JUDGMENT- M.S. VAIDYA, J.:-Rule made returnable forthwith by consent of the Advocates. 2. This is plaintiff's revision against an order dated 2-2-1993, passed by Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Aurangabad, in Regular Civil Suit No. 882 of 1990, below Exh. 49, rejecting the appointment of Commissioner, as sought by the plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff had brought the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from obstructing the plaintiffs' possession on the suit portion, namely, the northern triangular portion of his erstwhile Survey No. 6-A of village Shahnoorwadi (now C.T.S. No. 16035-A), which is located in the city of Aurangabad. In substance, the dispute between the parties is about the location of the boundary line between various sub-divisions of C.T.S. No. 16034 and various sub-divisions of C.T.S. No. 16035 of Aurangabad. According to the plaintiff, the alleged encroached portion forms part of C.T.S. No. 16035-A. According to the defendant, the same forms part of C.T.S. No. 16034. On this background, the application was made for appointment of the City Survey Officer at Aurangabad or the District Inspector of Land Records or Superintendent of Land Records, Aurangabad, or any of them, as Commissioner to measure the land bearing C.T.S. No. 16035/A. It was also prayed that the directions be issued to the Commissioner to take into consideration touch map of Survey No. 6/A, now bearing C.T.S. No. 16035/A and its sub-divisions, and also the City Survey map of the property bearing C.T.S. No. 16035/A. The learned Civil Judge rejected the application, because it was contended by the defendant before him, that both the parties had carried measurement several times and the maps were already on record. The fact that the suit was of 1990 also appears to have weighed the mind of the learned Civil Judge while rejecting the application. The learned Civil Judge held that the plaintiff had come to the Court taking his case, and according to himself, there was sufficient record. A review application made vide Exh. 60 also came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge. Therefore, the present revision application has been filed. 4. The first contention of Mr. Salunke, the learned Counsel for the respondent/defendant was that the revision application against an interlocurtory order was not tenable at all. A review application made vide Exh. 60 also came to be rejected by the learned Civil Judge. Therefore, the present revision application has been filed. 4. The first contention of Mr. Salunke, the learned Counsel for the respondent/defendant was that the revision application against an interlocurtory order was not tenable at all. In support of his submissions, he relied upon rulings in (Usman Gulam v. Abdul Hamid)1, 1986(3) Bombay C.R. 147 and (Smt. Harvinder Kaur v. Godha Ram)2, A.I.R. 1979 Punjab and Haryana-76. Indeed, the later mentioned ruling has been relied upon in the Bombay ruling. It may be noted here that the Bombay ruling, referred to above, was the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court, whereas the view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court was taken by a Division Bench of that Court. 5. Section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, empowers the High Court to call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court, and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears to have exercised the jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Mr. Muley, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, wanted to bring his case in the second clause, namely, the failure of the subordinate Court to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. The proviso to the aforesaid sub-section, imposes a limitation on the High Court, namely, that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where - (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would hav finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. The contention of Shri Muley was that the impugned order in this proceeding, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. On the other hand, Mr. The contention of Shri Muley was that the impugned order in this proceeding, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. On the other hand, Mr. Salunke, the learned Counsel for the respondent, relied upon the explanation, which provided that, for the purposes of that section, the expression "any case which has been decided", included any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. 6. Both the rulings relied upon by Mr. Salunke, decided the point at issue on the interpretation of the expression "any case which has been decided." The A.I.R. report of the ruling in Harvindar Kaur's case (supra) does not elucidate all the relevant facts in the sense, that it does not state which sort of commission was sought in the proceeding before Punjab and Haryana High Court. In paragraph 9 of the report, the High Court had only stated, that the Trial Court had rejected the application for the issuance of a commission on the ground that issue No. 3 could have been proved by producing relevant record and that demarcation was not necessary. It was on this background, that High Court was deciding the point, which was raised and argued before it. Paragraph No. 13 of the report pointed out that it could not, as a general rule, be laid down that in no case, a revision