Judgment S.B. Sinha, J. Both these writ applications involving common questions of fact and law were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The petitioners in these applications have prayed for a direction upon the respondents to shift back the date of promotion to the post of Electrical Executive Engineer in the G.T.O. Cadre with effect from 29th December, 1979 as allegedly from that date the juniors were promoted to the said post as also the consequential benefits attached thereto. 3. The petitioners were appointed directly to the post of Assistant Electrical Engineer in the year 1965. The private respondents were promoted to the post of Assistant Electrical Engineer in the years 1965-66 after the appointment of the petitioners. 4. In the year 1968 a combined gradation list was prepared wherein the petitioner No. 1 was show as junior to respondent nos. 3 to 10 and petitioner no. 2 was shown junior to respondent nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 10. 5. An objection was filed to the said gradation list. The respondent-Board bifurcated the cadre of Assistant Electrical Engineer and other higher post into two different cadres, namely; (a) Generation and Transmission Organisation Cadre (GTO Cadre, for short). (b) General-Cadre. 6. The petitioners and the private respondents were placed under the Generation and Transmission Organisation (GTO) Cadre. On 23rd November, 1976 a gradation list was published wherein the petitioners were again shown as juniors to t he respondents. The petitioners again represented against the said gradation list. 7. According to the petitioners, the aforementioned gradation lists were published purported to be on the basis of the principles of "same transaction", although according to the petitioners, they were appointed in the year 1965 whereas promotions were made in the year 1966. 8. The petitioners have contended that other persons who were placed in the general cadre filed a writ petition before this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 3292 of 1979 and by a judgment dated 8th of March, 1984 the said writ application was allowed. A copy of the said judgment is contained in Annexure-G. Some other persons also filed another writ application in this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 2106 of 1981 and the said writ application was also allowed by a judgment dated 10th of November, 1982 a copy of which is contained in Anncxure-7 to the writ application. 9. A copy of the said judgment is contained in Annexure-G. Some other persons also filed another writ application in this Court being C.W.J.C. No. 2106 of 1981 and the said writ application was also allowed by a judgment dated 10th of November, 1982 a copy of which is contained in Anncxure-7 to the writ application. 9. The respondent-Board filed special leave application against the said judgment passed in CWJC No. 2106 of 1981 hut by an order dated 10th of April, 1983 the said special leave application was dismissed by the Supreme Court. It is stated that on 24.7.1984 a final combined gradation list was prepared in terms of the law laid down by this court wherein the petitioners were placed above the private respondents. On 3rd December 1986 another tentative gradation list was published in the office of Electrical Executive Engineers of GTO Cadre wherein also the petitioner No.1 was shown as senior to the respondent nos. 3 to 11 and petitioner no. 2 was shown senior to respondent nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 17. 10. In the year 1987 the petitioners as also the private respondents were promoted to the selection grade scale of Executive Engineer. The petitioners were promoted with effect from 15th of November, 1984 and 16th of November, 1984 respectively whereas many of the respondents were granted such promotion to the post of Selection Grade scale of the Executive Engineer with effect from January, 1983. 11. In the year 1990 another tentative gradation list of Electrical Executive Engineers was published on 19th December, 1990 wherein again the petitioners were shown juniors to the private respondents. Allegedly by that time the date of the promotion of the petitioners as Electrical Executive Engineer was not shifted to 29th of December, 1979. 12. The petitioners thereafter filed a representation. It is stated that on 13th of January, 1992 a final gradation list was published as contained in Annexure-l to the writ application wherein again the respondent Nos. 3 to 11 were shown senior to that of petitioner No. 1 and respondent nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 were shown senior to that of petitioner no. 2. 13. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the seniority has to be determined in accordance with the respective dates of appointment/promotion. 14. 3 to 11 were shown senior to that of petitioner No. 1 and respondent nos. 3 to 6 and 8 to 11 were shown senior to that of petitioner no. 2. 13. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the seniority has to be determined in accordance with the respective dates of appointment/promotion. 14. It has further been contended that the Board is hound by the judgments of this Court which arc contained in Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ application wherein the plea of the respondent Board to the effect that promotion were affected in course of the same transaction had been rejected. 15. Mr. S.P. Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents, on the other hand, submitted that this application should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. 