JUDGMENT NISITH KUMAR BATABYAL, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 25th February, 1993 passed by a Learned Single Judge of this Court in C.R. No. 13552 (W) of 1982 (Messrs. Accounting & Secretarial Services Pvt. Ltd. & another vs. Union of India & other) The appellants-petitioners filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the ex parte order passed by the Estate Officer, United Commercial Bank dated 25th November, 1982 directing the petitioner to vacate the premises no. 1B, Russel Street, Calcutta by 31st December, 1982. The said order was passed under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The vires of s. 3 of P.P. Act, 1971 was also assailed as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. In short, the facts of the case are that the United Commercial Bank, respondent no. 2 in the appeal is the owner of premises no.1B, Russel Street, Calcutta. The appellants claim to be the tenant in respect of the disputed premises at a monthly rental of Rs. 1000/- for carrying on business therein. By an agreement between the appellant no.1 and the respondent no.2 dated 3rd January, 1962, the Bank permitted the Company to occupy and use a portion of the disputed premises for carrying on its business there and also use certain furniture, fittings, office equipments, air-conditioner etc. belonging to the Company on certain terms and conditions. The parties thereafter mutually agreed to enter into a fresh agreement on, 20th March, 1972. Under that agreement the Company was to use and occupy the disputed premises at 1B, Russel street, Calcutta for its business and also use the furniture, fittings, equipments etc. which were being used so long and the Company would pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- per month to the Bank as compensation plus the occupier's share of the Municipal Tax in respect of the said premises. The charges for electricity on June by the Company would also be borne by the Company itself. It was further agreed that at the request of the Company, the Bank would continue its guarantee to IBM for payment of rent due and payable by the Company to the IRM in respect of certain machines on condition that the Company would procure in favour of the Bank a counter guarantee within a specified time. It was further agreed that at the request of the Company, the Bank would continue its guarantee to IBM for payment of rent due and payable by the Company to the IRM in respect of certain machines on condition that the Company would procure in favour of the Bank a counter guarantee within a specified time. By a notice dated 15th December, 1972 the Bank gave a notice to the appellant no. 1 to quit vacate the disputed premises and deliver up vacant possession in their occupation by 1st July, 1973. The appellant no.1 was also asked by that notice to deliver to the Bank the furniture, fittings, equipments and air-conditioner etc. belonging to the Bank. 3. In October, 1975 the respondent no.2 issued another notice under s. 13(6) of the W.B.P.T. Act, 1965 calling upon the appellant no.1 to quit and vacate the premises in dispute but no suit for eviction was instituted on the basis of that notice. On 4th February, 1977 the respondent no.2 appointed one of its officers as Estate Officer who issued a notice under Ss. 4(1) and 7(3) of the P.P. Act, 1971. 4. Thereafter the appellant no.1 filed a writ application challenging the taking of resort to the P.P. Act, 1971 by the Bank contending that the Act could not extend to any premises held by a Government Corporation and such extension was beyond the legislative competence of the Central Government. That matter was referred to a Division Bench by one Learned Single Judge of this Court as an important point of law was involved. The Division Bench dismissed the writ petition. The apex Court of the land confirmed the judgment of the Division Bench. 5. Ultimately, the respondent no.3 in the appeal was appointed an Estate Officer by a Notice dated 14th February, 1982. According to the appellants, the recourse of the P.P. Act is not bona fide. It is also alleged that though in October, 1975 the respondent Bank issued a Notice under s. 13(6) of the W.B.P.T. Act, ultimately they resiled from that portion and treated the appellant no.1 as a licencee to evade the provisions of the Tenancy Act and to invoke the provisions of the P.P. Act, 1971. Therefore, the respondent no.2 is behaving arbitrarilly like a private landlord to achieved the purpose of getting rid of the appellants as a tenant. 6. Therefore, the respondent no.2 is behaving arbitrarilly like a private landlord to achieved the purpose of getting rid of the appellants as a tenant. 6. The appellants have also attacked the order passed by the Estate Officer pursuant to the notice dated 14th April, 1982 on the ground that the said order is in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice. On 16th February, 1982 an application was filed by the appellants before the Estate Officer was pleased to reject the petition whereupon the Estate Officer was requested to keep the matter in abeyance for sometime for taking the matter to a higher forum for adjudication. On 12th October, 1982 the case was fixed for hearing and the Learned Advocate for the appellants could not appear due to the sudden demise of one of his relations. The prayer was made for adjournment of the case but it was rejected though he did not record any formal order of rejection on the self same date the Estate Officer heard the argument of the respondent no.2 Bank in the absence of he Learned Advocate for the appellants and concluded the proceedings ex parte. On 25th November, 1982 the Estate Officer issued the order of eviction in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice resulting in grave injustice to the appellants. The next contention of the appellants is that the impugned order is devoid of jurisdiction because the appointment of the respondent no.3 in the appeal as Estate Officer is its self invalid being an abuse of the statutory power under P.P. Act, 1971. According to them the respondent no.3 has no legal experience or training and is an employee of the respondent no.1 and thus he cannot be taken as a person competent to adjudicate and decide upon the legal questions involved in the proceedings. According to appellants s. 3 of the P.P. Act, 1971 does not lay down any qualification of the Estate Officer and leaves the matter entirely to the unbridled discresion of the Central Government which yields unguided power to appoint as Statutory Officer any person irrespective of whether he has a judicial experience or a person capable of acting independently. 7. The case of the respondent-Bank is that the appellant no.1 was never a tenant of the premises in dispute but a mere licencee. 7. The case of the respondent-Bank is that the appellant no.1 was never a tenant of the premises in dispute but a mere licencee. The Bank decided to construct a multi-storied building at the site of the said premises to meet the increased requirement for office space for the Bank. The licence was accordingly revoked and the appellant no.1 was asked to quit upon delivering vacant possession before 1st July, 1973. The vacant possession was absolutely necessary as the first step towards implementing the Bank's plan for erection of a multi-storied building. As the appellant no.1 refused to vacate the premises, therefore, the Bank was forced to initiate proceedings under the P.P. Act, 1971. According to the Bank, the appellant no.1 has no legal right to hold on to the property after the termination of the licence. All the legal contentions raised by the appellant no.1 in the writ petition have been challenged by the Bank. According to the Bank, there is no substance in the contention of the writ petitioner. 8. The learned Trial Judge in his elaborate judgment has been pleased to hold that the appellant no.1 was only a licencee and not tenant under the Bank. The learned Judge has further held that there is nothing wrong with the appointment of the respondent no.3 as Estate Officer. It has been further held that there is no substance in the challenge thrown to the validity of s. 3 of the P.P. Act, 1971. The Learned Judge has also been pleased to hold that the guidelines of the Government of India issued on 8th February, 1992 in the matter of invoking the provisions of the P.P. Act, 1972 for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises clearly spelt out. The conditions for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and the same hardly give any advantage to the appellant no.1 in this case as the said Company became a simple unauthorised occupant after the termination of the licence. The Learned Court below has accordingly dismissed the writ application. 9. The conditions for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and the same hardly give any advantage to the appellant no.1 in this case as the said Company became a simple unauthorised occupant after the termination of the licence. The Learned Court below has accordingly dismissed the writ application. 9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order of dismissal the appellants have come before this Court contending, inter alia, that the Learned Judge erred in law and in fact in dismissing the writ application, that the Learned Judge failed to consider that after the issue of the guidelines by the Central Government was to review the ongoing eviction proceeding for continuation/withdrawal of the proceeding, that the Learned Judge erred in law and in fact in not considering that the impugned order of eviction passed by the Learned Estate Officer was in gross violation of the principles of natural justice; that the Learned Judge ought to have held that the respondent no.3 in the appeal was incompetent to be appointed as Estate Officer; that the Learned Judge ought to have held that the appellant company was a tenant under the Bank and not a licencee and that the impugned judgment should be set aside. 10. The Learned Counsel for the appellants have mainly restricted themselves before us on two points. His first contention is that the appellant company was a tenant under the respondent Bank. The second contention is that the guidelines issued by the Government of India though long after the passing of the order by the Estate Officer is binding upon the respondent-Bank which was bound to review the eviction case earlier instituted by them. The Public Sector Enterprises or the Central Government has a duty to review the ongoing eviction proceeding for continuation or withdrawal under the guidelines. As the matter was not done in this case causing injustice to the appellant company, therefore, it is a fit case where interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was called for. It has been further argued that the appellant company had a legitimate expectation after the issuance of the guidelines that their case would be reviewed by the appropriate authority but as the same has not been done, therefore, it is a case of an arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of administrative discretion by the appropriate authority. 11. It has been further argued that the appellant company had a legitimate expectation after the issuance of the guidelines that their case would be reviewed by the appropriate authority but as the same has not been done, therefore, it is a case of an arbitrary and irresponsible exercise of administrative discretion by the appropriate authority. 