S. P. RAJKHOWA, J. ( 1 ) BY an order dated 22/4/1993 the learned Judge in charge, Special Court, Alipore has rejected the petitioner Md. Farid Alits application for bail in N. C. B. F. No. 104/n. C. B/cal/92 dated 25/8/1992 under section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Hence the petitioner has filed this application under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for bail. It is alleged that on 25/8/992, acting on specific information, a batch of officers from the Narcotic Control Bureau, Eastern Zonal Unit, Calcutta went to Sealdah Railway Station at about 11. 00 hrs. At about 17. 00 hrs. on being identified by an informer, the said officers intercepted the petitioner and one Safikul slam near the ticket counter of Sealdah Rly. Station when they were about to purchase tickets for going to Lalgola in the District of Murshidabad. It was alleged that on preliminary search on the spot in presence of two witnesses, two polythene packets containing brown colored powder substance believed to be Heroin weighing 850 grams were found from inside the pouch (hand held) of the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner and the said Safikul Islam were taken to Narcotic Control Bureau Office at 4/2, Karaya Road. Calcutta and the recovered brown powder substance was tested there which tested positive to be heroin. On being asked, the petitioner could not give any satisfactory explanations reading the possession of the same. Thereafter the brown - powder substance was seized under a seizure memo duly signed by the petitioner, two witnesses and the officer who conducted the search. It is further alleged that the petitioner disclosed that he procured the seized Heroin from one Ramesh Singh of Asansol. The petitioner was arrested and he along with the said Safikul Islam, Ramesh Singh and one Ramesh Verma were produced before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. Alipore on 27/8/1992 and they were remanded to Jail custody. Subsequently the case was transferred to the Special Judge. On 14/12/1992, the petitioner in jail custody was served with a detention order under section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 along with grounds for detention issued by the Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India on 11/12/1992. Subsequently the case was transferred to the Special Judge. On 14/12/1992, the petitioner in jail custody was served with a detention order under section 3 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 along with grounds for detention issued by the Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India on 11/12/1992. The grounds for detention are identical with the allegation made in the complaint filed by the Narcotic Bureau (Case No. P. R. 96/92 ). Thereafter the case of the petitioner was placed before the Advisory Board and the report of the Board was placed before the Central Government. By an order dated 2/3/1993 issued by the Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, the Central Govt. in exercise of powers conferred under section 9 (1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1983 revoked the detention order of the petitioner and directed that he be released forthwith. Inspite of the aforesaid order directing release of the petitioner, he was not granted bail by the Learned Special Judge. Hence the petitioner has filed this application for bail on the ground that the Learned Special Judge, has acted in contrary to law by not releasing the petitioner on bail when the Advisory Board as well as the Central Govt. after considering the materials on record opined that there was no sufficient - cause for his detention and that the Learned Special Judge has completely over-looked the provision of sec. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act which contemplates that a person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of 5 years or more under this Act shall be released on bail if the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. No other point of law is canvassed in the petition for bail. ( 2 ) BY an order dated 5th May, 1993 the Learned Sessions Judge, Hooghly rejected the petitioner Ramesh Mahatos application for bail in connection with N. D. P. S. Case No. 12/93, now pending before the Court of the learned Sessions, Judge, Hooghly arising out of Polba Police Station Case No. 23 dt. 25. 2. 1993 under sections 20/29/ 30 of the N. D. P. S. Act. It is alleged that on 24. 2. 1993 at about 17. 25. 2. 1993 under sections 20/29/ 30 of the N. D. P. S. Act. It is alleged that on 24. 2. 1993 at about 17. 30 hrs. the de facto complainant Nitendra Nath Bhattacharjee, Sub - Inspector of Police attached to Narcotic Cells, C. D. S. , C. I. D. , West Bengal received an information that ganja was being carried in huge quantity by bus which was likely tot start from Giridi (Bihar) in the evening and reach Grand Trunk Road near Mogra late in the morning. The defacto complainant along with force reached the check post on G. T. Road near Mogra at 5. 05 hrs. and waited for the bus. At about 10. 55 hrs. the bus of Bihar State Road Transport Corporation bearing Registration No. B. P. C. 9269 came there and the de facto complainant along with force raided the bus. During raid a chocolate colored polythene suitcase was found from the possession of the petitioner wherefrom 11 kgs. 800 grams of ganja was recovered and a steel box was recovered from the possession of two other persons viz. Pannalal Shaw and Bhagabati Shaw whereupon 17 kgs. 700 grams of ganja was recovered. The driver of the said bus could not produce any document concerning the vehicle save and except his driving licence and it was within his knowledge that ganja was being carried on the said bus. The de facto complainant seized the bus along with the aforesaid articles and arrested the aforementioned persons. The petitioner has stated that he is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in this case by the police officers in order to save actual offenders and that he had no knowledge about the alleged suit case which was kept below the seat on which he was traveling. The petitioners prayer for bail was turned down by the learned Sessions Judge, on the last occasion on 5th May 1993. No specific point of law has been canvassed in the petition for bail before this Court. ( 3 ) BY the Judgment and order dt. 15th June 1993, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 9th Court, Alipore in Case No. S. T. 49 1/93 convicted the petitioner - appellant Lalit Halder under Section 21 of the N. D. P. S. Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 15th June 1993, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 9th Court, Alipore in Case No. S. T. 49 1/93 convicted the petitioner - appellant Lalit Halder under Section 21 of the N. D. P. S. Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 5 years. The facts of this case in brief are that on 27th May 1989 one police officer attached to Lake Police Station, Calcutta accompanied by another Sub - Inspector of Police and force, on the basis of a secret information, had been to Panchanantola Road, Calcutta and kept watch over the place which is in front of premises No. 22, Panchanantola Road and after prolonged watch the officer found that a person was moving suspiciously and as the said person was running away, the officer chased him and apprehended him and being asked the person disclosed, his identity as Lalit Halder Lalu residing at premises No. 10/3, Panchanantola Lane, Calcutta - 29. The body of that person was searched and upon search one match box, trade mark Ship, carbonised containing small paper packets filled up with Heroin like substance was found and the said match box wrapped up with his wearing lungi on his waist. There was no match - stick in the match - box. The officer arrested the person at about 21. 25 hrs, and seized the said articles. Upon due investigation, that person viz. Lalit Halder was charge - sheeted under Section 21 of the N. D. P. S. Act. He was tried and convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. The appeal has been admitted for hearing and the liberty was granted to apply for bail on the same application upon prior notice to the State. ( 4 ) IN all this batch of bail applications, the law points canvassed by the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners are the same, namely that the procedural safe-guards embodied in the Act have been violated causing prejudice to the accused petitioners and that for violation of the provisions, which according to the learned counsels are mandatory, the accused petitioners are entitled to bail. ( 5 ) AS all these three applications for bail involve the same question of law, we propose to, dispose of them by this common order. ( 5 ) AS all these three applications for bail involve the same question of law, we propose to, dispose of them by this common order. ( 6 ) TO be or not to be was the searing question before Hamlet. He found something rotten in the State of Denmark. He also realised that all the ills of the State of Denmark was rooted in his uncle who had usurped the thorne. Yet he could not instantly take up arms against a sea of troublestt. He dithered and dithered and came on to the state of morbid inaction. To grant bail or not to grant bail under the N. D. P. S. Act is the question before us in view of the protection of personal liberty granted to a citizen by Art. 21 of the Constitution of India and in view of the limitations imposed by the stringent provision of Sec. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act. Drug affects an individual, goes on contaminating others and then the whole society becomes diseased. Therefore, we cannot play Hamlet, we are to act. The question has engaged the attention not only of this Court but has been agitated in all the High Court in our country. We propose to scrupulously survey the whole gamut of decisions placed before us, within a shan compass as far as practicable. Some decisions that have come to our notice will also be, discussed at appropriate places. But we make it clear that we are not going to write a treatise at a critique on the N. D. P. S. Act and so some of the decisions cited before us may remain untouched. A hymn is sung before undertaking something auspicious but onerous. We sing a hymn in the nature of a ruling of the Apex Court rendered in Kishan Lal Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kishan Lal, which settled the issue that the powers of the High Court to grant bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are subject to the limitations contained in the amended section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act and the restrictions placed on the powers of the Court under the said section are applicable to the High Court also in the matter of granting bail. It, therefore, follows that the proviso under section 167 (2) Cr. It, therefore, follows that the proviso under section 167 (2) Cr. P. C. is rendered impotent while considering an application for bail under the N. D. P. S. Act. As such, it is immaterial whether an accused under this Act is in Jail for 60 days or 90 days or more. High Courts power to grant bail having been thus circumscribed, we begin with a reference to Man Appa v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (because of its acceptance by Allahabad and Bombay High Courts), in which a Learned Single Judge of the Indore Bench of the M. P. High Court while discussing 42 and 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act has held that if procedure laid down under the Act is not followed, it would not be proper for the Court to refuse bail, particularly when the procedural safe -guards violated have a material bearing on the trial of the case. The Learned Single Judge has drawn inspiration, among others, from a ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Ernesto A. Miranda v. State of Arizona. In this case the U. S. Supreme Court enunciated certain brilliant principles as regards safe-guards to an individual accused of an offence allegedly committed by him. Man Appa was relied on by the Allahabad High Court in Sewa Ram v. State. Both Mr. Dutt and Mr. Bose have placed reliance on this Allahabad High Court decision. Man Appa has also been followed by the Bombay High Court in Lawrence Souza v. State of Maharashtra. Earlier to Lawrence there was a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Wilfred Joseph Dawood Lema v. State of Maharashtra. The Division Bench consisting of D. N. Mehta and H. H. Kantharia JJ. held that a police officer taking search is not duty bound to inform the person searched that if he so desired he shall be searched in presence of a gazetted office or a Magistrate. This Division Bench decision was placed before the Learned Single Judge deciding Lawrence. Apparently, the Division Bench decision was not relied upon by the Learned Single Bench. Incidentally it has come to my notice that the name of the Learned Presiding Judge of the Division Bench has been shown as Kurdukar J. in Para II page 402 of 1992 Cr1. L. J. 399. I do not know which is correct. Apparently, the Division Bench decision was not relied upon by the Learned Single Bench. Incidentally it has come to my notice that the name of the Learned Presiding Judge of the Division Bench has been shown as Kurdukar J. in Para II page 402 of 1992 Cr1. L. J. 399. I do not know which is correct. But a recent Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ram Dayal