ORDER 1. The subject matter of challenge in this writ application is an order of requisition passed by the Collector, Howrah under S. 3(1) or the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). By the aforesaid order of requisition, premises no. 10/5, Bibi Bagan Lane, Salkia, Howrah (hereinafter referred to as the premises) has been requisitioned by the Collector in the exercise of his power under S. 3(1) of the Act. 2. The writ petitioner no.1 claims to be a tenant of the aforesaid premises which consists of land measuring about more or less 30 cottahs on which there were office building, several quarters, six godowns, three factory sheds and a Shiva temple. According to the writ petitioners, they constructed the aforesaid buildings, godowns, factory sheds and the temple since their occupation of the said premises. The order of requisition, which is now under challenge in this writ application, runs as follows:- "Whereas in my opinion, it is necessary for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community/or provide proper facilities for transport/communication, viz. for land for rehabilitation in connection with the construction of flyover at the crossing of G.T. Road (North), Salkia, Howrah." 3. Challenging the aforesaid order of requisition Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners, made several submissions. Firstly, it has been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that as the premises has been requisitioned for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community and or for providing proper facilities for transport/communication, it cannot be said that the said purpose is in any way connected with the rehabilitation in connection with construction of flyover at the crossing of Grant Trunk Road (North), Salkia, Howrah (hereinafter referred to as G.T. Road). In other words, Mr. Chatterjee has sought to argue that the said premises cannot be requisitioned for rehabilitation of persons, who have been evicted from their places of business for construction of flyover at G.T. Road, as, for such rehabilitation, which is not the specified purpose mentioned in S. 3(1) of the Act, the power under S. 3(1) of the Act cannot be invoked. According to Mr. Chatterjee, therefore, it is beyond the scope and ambit of the power of the State Government under S. 3(1) of the Act. According to Mr. Chatterjee, therefore, it is beyond the scope and ambit of the power of the State Government under S. 3(1) of the Act. He has further submitted that it is one thing to say that the premises is required for the purpose of construction of flyover at the G.T. Road and it is totally different thing to say that for rehabilitation of persons who have been evicted from their places of business for construction of flyover, the premises is requisitioned by the State Government in exercise of power conferred upon it under S. 3(1) of the Act. Mr. Chatterjee has further submitted that when S. 3(1) of the Act clearly lays down the specific purposes for which a premises can be requisitioned, it is not open to the State Government to exercise such power under S. 3(1) of the Act to requisition the premises which is not at all connected with the purposes specified in S. 3(1) of the Act. In support of this contention, Mr. Chatterjee has first relied on a Single Bench decision of this Court reported in Sailendra Nath Roy vs. State of West Bengal & other, 1982(2) CLJ 142. Mr. Chatterjee, relying on paragraphs 8 and 11 of the said decision has sought to argue that the purpose for which the premises has been requisitioned cannot come within the ambit of the specific purposes viz. maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community and/or for providing proper facilities for transport and communication. D.K. Sen, J., (as His Lordship then was) in the said decision, held that the settlement of displaced small traders could not be said to have any connection with or incidental to either of the aforesaid purposes. Mr. Chatterjee next relied on the decision reported in Bhinashar Finance Pvt. Ltd. & another vs. State of West Bengal & other, 1992 (1) CLJ 222 . In that decision Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee J., has held that a premises cannot be requisitioned under this Act for rehabilitation of evicted families due to acquisition of their premises for the purpose of extension of Ram Krishna Mission Seva Pratisthan. In that decision Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee J., has held that a premises cannot be requisitioned under this Act for rehabilitation of evicted families due to acquisition of their premises for the purpose of extension of Ram Krishna Mission Seva Pratisthan. According to Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee J., under the Scheme of the Act, a property can be requisitioned for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community if it transpires that a minimum expansion of hospital is necessary and if it is very urgent, in that case the State Government has the jurisdiction to requisition the property in exercise of power conferred upon it under S. 3(1) of the Act inasmuch as the establishment and expansion of a hospital certainly amounts to services which are essential to the life of the community. It is true that Bhagabati Prasad Banerjee J., in the said decision, has held that the power under S. 3(1) of the Act cannot be invoked for the purpose of rehabilitation of persons who have been evicted because of requisition of their properties which were required for the purpose of extension of Ramkrishna Mission Seva Pratisthan. 