11. In paragraph 3 of the said agreement dated 20.3.1972 it has been specifically stated as follows:- "3. The Bank will permit the company to me and occupy the portion of its premises at 1B, Russel Street, Calcutta which is now under occupation of the Company and also used the furniture, fittings, equipments, air-conditioner etc. which has been using so long and the company will pay a sum of Rs. 1000/- per month to the Bank as compensation for such use and occupation. In addition to the sum of Rs. 1000/- to be paid as aforesaid by the company to the Bank, the company also agrees to pay to the Bank a sum equivalent to the occupier's share of the Corporation Tax in respect of the premises. The charges for electricity consumed by the company in the said premises will also be paid and borne by the company. The above sums shall be paid by the company to the Bank within 7 days of the receipt of the Bank's bill." 12. Regarding withdrawal of the permission given to the company it has been specifically stated in paragraph 4 of the said agreement as follows:- "4. The Bank may withdraw its permission given to the company for use and occupation of a portion of the said premises and the use of furniture, fittings etc. as aforesaid by giving six months notice in writing to the company. The company shall on expiry of the said period deliver up vacant possession of the portion of the said premises and the furniture, fittings, equipments etc. notice to the Bank." 13. It appears from the letters exchanged between the parties that the expression rent has found place in the letter dated 26.12.1973 written by the Bank to the appellant company vide page 112 of the Paper Book as also in the letter dated 19th July, 1973 written by the appellant company to the respondent Bank vide page 106 of the paper Book in which a reference has been made to some debit notes for maintenance of the office premises. Moreover, in the letter dated 8th October, 1975 written by the Solicitors for the respondents Bank to the appellant company (vide page 113 of the Paper Book in 6 paragraph) it has been stated as follows:- "In the alternative, if you claim to be a tenant, notice is hereby given terminating the tenancy on the expiry of the month of April, 1976 and you are called upon to make over quit, vacant and peaceful possession of the said portion with all furniture and fittings and equipments etc. belonging to the Bank on the expiry of the said date." 14. It has been argued by the learned Counsel for the respondent Bank that a mere mention of the expression like tenant or rent in the debit note or in any letter will not create a tenancy unless a tenancy was in fact created between the parties. The learned Counsel for the appellants does not dispute this legal contention. So it is clear that the dispute is not so much about the principles of law but about its application here. The learned Counsel for the appellants has placed much emphasis upon sixth paragraph in the letter dated 8th October, 1975 written by the Solicitors of the respondent Bank to the appellant company to underline the fact that there is a dear admission of tenancy in favour of the company by the Bank. This point was argued at length in the Learned Trial Court also the general principle is that when one party tries to bank upon the admission of the other party in a document, the said document has got to be taken as a whole. A party relying upon the admission cannot be allowed to skip over inconvenient portion and take advantage only of the portion which is in his favour. Paragraph 2 of the said letter is very clear. In paragraph 6, it has been already mentioned above that a reference has been made to the expression tenant, if the company claims itself so. Then in the seventh paragraph it has been again stated that the company is not entitled to the benefit of the State Tenancy Law. Paragraph 2 of the said letter is very clear. In paragraph 6, it has been already mentioned above that a reference has been made to the expression tenant, if the company claims itself so. Then in the seventh paragraph it has been again stated that the company is not entitled to the benefit of the State Tenancy Law. Then in the last paragraph it has again been stated that the notice be treated as a notice terminating the leave and licencee and in the alteration also as a notice under s. 13(6) of the W.B.P.T. Act, 1956 and a notice under the T.P. Act. 15. The Bank has permitted the company to occupy a portion of its premises at 1B, Russel Street, Calcutta within certain furniture, and fittings of the Bank therein for a compensation of Rs. 1000/- per month for occupation plus charges for electricity consumed and occupier's share of the Municipal tax. It was further stipulated that the permission could be withdrawn by giving six months' notice to the company whereupon the company would be bound to deliver up vacant possession with the furniture and fittings etc. It appears in the company's letter dated 18th August, 1973 (at page 155 of the Paper Book) the Bank has used the expression rent for the months of January, February and March, 1973. It also appears from page 133 of the Paper Book the Solicitors of the Bank in a notice described the company alternatively as a tenant though in the same letter the tenant was described as a licencee not protected under W.B.P.T. Act, 1956. 16. The learned Counsel for the appellant company has submitted that by applying the real test for determining whether a tenancy or a licence has been created, as laid down in the following cases, it can be inferred that the relationship which was created between the parties in this case was one of landlord and tenant not that of a licencor and a licencee. 