v. Central Narcotic Bureau, has over - ruled Man Appa and has held that the Court may reject the defence plea raised in terms of Sec. 50 if the same is found to be a mere pretence; so also, if it is not a case of searching, the person of the accused and of alleged recovery, in the course of such search, of the contraband substance. ( 7 ) IN Dadan Singh v. State of U. P. , a Learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has held that the provisions of Ss. 42 and 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act are mandatory and violation of any of these provisions will raise a presumption of prejudice and, therefore, mere alleged recovery of large quantity of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances may not be considered to be sufficient to deny bail. The Learned Judge has further held in regard to sec. 50 that the police officer is hound to inform the accused that he could have his search made before a Magistrate or any other Gazetted Officer referred to in the section and where provisions of sec. 42 or sec. 50 have been violated and it is not shown that no prejudice was, in fact, caused. (While coming to the above view, the learned judge has discussed a large number of case laws including Sewa Ram, supra ). But the Learned Judge has added, It is difficult to lay down precisely as to what facts or circumstances will be sufficient for holding the recovery to be genuine or displacing the prima facie presumption of prejudice. That will depend on the facts of each case. Neither the mere fact that alleged recovery is of large quantity may, in a given case, be sufficient to hold the recovery to be genuine nor this factor may be completely ignored. That may be one of the factors to be considered along with others in excluding the possibility of false implantation. Neither the mere fact that alleged recovery is of large quantity may, in a given case, be sufficient to hold the recovery to be genuine nor this factor may be completely ignored. That may be one of the factors to be considered along with others in excluding the possibility of false implantation. Indeed, it is a fair observation. Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the powers of the High Court to grant bail under section 439 Cr. P. C. is not curtailed by Sec. 37, N. D. P. S. Act, but controlled and regulated, Dayanand v. State of Haryana. Similar view is held in Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, and in Jagir Singh v. State of Haryana. Karnataka High Court, while dealing with Sec. 50 N. D. P. S. Act in Babu Rao State of Karnataka12, has held that after a person is arrested and before a search is conducted it is mandatory on the part of the officer to inform the arrested person that he has a right to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. If the accused is not informed of this right, there will be non compliance of this mandatory provision. The mere presence of the Gazetted Officer would not validate the search. Similarly in an earlier decision of that Court in A. V. Dharmasingh v. State of Karnataka, it was held that non - compliance with the provisions of Ss. 42 and 50 N. D. P. S. Act being prejudicial to the accused, he was entitled to bail. Kerala High Court, in its decision in Haneefa v. State , has made a reference to its own decision in Ahammed Koya v. State of Kerala. In that case it was held that Sec. 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act does not require the officer who wants to effect the search to ascertain the opinion of the accused as to whether he wants this search to be conducted in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and that the Section clearly shows that it is for the accused to make such a request before the search is made. According to that decision the very wording of the section is such that it is for the accused to require that he should be taken to the Gazetted Officer or to the Magistrate and on the wording of the said section, it is not possible to agree that it is for the officer to ask the accused whether the search is to be made in presence of the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. But it appears that the Kerala High Court has modified its earlier view in rendering its decision in a latter case. Sulaiman v. State of Kerala, in which it was held, The plain language of sections 50, 52, 53, 55,56 and 57 of the Act, leave no doubt that these are mandatory provisions. But violation of a mandatory provision per se, will not vitiate the conviction, unless prejudice thereby to the accused is shown. It seems that this decision has been followed by a Learned Single Judge of that High Court in Honeefas case, 1993 Cr1. L. J. 2125. Orissa High Court in its decision in Bidyadhar Dolui v. State of Orissa, has held that arrest and detention is liable to be set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 50,52,57 unless non-compliance is otherwise Justified. This decision was rendered by a Learned Single Judge, (L. Rath - J ). However, there was difference of opinion as to the interpretations of various provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act. So the case of Banka Das was referred to a Full Bench constituted with G. B. Patnaik, L. Rath and A. Pasayat - JJ. The case is reported in 1993 Cr1. L. J. 442. The majority view, (L. Rath-J dissenting), is that Sec. 50 (1) of the N. D. P. S. Act cases no obligation on the concerned officer to inform the person to be searched that he has option of making requisition to be taken before Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Following the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Kishanlal, it was also held that in the matter of granting bail under the N. D. P. S. , Act, Sec. 37 of the Act overrides the provisions of Sec. 