16. The learned counsel in support of his contention has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in M.L Gecil D'Souza vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 1269 , R.S. Makashi vs. T.M. Menon reported in AIR 1982 S.C. 101 and K.R. Mudgal and others vs. R.P. Singh and others reported in AIR 1986 S.C. 2086 . 17. The learned counsel further submitted that even the fresh cause of action which has arisen in the year 1992 cannot be a ground for granting relief to the petitioners inasmuch as they had all along been shown juniors to the private respondents. 18. It was further submitted that the private respondents were not parties in the earlier writ applications and thus they are not bound by the judgment passed in the aforementioned case. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 334 19. Mr. Rafat Alam, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bihar State Electricity Board submitted that in terms of the Rules framed by the Bihar Stale Electricity Board vacancy has to be filled up each year on a percentage basis and thus the direct recruits are to rank juniors to the promotees. 20. Mr. Rafat Alam, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bihar State Electricity Board submitted that in terms of the Rules framed by the Bihar Stale Electricity Board vacancy has to be filled up each year on a percentage basis and thus the direct recruits are to rank juniors to the promotees. 20. It has been staled that although the private respondents were promoted in the year 1965 and 1966 they had been shown senior to the petitioners who were direct recruits on the basis of the aforesaid Rule. It has been stated that the Bihar State Electricity Board has strictly followed the quota rules. 21. In this case, it is not in dispute that the petitioners, entered into the services earlier. The question as to whether the appointment and promotion had been made in the same transaction, has been considered by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Ishwar Prasad Tewari & 44 others vs. The Bihar State Electricity Board & 32 others in CWJC No. 3292 of 1979 (Annexure-6). In that case, it was held as follows : "This court had the occasion to consider a somewhat similar dispute between the appointees of 1966 batch, the direct recruits and the promotees, in the case of Upendra Narain Mishra and others Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board & Ors. ( 1983 BBCJ 79 ) where firm principles and guidelines had been engrafted and the orders of the Board giving seniority to the promotees over the direct recruits were cancelled. Whereas the contention or Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the petitioners, is that this case is covered by the principles decided in the above reported case, the contention of Mr. Tarakant Jha, appearing for the private respondents is that there may be slight difference between the case of the petitioners and those promoted in the earlier case, inasmuch as here the promotees are not promotees of the same transaction but the promotees of it transaction which took place in the same year and this distinction would give rise to the application of different rules of promotion. Learned counsel for the parties are, however, at once that the Board may he directed to prepare the final gradation list at an early date in accordance with law. A similar direction has already been given by this Court in MJC no. Learned counsel for the parties are, however, at once that the Board may he directed to prepare the final gradation list at an early date in accordance with law. A similar direction has already been given by this Court in MJC no. 614 of 1993 on 23rd February, 1984, in relation to the 1966 batch appointees, covered by the earlier reported decision (Supra) and time fixed by this court for preparation of the gradation list is to expire on 22nd April, 1984." 22. This Court in that case directed as follows : "We direct the Board to first determine this question and, if scrutiny or the relevant documents, the case of promotion of the respondent are similar to those or the promotees of the 1966 batch then the final gradation list must he prepared in the same manner and on the same principles as for the 1966 batch in view of the principles of judicial amity. If, however, their case is found to be in any way different from that which may attract any other rule operating upon their case, then the Board will be at liberty to apply that rule and prepare the gradation list in terms of that rule or to say in one expression, in accordance with law. It will be open to both the contending parties to submit their claims of seniority over the other within two weeks from today-The gradation list must be completed by 30th June, 1984" 23. The matter again came up before this court in Upendra Narain Mishra and others vs. Bihar State Electricity Board and others in CWJC No. 2106 of 1981 (Annexure-7) wherein this court following the full Bench decision of this court in Bishundeo Mahto vs. State of Bihar reported in 1982 BBCJ 45 rejected the contention that the appointment and 'promotion was made in the same transactions purported to be in terms of paragraph 3 of a Government circular No. 15784 dated 26.8.1972 commonly known as the ‘1972 Rules’ in the following terms: It is difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Basudeva Prasad as in the case of Saleshwar Dass and others vs. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1981 S.C. 41 ) the Supreme Court has set this controversy at rest and I may repeal the quotation extracted in Bishundeo Mahto's case (Supra) from the above decision: "Substantive capacity refers to the capacity in which a person holds the post and not necessarily to the nature or character of the post. To approximate to the official decision used in this connection we may well say that a person is said to hold a post in a substantive capacity when he holds a post for an indefinite period especially of long duration in contradiction to any person who holds it for a definite or temporary period or holds it on probation subject to confirmation." The condition indicated in Baleshwar Dass's case that appointments to a temporary post must have been made after fulfilment of all the tests' for regular appointment, is fulfilled in the present case. As already stated earlier, the petitioners were interviewed by the Selection Committee and were recommended for appointment. In that view of the matter, following the principle laid down in the above cases, there does not appear to be any reason to hold that the petitioners were not appointed in the substantive capacity. In another often quoted case of the Supreme Court, namely S.B. Patwardhan vs. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1977 S.C. 2051 ), it was held that the valuable right of seniority cannot depend upon the mere confirmation and that it would depend on continuous officiation." 24. In that case also the contention of the Board to the effect that Rule 15(i) of the Bihar State Electricity Board Electrical Engineers (General Cadre) Rules, 1976 whereby the earlier seniority of the Officers of the cadre were to be fixed in the manner laid down therein was rejected. 25. It was pointed out that earlier to framing of the said rules, the Board had been following 1934 Rules which reads as follows:- "Where Officers arc recruited by promotion and by direct appointment at the same time the promoted Officers shall take precedence over the Officers directly recruited." 26. In this case, the petitioner as also the private respondents were appointed/promoted in the years 1965-66. In this case, the petitioner as also the private respondents were appointed/promoted in the years 1965-66. It is, therefore, clear that 1976 rules which had merely a prospective operation cannot be invoked for the purpose of determination of inter-se seniority amongst the petitioner and the private respondents Inter-se seniority of the parties would be covered by the 1934 Rules as has been found in Upendra Narain Mishra's case (Supra). The Bench of the aforesaid case categorically rejected the contention of the Board as also the private respondents therein that the private respondents were confirmed earlier than the petitioners holding as follows: "The act of confirmation may give stability in some cases to an employee, but for the question with which we are faced in the present case, in my view, it has got no hearing. The question is very simple as to whether the promotees who admittedly had joined their higher post later than the petitioners could be reckoned senior to them simply on the ground that the question of promotion was taken up by the employer at the same time when certain number of posts had fallen vacant and it was decided to fill some of them by direct recruitment and some by promotion. In view of several decisions already noticed above on the point, the answer must be given in favour of the petitioners." 27. As noticed hereinbefore the Board preferred a Special Leave Application against the said judgment before the Supreme Court of India which was dismissed by an order dated 10.4.1993. The Board was therefore, hound by the aforementioned judgment. 28. Mr. Alam despite the aforementioned binding decisions of this court has relied upon the following decisions in N.K. Chauhan vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1977 S.C. 251 , Kartik Charan Jha vs. State of Bihar reported in 1986, PLJR 992, Awadh Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1990 S.C. l25, and Shashi Shekhar Prasad vs. State of Bihar reported in 1987 PLJR 1128. In N.K. Chauhan vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1977 S.C. 251 , the Supreme Court observed that seniority normally, is measured by length of continuous, officiating service the actual is easily accepted as the legal. This does not preclude a different prescription, constitutionality test being satisfied. 29. In N.K. Chauhan vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1977 S.C. 251 , the Supreme Court observed that seniority normally, is measured by length of continuous, officiating service the actual is easily accepted as the legal. This does not preclude a different prescription, constitutionality test being satisfied. 29. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore the 1934 Rules would apply which only refers to the recruitment and promotion at the same time and not in the same year. 30. In Kartik Charan Jha vs. State of Bihar reported in 1986 PLJR 992 a Division Bench of this Court considered Bishundeo Mahto's case (Supra) wherein it was held:- "(e) Ad-hoc temporary appointment on account of administrative exigency unrelated to the consideration of merit is not to be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning seniority or when the question of promotion is decided. (f) Where substantive appointments/promotions arc at the same time, a person who had been substantively appointed/promoted earlier would be reckoned senior to a person who has been substantively appointed/promoted at a later stage. The only exception would be where the service rules; are to the contrary." In the aforementioned case, it was held that clauses (e) and (f) have no relevance in the facts of that case. 31. The Court further observed; "The present case has no parallel in any decided case. Law and equitable considerations demand that the 'mergees' should reckon their berth in the cadre from the date of their merger." 