17. In this context, Dr. Tapas Banerjee, learned Counsel has referred the principles laid down in Associated Hotel of India vs. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262 . 17. In this context, Dr. Tapas Banerjee, learned Counsel has referred the principles laid down in Associated Hotel of India vs. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262 . In that case it was laid down that where the question is whether the documents is a lease or licence, it is the substance of the agreement that matters and not form, or otherwise clever drafting may camouflage the real intention of the parties. In paragraph 27 of the reported judgment at page 1269 it has been laid down as follows:- "The following propositions made, therefore, be taken as well established:- (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form. (2) The real test is the intention of the parties-whether they intended to create a lease or a licence. (3) If the document creates an interest in the property it is a lease, but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence. (4) If under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property prima facie, he is considered to be a tenant but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease." 18. In the reported case though Justice Subba Rao delivered the minority judgment still on this point there was no difference of opinion amongst the Hon'ble Members of the Bench. 19. The learned Counsel has also referred to the principles laid down in B.M. Lall vs. Dunlop Rubber Co., AIR 1968 SC 175 . In that case it has held that a lease is the transfer of a right to enjoy the premises, whereas a licence is a privilege to do something on the premises which otherwise shall be unlawful. If the agreement is in writing, it is a question of construction of the agreement having regard to its terms and where its language is ambiguous, having regard to its object and the circumstances under which it was executed whether the rights of the occupier are those of a lessee or a licencee. The transaction is a lease, if it grants an interest in the land; it is a licence if it gives a personal privilege with no interest in the land. The transaction is a lease, if it grants an interest in the land; it is a licence if it gives a personal privilege with no interest in the land. The question is not of words, but of substance, and the label which the parties chooses to put upon the transaction, though relevant, is not decisive. The test of exclusive possession is not conclusive though it is a very important indication in favour of tenancy. The principles laid down in the Associated Hotel of India vs. R.N. Kapoor, (supra) were affirmed in this case. 20. The learned Counsel Dr. Banerjee has also referred to the principles laid down in Board of Revenue & other vs. A.M. Ansari & other, (1976)3 SCC 512 . In that case it has been held that a licence does not create an interest in the property to which it relates whereas a lease does. There is in other words transfer of a right to enjoy the property in case of a lease. As to whether a particular transaction creates a lease or a licence is always a question of intention of the parties which is to be inferred from the circumstances of each case. For the purpose of deciding whether a particular grant amounts to a lease or a licencee, it is essential, therefore, to look to the substance and essence of the grant and not to its form. 21. It is thus clear that this case also reiterate the principles laid down in Board of Revenue & other vs. A.M. Ansari & other, (1976)3 SCC 512 Associated Hotel of India Ltd. case (supra). 22. The learned Counsel Dr. Banerjee has also referred to the principles laid down in Dipak Banerjee vs. Smt. Lilabati, AIR 1987 SC 2055 . In that case the question was whether an alleged sub-tenant was in exclusive possession of the part of the premises and whether the tenant had retained no control over that part of the pren1ises. Therefore the principles: laid down in this case cannot have any bearing on the questions in issue in our case here. 23. In that case the question was whether an alleged sub-tenant was in exclusive possession of the part of the premises and whether the tenant had retained no control over that part of the pren1ises. Therefore the principles: laid down in this case cannot have any bearing on the questions in issue in our case here. 23. It is clear from above that in a chain of decisions handed down since the last part of the fifth decade of this century it has been consistently held that whether there was a relationship of landlord and tenant as distinguished from the relationship of a licencor and a licencee between the parties, will depend upon the intention of the parties, the substance of the agreement, if any, the external indicia like exclusive possession and the fact whether there was any transfer of interest in the demised property. 24. In this case a very peculiar feature of the agreement is that the Bank at the request of the company continues its guarantee to IBM for payment of rent due and payable by the company to the IBM in respect of certain machines described in the schedule to the agreement. Another uncommon thing about the agreement is a list of machines in the schedule to the same. An out and out agreement for lease would certainly have no connection with the list of machines which the so called tenant was going to keep in the premises let out. Moreover its letter unthinkable though the so called landlord would act as a guarantor to some financial liability of the would be tenant in the premises let out. These very expectional elements had to be considered along with the expression used in the document will permit the company to use and occupy and Bank may withdraw its