to appear before the Deputy Commissioner and establish that he is hereditary trustee. Therefore, there are two courses open to the appellant/ petitioner. As such, it cannot be held that the right of the appellant to establish that he is hereditary trustee, has been taken away by he order passed by the Commissioner. 4. The next question for consideration is as to whether the Commissioner can be held to have acted without jurisdiction in exercising power of revision suo motu after a lapse of 9 years. As already pointed out, the Deputy Commissioner passed the order on 9. 1983. 4. The next question for consideration is as to whether the Commissioner can be held to have acted without jurisdiction in exercising power of revision suo motu after a lapse of 9 years. As already pointed out, the Deputy Commissioner passed the order on 9. 1983. There is no material placed before us that the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner was either published or served upon the parties concerned. Sec.69(l) says that the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal against the order of the Deputy Commissioner within 60 days from the date of the publication of the order or of the receipt thereof by him. In the absence of any such material placed before us, it is not possible to presume that the other persons had come to know of this order. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the aggrieved persons were entitled to preferan appeal under Sec.66(l) within 60 days to the Commissioner and as they have failed to prefer an appeal, the Commissioner could not have exercised suo motu, the revisional jurisdiction is without merit. 5. Now, the question is whether the Commissioner could have exercised the revisional power. Sec.69(2) reads thus: “Any order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of which no appeal has been preferred within the period specified in Sub-sec(l) may be revised by the Commissioner suo motu and the Commissioner may call for and examine the records of the proceedings to satisfy himself as to the regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Any such order passed by the Commissioner in respect of an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner shall be deemed to have been passed by the Commissioner on an appeal referred to him under Sub-sec(l).” It does not prescribe any period of limitation. The statute has purposely not prescribed the period of limitation in order to ensure that if the original authority commits any mistake in the matter of passing an order which touches the public interest, because the temples under the Act are open to general public as such the public are entitled to visit, such mistake can be corrected by the Revisional authority i.e. the Commissioner. No doubt, the statute does not prescribe any time limit for exercising.suo motu power, but,nevertheless, the Commissioner is expected to exercise the suo motu power within a reasonable time. The question as to in a given case whether revisional jurisdiction has to be exercised suo motu within a reasonable time, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In fact, the very decision relied on by the learned counsel for theappel-lant in Gurbaksh Singh v. Union of India, (1976)37 S.T.C. 425 slates thus: “What is a reasonable time, however, will depend upon the facts of each case.” As far as the facts of this case are concerned,the various grounds enumerated by the Commissioner for exercising the suo motu revisional jurisdiction would go to show that he is justified in exercising the suo motu power. The grounds we have already reproduced. However, it is contended before us that the Deputy Commissioner has also passed a well considered order and therefore, there was no reason for the Commissioner to interferre with it. The Commissioner has pointed out, how the Deputy Commissioner has erred in the matter. We do not consider it necessary to go into this question, because the matter has now been remitted to the Deputy Commissioner for fresh consideration. Any observation made by us in this regard is likely to affect the interests of the petitioner/ appellant. Hence, we refrain from going into the merits of the case. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner is justified and has acted properly in suo motu exercising the power of revision. 6. Lastly, it is contended that if the order of the Commissioner passed after a lapse of 9 years is allowed to remain and is approved, the Commissioner will take up each and every case and exercise suo motu the power of revision even after a lapse of considerable time. We have not stated that it is open to the Commissioner to exercise the suo motu power in every case after a lapse of considerable time. The exercise of revisional power suo motu after a lapse of considerable time is reasonable and proper would depend upon the fact and circumstances of each case. As such no criteria or timelimit for suomotu exercise of revisional jurisdiction can be laid down. The exercise of revisional power suo motu after a lapse of considerable time is reasonable and proper would depend upon the fact and circumstances of each case. As such no criteria or timelimit for suomotu exercise of revisional jurisdiction can be laid down. Every such case has to be judged on the facts and circumstances of each such case. 7. For the reasons stated above, we see no ground to admit the appeal. It is accordingly rejected.