J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these appeals arise out of a judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, at Junagadh, in Civil Regular Appeals No. 131 of 1977 and 123 of 1977. Since common questions are involved in both the appeals and arising out of the composite order passed by the learned District Judge, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. Respondent No. 1 in both the appeals is the original plaintiff, who had to initiate a legal battle against the appellant, District Panchayat and respondent No. 2, State of gujarat, by filing Regular Civil Suit No. 574 of 1973, in the Court of Civil Judge (SD), at junagadh, for declaration that the impugned letter dated 22. 5. 1973, is void, inoperative and illegal and it should also be declared that the plaintiff is continuing in service as a field Worker, with full back wages. The parties are, hereinafter, referred to, for the convenience and brevity sake, as "original-plaintiff and "defendants". The defendants appeared and resisted the suit, contending that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as he had tendered the resignation, which was accepted by original defendant No. 1 In short, all the averments and the allegations made in the plaint came to be traversed by the defendants. ( 2 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances and the pleadings of the parlies, issues came to be raised by the Trial Court at Ex. 16. Upon examination and analysis of the evidence, the Trial Court reached to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration that the impugned order and letter dated 22. 5. 1973, allegedly taken as resignation by original defendant No. 1, is void, illegal and not operative. However, the trial Court also reached to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief as regards the salary from 11. 11. 1972 and, therefore, that prayer came to be rejected. However, it was left by the Trial Court to the Department to pass appropriate orders in that behalf. This decision of the Trial Court, dated 30th July, 1977, came to be questioned before the District Court, by filing two appeals, as aforesaid. Civil Regular Appeal No. 131 of 1973 came to be filed by original defendant no. However, it was left by the Trial Court to the Department to pass appropriate orders in that behalf. This decision of the Trial Court, dated 30th July, 1977, came to be questioned before the District Court, by filing two appeals, as aforesaid. Civil Regular Appeal No. 131 of 1973 came to be filed by original defendant no. 1 and Civil Regular Appeal No. 123 of 1973 came to be filed by the original plaintiff. ( 3 ) HAVING heard the learned advocates of the parties and having considered the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the case, the learned District Judge was pleased to dismiss the appeal filed by original defendant No. 1 and the appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed. The decree passed by the learned Trial Court Judge, in favour of the plaintiff, was partly modified. The prayer which was rejected for salary was set-aside the decree of the trial court, rejecting the relief of declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to salary with effect from 11. 11. 1972, was quashed. The rest of the decree and the judgment of the Trial Court came to be confirmed. Thus, die plaintiff came to be awarded the salary from 11. 11. 1972, by the learned District Judge, by allowing the appeal of the plaintiff. The judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, on 29th June, 1981, by passing a composite order, came to be questioned by original defendant No. 1, appellant herein , by filing the aforesaid two appeals. Before the merits of these appeals are examined in greater details, it may be specifically mentioned, at the outset, that the jurisdictional sweep of this Court in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) has been very much circumscribed. Needless to reiterate that, unless and until a substantial question of law is emerging and pointed out successfully, this Court will be at location to interfere with the concurrent finding of facts arrived at by both the courts below. This proposition of law is very well settled and requires no further elucidation. ( 4 ) IN the background of the aforesaid proposition of law, the merits of the appeals are required to be examined. This proposition of law is very well settled and requires no further elucidation. ( 4 ) IN the background of the aforesaid proposition of law, the merits of the appeals are required to be examined. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the appellant to first convince this Court that there is a question of law and, that too, a substantial question of law, which requires interference by this Court Before the submissions advanced are examined, certain facts leading to the rise of these two appeals may briefing be highlighted. The plaintiff was appointed as Field Worker by the District Development Officer of defendant No. 1, at Junagadh, by a letter dated 2. 6. 1971, and, initially, posted at village vadal. The appointment was temporary as a Field Worker. The plaintiff came to be transferred from village Vadal to Jamvada. The plaintiff did not resume at the transferred station and instead, on being asked to explain for non-resumption, wrote a letter raising several objections and contentions against his transfer. The transfer order passed by the district Development Officer is dated 13th March, 1972. As the plaintiff failed to resume at the transferred station, he was required to explain. An official memo dated 8. 