permission given to the company for arriving at the real intention of the parties. It is too much true to expect that if the real intention was to create a relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties, the Bank would agree to continue its guarantee to IBM for payment of sum payable by the company to the IBM in respect of the machines mentioned in the schedule. In the normal course, there was no justification for inclusion of a list of machines unconnected with the lease in the body of the agreement. In the normal course, there was no justification for inclusion of a list of machines unconnected with the lease in the body of the agreement. What is generally found in the schedule to the deed of lease is the description of the demised premises. At least no satisfactory explanation has been given why the so called landlord undertook the risk of the financial liability by becoming a guarantor to IBM for any sum due and payable by the company. The documents upon which the company is relying to prove its case are the letter dated 8th October, 1975 at page 113 of the Paper Book written by the petitioner's Solicitor, letter of the Bank dated 28th August, 1973 the company page 229 of the Paper Book) and the letter dated 19th July, 1973 written by the company to the Bank (vide page 106 of the Paper Book). It is made very clear that the letter of the Bank's Solicitor is not an admission of the tenancy because if the document is construed as a whole then it is not only an admission. It is also an assertion of the Bank's case of licence. Regarding the other papers, mentioned above, it is sufficient to note that the expression rent has been used in the notes by the accounting-staff claiming the amount due for three months. The office letter is written in the background of this demand by the Accounts Departments. The mere use of the expression rent in the said letter cannot be considered divorced from the terms of the agreement of January, 1972. Thus from a consideration of the facts, circumstances and probabilities of the case it can be concluded that there was no intention between the parties to create a lease. The finding of the learned Trial Court on this point is accordingly affirmed. 25. It is true that the so called guidelines referred to above were not in existence when the proceeding before the Estate Officer was concluded. The said guidelines came into existence about a decade thereafter. Naturally the question arises whether the guidelines will cover a case which was decided about 10 years before the guidelines saw in the light of the day. 26. Let us assume for the sake of argument only that the guidelines will apply in such a case. The said guidelines came into existence about a decade thereafter. Naturally the question arises whether the guidelines will cover a case which was decided about 10 years before the guidelines saw in the light of the day. 26. Let us assume for the sake of argument only that the guidelines will apply in such a case. We have to consider whether in such a situation any benefits can flow to the appellants. There is no doubt that the guidelines cannot cover the case of a licensee whose licence has been lawfully terminated. The next question is whether in case of a genuine tenant the benefit of the summary procedure as laid down under the P.P. Act 1971 would be available under the law. The guidelines in terms can apply to ongoing cases. In the case at hand, the relevant proceeding under the P.P. Act, 1971 was not pending. What was pending was a proceeding under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This proceeding cannot be said to be a proceeding in continuation of the original proceeding under the P.P. Act, 1971. In this sense there is no duty cast upon the respondent Bank to review the case for withdrawal or continuation as argued by the learned Lawyer for the appellant company. 27. The next question which has been argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant company is that the guidelines, though administrative in nature, are nevertheless binding upon the Public Sector Banks. In this connection the learned Counsel has referred to several decisions. The first decisions cited by the learned Counsel is Union of India vs. K.P. Joseph, AIR 1973 SC 303 . In that case it was held that an administrative order can never confer any right would be too wide a proposition. There are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that courts have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. In another case reported in Dr. There are administrative orders which confer rights and impose duties. It is because an administrative order can abridge or take away rights that courts have imported the principle of natural justice of audi alteram partem into this area. In another case reported in Dr. Amarjit Singh vs. State of Punjab & other, AIR 1975 SC 984 , it has been held that though the particular office memorandum in that case was in the nature of an administrative instructions, not having the force of law, but the State Government could not at its sweet-will depart from it without lawful justification. The learned Counsel for the appellant company has also referred to a case reported in Comptroller & Auditor General of India vs. K.S. Jaganathan, AIR 1987 SC 537 . In that case in paragraph 21 of the reported judgment it has been held as follows:- "21. It is now necessary to examine the nature of the discretion conferred by the State Office Memorandum dated January 21, 1977 whether it is a discretionary power simpliciter or a discretionary power coupled with a duty? From the provisions of the Constitution referred to above, it is transparently clear that it is a discretion to be exercised in the discharge of the Constitutional duty imposed by Article 335 to take into consideration the claims of the members of the Schedule Caste and the Schedule Tribes, consistently that the maintenance of efficiency of administration in the making of appointments to services and post in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. This duty is to be exercised in keeping with the directive principle laid down in Article 46A to promote with special care the discretionary and economic interest of the weaker section of the people, and, in particular, of the Schedule Caste and the Schedule Tribes, and to protect them from social injustice and all forms exploitation." 