A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THESE two appeals are directed against a common judgment passed by learned second Additional Sessions Judge, Pun (hereinafter described as the trial Judge) in S. T. Nos. 2/30 and 4/174 of 1988. The appellants in the present appeals (hereinafter referred to as the accused) have been convicted for offence punishable under section 304/34 of the Indian Penal code, 1860 (in short, T1the I. P. C.) and sentenced to imprisonment for life. In S. T. No. 2/30 of 1988 one Deba Debendra Kumar Sahu Cased trial but has been acquittal by learned trial Judge. ( 2 ) ACCUSATION which led to the trial of accused, filtering out unnecessary details, is as follows: One Chandramani Sahu (hereinafter referred to as the deceased) had a sweetmeat stall at Market crossing of Pun Municipality. On 25. 7. 1987 at about 3 a. m. night a written report was submitted by Binod Kumar Mohanty (P. W. 1 ). According to it, at about 2. 15 a. m. night, two accused - appellants along with another had come to the shop of the deceased. The informant was working as a servant in the said shop. Accused Baina all of a sudden caught hold of the neck of Karna, another employee and asked him to give him a glass of water. He took a sip of water from the glass offered to him, and sprinkled the same on the face of the aforesaid Karna. When the deceased raised protest accused Baina Brahma suddenly got furious and threw a challenge to the deceased. There was a counter challenge by the deceased. This resulted in an altercation between two of them. Accused Baina took a vow to take revenge touching the tail of a cow standing in front of the shop. At that time, the police vehicle passed on the road, and two accused persons and third person who was accompanying them fled away towards Narendra tank. After about half an hour, they returned to the shop of the deceased. Accused Deba and other one who. was accompanying them sat on a table in front of the shop of one Laxmidhar. Accused Baina went inside the shop and dragged the deceased to the road. When P. W. I tried to stop ahem, accused Baina gave a slap on his face and he sustained injuries. Accused Deba and other one who. was accompanying them sat on a table in front of the shop of one Laxmidhar. Accused Baina went inside the shop and dragged the deceased to the road. When P. W. I tried to stop ahem, accused Baina gave a slap on his face and he sustained injuries. Accused Baina made the deceased sit down on the bench in front of the egg shop of Laxmidhar. Accused Deba, and other person who was with them stood on the right side of the deceased, and accused Baina stood on his left side. When the deceased raised a protest suddenly accused Deba brought out a knife which he was holding in his hand and stabbed on the chest of the deceased. P. W. I caught hold of the accused Baina, but he gave him a push and all of them fled away. On account of such stabbing the deceased Cell down on the ground in a pool of blood. P. W. 1 shifted the deceased to the Pun Sadar hospital in a rickshaw, where the doctor declared the deceased dead. A description was given of the person who was with accused- appellants. It was stated that prior to the occurrence, accused Baina and Deba had taken Limn worth of Rs. 22 without payment and when the deceased asked for money they threatened him to teach him a lesson. Investigation was undertaken on the basis of information lodged. During investigation, blood-stained Dhoti, banian and wearing apparels belonging to the deceased were seized and the dead body was sent for Postmortem examination. Deba Sahu was arrested on 7. 8. 1987. Accused Deba Mohapatra was arrested at Calcutta on 6. 8. 1987 and accused Baina was arrested on 27. 7. 1988. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted and accused faced trial. Plea of accused persons was denial of allegations. Though they did not dispute murder of the deceased, they denied their complicity. ( 3 ) IN order to further its case, prosecution examined twenty three witnesses. Out of them, P. Ws. 1,2, 3, 5,6, and 14 were stated to be occurrence witnesses. Among these P. W. 1, 3 and 14 spoke about the murderous attack on the deceased, but P. W. 6 resided from his statement made during investigation. ( 3 ) IN order to further its case, prosecution examined twenty three witnesses. Out of them, P. Ws. 1,2, 3, 5,6, and 14 were stated to be occurrence witnesses. Among these P. W. 1, 3 and 14 spoke about the murderous attack on the deceased, but P. W. 6 resided from his statement made during investigation. P. W. 2 deposed to have seen the first part of occurrence, and to have come after hearing to cry of the deceased after he was, stabbed, and also to have seen the accused persons running away. He also deposed to have seen the accused Baina dragging the deceased out of his shop. Evidence of P. W. 5 is to the effect that on hearing the cry of the deceased he came out and saw the accused persons running away. Learned trial Judge found evidence of the eye witnesses to be credible and cogent and convicted and sentenced the accused persons as aforesaid. 