4. The next decision which was relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee in support of this contention is the decision reported in Remington Rand of India Ltd. vs. Howrah Mills Ltd. & other, 1991 (2) CHN 249. In that decision, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the requisition of a premises for continuation of employment opportunity for the employees of a company does not come within the meaning of increasing employment opportunity as envisaged in S. 3(1) of the Act. The Division Bench has held in that case that the power under S. 3(1) of the Act can only be exercised by creation of something new and not by maintaining status quo. So far as the decision reported in Sandeep Kumar Bhakat & other vs. State of West Bengal & other, 1992 (2) CLJ 267 , which has also been relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee in support of this contention, is concerned, the said decision has now been overruled by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court passed in appeals, being F.M.A.T. Nos. 2610 with 2619 of 1992 and F.M.A.T. Nos. 3347-48 of 1992. Chatterjee in support of this contention, is concerned, the said decision has now been overruled by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court passed in appeals, being F.M.A.T. Nos. 2610 with 2619 of 1992 and F.M.A.T. Nos. 3347-48 of 1992. Sriniketan Santiniketan Development Authority & another vs. Sandip Kumar Bhakat & other, unreported decision of Division Bench disposed of on 19.1.1993 in F.M.A.T. Nos. 2610 with 2619 of 1992, which were preferred against the aforesaid Single Bench decision of this Court. Lastly, another Single Bench decision of this Court, reported in Tarak Nath Sen vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, 1983 (1) CLJ 371, has also been relied upon by Mr. Chatterjee in support of his contention on the point in hand. 5. Mr. Sarkar, appearing on behalf of the Howrah Municipal Corporation, has seriously contested the aforesaid submissions made by Mr. Chatterjee. Mr. Sarkar has submitted that a premises can be requisitioned in exercise of power conferred under S. 3(1) of the Act by the State Government for rehabilitation of persons who have been evicted from their places of business as the said purpose would certainly come within the specified purpose mentioned in S. 3(1) of the Act. According to Mr. Sarkar, the said purpose would come within the meaning of or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto as mentioned in S. 3(1) of the Act. 6. Mrs. Gupta, appearing for the State of West Bengal, has adopted the argument of Mr. Sarkar on this point. 7. After hearing the learned Advocates, appearing for the respective parties and after giving my serious considerations to the submissions made on behalf of the parties, I am of the view that the submission made on this point by Mr. Chatterjee cannot be accepted in view of a later unreported decision of this Court State of West Bengal vs. Shefali Naskar & other, unreported decision of Division Bench in F.M.A.T. No. 3292-94 of 1991 disposed of on 4.8.1992, wherein A.M. Bhattacharjee, C.J., speaking for the Division Bench, has observed the following:- "A learned Single Judge of this Court has, however, held in Sailendra Nath Roy vs. State of West Bengal & other, AIR 1980 Cal 13 , that it would not. It has been ruled that settlement of persons displaced as a result of some other acquisition is not a purpose incidental to such acquisition. It has been ruled that settlement of persons displaced as a result of some other acquisition is not a purpose incidental to such acquisition. With respect, we are unable to agree with broad sweep of this observation. Lands for the construction of Belghoria Express Way were undisputedly acquired for providing proper transport and communication facilities and as we have seen, that is a purpose expressly specified in S. 3 of the Act. If the State Government now proposes to requisition/acquire lands to rehabilitate persons displaced as a result of such earlier acquisition, that would obviously be a purpose connected with the earlier acquisition and, therefore, connected therewith within the meaning of that expression as used in S. 3. In State of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Pista Devi, AIR 1986 SC 2025 , the Supreme Court referred to S. 2 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 providing for resettlement of persons living or carrying on business or other activities on the lands acquired and has observed that the above provision contains a wholesome principle which