JUDGMENT Radha Mohan Prasad, J. 1. The present writ application has been filed by the Bihar Fruit and Vegetable Development Corporation, Patna (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation') questioning the validity of the award dated 22nd of July, 1988 given by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna, in Reference No. 1 of 1987 whereby and whereunder the dispute and point of reference contained in item no. 1, namely, "whether the termination of the service of Sarbshri Arun Kumar, Mithilesh Upadhyay, Satya Prasad Sinha, Narayanji Jha, Sheodeo Choudhary, Jitendra Kumar Singh, Dilip Kumar Singh, Prem Kumar, Sanjay Kumar, Devendra Prasad Singh and Sheo Shankar Singh is justified, if not to what relief they are entitled to” has been decided partly in favour of the management and partly in favour of the workmen. The workers have been directed by the Tribunal to be reinstated with full back wages with the condition that the salary/wages on their reinstatement will be the same which they were drawing at the time of the retrenchment subject to any revision of scale that might have been made in the meanwhile, and, that the period from the date of retrenchment to the date of reinstatement will not be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning seniority of the workmen among temporary employees. The Corporation has been left free to deal with its employees who are temporary, according to law. As regards item no. 2, "Whether such daily rated workers, who have served for more than 240 days can be regularised?", the Tribunal ordered that the services of the workers who have served for 240 days in one year have to be regularised on the lines indicated in the judgment. The Corporation (petitioner) has confined its prayer for quashing of the award only so far as it relates to item no. 2, whereby the Tribunal has directed for regularisation of the services of the workers who have served for more than 240 days in one year. 2. Mr. J. Krishna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Corporation in support of the petition, has contended that the appointments of the respondent workers being wholly illegal, the reference contained in item no. 2 itself was illegal and in any view of the matter, the Tribunal was not justified in granting relief for regularisation of their services. 2. Mr. J. Krishna, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Corporation in support of the petition, has contended that the appointments of the respondent workers being wholly illegal, the reference contained in item no. 2 itself was illegal and in any view of the matter, the Tribunal was not justified in granting relief for regularisation of their services. It has also been contended that the Corporation is closed since May, 1990 and the Cabinet Committee has already taken a decision to finally close down the Corporation and thus, it will not be possible to regularise the services of the employees who are/were on the rolls of the Corporation on daily rated basis. In support of his first contention, learned counsel referred to the various statements made in the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner wherein it has been stated that the Corporation has only one fruit processing unit at Hajipur which is seasonal and used to run for only 4 to 5 months in a year, and, that during the remaining period used to be idle-period, and it is also burdened by over-staffing. Further, it is stated that the workmen who are/were engaged in the Corporation on daily rated basis were not recruited in proper and legal way, as no vacancy was published nor the name from the Employment Exchange was called nor there was any written test, and, based on these it is contended that their initial engagement/recruitment were in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, and, consequently they do not have any right to continue in the job, even if the processing unit had not been closed. In support of this learned counsel relied upon various decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the High Courts and reliance is placed on the decisions of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees’ Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others ( AIR 1992 S.C. 789 ), Bhagwan Dass and others v. State of Haryana and others ( AIR 1987 S.C. 2049 ), Sitaram Thakur v. The State of Bihar and others ( 1993 (2) PLJR 140 ] and Mahender Ram v. Deputy Commissioner, Palamau and others (1989 BLT 27). 3. In reply to the said contention Mr. 3. In reply to the said contention Mr. Birendra Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent workmen, submitted that having taken part in the proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal and also having allowed the proceeding to come to an end, it is now not open for the Corporation to challenge the correctness or legality of the reference made to the Industrial Tribunal by the State Government as it is the settled principle of law that a party having taken part in a proceeding and allowed the same to come to an and cannot legally challenge the legality of the proceeding when the proceeding has been decided against him. Further, he contended that a party is not legally permitted to derive advantage out of its own wrong. Learned counsel also submitted that the question as to whether it would be justified to make those employees regular, who have worked for 240 days came up for consideration before the Industrial Tribunal, Patna and the Tribunal, while deciding the case, directed that those employees who had Completed 240 days of continuous satisfactory service were eligible for regularisalion. The matter ultimately went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court in, Civil Appeal No. 1509 (NL) of 1987 (The General Secretary, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna v, The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Patna and others), The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while deciding the case, held as follows : "Since it is admitted that a large number of people have been working as casual labourers for a long number of years, the question whether they were initially appointed regularly or irregularly becomes immaterial for the purpose of the question involved in this case. This court has in a number of decisions already rendered by it directed regularistion of casual labourers wherever it found that such labourers had been working for a number of years vide Daily rated casual labour employed under P. & T. Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch Vs. Union of India & ors. (1987) 2 Scale-844, U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association Vs. Union of India & others. Writ petition 1870 of 1986 decided on December 4, 1987 and Delhi Municipal Karamechari Ekta Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India & ors. (1987) 2 Scale-844, U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association Vs. Union of India & others. Writ petition 1870 of 1986 decided on December 4, 1987 and Delhi Municipal Karamechari Ekta Union (Regd.) Vs. Shri P.L. Singhla (Civil) Appeal No. 3821 (NL) of 1987 decided on December 7, 1987.” It has been contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court also did not interfere with the direction of the Industrial Tribunal in that very case and, further, directed the Corporation to prepare a scheme of regularisation of casual labourers who have been working for more than one year. 4. The other decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in the case of Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v, Delhi Administration, Delhi and others (Supra) wherein the Supreme Court refused the claim of the union to regularise the services of the workmen though they had put in more than 240 days. In my opinion, this decision is of no avail to the petitioner in the facts of the present case. In the said case, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the petitioners were given employment under the schemes which has been evolved to provide income for those who arc below the poverty line, and, particularly during the periods when they are without any source of livelihood, and, therefore, without any income whatsoever. The schemes were further meant for the rural poor, for, the object of the schemes was to start tackling the problem of poverty at that end. The object was not to provide the right to work as such even to the rural poor; much less to the unemployed in general. In that context the Supreme Court held that to get an employment under the schemes and to claim on the has is of the said employment, a right to regularisation is to frustrate the schemes themselves and that no Court can be a party to such exercise. The Division Bench further observed that a good deal of illegal employment market had developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. The Division Bench further observed that a good deal of illegal employment market had developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, their Lordships declined to accede to the request of the petitioners that the respondents be directed to regularise them. However, their Lordships directed the respondent, Delhi Administration, to keep them on a panel, and that if they are registered with the Employment Exchange and arc qualified for employment on the concerned posts, give them a preference in employment whenever there occurs a vacancy in the regular posts, which also was given by way of direction by their Lordships. 5. In the case of Bhagwan Dass and others v. State of Haryana and others (Supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the two-fold grievances of the petitioners, who were appointed us Supervisors in the Education Department of Haryana. The petitioners were seeking reliefs in the context that they were visited with mala fide deliberate breaks of one day after lapse of every six months, and, they were treated as temporary Government servants notwithstanding the fact that they had been continuously working ever since the date of their respective appointments since October 2, 1978, with the aforesaid breaks at intervals of six months instead of absorbing them as regular employees in regular pay scale, Secondly, they were claiming equal pay for equal work as were being given to their counterparts who were also discharging similar duties. The Supreme Court in the facts of that case, though declining to grant relief to them of absorption as regular employees on a permanent basis from the date of their initial appointment directed as follows: "V. “We hope and trust that the State of Haryana will not show displeasure at the petitioners who have approached this Court in order to vindicate their right to claim equal pay and that service of no petitioner would be terminated except on reaching the age of superannuation or by way of appropriate disciplinary action, or on abandonment of the Scheme. For the sake of abundant caution we direct accordingly. VI. For the sake of abundant caution we direct accordingly. VI. Fresh appointment orders will have to be issued reappointing the petitioners who have continued in service on the expiry of the six months period from time to time in order to give effect to the direction contained in clause V hereinabove," 6. In the Patna case of Sitaram Thakur v. The State of Bihar and others (supra), a Division Bench, while dealing with somewhat similar grievance where the services of the petitioners, who were engaged in a IVth grade employees on daily wages in March, 1983, were terminated as the orders of their appointment/promotion were illegal. In this background, the Division Bench held that there cannot be any doubt that if the orders of appointment were illegal being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution and/or Recruitment Rules framed under a statute or Article 309 of the Constitution, the principles of natural justice need not be complied with, inasmuch as, in such an event the concerned employees had not derived any right to hold or continue in the said post. In the said case, the Division Bench has also considered the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and others etc. v. Piara Singh and others (JT 1992 (5) S.C. 1791 also reported in AIR 1992 S.C. 2130 . The court noticed the fact that the Supreme Court itself has held even in the matter of appointment of ad hoc and temporary employees provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India are required to be complied with and, thus, held that there cannot be any doubt that in absence of statute or statutory rules, the State may formulate scheme and/or adopt policy decisions for regularisation of its ad hoc employees if they had been continued in employment for a number of years subject to the criteria laid down therefor and reservation policy of the State but, as in the given case there was no such decision as also the fact that the petitioner on his own showing was appointed without following the procedure laid down under the 1983 Rules or the provisions of Article 16, the Court declined to give any relief to the petitioner. In my opii1ion, it escaped from the notice of the Division Bench that in the case of Piara Singh (supra), the Bench of the Supreme Court comprising three Hon'ble Judges in paragraph 25 laid down the general law concerning the issue of regular/ad/hoc/temporary employees in Government services and not that it was only considering the policy decision of the State of Punjab and Haryana for regularisation of ad hoc employees, as noticed by the Division Bench in paragraph 45 of the judgment. 7. It is true that the Supreme Court itself has held that in the matter of appointment of ad hoc and temporary employees the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India are required to be complied with. But the Supreme Court, on consideration of the problem being faced over now and then concerning the issue of regularisation of ad hoc/temporary employees in Government service, laid down a general law in Piara Singh's case to govern in all cases in relation to work-charged employees/casual labour and held as follows : "So far as the work-charged "employees and casual labour are concerned, the effort must be to regularise them as far as possible and as early as possible subject to their fulfilling the qualifications, if any, prescribed for the post and subject also to availability for the post and subject also to availability of work. If a casual labourer has continued for a fairly long spell-say two or three years - a presumption may arise that there is regular need for his services. In such a situation, it becomes obligatory for the concerned authority to examine the feasibility of his regularisation. While doing so, the authorities ought to adopt a positive approach coupled with an empathy for the person. As has been repeatedly stressed by this Court, security of tenure is necessary for an employee to give his best to the job. £n this behalf, we do commend the orders of the Government of Haryana (contained in its letter dated 6.4,90 referred to hereinbefore) both in relation to work-charged employees as well as casual labour.” While laying down the aforementioned general law, the Supreme Court has carved out a special category in relation to the work-charged employees and casual labours. £n this behalf, we do commend the orders of the Government of Haryana (contained in its letter dated 6.4,90 referred to hereinbefore) both in relation to work-charged employees as well as casual labour.” While laying down the aforementioned general law, the Supreme Court has carved out a special category in relation to the work-charged employees and casual labours. In the said case it appears that the Supreme Court, keeping in view the various provisions of the labour laws, has purposely held that the effort must be to regularise them as far as possible and as early as possible subject to their fulfilling the qualifications, if any, prescribed for the post and availability of work. If a casual labourer is continued for a fairly long spell-say two or three years a presumption may arise that there is regular need for his services. In such a situation, the Supreme Court has said that it becomes obligetory for the concerned authority to examine the feasibility of his regularisation and, further, that while doing so, the authorities ought to adopt a positive approach coupled with an empathy for the person. Their, Lordships also reiterated the view that security of tenure is necessary for an employee to give his best to the job. 8. In the instant case, the workmen had filed a list with details of days in the month they have worked in the Corporation and the same was marked as Ext. 66. According to the Corporation, the said list was not correctly prepared and does not represent the correct facts. This aspect has been considered by the Tribunal in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment from which it appears that though the Tribunal gave sufficient time to the Corporation to verify the correctness of the same but they did not produce any paper controverting the same and simply filed a petition denying the correctness. Accordingly, Ext. 66 was held to be correct. 9. From the said Ext. 66, a photo copy of which has been filed in Court and is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the said workmen have been in the employment of the Corporation for the last several years i.e. since 1983-87 with only a break of few days. However, it is not in dispute that all workmen completed 240 days in a year. However, it is not in dispute that all workmen completed 240 days in a year. Further, it is not the case of the petitioner that the said workers are not qualified to be appointed. Even today work is being taken by the petitioner. Thus, I am unable to accept the contention of the petitioner that no work is available for the petitioner. The Tribunal rejected the contention raised on behalf of the Corporation that the workmen have not been appointed in a regular manner and the procedure relating to temporary appointments of the State Government and its various circulars have not been followed and that therefore, the very appointments being illegal they cannot be regularised and for that relied on the direction of the Supreme Court in the case of the General Secretary, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation, Patna (supra) bearing Civil Appeal No. 1509 (NL) of 1987 decided on 16.12.1987. In the said case, similar argument was advanced before the Tribunal and the same was accepted by it while giving an award, against which the Union