4. Mr. B. S. Misra (1) addressed us on behalf of accused Baina Brahma. Mr. D. Panda made submissions on behalf of accused Deba Mohapatra. Their common ground of attack to the legality of judgment of learned trial Judge is that evidence of P. Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 14 does not inspire confidence and therefore, conviction is not in order. Emphasis is laid on the evidence of the doctor who stated that weapon of assault which was identified by the witnesses could not have possibly caused fatal injuries found on the body of the deceased. Non-examination of Karna and one Aju who are stated to have witnessed the occurrence was highlighted. In Court, P. W. 1 has given an exaggerated version, which varies materially from the statement made during investigation. There was no seizure of blood-stained earth. There was considerable delay in examination of P. W. 2 and that throws a shadow of doubt on the veracity of his evidence. There is substantial variation between evidence of the witnesses about, manner of assault the place of assault and as to, how the occurrence took place. With reference to evidence of doctor (P. W. 21) it is stated that he had found one punctured wound on the right hypochoendrium (right planks of the abdomen), just below the dorsal margin. There is substantial variation between evidence of the witnesses about, manner of assault the place of assault and as to, how the occurrence took place. With reference to evidence of doctor (P. W. 21) it is stated that he had found one punctured wound on the right hypochoendrium (right planks of the abdomen), just below the dorsal margin. P. W. 1 has stated in the F. I. R. that the deceased was stabbed on the chest but in Court he stated that injury was sustained on the right side of the belly, P. Ws. 3 and 14 have stated assault was on the right side of the belly. The Doctor has opined that the death was due to shock and hemorrhage due to injury on the abdomen. In view of the contradictions, omissions and discrepancies in the evidence of P. W. 1, vis-a-vis the statement in the F. I. R. , his evidence becomes suspect and is liable to be discarded. The Doctor has noticed two injuries: one of them being on the scalp. No witness has stated about any assault on the scalp and in view of the I. Os. statement that he found two injuries on the person of the deceased and the inquest report mentioned about two injuries on the deceased, absence of any explanation as to how the second injury was sustained throws doubt on, the credibility of evidence. The direction of the wound was upward as noticed by the Doctor (P. W. 21) which is impossible if the assault was standing and the victim was on a sleeping position. In addition, learned counsel for accused Baina has submitted that even if prosecution version is accepted in toto, a case under section 302/34, I. P. C. is not made out against accused Baina. No evidence has been led to show that be said accused shared any common intention to cause death of the deceased. There is no material to show accused Baina knew about possession of knife by accused Deba which was stated to have been used fur assault. The same was concealed, as accepted by witnesses for the prosecution. Therefore, conviction of Baina under section 302/34 is not maintainable. Learned counsel for State on the other hand, contended that evidence of the witnesses is clear I and cogent. There is absolutely no contradiction, and/or omission so far as evidence of the witnesses is concerned. The same was concealed, as accepted by witnesses for the prosecution. Therefore, conviction of Baina under section 302/34 is not maintainable. Learned counsel for State on the other hand, contended that evidence of the witnesses is clear I and cogent. There is absolutely no contradiction, and/or omission so far as evidence of the witnesses is concerned. The F. I. R. is not required to give an elaborate description of the facts situation. The purpose for submission of the F. I. R. is to set law into motion. It is sufficient if salient features of the prosecution case are indicated therein. The F. I. R. was lodged a few minutes after the occurrence after the deceased was assaulted from a very close quarter by accused Deba. Hypothetical evidence of the doctor is not sufficient to discard credible and cogent ocular testimony of the witnesses. Learned trial Judge has looked at the weapon and had observed that injuries were possible. So far as plea of non-applicability of section 34, I. P. C. to accused Baina is concerned, it is submitted that evidence clearly shows that he was fully aware that accused Deba was intending to assault the deceased with a knife. It is highly improbable that all the three came together and accused Baina did not know that accused Deba was carrying a knife. The background facts clearly show that there was pre-concert and each one shared the common intention. Merely because Karna and Aju have not been examined in the shop of the deceased, their non-examination is of no consequence because it is nobody s case that they witnessed the murderous