should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country. But even then, however laudable the purpose may be, a requisition/ acquisition under the West Bengal Act of 1948 can be sustained only if the purpose is one specified in S. 3 of the Act, extracted hereinabove. As already indicated, the purpose of the present requisition is such a one, being connected with the purpose for providing proper facilities for transport and communication. If the present requisition has become necessary because of the earlier acquisition for providing proper transport facilities and the consequential displacement of the persons occupying the land, then we would require stronger reasons than those mentioned in Sailendra Nath Roy (supra) to hold that the former is in no way connected with the latter or is not consequential or incidental to the latter. The words or for purposes connected therewith or incidental thereto have been inserted in S. 3 of the Act by the Amendment Act of 1973 and as the Statements of Objects and Reasons accompanying the relevant Bill would show, the amendment had the object of widening the scope for requisition and acquisition of land by including purposes connected with or incidental to the purposes for which land could be requisitioned. We accordingly, answer the first question in the affirmative regretting our inability to agree with the learned Single Judge in Sailendra Nath Roy (supra) and with the learned trial Judge in these cases." 8. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench of this Court, I am unable to follow the Single Bench decisions of this Court referred to by Mr. Chatterjee and therefore, it is not possible for me to hold that the order of requisition is bad because the purpose for which the premises has been requisitioned cannot come within the purview of S. 3(1) of the Act. 9. So far as the Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in Remington Rand of India Ltd. vs. Howrah Mills Ltd. & other, 1991 (2) CHN 249, is concerned, the facts of that case is clearly different to that of the present case. In that decision, as noted hereinabove, the premises was requisitioned in the exercise of power under S. 3(1) of the Act for the purpose of increasing employment opportunity. It was held in the facts of the case that when the legislature spoke of increasing and not maintaining employment opportunity by establishing industrial or commercial estates, it means that such increase was to he done by bringing into existence estates. In other words, the Division Bench held in the facts of that case that the power under the above clause, could be exercised through creation of something new and not by maintaining status quo. 10. It was next contended by Mr. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, that the order of requisition was not served upon the writ petitioner no.1, who claims to be a tenant of the said premises, under S. 3(2) of the Act. In support of non-service of the order of requisition under S. 3(2) of the Act, Mr. Chatterjee, relied on the decisions reported in Syed Fateyab Ali Meerza vs. Union of India, 1989 (1) CHN 280 , Bhinashar Finance Pvt. Ltd. & another vs. State of West Bengal & other, 1992 (1) CLJ 222 , Dipak Ghosh & other vs. The State of West Bengal & other, 1992 (1) CLJ 205 and Tarak Nath Sen vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, 1983 (1) CLJ 371. 11. Mr. Sarkar and Mrs. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the respective respondents, however, contested the aforesaid submission of Mr. 11. Mr. Sarkar and Mrs. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the respective respondents, however, contested the aforesaid submission of Mr. Chatterjee and contended that the order of requisition was duly served upon the writ petitioners is accordance with S. 3(2) of the Act which would be evident from the averments made in the writ application itself. It is on record that prior to moving of this writ application, another writ application has been moved by the writ petitioners wherein non-service of order of requisition has been taken as a ground for setting aside and/or quashing of the order of requisition. The said writ application had been taken up for hearing along with this writ application. The earlier writ application was assigned to P.K. Mukherjee J., and the said writ application was moved before P.K. Mukherjee J., in his residence and an ad-interim order of injunction, inter alia, restraining the respondents from taking possession of the premises or any part thereof without serving any formal order of requisition, in accordance with law, was passed. A copy of the order, passed by P.K. Mukherjee J., has been annexed as Annexure 'A' to this writ application. In paragraph 9 of this writ application, the petitioners have stated as follows:- "That the petitioners state that after receiving the plain copy of the aforesaid order your petitioners went to the suit premises whereby that time demolition work had already been started by the respondent authority in presence of the police and your petitioner tried to serve the copy of the order upon