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that even if the accused is entitled to bail by operation of Sec. 167 (2) proviso, Cr. P. C. he cannot be released on bail unless conditions stipulated under section 37 are satisfied. The learned counsels for the petitioners have referred to Badri Prosad v. State. This was a case under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 (as amended by Act 520f 1950 ). Sec. 13a of that Act fettered and circumscribed the Courts power to grant bail in offences under the proviso to sub -section (2) of Sec. 7. The conditions in granting bail under Section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act are almost in parimateria of the conditions in Sec. 13 (A) of the West Bengal State Act. While dealing with an application for bail under Section 13a, a Division Bench of this Court has observed The Court cannot grant bail in such cases without giving an opportunity to the prosecution to oppose the application. Its first duty, therefore, is to give the prosecution that opportunity. If, in spite of this opportunity, the prosecution does not oppose, then the further rigours of this Section do not opened and the Court is free to decide the question of grant of bail apart from and independently of this Section by reason of Section 5 (2) Criminal P. C. (old Code ). But if the prosecution does oppose the application for bail, then comes the second duty of the Court under the Section. In that event the Court cannot grant bail unless it appears to the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the applicant for bail is not guilty. Section 13a, Essential Supplies Act, represents a new species of non - bailable offence with its own rules for bail and that Section, therefore, is an extension of Section 497. Criminal P. C. T (old Code ). It goes onto say, In weighing the likelihood of the guilt or otherwise of the accused at a stage when he is under trial and when he ordinarily asks for bail, the Court has necessarily to act on a reasonable intelligent anticipation which exhypothesi must, to a certain extent, be problematical at that stage because the trial has not run its course so as to enable a conclusive decision on the guilt or innocence of the accused. It may be mentioned that the case of Badri Prosad was also placed before the Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ram Dayal v. Central Narcotic Bureau (supra ). The learned counsels have referred to K. L. Subhayya v. State of Karnataka. This is a case under Mysore Excise Act 1966. While dealing with Sections 53, 54 and 37 of this Act Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that both Sections 53 and 54 contained valuable safeguards for the liberty of the citizen in order to protect them from ill-founded or frivolous prosecution or harassment. In the instant case, the Inspector who had searched the car of the accused had not made any record of any ground on the basis of which he had a reasonable belief that an offence under the Act was being committed before proceeding to search the car and so it was held the provisions of Sec. 54 were not at all complied with and this non - compliance rendered the entire search without jurisdiction and as a logical corollary, vitiated the conviction under Section 34. Learned counsels have referred to a decision of this Court in Divendra Singh reported in 1980 (1) CHN 365. While dealing with Sections 41 (1) and 50 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, the learned Bench has held; Section 41 (1) of the Code is undoubtedly a powerful weapon in the hands of a police officer empowering him to take a person into custody without a warrant and without any order from a Court. In order that this power may not be misused, the legislature has enacted Section 50 (1) of the Code, which casts certain obligations on the police officer making such arrest. The language of the Section is clear and unambiguous and the use of the words shall forthwith communicate makes it mandatory on the part of the police officer making the arrest to simultaneously communicate to the officer being arrested the full particulars of the offence for which the arrest is being made or other reasons for such arrest. As such, forthwitht must be given its natural and literal meaning i. e. simultaneous with or immediately and for construing the meaning it is not necessary to fall back on Art. 22 of the Constitution The learned counsels have referred to Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi. As such, forthwitht must be given its natural and literal meaning i. e. simultaneous with or immediately and for construing the meaning it is not necessary to fall back on Art. 22 of the Constitution The learned counsels have referred to Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi. In this case Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the detention of a person in custody after the expiry of remand order, without any fresh order of remand committing him to further custody while adjourning the case under Section 344 Cr. P. C. (old) is illegal. Learned counsels have referred to Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation In this case Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while discussing Art. 21 of the Constitution, have laid down that The procedure prescribed by law for the deprivation of the right conferred by Art. 21 must be fair, just and reasonable. Just as a mala -fide act has no existence in the eye of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and procedure alike. It is, therefore, essential that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his fundamental right must conform to the norms of justice and fair - play. Procedure, which is unjust or unfair in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law which prescribes that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it. Any action taken by a public authority which is invested with statutory powers has, therefore, to be tested by the application of two standards; the action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and secondly it must be reasonable. If any action, with scope of the authority conferred by law, is found to be unreasonable, it must mean that the procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable. The substance of the law cannot be divorced from the procedure which it prescribes, for how reasonable the law is, depends upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by it. The Supreme Court has also added that the test of reasonableness depends on facts of each case. Learned counsels have also referred to Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12 Edition (1966), Chapter - 15 which deals with the law of procedure. We reproduce here few lines which were quoted by Mr. Bose during hearing. The Supreme Court has also added that the test of reasonableness depends on facts of each case. Learned counsels have also referred to Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12 Edition (1966), Chapter - 15 which deals with the law of procedure. We reproduce here few lines which were quoted by Mr. Bose during hearing. It is no easy task to state with precision the exact nature of the distinction between the substantive law and the law of procedure. To define procedure as concerned not with rights, but with remedies, is to confound the remedy with the process by which it is made available. Although the distinction between substantive law and procedure is sharply drawn in theory, there are many rules of procedure, which, in their practical operation, are wholly or substantially equivalent to rules of substantive law. In such cases the differences between these two branches of the law is one of form rather than of