would lie against an interlocutory order passed under any provision of Order XXVI of the Code of Procedure, and that it would be on the facts of each case, that it will have to be found out, whether the interlocutory order, against which a revision is sought to be filed, has to be adjudicated for the purposes of the suit, some right or obligation of the parties in controversy or not. Again, while answering the issue set up for itself, the Punjab and Haryana High Court said in paragraph 5 of the report,"in our view, in the circumstances of this case, the answer has got to be in negative." Therefore, it is very clear that even the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court did not want to lay down an absolute rule, that no revision would be entertainable in a matter, which has come before the High Court in revision, though it had arisen as a result of the orders passed under Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. In Usman Gulam's case, the facts are more clear from the report of the judgment. In that matter, five respondents had filed a suit in the Civil Court praying for the possession of certain premises on the ground of bona fide requirement under section 13(1) (b) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In the course of that proceeding, the parties had made an application for the appointment of Commissioner for the purposes of 'inspecting the internal and external condition of all the properties of the ownership of the plaintiffs'. 8. Finding that this was not necessary for the purposes of the decision of the suit, the Court had taken the particular view which it had taken in that matter and had held that the revision application was not entertainable. Indeed, the observation of the Supreme Court in (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon)3, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 497, were quoted and relied upon by the learned Single Judge of this Court, while taking that view. The Supreme Court was very explicit in saying that the expression 'cases' was a word of comprehensive import inclusive of civil proceedings other than suits, and the same was restricted by anything contained in the section to the entrety of the proceedings in a Civil Court. To interpret the expression 'case' as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction were not subject, and might result in certain cases in denying relef to an aggrieved litigant where it was most needed and might result in the perpetration of gross injustice. The consideration which weighed in making this observation was very clear that, in no event, the Court should allow the perpetration of gross injustice. This is exactly the purpose of sub-clause (b) of the proviso to section 115(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court proceeded to observe further, that this was not to say that the High Court was obliged to exercise the jurisdiction when a case was decided by a subordinate Court and the conditions in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) were satisfied. It pointed out that the exercise of jurisdiction was discretionary and the High Court was not bound to interfere merely because the conditions were satisfied. The Supreme Court then said..... " The interlocutory character of the order, the existence of another remedy to an aggrieved party by way of an appeal, from the ultimate order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in case where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction. " 9. In the present case, it was submitted before this Court by both the learned Counsel, that both the parties have tendered on record maps drawn by the City Survey Officers, from time to time, in respect of their respective lands. The contention of Mr. Salunke was that, when so many maps were on record, it was possible for the Court to arrive at a conclusion on the point. On the other hand, Mr. Muley, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, rightly contended that the existence of so many maps which were not consistent with each other, itself was the ground, which had obliged the present petitioner/plaintiff to make application to the Court for appointment of a Commissioner, in the matter. He submitted that while drawing the maps at the instance of one party or the other, the City Survey Officer might not consider the matter of interest for the other adjoining co-owners. He might over-look them or he might think that they were not relevant for the purpose, for which each map was being drawn. He submitted that while drawing the maps at the instance of one party or the other, the City Survey Officer might not consider the matter of interest for the other adjoining co-owners. He might over-look them or he might think that they were not relevant for the purpose, for which each map was being drawn. In a suit, in which the cause of action is founded on the alleged encroachment of a particular land and in which the determination of the boundary line between the two adjoining properties is the only issue, the Court could hardly decide such a matter on its own without any dependable expert assistance. Mr. Muley was right, in this context, in relying upon the observations made in (V.C. Tari v. Nilconta S. Kete)4, A.I.R. 1975 Goa, Daman and Diu 32, to the effect that where there was a dispute as regards the identity of the suit property allegedly bearing two different registration numbers, the