32. In Shashi Shekhar Prasad vs. State of Bihar reported in 1987 PLJR 1128, the Division Bench of this Court has held that the promotees continuously officiating for years in the vacancy of direct recruits after promotion (sic) made in excess of the quota of promotees. The Bench held: "Thus in my view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases is that the quota rule is mandatory in nature and if any promotion is made in excess of the quota rule against the vacancy of the direct recruits and such promoted officers have continuously officiated even for a long period, they cannot claim seniority over the direct recruits who later on are recruited against their vacancy. The exception provided to this general law laid down is that if a power has been conferred upon the Government to make relaxation in the quota rule and promotion has been made against the vacancy of direct recruits any such promotees have continuously officiated on the promoted post for 15 to 20 years against the vacancy of direct recruits, it will be assumed that the Government by making such promotion in excess of the quota has made relaxation in the quota rule even if no specific order of making relaxation in the quota rule has been passed. Therefore, the promotees have to first show that the Government is empowered to make relaxation in their quota rule. But in cases where there is no power of relaxation for howsoever long period a promotee may officiate in excess of the quota against the vacancy of direct recruit, he cannot claim seniority over the direct recruit, who is recruited even after a long time against the vacancy." 33. While interpreting the Bihar Excise Act, 1915, the Division Bench however allowed one of the writ application being CWJC No. 4097/85 and dismissed the other writ applications. 33. In Awadh Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 1256 : 1991 (1) PLJR 22 (SC), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of this court in CWJC No. 4097/85 and held: "Therefore the argument on behalf of the respondents in this appeal that the appellants were promoted against the 5% quota in respect of the vacancies of the year 1975-76 is not sustainable. The appellants having been appointed in the quota of 5% out of the vacancies of 1974-75 arc entitled to be shown as senior in the gradation list prepared by the Government on 9.1.86. We have already mentioned hereinbefore that the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 were promoted from the selected Sub-Inspectors Excise, that is, in the 5% quota reserved for promotion from the Upper Division Assistants of the Excise Department. In accordance with the decisions rendered by this court in the case of V.B. Badami v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1980 S.C. 1561 ) (Supra) the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 were promoted from the selected Sub-Inspectors Excise, that is, in the 5% quota reserved for promotion from the Upper Division Assistants of the Excise Department. In accordance with the decisions rendered by this court in the case of V.B. Badami v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1980 S.C. 1561 ) (Supra) the respondents Nos. 3 and 4 who were promoted to officiate in the sift; quota of Upper Division Assistants and confirmed Head Clerks are to be pushed down as soon as the appellants have been recruited in the said quota to the post of Inspectors of Excise in 1976 inasmuch as the promotion though not illegal is irregular and the promotees are to he accommodated in the vacancies of subsequent years in their quota. It is only in the case of Narendra Chadha vs. Union of India ( AIR 1986 S.C. 638 ) (Supra) exception was made by this court to the aforesaid decision on the ground that the quota was broken down of not adhered to as there was no recruitment from the quota of direct recruits for a period of 15 to 20 years and the promotees were allowed to officiate in the quota of direct recruits for a long period of 15 to 20 years. In such circumstances, it was held that in view of Rule 16 empowering the Government to relax the quota rules, the promotees officiating in the vacancies of direct recruits were presumably permitted to do so in relaxation of the quota as such the seniority will be determined from the date of their continuous officiation in the said posts. Similar view has been expressed in G.S. Lamba’s case (AIR 1985 1019) (Supra). In the instant case there was no rule for relaxation of the quota nor the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who were promoted from selected Excise Sub-Inspectors to the Inspectors of Excise in the 5% quota. Similar view has been expressed in G.S. Lamba’s case (AIR 1985 1019) (Supra). In the instant case there was no rule for relaxation of the quota nor the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 who were promoted from selected Excise Sub-Inspectors to the Inspectors of Excise in the 5% quota. It cannot be said in such circumstances that the quota has not been filed up for a long period nor can it be said that the respondents 3 and 4 who were promoted in excess of their quota have worked as Inspectors of Excise for long time and as such the respondents No. 4 cannot claim to be senior to the appellants." In this case there is no relaxation of quota nor the promotees had brought on officiating basis for a long time. Further the promotees were not promoted with retrospective effect nor in their order of promotion it has been stated that they would rank to be senior to the direct recruits. 