Judgment : The tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), who is respondent in R.C.O.P.No.3598 of 1985 filed by the 1st respondent-Original landlord for eviction is the revision petitioner. Respondents 2 and 3 herein are subsequent purchasers of the same building from the 1st respondent. 2. In the abovesaid rent control original petition, the petitioner herein was set ex parte by order dated 22. 1986 and so he filed M.P.No.245 of 1986 to set aside the said order. No doubt in the said miscellaneous petition, an endorsement was made by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent on 23. 1986 as follows: "The respondent Mathuram Perumal is not filing any counter. Petition may be allowed and the main RCOP may be posted in the list, as the arrears of rent accumulates further". 3. However, the Rent Controller has allowed the said miscellaneous petition only on condition that the 1st respondent pays a sum of Rs.25 on or before 4. 1986. The said conditional order was passed on 20.3.1986 and the order runs as follows: "In view of the endorsement of the other side counsel the petition will be allowed on payment of Rs.25 on or before 4. 1986 failing which the petition will be dismissed. Call on 4. 1986". Thus, even here it may be noted that even though as per the endorsement the petition may be allowed without stipulating anything regarding payment of costs, the learned Rent Controller has only passed a conditional order stipulating that Rs.25 has to be paid before the stipulated date as condition for allowing the said petition. 4. Then on 4. 1986 the miscellaneous petition was called and since the said sum of Rs.25 was not paid by then, the consequential order of dismissal of the said petition was passed. .5. The petitioner has subsequently filed R.C.A.No.498 of 1986 as against the abovesaid dismissal order dated 4. 1986 only, and not against the initial conditional order dated 20.3.1986. The said rent control appeal was dismissed and so the petitioner has filed this revision petition. 6. Now, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that the civil revision petition itself is not maintainable since the abovesaid rent control appeal itself is not maintainable against the order dated 4. 1986 only, and not against the initial conditional order dated 20.3.1986. The said rent control appeal was dismissed and so the petitioner has filed this revision petition. 6. Now, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that the civil revision petition itself is not maintainable since the abovesaid rent control appeal itself is not maintainable against the order dated 4. 1986, since, if at all a rent control appeal could be filed only against the order dated 20.3.1986. But, the learned counsel for the petitioner contends that pursuant to Sec.23 of the Act, every order is appeal-able and the order dated 4. 1986 also affects the rights of the petitioner and hence it is appealable. No doubt he also points out on the merits of the case that the Appellate Authority wrongly stated that the abovesaid endorsement was made with a stipulation regarding payment of cost, though actually it is not so. No doubt this latter contention of the said counsel on merits, is correct the endorsement does not at all stipulate payment of cost. 7. But only if the abovesaid rent control appeal and, consequently, the present civil revision petition are maintainable, the petitioner could go into the merits of this civil revision petition. So, the first point to be considered is whether the rent control appeal and the civil revision petition are maintainable at all. If the rent control appeal is not maintainable, consequently, the civil revision petition is also not maintainable. .8. So, let me now see whether the rent control appeal is maintainable. In Ramayya v. Laksh-mayya, (1944)1 M.L.J. 381.A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 383: I.L.R 1945 Mad. 203: 57 L.W. 292:1944 M.W.N. 296, a Division Bench of this Court has held in the context of O.9. Rule 13, C.P.C., that where a conditional order allowing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree is passed on a particular date and on the applicant’s failure to fulfil the condition, consequently, an order later on, is passed dismissing the application, actually there is only one order in law, though the court might have chosen to pass a formal consequential order after the non-fulfilment of the condition stipulated in the original conditional order. Therefore, the Division Bench held that only the original order is appealable. Therefore, the Division Bench held that only the original order is appealable. In this connection, the relevant observation of the Division Bench is as follows: ."But in my view, no further order was passed at all and the reason, as I have indicated it that no further order was required“. This decision has also been followed in Balarama Reddy v. Subbarama Reddi, (1953)1 M.L.J. 40 : A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 360:8 D.L.R. (Mad.) 199:1952 M.W.N. 953 and I have also followed the above said decision in my judgment dated 27. 