assault. Therefore, judgment of conviction and sentence is in order. ( 4 ) COMING to the evidence of P. Ws. I, 3 and 14, it is seen that they have graphically described the background of assault. We shall first deal with the evidence of P. W. 1. He has lodged information immediately after the incident. Admittedly, he was one of the servants working in the shop of the deceased. His claim to have witnessed first part of the occurrence when there was exchange of words when accused Baina misbehaved with Aju is substantiated. He has stated about the vow taken by accused Baina to take revenge against the deceased. He has received an injury on account of thrust on his face given by accused Baina. His claim to have witnessed first part of the occurrence when there was exchange of words when accused Baina misbehaved with Aju is substantiated. He has stated about the vow taken by accused Baina to take revenge against the deceased. He has received an injury on account of thrust on his face given by accused Baina. Even though he was subjected to lengthy cross-examination, nothing material to entertain any doubt about veracity of his evidence has been elicited. He was the person who had been the deceased to the hospital in a rickshaw where the Doctor declared the deceased to be dead. P. W. 3 is another witness who claims to have seen the occurrence. His evidence corroborates version of P. W. 1 in all material aspects. Similarly also P. W. 14 has corroborated the evidence of other two witnesses. P. W. 2 admittedly was working in the shop of the deceased. He does not state to have seen actual stabbing, but stated that when he was taking his night meal, hearing shout from the deceased, he immediately came outside and saw accused Baina was coming out of the shop of the deceased and was abusing the deceased. He touched the tail of a cow and took a vow to take revenge. When police jeep came, the three persons fled away, but after some time he saw that the accused persons came and stood in front of the shop of Laxmidhar. The accused went inside the shop of the deceased and took him to a place in front of the shop of Laxmidhar. He has further stated that while he was washing plates, he heard cry of agony made by the deceased. On coming out he saw that the deceased was lying on the ground and the accused persons were running away. He has clearly stated that when accused Baina brought the deceased near the shop of Laxmidhar, accused Deba and another person were standing on his right side while accused was standing on the left side. Similarly, P. W. 5 was another servant who was working in the sweetmeat stall of the deceased, like P. W. 2. He has clearly stated that when accused Baina brought the deceased near the shop of Laxmidhar, accused Deba and another person were standing on his right side while accused was standing on the left side. Similarly, P. W. 5 was another servant who was working in the sweetmeat stall of the deceased, like P. W. 2. He has stated not to have seen the actual stabbing but he has stated that on hearing cry of agony of the deceased, he came out and saw the deceased lying on the ground and two accused persons running away towards Narendra tank, and another was running towards Chudapati. He followed them but could not catch any of them. According to him, by the time he returned, P. W. 1 removed the deceased to the hospital. This being the evidence, there is no material inconsistency, omission or contradiction. The inevitable conclusion is that accused Deba had given stab blow to the deceased. Non - examination of Karna and Aju is not of any consequence because they were not claimed to have witnessed actual assault. ( 5 ) EMPHASIS has been made on the alleged infirmity in the evidence of the eye - witnesses and medical evidence. The Doctor has given opinion that injury No. 1 which was vital one could not have been caused by M. O. II, since sharpness was not on both sides of the knife. According to the Doctor, if M. O. II would have caused injury No. 1, there would have been bruises. He had not noticed any bruise. Absence of any evidence regarding injury on the parietal region is also highlighted. The submission in our view, has no force. Medical evidence has only corroborative value, as it proves that injury could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. Maximum use that defence can make of such evidence is to prove that injury could not have been possibly caused in the manner alleged. But the testimony of eye - witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency. Medical evidence cannot override direct evidence about assault by particular weapon when direct evidence is satisfactory and reliable. As indicated above, learned trial Judge has found evidence of the eye - witnesses to be satisfactory and reliable. But the testimony of eye - witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency. Medical evidence cannot override direct evidence about assault by particular weapon when direct evidence is satisfactory and reliable. As indicated above, learned trial Judge has found evidence of the eye - witnesses to be satisfactory