moved the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court, while disposing of the said Civil Appeal, observed as follows: "We are concerned in this case with only one of the three questions referred to the Tribunal for its decision and that questions reads as follows : “Whether it would be justified to make regular those employees who have completed service for 240 days? The Tribunal while answering this question has directed, that only those employees who had been regularly employed and who had completed 240 days of continuous satisfactory service were eligible for regularisation. Since it is admitted that a large number of people have been working as casual labourers for a long number of years, the question whether they were initially appointed regularly or irregularly becomes immaterial for the purposes of the question involved in this case. This court has in a number of decisions already rendered by it directed regularisation of casual labourers wherever it found that, such labourers had been working for a number of years vide Daily Ruled Casual Labour Employed under P. & T. Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch Vs. Union of India & ors. (1987) 2 Scale - 844, U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association Vs. Union of India & ors. (1987) 2 Scale - 844, U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association Vs. Union of India & others, Writ petition 1870 of 1986 decided on December 4, 1987 and Delhi Municipal Karamchari Ekta Union (Regd.) Vs. Shri P.L. Singhla (Civil) Appeal No. 3921 (NL) of 1987 decided on December 7, 1987.” The Tribunal applying the same principle to the instant case held that the workers who, had completed 240 days of their services have to be regularised. In view of the aforementioned direction of the Supreme Court in identical case, I do not find any justification to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. 10. Further, the very word "regularisation" means 'to make regular' which implies that the action was irregular and the same is being cured. The words "regular" or "regularisation" are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments as was observed by the Supreme Court in the case of R.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1979 S.C. 1676 ). Thus, in my opinion, by regularising any appointment the procedural irregularity of any nature including making appointment without advertisement is condoned on equitable reasons. 11. In my opinion, to advance the constitutional philosophy behind security of employment and right to work, once the appointment continued for long the service should be regularised if the incumbents possess the requisite qualifications, and that it would be unfair and unreasonable to remove people who have been rendering services for specially long time, as such removal will have serious consequence. For the family of the employee which has settled down and being accommodated need as per the emoluments received by the breadwinner will have to face economic ruination if the job of the breadwinner is suddenly taken away. Besides, the base precious period of early life devoted in the service of the establishment will be wholly wasted and the incumbent may be rendered 'age barred' for securing a job elsewhere. It is indeed unfair to use him, generate hope and a feeling of security in him, attune his family to live within his earnings and then suddenly to throw him out of job. It is indeed unfair to use him, generate hope and a feeling of security in him, attune his family to live within his earnings and then suddenly to throw him out of job. Such behaviour has been held by the Supreme Could in the case of Jacob M. Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority ( AIR 1990 S.C. 2228 ) (Para 15) to be an affront to the concept of job security and that it would run counter to the constitutional philosophy, particularly the concept of right to work in Article 41 of the Constitution. In the said case, while approving the rule of the Kerala Government regularising the services of those who had been in continuous service for two years prior to the cut-off date, it was held that the employees, who were serving on the establishment for long spells and had the requisite qualifications for the job should not be thrown out and their services should be regularised as far as possible. 12. In Piara Singh's case (supra) the Supreme Court. while laying down the general law concerning the issue of regularisation of ad/hoc/temporary employees in Government service, held that if for any reason (underlining is mine) such employee is continued for a fairly long spell the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment docs not run counter to the, reservation policy of the State. In my opinion, the words "if for any reason" are of wide import and include a situation where the authorities overlook or fail to notice the illegality, If irregularity in the appointment and the appointment is continued for fairly long spell and the work subsists, the authorities are bound to consider his case for regularisation subject only to the aforementioned conditions laid down by the Supreme Court. 15. The Supreme Court in the case of Surya Narain Yadav und others V. Bihar State Electricity Board and others (AIR 1988 S.C. 941) also invoked the principle, of equitable doctrine and held that the Board was bound to regularise the appointments of the appellants who had been taken as Trainee Engineers initially and had been continued since long to be in the employment of the Board and accordingly confirmed the mandamus earlier issued to the Board to offer regular appointment to the appellants of the said case. The relevant passage may usefully be quoted hereunder: "4. We have referred to these two documents out of several of them available on the record to show that the Board was aware of the position that these trainee engineers formed a special class and very peculiar circumstances warranted a definitely special treatment in regard to them. Yet it is unfortunate that a statutory body like the Board has failed to stand up to its representations made from time to time to a group of engineers who had spent years of their valuable life for qualifying, themselves as engineers and who believing the representation of the Board and acting upon the same continued to remain in the employment of the Board as trainee engineers forgoing opportunities available to seek other employments and in the process have become age-barred for any public employment This Court almost a score of years hack in clear language indicated in Union of India V. Indo Afghan Agencies (1968) 2 SCR 366 : (AIR 1168 S.C. 718) (Para 23): (Quotation omitted) In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCC 409 : ( AIR 1979 SC 621 ), this Court went ahead to state that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not really based on the principle of estoppel, but it is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent injustice and it can be basis of a cause of action. 