the responsible officer for stopping the work of demolition because of the stay order granted by the Hon'ble High Court but the officer concerned refused to accept the same and also handed over a copy of the order of requisition to your petitioners' agent who went to serve the order of the Hon'ble High Court upon the officer present in the site." (Emphasis is added) 12. In view of the aforesaid admission of the writ petitioners themselves made in paragraph 9 of the writ petition, the question of non service of the order of requisition cannot be taken at this stage as a ground for setting aside the order of requisition as the writ petitioners themselves have admitted that they have been duly served with a copy of the order of requisition by the respondents. In view of the above, it is not necessary for me to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Chatterjee in support of his contention that the order of requisition was not at all served upon the writ petitioners in due compliance with S. 3(2) of the Act, Even from the records it cannot be said that the notice of the order of requisition has not been served upon the writ petitioners. 13. The records of this case were produced by Mrs. Gupta appearing on behalf of the State respondents. It appears from the process server's report dated 8th of April, 1993 that the order of requisition was served upon the durwan of the writ petitioners, Sri Murali Yadav, who had acknowledged the same by putting his signature. In course of argument on this point, Mr. Chatterjee has, however, sought to argue that the service of the order of requisition on the durwan of the writ petitioners cannot be considered to be a good service within the meaning of Rule 3(a) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition & Acquisition) Rules 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules), because a durwan of the writ petitioners cannot be considered to be an agent within the meaning of Rule 3(a) of the said Rules. This argument of Mr. Chatterjee, in view of a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Dr. Nilkamal Bez Boruah & another vs. State of West Bengal & other, 86 CWN 1046, cannot be accepted. M.M. Dutta J., (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench, has observed as follows: (Page 1051 and 1052) "Now under rule 3(1)(a) of the Rules, the order may be served by delivering or tendering a copy thereof to the person on whom the order is to be served or to his agent. Therefore, if a copy of the order is delivered or tendered to the agent of the owner or occupier, it will tantamount to good service on the owner or occupier, as the case may be. In the writ petition it has been alleged the Sitaram Singh is the durwan of the appellant No.1........................... When the order was tendered to Sitaram Singh that would also amount to service of the order not only on the appellant no.1 but also on the appellant No.2............ In the writ petition it has been alleged the Sitaram Singh is the durwan of the appellant No.1........................... When the order was tendered to Sitaram Singh that would also amount to service of the order not only on the appellant no.1 but also on the appellant No.2............ Accordingly, we overrule the contention of the appellants that the impugned order was not served on the appellant No.2." (Emphasis is mine) 14. Relying on the aforesaid observations of M.M. Dutta, J., it cannot be held that a durwan of the owner or the occupier of a premises cannot be considered to be an agent within the meaning of Rule 3(a) of the Rules. Therefore, this argument of Mr. Chatterjee fails. It also appears from the record that on the basis of the service of notice of the order of requisition on the durwan of the writ petitioners, possession was taken by the concerned respondent at 10 A.M. on 9th of April, 1993. The earlier writ application, as already noted hereinabove, was moved by the writ petitioners at about 7 P.M. on 9th April, 1993 in the residence of P.K. Mukherjee, J., when the aforesaid ad interim order was passed by P.K. Mukherjee, J. As I have already held that the service of the order of requisition on the durwan is a good service, it is not. therefore, necessary for me to consider in this case as to whether an order of requisition can be set aside if the Court holds that the order of requisition has not at all been served upon the writ petitioners although the Court finds that the order of requisition has been passed by the authority in accordance with S. 3(1) of the Act. There is another aspect of this matter too. It appears from the record that the order of requisition was admittedly served upon the owner of the same on 8th of April, 1993. It appears from the process server's report dated 8th of April, 1993 that as the agent of the owner refused to accept service of the order of requisition from the process server the same was served by hanging on the same date i.e. 8th of April, 1993. Admittedly, the owners of the premises have not come forward to challenge the order of requisition on the ground that the order of requisition was not served on them. Admittedly, the owners of the premises have not come forward to challenge the order of requisition on the ground that the order of requisition was not served on them. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, I am of the view that the order of requisition was duly served upon the writ petitioners in accordance with Rule 3(a) of the said Rules and it is, therefore, not open to the writ petitioners to urge that the order of requisition is bad in law and should, therefore, be set aside as there is no service of the order of requisition upon the writ petitioners. Accordingly, the argument of Mr. Chatterjee, on the question that the order of requisition was not served upon the writ petitioners, cannot be accepted and is, therefore, rejected. 15. Mr. Chatterjee next contended that even assuming that the order of requisition was served upon the writ petitioners and the order of requisition was passed in accordance with S. 3(1) of the Act, the State Government had no power or authority to demolish the entire premises after requisitioning the premises in question, In my view, this submission has also no substance. Section 3 of the Act gives the power and authority to the State Government to requisition a property if it is of the opinion that the specified purposes mentioned in the Act have been satisfied for the purpose of requisitioning a property. Section 4 of the Act itself provides that where any land has been requisitioned under S. 3, the State Government may use or deal with such land for any of the purposes referred to in S.3(1) as may appear to it to be expedient. On a plain reading of S. 4 of the Act, there cannot be any doubt in one's mind that a power has been given to the State Government to deal with such premises for any of the purposes referred to in S. 3(1) of the Act. In this case, admittedly, the purpose for which the property has been requisitioned is for a permanent purpose. The premises has been requisitioned for rehabilitation of displaced traders who have been evicted from their places of business. In this case, admittedly, the purpose for which the property has been requisitioned is for a permanent purpose. The premises has been requisitioned for rehabilitation of displaced traders who have been evicted from their places of business. Considering the preamble and objects of the Act and reading S. 4 of the Act it cannot be said that the premises cannot be demolished when the order of requisition is continuing although the purpose for which the property has been requisitioned is for a permanent purpose and such purpose cannot be achieved without demolishing the requisitioned premises. A Single Bench decision of this Court, reported in Kewal Chand Mimani vs. The State of West Bengal & other, 1988 (1) CLJ 515, can be relied for this purpose. Samsuddin Ahmed, J., as His Lordship then was), in paragraph 13 of the said decision, relying on Dr. Nilkamal Bez Boruah's case, 86 CWN 1046, has observed as follows: (Page 531) "In view of Bez Boruah's case referred to earlier, I cannot accept the contention made by Mr. Mukherjee. After requisition for achieving the objects for which the land in question is being requisitioned the State Government is free to take steps for its use for the purposes and deal with the same for the same purpose as it may appear to it to be expendient. For achieving the purposes the State Government is free to use and deal with the land according to the expendiency of the situation. Such power includes the power to achieve the object through any agency, person or body corporate." 16. Relying also on the aforesaid observation of Samsuddin Ahmed, J., with which I am in full agreement and considering the preamble and the objects of the Act, I am of the view that the State Government has the power and authority to demolish the requisitioned premises after requisitioning the same under S. 3(1) of the Act. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee to this effect is, therefore, rejected. 17. Mr. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee to this effect is, therefore, rejected. 17. Mr. Chatterjee has next contended that in view of a compromise entered into by the Municipal Authority, the Howrah Improvement Trust Authority and the Salkia Business Association, in a writ petition filed in this Court, wherein it was clearly indicated that no shop keepers, traders or any other person would be asked to vacate his shop/place of business/residence or no building could be demolished unless alternative accommodation was given to him, the demolition work, which was started on the basis of the impugned order of requisition, could not have taken place without giving, any alternative accommodation even assuming that the impugned order of requisition had fulfilled the necessary conditions under the Act. It has been further submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that as the property, under the impugned order of requisition, is situated at 10/5, Bibi Bagan Lane, Salkia, Howrah but in the terms of settlement, it has been clearly undertaken by the