and reliable. He has also looking at the weapon, observed that though it has no sharpness on both its sides, in its top there is sharpness on both sides and it is a pointed one. Evidence of the Doctor is that the fatal injury might have been caused by sharp pointed and long knife. Absence of any material as to how injury on the head was caused cannot be a ground to discard the prosecution evidence. It is nobodyts case that Injury on the head was the vital injury. The deceased was on a sitting position and was struggling to come out of the restraint by accused Baina, when accused Deba gave the stab blow. Therefore, the hypothetical plea that injury margin and direction would be different as accused was in a sleeping position is not acceptable. We are in agreement with the analysis made by learned trial Judge. There is no substance in the plea that because of Doctors opinion ocular evidence has to be discarded. In view of clear evidence of the P. Ws. 13 and 14 corroborated by evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 5 we have no hesitation in holding that accused Deba had given fatal blow to the deceased and is liable to be convicted under section 302, I. P. C. We accordingly alter sentence from 302/34 to 302, I. P. C. Such alteration will not cause any prejudice to the accused. ( 6 ) THE next question comes for consideration is whether in case of accused Baina, conviction under section 302/34, I. P. C. is appropriate. Section 34 is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of the individual members of a party or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them in furtherance of the common intention of all. The reason why all are deemed guilty in such cases is that the presence of accomplice gives encouragement, support and protection to the person actually committing an act. The reason why all are deemed guilty in such cases is that the presence of accomplice gives encouragement, support and protection to the person actually committing an act. This section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. Therefore, section 34, I. P. C. can apply even if no charge is framed under that section provided of course from the evidence it becomes clear that there was pre-arranged plan to achieve the commonly intended object. The section really means that if two or more persons intentionally do a common thing jointly, it is just the same as if each of them had done it individually. It is a well -recognised canon of criminal jurisprudence that the Courts cannot distinguish between co-conspirators, nor can they inquire, even if it were possible, as to the part taken by each in the crime. Where parties go with a common purpose to execute a common object, each and every person becomes responsible for the act of each and every other in execution and furtherance of their common purpose; as the purpose is common, so must be the responsibility. (See Ganesh Singh v. Ram Raja ). All are guilty of the principle offence, not of abetment. In combinations of this kind a mortal stroke, though given by one of the party, is deemed in the eye of law to have been given by every individual present and abetting. But a party not cognizant of the intention of his companion to commit murder is not liable, though he has joined his companion to do an unlawful act. (See Duffeys and Hunts case2 ). Leading feature of this section is the element of participation in action. The essence of liability under this section is the existence of a common intention animating the offenders and the participation in a criminal act in furtherance of the common intention. The essence is simultaneous consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a particular result (See Ramaswami Ayyanagar and others v. State of Tamil Nadu. The participation need not in all cases be by violence, normally presence of the scene of offence may be necessary, but such is not the case in respect of other offences when the offence consists of diverse acts which may be done at different times and places. The participation need not in all cases be by violence, normally presence of the scene of offence may be necessary, but such is not the case in respect of other offences when the offence consists of diverse acts which may be done at different times and places. The physical presence at the scene of offence of the offender sought to be rendered liable under this section is not one of the conditions of its applicability in every case. Before a man can be held liable for acts done by. I another, under the provisions of this section, it must be established that (i) there was common intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between the two, and (ii) the person sought to be so held liable had participated in some manner in the act constituting the offence. Unless common intention and participation are both present, this section cannot apply. Common intentiont implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the prearranged plan. Under this section a pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved. The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. Though