34. In this situation, the decisions of this court in Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ application cannot be said to have been bad in law. Further the decisions of this court in Annexure-C has also been upheld by the Supreme Court. 35. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are senior. If the petitioners are senior to the earlier writ petitioners they would also be entitled to similar relief. 36. Further from a perusal of the office order dated 24.7.1984 as contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application it is evident that the Board itself has given effect to the said judgment by giving inter-se seniority of Assistant Electrical Mechanical Engineers of 1965 batch. The said seniority list is contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application. 37. It is true that the petitioners or the private respondents were not parties to the aforementioned decisions. The Bihar State Electricity Board, was, however hound by the said judgment and it itself having been given effect there to cannot now wriggle out therefrom and pass an order contrary to and inconsistent with the said decisions. Mr. Mukherjee as noticed hereinbefore, has strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Supreme Court Employee Welfare Association Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 334 . Mr. Mukherjee as noticed hereinbefore, has strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court of India in Supreme Court Employee Welfare Association Vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 334 . The said decision in fact runs counter to the submissions made by the learned counsel insofar as t herein it has been held as follows:- "The doctrine of res judicata is a universal doctrine laying down the finality of litigation between the parties. When a particular decision has become final and binding between the parties, it cannot be set at naught on the ground that such a decision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. So far as the parties are concerned, they will always be bound by the said decision. In other words, either of the parties will not he permitted to reopen the issue decided by such decision on the ground that such decision violates the equality clause under the Constitution. There is no question of overruling the provision of Article 14 as contended by the learned Attorney General. The judgment which is binding between the parties and which operates as res judicata between them cannot be said to overrule the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution even though it may be, to some extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. So far as the Supreme Court employees arc concerned in these proceedings the only enquiry to be made is whether the judgments of the Delhi High Court relating to the L.D.Cs, and the Class IV employees have become final and conclusive between the employees of the Delhi High Court and the Union of India." 38. Let us now consider the submission of Mr. Mukherjee that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. 39. In U.P. State Agro Industrial Corporation Ltd. vs. the Labour Court, U.P. and ors. reported in (1987 (59) F.L.R. 660), the Allahabad High Court refused to reject the writ application on the ground of delay and laches where an employee was superseded by another employee of the same cadre. Similar is the position in this case. 40. In R.M. Ranual vs. State or Himachal Pradesh and ors. reported in (1987 (59) F.L.R. 660), the Allahabad High Court refused to reject the writ application on the ground of delay and laches where an employee was superseded by another employee of the same cadre. Similar is the position in this case. 40. In R.M. Ranual vs. State or Himachal Pradesh and ors. reported in AIR 1989 S.C. 357 , it was held that where no prejudice is caused to the private-respondents and where the Government has accepted the recommendations and had been directing that the inter-se seniority in substantive rank be determined on that basis, writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 41. The fact in D'Souza's case (Supra) upon which Mr. Mukherjee relied upon was absolutely different. In that case the seniority was determined in the year 1956 in terms of 1952 Rules whereas the same was questioned in the year 1971. It was held that in absence or any satisfactory explanation the petitioner could not he allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years. Such is not the position here. 42. In R.S. Makashi's case (Supra) the gradation list was framed on 28th May, 1971 in terms of the resolution adopted by the State Government on 1st April, 1968. The said list was drawn up in accordance with the seniority principles enunciated in the Government Resolution dated March 22, 1968. Thereafter a provisional seniority list was published in the year 1976. The petitioners who were directly recruited in the former CFD as Supply Inspectors filed a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the legality and validity of the aforementioned two gradation list. In that case promotion had been made on the basis of the seniority list dated 1st April, 1968. In that situation, it was held that a writ petition questioning the Government resolution dated 22nd March, 1968 being highly belated, the preliminary objections should be upheld. 