substance. Lastly the learned counsels have referred to a recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Re: Smt. B. Ramannamma22. In this case the learned Division Bench has held the view that the conditions mentioned under section 50, N. D. P. S. Act are mandatory and have to be strictly followed. Before granting bail to the petitioner, that learned Bench also observed as follows, We are, therefore, of the view that there are reasonable grounds for belief on the basis of the documents and records produced before us that the petitioner may not be found be guilty of the offence charged at the trial Among others, Maneka Gandhi23 and Sunil Batra24, were also cited before that Bench. Mr. Ghosal, learned counsel for the Union of India, while arguing the case, has referred to the statement of objects and reasons of the Act 61 of 1985 (N. D. P. S. Act.) and has submitted that the legislature felt an urgent need for the enactment for the comprehensive legislation on narcotic and psychotropic substances as the various Acts enacted in the past were inadequate to combat the menace of drug trafficking and then he has submitted that the Court must strive to correctly interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The Court must, therefore keep the legislative policy in mind in applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. These observations have been made by the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Singh Srivastava v. IV Additional District Judge, Lucknow. Apart from this ruling, the learned counsel has also cited other rulings and we are making a brief reference to them. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), the Supreme Court has given some guidelines as to how the words of a statute should be interpreted. The Court first examines the words of the statute. If the words are precise and cover the situation in hand, there is no need to go further. Those words should be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense, but, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed, it is the paramount duty of the Court to put upon the language of the legislature rational meaning. The meaning of every word, every section and every provision should be examined. The Act as a whole with reference to the necessity which gave rise to the Act has to be examined. The provision cannot be considered out of the framework of the statute. The provision should be considered to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences. However, this does not imply power to the Court to substitute its own notions of legislative intention. It implies only a power of choice where differing constructions are possible and different meanings are available. For this purpose Court calls in external and internal aids. In State of Kerala v. Mathai Verghese, the Supreme Court has observed, the Court can merely interpret the section; it cannot rewrite, recast or redesign the section. In interpreting the provision the exercise undertaken by the Court is to make explicit the intention of the legislature which enacted the legislation. It is not of the Court to reframe the legislation for the very good reason that the powers to legislatet have not been conferred on the Court. In Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation. Bhupa, the Supreme Court has observed, There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a particular provision in a statute is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the status is important. In Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation. Bhupa, the Supreme Court has observed, There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a particular provision in a statute is mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the status is important. The object of the particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important. The weighing of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory is vital and, more often than not, determinative of the very question whether the provision is mandatory or directory. Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or preventation of public mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat that design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in addition to non-compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidate the act complained of. In A. C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration, the Supreme Court has observed, Statement of objects and reasons for introducing a Bill in the legislature is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the statue as enacted, far less can it control the meaning of the actual words used in the Act. It can only be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the circumstances which actuated the sponsor of the Bill to introduce it and the purpose for doing so. The preamble of a statute which is often described as a key to the understanding of it may legitimately be consulted to solve an ambiguity or to ascertain and fix the meaning of words in their context which otherwise bear more meanings than one. It may afford useful assistance as to what the statute intends to reach, but if the enactment is clear and un am biguous in itself then no preamble can vary its meaning. While construing a statute one has also to bear in mind the presumption that the legislature does not intend to make any sub startitial alteration in the existing law beyond what it expressly declares or beyond the immediate scope and object of the statute. In Indian Administrative Service Association v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed on the interpretation of statute, In case of ambiguity Court can endeavour to iron out the creases and adopt a just, reasonable and sensible construction in consonance with the legislative intention. In Indian Administrative Service Association v. Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed on the interpretation of statute, In case of ambiguity Court can endeavour to iron out the creases and adopt a just, reasonable and sensible construction in consonance with the legislative intention. If the provision is found to be defective, wrong, ultra vires or violative of fundamental rights, Court can strike it down but it cannot substitute its own words and phrases to supply casus omissus. In Radha Kishan v. State of UP. , the Supreme Court, while dealing with Sections 103, 165,417 and 432 of the Criminal P. C. (1898), has observed, It may be that where the provisions of Ss. 103 and 165 Criminal P. C. are contravened the search can be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that, because of the illegality of the search, the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues, and the seizure of the articles is not vitiated. In State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal, the Supreme Court has held that the police had powers under the Criminal P. C. to search and seize the gold if they had reason to believe that a cognizable offence had been committed in respect there of. Assuming arguendo, that the search was illegal, then also it will not affect the validity of the seizure and further investigation by the customs authorities or the validity of the trial, which followed on the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Customs. In Sunder Singh v. State of U. P, the Supreme Court has held that Section 103 of the Criminal P. C. (1898) applies when a search is to be made (If a place. It docs not apply to the search of a person. Mr. Hazra, learned Public Prosecutor (Acting) appearing for the State has also argued on the point of interpretation of the statutes. He has drawn our attention to the various rulings already cited by -Mr. Ghosal. He has further referred to the case of Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India. This was a case under Army Act (1955 and the Rules made there under. He has drawn our attention to the various rulings already cited by -Mr. Ghosal. He has further referred to the case of Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India. This was a case under Army Act (1955 and the Rules made there under. Rule 25 the Rules provides that where an charged with an offence under the Act, the investigation shall, if he requires it, be held, and the evidence, if he so requires, be taken in his presence in writing in the same manner as nearly as circumstances admit, as is required by Rules 22 to 24 are not mandatory in the case of on officer. The learned Public Prosecutor is stressing on the Clause If he so requires appearing in Rule 25 of the Army Rules which is similar to the Clause, If such person so requires, appearing in Section 50 (1) N. D. P. S. Act. The Supreme Court has observed in this case The dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Parliament. One of the well - recognised canons of construction is that the legislature speaks its mind by use of correct expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the language of the provision the Court should adopt literal construction if it does not lead to an absurdity. The first question to be posed is whether there IS any ambiguity in the language used in the provision. If there is none, it would mean the language used, speaks the mind of parliament and there is no need to look somewhere else to discover the intention or meaning. Mr. Hazra has also referred to the Member - Secretary, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution v. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. . In this case it has been observed that to find out the intention of the legislation, if possible it should be found out from the language used in case of doubt. The offence of legislation should be sought for to thrifty the ambiguity only, if any. On the point of interpretation of a statute, to counter the argument of Mr. Ghosal and Mr. Hazra, Mr. Bose has cited Mithu v. State of Punjab. In this case the Supreme Court, while striking down in 5. The offence of legislation should be sought for to thrifty the ambiguity only, if any. On the point of interpretation of a statute, to counter the argument of Mr. Ghosal and Mr. Hazra, Mr. Bose has cited Mithu v. State of Punjab. In this case the Supreme Court, while striking down in 5. 303 of to Indian Penal Code as bring violative of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Contribution, has observed that a savage sentence is anathema to the civilized Juris prudence or Article 21 It further inter alia added: Just as a reasonableness of restrictions under Clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 is im the Courts to determine, so is it for the Courts to decide whether the producer by a law for depriving a person of his life or liberty is fair, just and reasonable. ( 8 ) THE case laws cited and discussed above on the point of interpretation of statutes have paved the way for us to find out the meaning of Sec. 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act. As we read and re-read the construction of this Section and go on taking a close look, we find that there is no ambiguity in it. The meaning is plain and clear. Sec. 50 (1) enjoins that when any officer duly authorised under sections 42 is about to search any person under the provisions of Sections 41, 42 or 43 he shall take such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest gazetted officer of any of departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate, but is conditioned by the Clause if such person so requires. It is up to such person then to demand of the officer that he be produced before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate to effect the search, which may include his person or personal effects. Sec. 50 (1) does not cast any duty on the officer concerned to inform such person of such right. That no duty is cast upon such office will be clear from the wording of sub - section (4) of See. 50. No female shall be searched by any one excepting a female. It does not say, No female shall be searched excepting a female gazetted officer or a female Magistrate. That no duty is cast upon such office will be clear from the wording of sub - section (4) of See. 50. No female shall be searched by any one excepting a female. It does not say, No female shall be searched excepting a female gazetted officer or a female Magistrate. We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that it is the mandate of the that by a female shall be searched only by a female who need not necessarily be a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. This is in tune with subsection 2 of Sec. 51 of the Criminal P. C. which says, Whenever it is necessary to cause a female to be searched, the search shall be by another female with strict regard to decency. ( 9 ) MR. Bose has assiduously stressed that the procedure prescribed by Section 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act is violative of Article 21 and Article 22 (1) of the constitution. We have given our anxious thought to this submission. But Article 22 (1) speaks of arrest, whereas Section 50 N. D. P. S. Act speaks of search. We hold that Section 50 N. D. P. S. Act 21 neither violative of Art. 21 nor of Article 22 (1) of the constitution. Sect inn 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act cannot be read in isolation of Section 37 of the Act. Granting or rejection of bail ultimately on the satisfaction of the Court. No person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of 5 years or more shall be released on bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence, and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Here, our minds meet with the mind of P. N. Mookherjee. One of the Learned Judges handing down the rolling in Badri Prasad (supra ). We quote para (25) of that reported case. In matters of bail the test to be applied is the test of belief as opposed to decision or conclusion which marks the end of the (trial. Here, our minds meet with the mind of P. N. Mookherjee. One of the Learned Judges handing down the rolling in Badri Prasad (supra ). We quote para (25) of that reported case. In matters of bail the test to be applied is the test of belief as opposed to decision or conclusion which marks the end of the (trial. The belief should no doubt be reasonable but once that is reached one way or the other that is either with regard to the guilt or the innocence off, the accused nothing further is generally required to decide the question of bail. The learned counsels for the petitioners have relied much on the decision of this Court granting bail in. In Re: Smt. Ramannamma (supra ). But the facts are so very different from the facts of the cases in hand. Smt. Ramannamma, the accused is a Telegu speaking woman who does not know Hindi. The police officer (male) conducted the search himself. She was not searched by a female officer Panchanama (seizure memo) was prepared in Hindi. The contents were not explained to her. Two Panchanamas were prepared in Hindi one at the time of arrest, the other at the time of moving an application for bail before the Sessions Judge at Port Blair. Her plea before the Bench was that she signed those papers in good faith without knowing anything about their contents. Under the facts stated the Bench held the view that there are reasonable grounds for belief on the basis of the documents and records produced before us that the petitioner may not be found to be guilty of the offence charged at the trial and granted bail. ( 10 ) IN the case of Farid Au, 850 grams of Heroin had been recovered from the Pouch held by him in his hand in presence of a gazetted officer. His body was not searched. The substance found in the Pouch was chemically tested and proved to be Heroin. The international market value of this, quantity of Heroin would be about 85 lakhs of rupees. On the basis of his statements 3. 800 kgs. of Heroin had been recovered from the possession of one Ramesh Singh (not before us) at Asansol, the international market value of which would be more than 3 crore of rupees. The international market value of this, quantity of Heroin would be about 85 lakhs of rupees. On the basis of his statements 3. 800 kgs. of Heroin had been recovered from the possession of one Ramesh Singh (not before us) at Asansol, the international market value of which would be more than 3 crore of rupees. We are told at the Bar that the charge-sheet has in the meantime been submitted against accused Farid All Under the facts and circumstances, this Court is not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of the offence under the N. D. P. S. Act or that he will not jump bail or while on bail will not commit further offences. Mr. Dutt has heavily relied upon the order dated 2nd March, 1993 passed by the Under-Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi which speaks of Advisory Boards opinion that there is no sufficient cause for his detention and on the basis of such opinion the detention order was revoked and he (accused Farid Ali) was directed to be released forthwith. There is a patent difference between a proceeding of preventive detention under the prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1988 and a proceeding under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985. Detention under the former Act is preventive that is, it is intended to prevent a person from indulging in activities which may in the long run result in an offence punishable under the N. D. P. S. Act, and under the latter Act the offence is already committed for which the accused is being prosecuted as a punitive measure. Millions of Jews were put to death in the gas chambers in the Nazi Germany during war years (2nd world war ). During past half century the hunt is still going on to nab those war criminals. Their crime is horrendous mainly because they planned to wipe a nation out of this World. Millions of Jews were put to death in the gas chambers in the Nazi Germany during war years (2nd world war ). During past half century the hunt is still going on to nab those war criminals. Their crime is horrendous mainly because they planned to wipe a nation out of this World. Drug trafficking is equally, if not more, dangerous, as it allures, and has allured, a generation of young Indians from Manipur to Gujarat, from Kashmir to Kanya Kumari, who are crippled by these drugs and psychotropic substances, whose senses are atrophied, to whom illusion has become the reality, who are baling their own funeral marches slowly and painfully, while their parents and near and dear ones are helplessly looking at them with tearful eyes. In the Middle East, in some Arab countries drug peddlers are awarded death penalty by beheading. Section 31 of the N. D. P. S. Act also provides death penalty for certain offences after previous conviction. Of course, no death sentence under the N. D. P. S. Act has come to our knowledge up till now. The re -appearance of L. S. D. in the United States of America has sent an alarm signal in that country. The Telegraph, a Calcutta daily, in its issue of August 24,1993 had carried a news item under the heading Mizoram seeks U. K. held to counter drugs. India being a Member Nation of the U. N. cannot ignore its mandates and so enacted the prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1988 to supplement the punitive provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act 1985 so as to enable the State to fight out the menace of drug addiction more effectively. In the case of accused Ramesh Mahato 11 kgs. 800 grams of ganja were recovered from his possession while traveling in a Bihar State Road Transport Bus. This Court holds the same view as in the case of Accused Farid Ali. In the case of accused Lalit Halder, 4488 grams of Heroin were recovered from his possession. He was tried under section 21 N. D. P. S. Act and convicted there under and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh in default further rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. An appeal preferred there from is pending hearing in this Court. He was tried under section 21 N. D. P. S. Act and convicted there under and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1 lakh in default further rigorous imprisonment for 5 years. An appeal