common intention may develop on the spot, it must, however, be anterior in point of time to commission of offence showing a pre-arranged plan and prior concert. (See Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra. In Amrik Singh and others v. State of Punjab, it has I been held that common intention presupposes prior concert. Care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention; f the partition which divides their bounds is often very thin, nevertheless the distinction is real and substantial, and if overlooked will result in miscarriage of justice. To constitute common intention, it is necessary that intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. Undoubtedly it is a difficult thing to prove even the intention of an individual and, therefore, it is all the more difficult to show the common intention of a group of persons. To constitute common intention, it is necessary that intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. Undoubtedly it is a difficult thing to prove even the intention of an individual and, therefore, it is all the more difficult to show the common intention of a group of persons. But however a difficult may be the task, the prosecution must lead evidence of facts, circumstances and conduct of the accused from which their common intention can be safely gathered. In Magsoodan and others v. State of U. P. , it was observed that prosecution must lead evidence from which the common intention of the accused can be safely gathered. In most cases it has to be inferred from the act, conduct or other relevant circumstances of the case in hand. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at a conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit offence for which they can be convicted. The facts and circumstances of cases vary and each case has to be decided in view of the facts involved. Whether an act is in furtherance of the common intention is an incident of fact and not of law. In Bhaba Nanda Earma and others v. The State of Assam, it was observed that prosecution must prove facts to justify an inference that all participants of the acts had shared a Common intention to commit the criminal act which was finally committed by one or more of the participants. Mere presence of a person at the time of commission of an offence by his confederates is not, in itself sufficient to bring his case within the purview of section 34 unless community of designs is proved against him. (See Malkhan Singh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh8 ). In the Oxford English Dictionary, the word furtherance is defined as action of helping forward. Adoption this definition, Russell says that it indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect in future, and adds that any act-may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken, for the purpose of effecting that felony. (Russell on Crime 12th Edition, Vol. I, pages 487 and 488 ). Adoption this definition, Russell says that it indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect in future, and adds that any act-may be regarded as done in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken, for the purpose of effecting that felony. (Russell on Crime 12th Edition, Vol. I, pages 487 and 488 ). In Shankarlal Kacharabhai and others The State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court has interpreted the word furtherancet as advancement or promotion. ( 7 ) JUDGED in the above background, it cannot be held that stab blow given by accused Deba was in furtherance of common intention of himself and accused Baina. There is no material to show that accused Baina shared common intention to commit the offence. There was no evidence to show that accused Baina had known that accused Deba was carrying a knife. Additionally from the evidence of P. W. 18, it appears that about fifteen days prior to the occurrence, accused Deba had given him a knife for custody which was wrapped with paper. On the alleged date of occurrence at 6 p. m. he came back and had taken the knife with him. The occurrence took place after mid - night. P. W. 18s evidence is not to the effect that accused Baina was with Deba, when the knife was taken. At the time knife was taken by accused Deba, the dispute between Baina and the deceased had not arisen. The possession of the knife by accused Deba is linkless with the said dispute. It is not in dispute that the accused Deba had concealed the knife, suddenly brought it out and gave the stab blow. Accused Baina cannot be held liable for the individual act of accused Deba. His conviction under section 302/34 I. P. C. is set aside. He however, is clearly guilty for assaulting the deceased by dragging him out from his sweetmeat stall. He is convicted for offence punishable under section 352, I. P. C. Custodial sentence of three months would meet the ends of justice. ( 8 ) IN the ultimate result, Criminal Appeal No. 167 of 1989 filed by accused Deba is dismissed, while appeal filed by accused Baina is allowed to the extent indicated above. D. M. Patnaik, J.- I agree. Appeal dismissed.