28. It is dear from the above references that it has not been positively laid down anywhere that Office Memorandum has a force of law. For that it cannot be said that this can be highly transgrassed in all cases. In some cases, discretionary duty is cast upon the authorities concerned and in those cases the principle of natural justice must be complied with. 29. For that it cannot be said that this can be highly transgrassed in all cases. In some cases, discretionary duty is cast upon the authorities concerned and in those cases the principle of natural justice must be complied with. 29. However, in our case the question whether the guidelines had the force of law does not fall for consideration, as assuming that the guidelines have statutory force, it can be said that as there was no ongoing case for review, therefore, the respondent Bank did not fail to discharge any statutory duty by not considering the question of review as contemplated in the guidelines. 30. Now let us presume that the guidelines which came into existence about 10 years after the order of eviction was passed by the Estate Officer cannot have any effect on the case. If we accept this view, then there is no question of application of the guidelines to the facts of the case at all. 31. Thus what-ever view of the guidelines is taken, the appellant company cannot take advantage thereof. 32. The only question with which we are now left with the question of legitimate expectation. The learned Counsel for the appellant company has submitted that the appellant company had a legitimate expectation that their case would be reviewed in consonence with the direction of the guidelines and the legitimate expectation has been belied by the conduct of the respondent Bank for no good reason. 33. The learned Counsel in this connection has referred to the principles laid down in Union of India vs. Hindustan Development Corporation, J.T. 1993(3) SC 15. The learned Lawyer for the respondent-Bank has referred to the principles laid down in Narendra Kumar vs. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2138 and F.C.I. vs. Kamdhenu, 1993 (1) SCC 71 . 34. In Kamdhenu's case (supra), it has been held in paragraph 7 at page 77 of the reported decision as follows:- "7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt procedure which is fair play in action. There is no unfettered discretion in public law. A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt procedure which is fair play in action. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the gound of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic but provides for control of its execise by judicial review." 35. But the note of caution has been sounded in the next paragraph of the same judgment which is quoted below:- "8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principles of non-arbitrarinees, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important consideration far outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important consideration far outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent." 36. In Narendra Kumar's case (supra) it has been held at page 2164 in paragraph 64 as follows:- "We accept the position that the power of discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be confirmed and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departed from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it could be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, irrelevant, unreasonable or discriminatory." 37. In the case reported in Hindusthan Development Corporation case (supra) it has been held that to strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate expectation is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of power when its exercise otherwise accords with law. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial or right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more can not ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the grounds to consider but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It can be one of the grounds to consider but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognized general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It fol1ows that the concept of legitimate expectation is, not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court out of review on the merits, particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. 