trial Court should appoint a Commissioner, preferably a trained surveyor to examine whether a property bearing two different numbers was, in fact, the same. In the present case also, the dispute is more or less of the same type, in as much as the rival parties to this proceeding contend that a particular portion of the land forms part of one City Survey number or the other, and it is for the Court to determine, whether or not, it belonged to one City Survey number or the other. The need of the Court having for itself assistance of an independent authority, for the purposes of enabling it to decide the issue as aforesaid, can hardly be over-emphasized. The only fact which can be mentioned against the present petitioner/plaintiff in this petition, is that while making the application for appointment of Commissioner, he had sought the measurement of Survey No. 16035/A only and not of both the survey numbers, namely, C.T.S. Nos. 16035/A and 16034/2, which was adjoining the aforesaid land. The learned Civil Judge should have appreciated this fact, because but for the determination of the boundary line in between the two aforesaid lands, it was not possible for him to decide the issue merely on the basis of evidence adduced by one party or the other, or on the basis of the maps which were got drawn by them, time and again, on their respective applications. 10. 10. It may be noted here that making of such an order for appointment of the Commissioner would not have prejudiced the interest of either of the parties, because it was only in that eventuality, that it was possible for the Court to arrive at a proper conclusion. If at all any party was aggrieved by the report given by the Commissioner so appointed by the Court, an opportunity would have become available to that party to cross-examine the Commissioner and to point out how his conclusions were not correct. The party, who was not aggrieved could also prove how his conclusions were correct. 11. It need not be stated here that Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, deals with the power of the Court to appoint commissions in various contingencies. Some commissions are appointed to examine witnesses, some are appointed for local investigations, some are appointed for examining the accounts, some are appointed for making partitions, so on and so forth. One thumb rule that revision petitions cannot be entertained in any of such matters can hardly regulate the issue. It appears that all these aspects were not argued before the learned Single Judge of this Court, who decided the matter in Osman Gulam's case (supra). 12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, now in hand, therefore, we are of the view that this is a fit case in which the High Court must exercise its revisional jurisdiction to ensure that there would be no occasion for failure of justice or irreparable injury to a party against whom the impugned order by the trial Court was passed. 13. Considering the matter in this perspective, we entertain the revision preferred by the revision petitioner and allow the same. The impugned order dated 2-2-1993, passed by the learned Civil Judge below Exh. 49 in Regular Civil Suit No. 882 of 1990, on his file, is set aside. The said application shall stand granted with this modification, that the City Survey Officer, Aurangabad, be appointed Commissioner in the matter to survery, measure and draw a map of both the lands bearing C.T.S. No. 16053/A and 16034/2 together, and after giving due notice to both the parties to the proceedings and to the concerned other owners, if any, and should demarcate the boundary line in between the two, and show the same in the map. He may also indicate in the map, the encroachment, if any, made by one or the other owner on the property of the rival party. He may also consider, whether the aforesaid two city survey numbers form part of Survey No. 6/A of Shahnoorwadi and/or Survey No. 45 of village Aurangabad, as it existed then. He shall be at liberty to use the official village maps or the foundational City Survey Department maps and the official tipans. The Commission order shall be issued by the Court below within a period of two weeks from today and the Commissioner shall submit his reports, without fail, on or before 16th of December, 1993. The trial Court shall, then, allow the parties to take copies of the aforesaid report and to file their respective say about the report of the Commissioner. The contentions of the parties in respect of the Commissioner's report, shall be decided by the Court below after taking the evidence, at the time of final hearing of the matter. The revision petitioner/plaintiff shall deposit in the trial Court, Rs. 200/- towards the costs and the fees of the Commissioner. If he fails to deposit the aforesaid costs on or before 21st October, 1993, his application for appointment of Commissioner, shall stand rejected without any liberty to him to revive that application again. Formerly, this suit was ordered to be disposed of finally before the end of December, 1991. The matter is still pending in the Court. After the receipt of the say of the parties to the Commissioner's report, as directed above, the Court below shall forthwith fix the matter for hearing and shall dispose of the same, in any event, before 31st March, 1994. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs of this case. Rule made absolute accordingly. Rule made absolute.