JUDGMENT M. S. Rane, J. - Point of considerable significance arises for consideration with regard to the power of the court to pass interim orders in the proceedings adopted for challenging the awards rendered by the Arbitrator, in the context of provisions of Section 18, of the Arbitration Act, (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act' in brief. 2. The matter is before this court in some what peculiar circumstances which would require appraisal. 3. The petitioners M/s. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. have filed the petition herein under Section 30, of the said Act, challenging the award dated 8th March, 1995 made by the two Arbitrators against them and in favour of 1st Respondents, a company registered under the laws of Geneva and carrying on business at geneva, Switzerland for the sum of US $ 2,25,000 together with interest at the rate 18% p.a. plus a sum Rs. 1,00,000/- on account of cost, which has been admitted on file of this Court. 4. After admission the respondents have presented the above interim petition seeking relief that the petitioners be orders and directed to deposit the entire amount due under the Award in the court with liberty to the respondents to withdraw the same against furnishing the Bank Guarantee. It is abvious that such a relief is claimed by recourse to the provisions as contained in Section 18, of the said Act. 5. The matter was heard be my brother Judge Dhanuka, who by his order dated 21st June, 1993 directed the petitioners to deposit a sum of Rs. 50 lacs and/or furnish a Bank Guarantee of the said amount. However, before signing the said Judgment on 23rd June, 1993, my said brother Judge passed further order, which I reproduce and which would speak for itself. "By my order dated 21.6.1993, dictated in court. I have directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 50 lacs and/or furnish a Bank Guarantee. The said order is not yet signed. There is a dispute about the power of court to pass such an Order under Section 18, of Arbitration Act, 1940. The Division Bench Judgment of High Court of Calcutta in the case of Executive Officer Durgas Officer notified Area Authority v. Emergency Construction, has now been brought to my notice. The said order is not yet signed. There is a dispute about the power of court to pass such an Order under Section 18, of Arbitration Act, 1940. The Division Bench Judgment of High Court of Calcutta in the case of Executive Officer Durgas Officer notified Area Authority v. Emergency Construction, has now been brought to my notice. In all fairness, the question of granting interim relief under Section 18, of the Arbitration Act, 1940 shall have to be considered. Xerox copy of the said judgment is made available to learned counsel on both sides. By consent fixed for rehearing in respect of interim relief on 6.7.1993, interim order passed earlier is set aside. Liberty to both parties to file affidavit." 6. It is this circumstance that the matter is before this court. 7. Heard both the counsel. Perused the pleadings filed by the respective parties. 8. It would be convenient to produce Section 18, of the said Act. "Section 18. Power of Court to pass interim Orders. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 17, at any time after the filing of the award, whether notice of the filing has been served or not upon being satisfied by affidavit or otherwise that a party has taken or is about to take steps to defeat, delay or obstruct the execution of nay decree may be passed upon the award or that speedy execution of the award is just and necessary, the court may pass such interim orders as it deems necessary. 2. An person against whom such interim orders, have been passed may show cause against such orders, and the court, after hearing the parties, may pass such further orders as it deems necessary and just." From the plain reading of the above section it seeks to postulate: (i) After filing of the Award in the Court, it is imperative that court should satisfy that the party against whom Award is made, is conducting or acting in a manner so as to defeat delay or obstruct the execution of any decree that may be passed on the basis of the Award, and (ii) that court considers that speedy excution of the Award is justified by the circumstance and is necessary. It is to be notice that the said provisions contemplate two situations. It is to be notice that the said provisions contemplate two situations. The first part proceeds almost on the identical line there of as obtained in Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which seeks to provide sort of a guarantee against decree becoming infructuous from want of property available from which the decree holder can satisfy the decree. It is necessary however to satisfy that the defendant has acted or is about to act with intent to obstruct or delay the execution of the decree that may be passed against him. To that extent, even in the case of application under Section 18, of the said Act, as made in the instant case, the party in whose favour Award has been made must satisfy that the party against whom the Award is made has acted in the manner as mentioned in 1st part of Section 18 with intent to defeat, delay or obstruct etc. 9. However, second part of Section 18, which empowers the court to pass interim order for ensuring speedy execution of the Award in the cases where circumstances so justify is something unique provisions. It is relevant to note the expression appearing in the said section "Speedy execution of the Award". Such situation is no available in the Order 38 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore power under Section 18, of the said Act is much wider than Order 38 Rule 5. This is what the Divisional Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Executive Officer v. Emergency Construction and others (which my brother Judge Dhanuka has referred to in his order dated 23rd June, 1993) has observed in para 10 while construing the said provisions. "10. But the Section expressly provides making of such an interim order in another situation, namely when it is so necessary for speedy and expeditious execution of the award itself. It may seem anomalous that the act having expressly provided a scheme where execution in respect of an award can be made only when a decree is passed upon the award, it would still empower execution of an award by the interim order even before the judgment is passed on the same. But, in our view, the legislature reserved in court such a power necessarily to be exercised very sparingly and only in exceptional cases. But, in our view, the legislature reserved in court such a power necessarily to be exercised very sparingly and only in exceptional cases. The Court's power to enforce an award even before a judgment is delivered thereon leave being obtained therefore from the court on such terms as it may consider just was not unknown and was recognised by law (See Radman on Arbitration 5th Edition page 210 and R.S.C. Order 42 Rule 