respondents that the displaced persons would get alternative accommodation on the G.T. Road between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhang Road whereas the impugned order of requisition indicates that the same has been passed for rehabilitation in connection with construction of fly over at the crossing of G.T. Road (North), Salkia, Howrah, the impugned order of requisition is not consistent with the terms of the compromise, because as per the terms of compromise, accommodation should be given on the G.T. Road between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhang Road whereas the requisitioned premises is situated at 10/5, Bibi Bagan Lane, which is far away from the G.T. Road. 18. In my view, these submissions of Mr. Chatterjee are devoid of any merit. The premises under requisition is situated at 10/5, Bibi Bagan Lane, Salkia, Howrah whereas it appears from the terms of settlement entered into by the aforesaid parties that the displaced persons would get alternative accommodation on the G.T. Road between Khetra Mitra Land and Sri Ram Dhang Road. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that the requisitioned premises is far away from the site where the displaced persons should be settled in terms of the aforesaid settlement and/or compromise. Mr. Chatterjee has submitted that the requisitioned premises is far away from the site where the displaced persons should be settled in terms of the aforesaid settlement and/or compromise. In subparagraph 8 of paragraph 12 of the writ petition (in this paragraph the writ petitioners have quoted a term of settlement) it has been stated that the authorities shall see that the displaced persons will get alternative permanent accommodation on G.T. Road between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhanga Road. Therefore, on a perusal of the aforesaid terms, it is not possible to hold that in no case, the displaced traders cannot be rehabilitated in the area where the requisitioned premises situates. Apart from that, the fact that the G. T. Road between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhanga Road is far away from the requisitioned premises, has been disputed by the learned advocates, appearing on behalf of the respondents. According to them, the requisitioned premises is only 1 KM away from the G.T. Road running between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhanga Road. Since this is a disputed question of fact, I am unable to decide the said question, in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, without asking the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases. Apart from that, it also appears from the record that the writ petitioners were neither made parties to that writ application nor they were made parties in the said compromise petition. Therefore, it is not open to the writ petitioners to say that in view of the compromise petition filed, the authorities cannot requisition any premises other than the premises which are situated on the G.T. Road between Khetra Mitra Lane and Sri Ram Dhanga Road. 19. Before parting with this order, one more branch of submission of Mr. Chatterjee must be referred to. According to Mr. Chatterjee, the requisition having been made and the demolition work having been started for construction of a permanent nature, the authority had no power to requisition the premises for a permanent purpose in the exercise of power conferred in it under S. 3(1) of the Act. In support of this contention, Mr. Chatterjee relied on a decision of this Court reported in Surendra Kumar Nathany vs. State of West Bengal & other, AIR 1990 Cal. 236 . In support of this contention, Mr. Chatterjee relied on a decision of this Court reported in Surendra Kumar Nathany vs. State of West Bengal & other, AIR 1990 Cal. 236 . In that decision, Manoranjan Mallick, J., (as His Lordship then was) has held, explaining the earlier Supreme Court decision reported in Jiwani Kumar Paraki vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta & other, AIR 1984 SC 1707 , that it would not be correct to say that in no case an order of requisition, for a permanent purpose, can be made under S. 3(1) of the Act. In the said decision, the order of requisition was found to be bad because the requisition of a property for construction of a constable barrack, according to the learned Judge, was not permissible under S. 3(1) of the Act. 20. Apart from that, of we consider the preamble and also the scheme of the Act, it will be clear that under S. 3(1) of the Act, the Government has the power and authority to requisition a premises also for a permanent purpose. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the preamble and also the scheme of the Act. The preamble of the Act reads as follows:- "An Act to provide for the requisition and speedy acquisition of land for certain purposes. Whereas it is expedient to provide for the requisition and speedy acquisition of land for the purposes of maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, increasing employment opportunities for the people by establishing commercial estates and industrial estates in different areas, providing proper facilities for transport communication, irrigation or drainage and creating better living condition in urban or rural areas by the construction or re-construction of dwelling places in such areas or for purposes connected therewith and incidental thereto." 