43. In that case, it was further held:- "The Government Resolution of March, 22, 1968 must have come to the knowledge of the writ petitioners at least when the provisional seniority list dated May, 28 1971 was circulated amongst the staff of the BRO. 43. In that case, it was further held:- "The Government Resolution of March, 22, 1968 must have come to the knowledge of the writ petitioners at least when the provisional seniority list dated May, 28 1971 was circulated amongst the staff of the BRO. Thereafter, in Nov, 1972, a final gradation list of Rationing Inspectors/Senior Clerks/Deputy Accountant of the BRO as on April, 1, 1968 had been published and the said list was circulated to all the members borne on the concerned categories of the organisation. It was expressly stated in both the aforesaid lists that the ranking of personnel had been effected in accordance with the principles laid down in the Government Resolution dated March, 22, 1968. The writ petitioners did not file any objections against the provisional list despite representations having been invited, nor did they take any steps lo question the validity of the final gradation list or the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 1968, on the basis of which the said list had been prepared. In the light of what we have said above, the impugned seniority lists in so far as they have been drawn up in deviation from the legal position explained above call for immediate revision. We would accordingly direct respondents 23 and 24 (State of Maharashtra and the Controller of Rationing) to revise the two impugned seniority lists and refix the ranking assigned to the writ petitioners and others in the light of what we have said in this judgment." 44. In K.R. Mundgal and others vs. R.P. Singh and others reported in AIR 1986 S.C. 2086 , the Supreme Court held as follows: "The respondents in the writ petition raised preliminary objection to the writ petition stating that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. Although the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not disposed of the above writ petition on the ground of delay, we feel that in the circumstances of this case the writ petition should have been rejected on the ground of delay alone. The first draft seniority list of the Assistants was issued in the year 1958 and it was duly circulated amongst all the concerned officials. In that list the writ petitioners had been shown below the respondents. No objections were received from the petitioners against the seniority list. The first draft seniority list of the Assistants was issued in the year 1958 and it was duly circulated amongst all the concerned officials. In that list the writ petitioners had been shown below the respondents. No objections were received from the petitioners against the seniority list. Subsequently, the seniority lists were again issued in 1961 and 1965 but again no objections were raised by the writ petitioners, to the seniority list of 1961, but only petitioner 6 in the writ petition represented against the seniority list in which the writ petitioners had been shown above the respondents had been issued on a misunderstanding of the office memorandum of 1959 on the assumption that the 1049 office memorandum was not applicable to them. The June 1975 seniority list was prepared having regard to the decision in Ravi Verma Case and the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the writ petitions filed by, respondents 7 and 36 and thus the mistake that had crept into the 1968 list was rectified. Thus the list was finalised in January, 1976. The petitioners who filed the writ petition should have in the ordinary course questioned the principle on the basis of which the seniority lists were being issued from time to time from the year 1958 and the promotions which were being made on the basis of the said lists within a reasonable time. For the first time they filed the writ petition in the High court in the year 1976 nearly 18 years after the first draft seniority list was published in the year 1958 Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst the government servants created by the writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that anyone who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him should approach the Court as early as possible as otherwise in addition to the creation of a sense of insecurity in the minds of the government servants there would also be administrative complications and difficulties. Unfortunately in this case even after nearly 32 years the dispute regarding the appointment of some of the respondents to the writ petition is still lingering in this Court. Unfortunately in this case even after nearly 32 years the dispute regarding the appointment of some of the respondents to the writ petition is still lingering in this Court. In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches. The facts of this case are more or less similar to the facts in R.S. Makashi V. I.M. Menon. In the said decision this court observed at page 100 of the Reports thus: (SCC p. 400 para 30) In these circumstances, we consider that the High Court was wrong in overruling' the preliminary objection raised by the respondents before it, that the writ petition should be dismissed on the preliminary ground of delay' and laches,' inasmuch as, it seeks to disrupt the vested rights regarding the seniority, rank and promotions which had accrued to large number of respondents during the period of eight years that had intervened between the passing of the impugned resolution and the institution of the writ petition. We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of March 22, 1968 ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition insofar as it relate to prayer for quashing the said Government Resolution should have been dismissed. We are in respectful agreement with the above observation. We