5). Some Courts did interpret Section 15(1) of the Act of 1899 to vest with courts such a power. It is in that background that the legislature intervened to take away such a power generally on the new scheme introduced by Section 17, at the same time providing an exception in Section 18. It should be instructive to note that Section 18, starts with a non-obstinate clause "notwithstanding anything contained in Section 17." Why was the legislature overriding in Section 17 ? Obviously it was so doing to empower the Court contrary to the scheme introduced by Section 17 to enforce an award even before the judgment is passed thereon is exceptional cases. In this view we feel inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Roy Chowdhury that the scheme of Section 18, is much too wider than those of Rule 1 or 5 of Order 38 of the Code and in exceptional cases by an interim order the court as the power to direct enforce ment of an award or a part thereof even before any judgment is passed on such an award. Such a power only has to be exercised with circumspection and care and can be made only in exceptional cases which makes it necessary for the court to do so". 10. It would thus be clear that the court has under Section 18 of the said Act to pass interim order if two eventualities specified therein are fulfilled. Such power, which is discretionary, has to be exercised with circumspect, especially when order is required to be made in the second set of category namely it is necessary to do so and circumstances so warrant to do. 11. Such power, which is discretionary, has to be exercised with circumspect, especially when order is required to be made in the second set of category namely it is necessary to do so and circumstances so warrant to do. 11. It is further to be noted that when the petition challenging the Award is admitted by the court, as in the instant case, it presupposes the satisfaction of the court, although prima facie, there being substance and merits to the challenges as made by the petitioner impeaching the Award. The statute provides and recognises the remedy to challenge the Award and if the party chooses to exercise the legal remedy and where the court is prima facie convinced there being merits in the challenges and admits the petition for further probe then it cannot be said that such an act of party to follow legal remedy would tantamount to an act aimed at defeating, delaying or obstructing etc." If challenges of the Award are false frivolous, then it is open to the court to reject the same at threshold itself. But it would not be just and proper to hold that filing of such an objection is itself an act or attempt calculated to delay defeat, etc., and to impose the condition of deposit of the amount of the Award even before the disposal of the challenge petition on merits. Certainly such is not the situation contemplated in the said section. 12. Furthermore, satisfactory material be placed before the court that the part against whom Award is made acting in a manner so as to defeat, delay or obstruct the execution of anticipated decree. In such contingency, it would be justified for the court to pass appropriate interim order as provided in the first part of the said Section 18 of the said Act. 13. Even while applying the provisions of sub-section 2, of the said Section 18, the circumstances should be such as to justify and warrant passing of an interim order. The contingency of the case must demand such course of action and it only in such exceptional cases the court can exercise its power under sub-cluase 2 to pass interim order even before passing of the judgment on such Award. The contingency of the case must demand such course of action and it only in such exceptional cases the court can exercise its power under sub-cluase 2 to pass interim order even before passing of the judgment on such Award. Such cases of instances may be there where contract between the parties has been kept alive and continued as was the position in the case before the Calcutta High Court i.e. Executive Officer v. Emergency Construction (supra) where the work of construction was in progress and dispute arose in the midst and in the process of construction over payment to be made for the work carried out and completed by phases. The facts disclose that the reference to the arbitrator was by consent and Award made was uncontested. To avoid further escalation in the cost of building material and idle labour, the payment as awarded under the Award has to be made immediately and cannot be deferred till the disposal of the challenge petition. The contract between the parties was still on going contract. In such cases the interim order was perfectly justified under sub-section 2, of the said section. 14. Turning to the facts and circumstances in the matter herein at the outset I may state that the applicant-respondent No. 1 herein have not been able to make out a case for grant of any reliefs either by way of calling the petitioner to deposit the amount payable under the Award or furnish the security to that extent for more than one reason. Inasmuch as the affidavit does not disclose even remotely that the Petitioners have acted or taken such steps or conducted in such manner which would be indicative of the fact that the they are out to defeat to delay or to obstruct execution of the decree that may be passed under the Award. No allegations even remotely are found in that behalf in the affidavit filed in this application. The second factor which will militate against the grant of any relief of this application is that as far as financial solvency of petitioners is concerned it is a public limited company, a public sector, major part of which is owned by the Union of India. In their affidavit in reply the petitioners have grafically stated their standing both financially and with regard to other sources to which the respondent has to answer. 15. In their affidavit in reply the petitioners have grafically stated their standing both financially and with regard to other sources to which the respondent has to answer. 15. The next factor to be considered in the matter is that the affiant (sic) who has declared the affidavit on himself of the 1st respondent in support of this interim application, has not disclosed in what capacity he has been authorised to do so or how he is concerned with the 1st respondent-company. The petitioners were right in their contention that the person authorised on behalf of the 1st respondent has not made the affidavit in support of the application and on perusal of the affidavit filed on behalf of the 1st respondent this is amply borne out. 16. To sum up, therefore, I do not filed any merits in the interim application. No case has been made out as required under the provisions of Section 18, clauses 1 and 2 of the said Act. No circumstances have also been shown justifying the grant or reliefs as claimed in the present application. Consequently, the application stands dismissed with no order as to costs. Application dismissed.