21. Section 3 of the Act gives the power to the requisitioning authority to requisition the land on some specified purposes. Section 4 of the Act says that when an order of requisition has been made under S. 3 of the Act, the authority can also acquire the property under the said Section. Therefore, the Act itself provides that for acquisition of a property also the authority has to proceed under S. 3 of the Act to requisition the property which will be followed by an order of acquisition under S. 4 of the Act. 22. Therefore, the Act itself provides that for acquisition of a property also the authority has to proceed under S. 3 of the Act to requisition the property which will be followed by an order of acquisition under S. 4 of the Act. 22. On a plain reading of the preamble of the Act and its scheme, as aforesaid, I have no doubt in my mind that a wide power has been given to the authority by the Act to requisition a property for speedy acquisition of a property for a permanent purpose. But for speedy acquisition of a property under the Act, it would be necessary to requisition the property under S. 3 of the Act which would be followed by an order of acquisition under S. 4 of the Act. Therefore, since the Act itself provides for acquisition of a property by requisitioning the property first, it is immaterial whether the property has been requisitioned for a permanent purpose or not. Even in the Supreme Court decision, reported in H.D. Vora vs. State of Maharashtra & other, AIR 1984 SC 866 . I find that the Supreme Court has not held that if the purpose of requisitioning the property is of a permanent one, the authority cannot take help of the Act because the purpose for such requisition is ultimately aimed at acquisitionl of such property. One more significant fact in this connection needs to be mentioned. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court was based on Bombay Land Requisition Act (32 of 1948). It does not appear from the said decision that the Bombay Land Requisition Act has given power to acquire a property to the authority. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and looking to the preamble of the Act and considering the fact that specific power has been given to the authority to acquire a property under S. 4 of the Act, I do not find any reason to hold that under the Act, the Authority has no power to requisition a property for a permanent purpose. As seen above, if the Act is applied in a particular case, the authority has to requisition the property first under S. 3 of the Act which would be followed by an order of acquisition under S. 4 of the Act. As seen above, if the Act is applied in a particular case, the authority has to requisition the property first under S. 3 of the Act which would be followed by an order of acquisition under S. 4 of the Act. The question of acquisition under S. 4 would not arise before an order of requisition is passed under S. 3 of the Act. Apart from that, it appears that in the said decision, it has not been held by the Supreme Court that a property cannot be requisitioned for a permanent purpose but only it has held that if a property is requisitioned for a permanent purpose, such requisition cannot continue for an indefinite period and the authorities, after considerable period of time, must either release the property from requisition or acquire the same. In the decision reported in Jiwani Kumar Paraki vs. First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta & other, AIR 1984 SC 1707 , also it has been made clear that for a permanent purpose, an order of requisition can be passed but that order of requisition cannot continue for an indefinite period and the authorities have to acquire the same within a reasonable point of time or have to release such property from requisition. 23. Therefore, the argument of Mr. Chatterjee that as the property has been requisitioned for a permanent purpose, the authority, without taking recourse to this Act, ought to have proceeded under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, cannot be accepted. 24. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ application has no merit and therefore, it is rejected. 25. In view of this order disposing of this writ petition, no order need be passed on the earlier writ petition and the same is accordingly disposed of. 26. There will be no orders as to costs. 27. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 28. Xerox copies of this order be furnished to the learned Advocates, appearing for the parties, on their usual undertaking. Application dismissed. Thereafter:- 29. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners prays for stay of operation of the judgment dated 8th October, 1993 and the same is hereby declined.