1993 in Nachiar Theatre, Thirupartur by Sakunthalai Rajan v. Ml s..Sheik Iron Centre, Madurai by partner ASadhakkathullah, C.M.A.No.596 of 1993. 9. But the learned counsel for the petitioner strongly contends that those decisions arose under O.9. Rule 13, C.P.C. and they would not apply to the present proceeding under the Act. In this connection, he draws my attention to Sec.23(l)(b) of the Act, which provides for appeal to the Appellate Authority under the said Act. It no doubt says” any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may....prefer an appeal.....to the appel- late authority having jurisdiction. He lays emphasis on the words “an order” and contends that even theabovesaid order dated 4. 1986 is an order and hence an appeal would lie against the said order also. In this connection, the learned counsel also relies on Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, AIR. 1967 S.C. 799: (1967)1 S.C.W.R. 316: (1967)1 S.C.R. 310 : (1967)2 S.C.J. 826, which also arose under the corresponding Rent Control Act of Delhi. Further, he also relies on Appulu v. Fatima Zohra, (1982)2 M.L.J. 340 , to contend that if any party’s right is affected by any order, it is appealable. He also relies on the decisions in Venkat-achary v. Parthasarathy, (1980)2 M.L.J. 243 and Hyath Basha v. Tajan Bi, (1983)1 M.L.J. 277 : A.I.R 1983 Mad. 328:96 L. W. 85: (1983) 1 Rent. L. R. 594: (1983)1 Rent.C.R. 577: (1983) Rent.C.J. 338. 10. Now, so far as what is contained in Scc.23(l)(b) of the Act, though the term ‘an order’ is used therein, in the light of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ramayya v. Lakshmayya, (1944)1 M.L.J. 381, the order dated 4. 1986 is not actually an order in law. L. R. 594: (1983)1 Rent.C.R. 577: (1983) Rent.C.J. 338. 10. Now, so far as what is contained in Scc.23(l)(b) of the Act, though the term ‘an order’ is used therein, in the light of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ramayya v. Lakshmayya, (1944)1 M.L.J. 381, the order dated 4. 1986 is not actually an order in law. As already pointed out, the Division Bench says that the first order was the only order in the case and the second order was nothing more than recording of the legal position which had arisen from the non-fulfilment of the condition precedent by the petitioners and that the second order was not any further order, because no further order was required in the case. The same principle would apply even in the present case, which no doubt, arises under the Act. The principle being something fundamental, it would also equally apply to similar ‘second’ orders passed under the Act also. ‘ 11. In Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799: (1967)1 S.C.W.R. 316: (1967)1 S.C.R. 310 : (1967)2 S.C.J. 826, the facts were different. There, the question was whether an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal. Thus, the facts are different in that case. There was no first conditional order and a second consequential order, there, as in the present case. That apart, the Supreme Court, in the said case, has made the following observation: “In the context of Sec.38(l) (the above referred to Delhi Rent Control Act) the words ‘every order of the Controller made under this Act’ though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties”. In the present case, the order dated 4. 1986 does not make any new inroad into the rights and liabilities of the parties. It is only a formal order flowing automatically from the earlier order. Actually, it is only the earlier order dated 23. 1986 which affects the rights and liabilities of the parties. No doubt, the said order allows M.P.No.245 of 1986 on condition. If that condition is not fulfilled, then automatically, the miscellaneous petition gets dismissed and in such a situation an appeal could lie against the conditional order dated 20.3.1986 only. Actually, it is only the earlier order dated 23. 1986 which affects the rights and liabilities of the parties. No doubt, the said order allows M.P.No.245 of 1986 on condition. If that condition is not fulfilled, then automatically, the miscellaneous petition gets dismissed and in such a situation an appeal could lie against the conditional order dated 20.3.1986 only. Therefore, it is clear that the abovesaid rent control appeal itself is not maintainable. Even in Appulu v. Fatima Zohra, (1982)2 M.L.J. 340 , it has only been held that if one’s right is affected by any order, then it is an appealable order. Here, the rights of the petitioner are affected only by order dated 20.3.1986 and no further inroad into his right has been made anew by the latter order dated 4. 1986. If that is so, the present civil revision petition is also not maintainable. 12. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. The learned counsel for the petitioner requests time to vacate. Three months’ time is granted to the petitioner provided the petitioner files an affidavit within a week from to-day, undertaking to vacate the building positively within three months.