38. Basically the doctrine of legitimate expectation is one of the innovations for the review of administrative actions. It is ingrained in the principles of rule of law. A claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot give a right to invoke this principle, court has to see whether the decision taken is violative of any of the principles warranting interference. In the case at hand, the appellant company's case did not come within the enumerated items requiring review. There is no allegations of any. discriminatory treatment of the appellant company's case vis-a-vis any other unit standing on the same footing. So it cannot be said that the administrative discretion was exercised in this case in a manner which was violative of any of the principles requiring interference. The ground for eviction is the reasonable requirement of the Bank itself for its own use and occupation which is one of the grounds recognized under the rent laws. In this view of the matter, it is found that no case for interference on the ground of legitimate expectation has been made out in this case. 39. The learned Counsel for the appellants did not canvass any other point before us. 40. In view of our findings made above, the impugned judgment and order are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs is made. 41. 39. The learned Counsel for the appellants did not canvass any other point before us. 40. In view of our findings made above, the impugned judgment and order are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case no order as to costs is made. 41. I have gone through the draft of the judgment prepared by my learned brother Batabyal, J., and I agree with him that the appeal must be dismissed. 42. Batabyal J. has devoted a considerable portion of the judgment in deciding as to whether the appellant was a tenant or a licencee and has come to the finding on a consideration of the materials on record that the relevant law on the point, that the appellant was not a tenant but was a licencee. I would agree with him, though I am of the view that for the purpose of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to decide that question. I have no doubt that the appeal shall fail even if we proceed on the basis that the appellant was a tenant and not a licencee. 43. The main plank of the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is that even though the order of eviction was passed against the appellant in November, 1982, the appellant is still not liable to be evicted in view of a Circular dated 8th February, 1992 issued by the Union Government, Ministry of Industries, Department of Public Enterprises. The Circular purports to contain five guidelines and the words used therein, namely, the provisions under he P.P. Act should be used henceforth only in accordance with these guidelines, would give rise to the impression that the alleged guidelines were to apply only prospectively. One of the guidelines being no. V provides that all the Public Undertakings should immediately review all pending cases before the Estate Officer or Courts with reference to these guidelines and withdraw eviction proceedings against genuine tenants on grounds otherwise than as provided under these guidelines. The writ proceeding giving rise to this appeal whereunder the impugned order of eviction was challenged was nevertheless pending when these guidelines were issued and it has accordingly been urged that this guideline is ex-facie retrospective and was to apply to the writ proceeding whereby the impugned order of eviction was challenged. The writ proceeding giving rise to this appeal whereunder the impugned order of eviction was challenged was nevertheless pending when these guidelines were issued and it has accordingly been urged that this guideline is ex-facie retrospective and was to apply to the writ proceeding whereby the impugned order of eviction was challenged. But assuming arguendo that the writ proceeding could be regarded as eviction proceeding within the meaning of the guideline no. V, I have no doubt that the said guideline could not apply to the case at hand. For the guideline makes it clear that only such eviction proceeding was to be withdrawn which was initiated on grounds otherwise than as provided under these guidelines no. III clearly provides that eviction under genuine grounds under the Rent Control Act for possession is permissible. I has not been disputed that the eviction in the case was sought to be made for building and re-building and also the own occupation of the landlord Bank those being grounds under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. That being so, even assuming that the writ proceeding challenging the order of eviction was as eviction proceeding within the meaning of guideline no. V, the same was not required to be reviewed or withdrawn thereunder. 44. It is, therefore, apparent that even these guidelines were to apply as something binding the appellant would still have no case. And in that view of the matter, the question of legitimate expectation, so anxiously adverted to by Batabyal, J., cannot, in my view, show its head. If the appellant has no case even if the guidelines were binding and as such, applied to the case at hand, the question of any legitimate expectation on the basis of those guidelines cannot obviously arise. I must, however, make it clear that I should not be taken to have held that these guidelines were binding; but all that I want to impress is that even if those were binding the appellant would have no case. And once we hold these guidelines to be binding, then the question of legitimate expectation cannot arise but must duck. 45. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed and the order of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. No order as to costs. 14.10.1993. Mr. Tapas Banerjee appearing for the appellant prays for stay of operation of this order. The prayer is refused. 45. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed and the order of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. No order as to costs. 14.10.1993. Mr. Tapas Banerjee appearing for the appellant prays for stay of operation of this order. The prayer is refused. Let xerox copy of the judgment and order be given to the learned Advocates for the parties on the usual undertakings. Appeal dismissed judgment and order of the learned trial Judge affirmed.