9. 1972 was served, whereby he was called upon to tender his explanation. It was received by the plaintiff on 19. 9. 1972. After having received the official memo issued by the District Development Officer of defendant No. 1, the plaintiff wrote a letter dated 20. 9. 1972, Ex. 29, wherein, he raised, inter alia, several objections and contentions against his transfer. Ex 29, as such, is the bone of contention. The question of interpretation has been raised rigorously and vigorously in the Courts below as well as in this Court. After exchange of some correspondence, despite Ex. 29, the plaintiff resumed at jamvada, the new-transferred station, on 30th October, 1972. It is also not in dispute that ex. 29, a letter which is alleged to be a letter of resignation by the defendants, was accepted as resignation, as such, on 22. 5. 1973, with effect from 11th November, 1972. The main contention of the plaintiff has been that, Ex. 29 was not as such a letter of resignation. It is also not in dispute that ex. 29, a letter which is alleged to be a letter of resignation by the defendants, was accepted as resignation, as such, on 22. 5. 1973, with effect from 11th November, 1972. The main contention of the plaintiff has been that, Ex. 29 was not as such a letter of resignation. According to him, since he was suffering very serious illness and his mental condition being not normal, on account of such personal grounds, he had submitted an application to the defendants, wherein the word "resignation" was used. It was not, according to him, a voluntary letter of resignation. Therefore, there was no question of acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, he pleaded, by filing the suit, that the order dated 22. 5. 1973, passed by defendant No. 1, was illegal and void. ( 5 ) THE Trial Court came to the conclusion, on appreciation and interpretation of ex. 29, that the acceptance of the resignation of the plaintiff was void and not operative. That part of the finding was also confirmed by the learned District Judge on different grounds and reasons. The learned District Judge reached to the conclusion that Ex. 29 dated 20. 9. 1972 cannot be characterised as a resignation in the eye of law. Therefore, while confirming the decree passed by the learned Trial Court Judge, the learned District judge also granted the relief for the salary with effect from 11. 11. 1972, which was refused by the Trial Court. Hence, these two appeals, at the instance of original defendant no. l, District Panchayat, Junagadh, by invoking the provisions of Section 100 of the cpc. Having examined the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the case, this Court has not the slightest hesitation in holding that the letter dated 20. 9. 1972, purported to have been written by the plaintiff tendering his resignation from the post as a field Worker, cannot be said to be a resignation as such. At the best, it could be said to be a letter of representation. While reading Ex. 9. 1972, purported to have been written by the plaintiff tendering his resignation from the post as a field Worker, cannot be said to be a resignation as such. At the best, it could be said to be a letter of representation. While reading Ex. 29 as a whole and the picture emerging after reading the letter as a whole coupled with the evidence on record, it can safely be concluded that the plaintiff intended to make the representation before the authority, so that his case could be re-considered and the order of transfer passed by the District development Officer, from Vadal to Jamvada, on 13th March , 1972, could be reviewed and reconsidered on various grounds; and one of the grounds was of mental disorder. It is true that the plaintiff, despite the transfer order passed by the District Development officer, did not resume, though he was relieved from the original posting place at Vadal. As he had personal difficulties and problems, he went on making several objections. He also, in response to an official memo, wrote a letter, Ex. 29, wherein though the heading is titled as for the purpose of "resignation", in reality and on totality of the circumstances emerging from the record of the present case, it could not be characterised as a letter of resignation, as such. Be as it may, even assuming that the intention of the plaintiff was not to make a representation but to tender the resignation, then also, it cannot be said to be unqualified and unrestricted or unfettered letter of resignation. The plaintiff has implored and emphatically stated to post him at a place where he could seek medical treatment He has raised various objections with a humble request to reconsider his case. So, alternatively, it could be said to be a conditional resignation. There is no dispute about the fact that the conditions incorporated by the plaintiff in his letter, Ex. 29, were not satisfied. There is nothing on record, which would even remotely indicate that his case for reconsideration of his transfer was ever considered by defendant No. 1 or its officers. Since the conditions incorporated in the letter, Ex. 29, are not satisfied, it cannot be said to be a legal or valid acceptance of the conditional resignation letter. ( 6 ) APART from that, if contention of the appellant-original defendant No. 1 master, that ex. Since the conditions incorporated in the letter, Ex. 29, are not satisfied, it cannot be said to be a legal or valid acceptance of the conditional resignation letter. ( 6 ) APART from that, if contention of the appellant-original defendant No. 1 master, that ex. 29 is nothing but a letter of resignation, is accepted in its totality without any demur, then also, in that case again alternatively, the acceptance on 22. 