Judgment : Petitioner instituted a private complaint against respondents in C.C.No.420 of 1985, before the then Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Tiruvannamalai, alleging what they had committed an offence punishable under Sec.323, I.P.C., occurrence which led to this prosecution is alleged to have taken place on 15. 1985. Detailed facts which led to the institution of this prosecution need to have to be stated, for this revision is liable to be disposed of on a very short ground, purely on a question of law. Trial Magistrate, on appreciation of evidence placed before him, found both the respondents guilty under Sec.323, I.P.C., but chose to admonish them under Sec.3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, without, immediately sent facing them either to imprisonment or payment of fine. Aggrieved respondents challenged the sustainability of their convictions and consequent direction under the Probation of Offenders Act. Appellate court allowed the appeal and acquitted both the respondents. Aggrieved private complaint has preferred this revision. 2. On the fact, aforestated, it is apparent that a criminal revision cannot be maintained. Under Sec.378, clause(4), Crl.P.C, if an order 6f acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, ‘grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. The words “if such an order of acquittal” in clause(4) have relevance, for they refer to Sec.378, clause (1) which reads that an appeal in case of acquittal will arise not only from the rigi-nal order of acquittal, but from an-appellate order of acquittal as well, passed by any court other than the High Court, or even from an order of acquittal passed by the court of session, in revision. There is no dispute that the impugned prosecution was initiated, a private complaint. If that be so, a revision cannot be maintained under Secs.397 and 401, Crl.P.C., Under Sec.401, clause (4), Crl.P.C., where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. If that be so, a revision cannot be maintained under Secs.397 and 401, Crl.P.C., Under Sec.401, clause (4), Crl.P.C., where under this Code an appeal lies and no appeal is brought no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. No doubt, under Sec.401, clause (5), Crl.P.C, where an appeal lies under the Code, but an application for revision has been made to the High Court by any person and the High Court is satisfied that such application was made under the erroneous belief that no appeal’ lies thereto and that it is necessary in the interest of justice so to do, the High Court may treat the application for revision as a petition of appeal and deal with the same accordingly. 3. However, in the instant case, I am unable to adopt such an exercise, for under Sec.378, clause (5) no application under Sub-sec.(4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after 60 days in a case of this nature, computed, from the date of that order of acquittal. A reference to the date of judgment passed by the appellate court in conjunction with the date of filing of their revision case allowing permissible exclusions, clearly indicates, that this revision has been filed, after time for an application for grant of special leave got barred by limitation. Limitation bar is a valuable right which accrues to the respondents. It will be too late in the way, especially when the occurrence had taken place in 1985 to exercise revisional powers by ordering notice to the respondents even without a petition for condoning delay in presentation of the then maintainable appeal and thereby regularise, when prima facie legal lacuna so apparent. With the help of petitioners counsel, I have perused the appellate judgment. One main ground on which the acquittal is based is the long delay in the preferring of the private complaint. Occurrence was on 15. 1985 and the private complaint was instituted only on 7. 1985 and no valid reasons had been assigned for the long delay. That ground is vital enough to be held against the petitioner. Not only due to this legal lacuna, but also on this vital factual detail, this revision shall stand dismissed.