5. In our view, the principle relied upon in these cases has full application to the facts before as. The Board is a statutory authority and is 'State' within the meaning of Art. 22 of the Constitution. The Board has tried to seek, shelter under a set of rules framed by it in exercise of the powers vested under S. 79) of the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948. In the peculiar facts of the case we are of the view that the deference is illplaced and cannot hold as a shield against the application of the equitable doctrine. Admittedly, the trainee engineers before us formed a specific class and from time to time the Board treated them as members of a class and in its resolution of April 26, 1979, recognized this fact and swore to the position that such treatment should never be repeated even if apprentice engineers were appointed.” 14. Admittedly, the trainee engineers before us formed a specific class and from time to time the Board treated them as members of a class and in its resolution of April 26, 1979, recognized this fact and swore to the position that such treatment should never be repeated even if apprentice engineers were appointed.” 14. In the case of K.S.P. College Stop-Gap Lecturers Association Vs. State of Karnataka ( AIR 1992 S.C. 677 ) also the Supreme Court involved the equitable doctrine and issued direction that the "service of such temporary teachers who have worked as such for three years, including the break till today shall not be terminated. They shall be absorbed as and when regular vacancies arise". It was further directed that "From the date of judgment every temporary teachers should be paid salary as is admissible to teachers appointed against permanent post. Such teachers shall be continued in service even during vacations". 15. Thus, in my opinion, if the authorities concerned do not wake up even after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Piara Singh (supra) and are not vigilant in detecting the irregularities in any appointment at the earliest stage i.e. before as employee has already continued for a fairly long spell, then they cannot be allowed to question the legality of the appointment of such an employee and such employee will be entitled for regularisation of service subject to the conditions as laid down by the Supreme Court in Piara Singh's case (supra). 16. Learned counsel for the workmen also contended that the facts of this case have not correctly been placed before this Court. None of the posts held by the workmen carry any work of seasonal nature. The Company is engaged in the product of tomato, mango, lichi, pineapples, guavas, raswanti and various other items. It has further been contended by Mr. Sinha that the pica raised by the petitioner that the workmen carry work of seasonal nature has only been raised to accommodate the favourites of the high-ups and to deny the benefit of their long service in the Corporation. Further, it has been contended that the piea that the Corporation is running in loss and is on the verge of closure have been mala fide raised for the first time in this Court and was never raised before the Tribunal. Further, it has been contended that the piea that the Corporation is running in loss and is on the verge of closure have been mala fide raised for the first time in this Court and was never raised before the Tribunal. It has been contended that a large number of orders for a huge quantity of the products of the Corporation were not fulfilled and the demand or the orders were refused by the Corporation due to deliberate creation of the situation by the high-ups to show the Corporation to be a failure with an oblique purpose to lease out or to sell it in connivance with sourceful men for some undisclosed reasons. In this regard certain correspondences have been produced as Annexures E Series. Learned counsel also contended that the Corporation has mala fide taken the plea of absorption of 22 such employees of the Corporation in some other departments. It has been denied by him that there is any move of closure of the Corporation. According to him, such pleas have been taken by the Corporation only to exploit the workmen by taking work from them by only paying at the rate of Rs. 15.85 per day. It is also contended that the Corporation is not considering the case of respondent intervenors only due to the pendency of the instant writ application and by taking undue advantage of the interim order passed by this Court on 4.10.1989 even though this Court, while passing the said interim order, observed that pendency of the writ application will not stand in the way of taking any decision to implement the award. In support of the same learned counsel has referred to the proceedings of the Corporation at the meetings held on 5.12.1990, 30.12.1991 and 16.12.1992, true copies of which are annexed as Annexures A and B to the petition for vacating the stay and annexure I of the reply to the supplementary affidavit filed on their behalf. The aforementioned facts have not been disputed by the Corporation. 17. However, as I have found no legal infirmity in the award of the Tribunal which has been given relying on the precedent laid by the Supreme Court in the case of similar nature, I do not feel it necessary to consider the last contentions mentioned above. Accordingly, this writ application is dismissed but without costs.