5. 1973 cannot be said to be legal and valid. In that, it ought to be mentioned that the letter, Ex. 29, being dated 20. 9. 1972, had lost its survival value, if at all any as resignation, on plaintiffs joining or resuming the new posting at Jamvada and continuing at that station till 22. 5. 1973. It is immaterial whether he had physically worked there or not. But there is no dispute about the fact that the letter, Ex. 29, which is alleged to be a letter of resignation by the appellant, original defendant No. 1, cannot be said to be legally and validly accepted after almost a spell of more than seven months, and giving its effect respectively. Even if its presumed that it was a letter of resignation, it cannot be said to be in existence after the plaintiffs resuming at the new station, at Jamvada, and having not been accepted it within a reasonable period after its receipt by the Department, namely, defendant No. 1. Since the ultimate conclusion arrived at by both the Courts is, factually, required to be confirmed, of course on different grounds as aforesaid, it does not warrant any interference of this Court. The final conclusion of the Courts below is quite justified and requires no any interference. Applying the aforesaid yardstick while dealing with an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein the jurisdictional sweep is very much circumscribed, and considering the factual conclusion, ultimately, reached by the Courts below, this Court is fully satisfied that the ultimate conclusion is fully justified. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, both these appeals are totally meritless and require to be partly allowed with a little modification, as highlighted hereinafter. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, both these appeals are totally meritless and require to be partly allowed with a little modification, as highlighted hereinafter. ( 7 ) HOWEVER, it may be mentioned that, this Court cannot be oblivious to the fact that the original plaintiff, though has suffered much mental and physical agony for a spell of almost two decades, had only worked for a short spell of seven months as Field Worker in class-III category and, therefore, the question as to whether he should be awarded full back wages, as directed by the learned District Judge, requires some consideration. Ordinarily, the employee would be entitled to claim full back wages in a case like the one on hand where he could not perform his dudes as an employee on the ground of reasons, which were not within his control or where he was not allowed to perform his duties by the Master. However, this is an area where the Court is obliged to consider the various factors including the length of service put in, initially, by the plaintiff-employee. This aspect may not be gone into greater details as learned advocate, Mr. Shelat, for the original plaintiff, respondent No. l, has fairly submitted that it is left to the court as to whether the plaintiff should be awarded full back wages or not. Having regard to the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case and in view of the peculiar situation emerging in the case of the plaintiff, the ends of justice would be satisfied, if the plaintiff is awarded back wages to the extent of 75 percent instead of full back wages, with effect from 11. 11. 1972, as directed by the learned District Judge. In other words, it is clarified that the plaintiff shall be entitled to 75 percent of the salary from 11. 11. 1972 till he is re-posted or reinstated. Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the appellant, fairly mentioned that the plaintiff will be reinstated and re-posted, preferably near Junagadh city, on or before 25th October, 1993. In other words, it is clarified that the plaintiff shall be entitled to 75 percent of the salary from 11. 11. 1972 till he is re-posted or reinstated. Mr. Raval, learned advocate for the appellant, fairly mentioned that the plaintiff will be reinstated and re-posted, preferably near Junagadh city, on or before 25th October, 1993. Therefore, while partly allowing these appeals on hand, with the aforesaid modifications, further following directions are given:- which also shall be interpriated in decree (1) That the original plaintiff-respondent No. l herein shall be reinstated or re-posted on or before 25th October, 1993, by the appellant, original defendant No. 1; (2) That the plaintiff shall be paid an amount of Rs. 94,000/- towards arrears of salary, as aforesaid, at the first instance, on or before 30th November, 1993, as agreed by learned advocate, Mr. Raval, for the appellant; (3) The plaintiff shall be paid the remaining amount of arrears of salary on or before 1. 2. 1994; (4) The appellant, original defendant No. 1 is directed to supply a copy of the service Book preferably on or before 1st February, 1994; and (5) On the full amount being paid to the original plaintiff, the proceedings of recovery Application No. 7593 of 1993 shall be withdrawn, immediately, as agreed by learned advocate, Mr. Shelat, for the plaintiff. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs all through out. Obviously, on full amount being paid, as per the order of this Court, the award passed by the Labour Court shall stand satisfied. The appeals are partly allowed in the aforesaid extent with no orders to cost Decree shall be drwansoom accordingly. .