may also refer here to the weighty observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Malcom Lawrence Cecil D'Souza Vs. Union of India at Pages 413-414 of the Reports which are as follows : (SCC p. 602 Para 9) Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapses of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its various aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old mailers like seniority after a long lime is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would therefore, appear to be in the interest' of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matter should be given a quiet us after lapse of some time." 45. In this case the fact of the matter is entirely different. It is true that the petitioner did not question the seniority list for a long time. But the other employees did. This court in its judgment as contained in Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ application upheld the contention to the effect that the seniority should be determined on the basis of the date of entry in the service. It also interpreted the existing rules while arriving at the said decision. 46. As noticed hereinbefore, the Board not only is bound by the said decision but in fact acted pursuant thereto. The Gradation list dated 14th July, 1982 was published on the basis of the judgment of this court and thus the Board could not have resiled from the said decision and in any event it was bound by the said judgment. If in the year 1984 the private respondents were aggrieved by the seniority list prepared by the Board on the basis of the judgment, they could have approached this court or the Supreme Court for review of the judgment but they did not choose to do so. 47. In such a situation, in my opinion, the Board can not by its action seek to set at naught the binding decisions of this court. We are further of the opinion that in view of the fact that the persons similarly situated have been granted relief by this court, as also the Supreme Court of India; the petitioners were also entitled to the similar relief. 48. In Lt. Governor of Delhi vs. Dharampal reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 2059 the Supreme Court held as follows:- "Subsequently, some other constables whose services were similarly terminated hut were not reinstated in service even as fresh entrants, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi being CWP Nos. 270 and 937 of 1978. 48. In Lt. Governor of Delhi vs. Dharampal reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 2059 the Supreme Court held as follows:- "Subsequently, some other constables whose services were similarly terminated hut were not reinstated in service even as fresh entrants, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Delhi being CWP Nos. 270 and 937 of 1978. These writ petitions were heard by Anand, J. who rejected the contention wised by the respondents in the writ petitions regarding the delay and laches in moving the writ petitions allowed the writ petitions quashing the impugned order of termination declaring that the petitioners will be deemed to have been in service and would be treated as such subject to certain conditions. The Police Administration filed IPA against this judgment which was dismissed on August 29, 1983. Thereafter the respondents herein filed the writ petitions in the High Court against the orders of termination of their services praying for quashing of the orders of termination and for reinstating them in service with effect from the respective dates of their termination of services and to treat them as being in service throughout and to award them all consequential benefits. These writ petitions were subsequently transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Delhi. The Tribunal while rejecting the pica of the respondents that the petitioners should be denied any relief because of delay and laches held that the claim of the petitioners (respondent in these appeals) was identical to the claim of the petitioners in CWP Nos. 270 and 937 of 1978 whose petition were allowed by the High Court of Delhi. The Tribunal further held that the petitioners were entitled to the same relief as was granted to the petitioners by Anand J, in CWP Nos. 270 and 937 of 1978. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considering the facts and circumstances as well as the judgment rendered by Anand J, in CWP Nos. 270 and 937 of 1978, we dismiss the appeals and confirm the judgment and under dated November, 25, 1987 of the Tribunal with the modification that the respondents, excepting respondents No. 24, Kanwal Singh who is dead, will file affidavits stating whether they had been gainfully employed or not during the period of the termination of service and if so employed, they will state further in the affidavits the period of such employment. The appellants may verify the same and will be at liberty to deduct the pay and allowances during the period of such gainful employment while determining the arrears of salary and allowance for the period of termination. We, however, make it clear that for the purposes of seniority, promotion and retiral benefits, the entire period between termination and reinstatement shall be taken into account." 49. In the peculiar situation of this case and keeping in view the aforementioned binding decisions, we allow this writ application and direct that the promotion of the petitioners and/or their inter-se seniority may now be given in terms of the judgment of this court in the aforementioned cases as contained in Annexures 6 and 7 to the writ petitions. 50. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.