JUDGMENT G. C. Bharuka, J. This writ application has been fired for quashing the order dated 12th April, 1993. (Annexure 1) passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Bihar, by which the petitioner has been put under suspension during the pendency of a departmental proceeding. The petitioner has been working as headmaster in High School, Purainiya, Neora (Bihta), Patna. It appears that pursuant to a complaint of the Director, Welfare Department, Bihar, Patna, under his letter no. 7750 dated 28.10.1992 alleging therein that two assistant teachers of the aforesaid school, namely, Ramesh Choubey and Suresh Tiwary, had defalcated a huge sum relating to scholarship payable to scheduled caste students by forging their signatures, a criminal case was instituted under Sections 420, 467, 468,409 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, in which, as a conspirator, the petitioner was also made an accused and, ultimately, he was convicted by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st class, Danapur, in Trial no. 1068/91 and was awarded a sentence of 6 months R. I. and a fine of Rs. 500/-. 2. It is stated that the petitioner had filed an Appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 1991 before the learned Sessions Judge, Patna, against the judgment of the trial court, which has been allowed by judgment dated 19.8.1993 and the order of conviction and sentence of the trial court has been set aside. But before passing of the above said appellate court's order, the impugned order (Annexure 1) which is dated 12th April, 1993, was passed keeping in view the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against the accused persons including the petitioner, and the respondent Director initiated a departmental proceeding against the petitioner by issuance of charge-sheet and, in the meantime, suspended the petitioner as is evident from the impugned order (Annexure-1). 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has originally assailed the impugned order of suspension in view of the policy decision of the Government contained in letter no. III/R1- 102/63/ A- 10158 dated 3rd August, 1983 (Annexure 2) issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government to all the departments clearly spelling out that if a Govt. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has originally assailed the impugned order of suspension in view of the policy decision of the Government contained in letter no. III/R1- 102/63/ A- 10158 dated 3rd August, 1983 (Annexure 2) issued by the Chief Secretary to the Government to all the departments clearly spelling out that if a Govt. Servant is convicted by a criminal Court then the recourse should not be taken of dismissal under the proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution till the appeal filed against the said judgment is finally disposed of or the time limit for filing an appeal has expired. But now since during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner has been acquitted by the Appellate Court, therefore, it has been submitted that the order of suspension can not be allowed to stand as the very basis on which the departmental proceeding has been initiated and the petitioner has been put under suspension has been set aside. 4. Dealing with identical submissions raised in relation to the policy decision of the Government as referred to above (Annexure 2) it has been held by us in the case of Radhe Shyam Pathak Vs. The State of Bihar and others (C.W.J.C. No. 11006 of 1992) (reported in 1993(2) PLJR 779 ) disposed of on 13th October, 1993, that once the Government has taken a policy decision of not resorting to clause (a) if the provision to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution during the pendency of an appeal by a convict Government servant, then, the same should he followed till the said policy is otherwise modified or revoked. But in the present case that is not the situation. By Annexure-I the petitioner has not been dismissed under the proviso (a) to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. He has merely been put under suspension during the pendency of a duly initiated departmental proceeding though it appears that the charges in the departmental proceeding arc the same on the basis whereof the criminal case was instituted. Nonetheless, it is now well settled that the disciplinary authority is well within its own power to initiate a departmental proceeding .and come to its conclusion in respect of the charges leveled against a Government servant and pass appropriate order awarding appropriate punishment. Nonetheless, it is now well settled that the disciplinary authority is well within its own power to initiate a departmental proceeding .and come to its conclusion in respect of the charges leveled against a Government servant and pass appropriate order awarding appropriate punishment. It will be open for the petitioner to rely on the appellate court's judgment passed in his favour setting aside the order of conviction in support of his defence, which again has to be considered in accordance with the settled principle in this regard. 5. In the case of Corporation of the City Nagpur Vs. Ramchandra G. Modak (A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 626) it has been held that normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exl1nerated of the charges in a criminal case, it is not expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges or the grounds or evidence. It has further been held that, however, merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is not .taken away nor is its discretion in any way fettered. 6. In the said view of the matter. I do not find any valid ground for interference in the writ jurisdiction. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed but without cost. Gurusharan Sharma, J.- I agree.