preferred there from is pending hearing in this Court. We do not consider it fit and proper to grant bail. ( 11 ) HAVING thus discussed, we draw the curtain here and reject all the 3 applications for bail. R. Bhattacharyya, J: ( 12 ) I may say straightway that I agree entirely with the reasonings and the conclusions of my learned brother. I venture, however, to express my own feelings on the matter in issue. An interesting question arises in these petitions as to whether the grant of bail under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is foreign to the Code of Criminal Procedure and contrary to the intent and spirit of the protection of personal liberty ensured by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The formidable question that stares at the face at the very threshold has invited our own decision. Indeed it is true that out voyage in quest of truth is not to assume the role of critic or jurist but to afford a decision to lay down the correct law to resolve all controversy. ( 13 ) TO maintain the integrity of the law, the court must suit the action to the word. The word to the action and so, we have to fathom for the language enquired, what the meaning of section 50 is and save it from possible exploitation or invasion by the accused for whom fair is foul, foul is fair. ( 14 ) IT is easy to envisage the terrible blow to the fundamental right as encompassed in Article 21 if sections 37, 50 and other provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act are freely permitted to subvert the scheme of Article 21 where human rights have been vigorously and rigorously worshipped. ( 15 ) TO approach the problem for decision, it has been highlighted emphatically by the Ld. Counsels for the petitioners that Section 439 cannot override the provisions of the amended Section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, which found room in the Code by the amendment sustained by Act 2 of 1989. ( 15 ) TO approach the problem for decision, it has been highlighted emphatically by the Ld. Counsels for the petitioners that Section 439 cannot override the provisions of the amended Section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, which found room in the Code by the amendment sustained by Act 2 of 1989. The Counsels are apt to argue that section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is a Draconian piece of legislation aimed at forfeiting the basic human rights having their fundamental root in Magna Carta during the reign of the English King. Even the historical research will prove that with the march of time the plebians succeeded in securing some human rights in course of their struggle with the patricians. The development and the attainment of human rights attained considerable height as the world passed between the two wars. ( 16 ) TO broach the subject, I may say that modern legislation does not proceed on the anvil of preamble, since the legislative formula has taken an inhospitable look. But where, as here, when the scheme and object of the Act has been given publicity in the statute itself, the adjudication of a dispute divorced from the scheme and object of the Act does not stand to be proper and goes against all the Canons of law. It is a lamp in the statute and provides a better key to understanding the intent and purpose of the Act. Returning to the scheme and object of the Act, it is seen, that the provisions have been made stringent by Act 2/1989 to combat the menace of Narcotic Drugs more effectively. To eradicate the social evil, it is the International Convention and the modelities that generated legislation. ( 17 ) THE Ld. Counsels to prove the futility of Section 37 of the Act have argued with much vehemence that it cannot exist in the statue book, in default of compliance of prescribed procedure established by law. ( 18 ) THE legislators in their ample wisdom in framing the law were not unmindful of provisions of section 167 (2) of the Cr. P. C. It may be legitimate to infer to keep the society safe from the onslaught of drug trafficking and, therefore, statutory period for enlargement of bail was safely excluded by them. ( 18 ) THE legislators in their ample wisdom in framing the law were not unmindful of provisions of section 167 (2) of the Cr. P. C. It may be legitimate to infer to keep the society safe from the onslaught of drug trafficking and, therefore, statutory period for enlargement of bail was safely excluded by them. ( 19 ) IN the background, section 37 was introduced which stood on its footing where the provisions for bail could only be evaluated and assessed on the grounds catalogued in the said section. ( 20 ) IN short the foundation of the claim is that there must be faithful adherence to the provisions of the Sections 41- 43, 50, 50 (3), 52a, and 58 as section 37 of the Act cannot be adjudged on its own merit independent of the Sections as referred to above and the mandate of the constitutional provisions touching on fundamental right. ( 21 ) IN developing the contention, the Ld. Counsels have assiduously contended that the import, implication and meaning of the sections referred to above, if read in isolation or in conjunction with each other would indicate without any ambiguity that they were mandatory. But this aspect of the matter has been copiously dealt with by my Ld. brother where citations are not few and far between. ( 22 ) AGREEING with my brother, I am tempted to say upon reading Section 50 of the Act scrupulously along with other sections that there are no pitfalls in them. The expressions employed he is such person so requirest in section 50 do not lay any obligation that the officer concerned is to inform the accused before he could exercise his option relating to search in presence of the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer. If any legalistic and realistic approach is taken for in terpreting the sections it reveals that it is none but the accused who can legitimately demand compliance. The section does. not foreshadow that the accused is to stand and wait for the Officer of his mere asking before search as to whether he should be searched in presence of the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. In my view, there is no dent in the wording of the sections that could foster any duty on the officers before search. not foreshadow that the accused is to stand and wait for the Officer of his mere asking before search as to whether he should be searched in presence of the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. In my view, there is no dent in the wording of the sections that could foster any duty on the officers before search. A mere illustration will expose the infirmity of the claim in the background of recovery of Narcotics from the pouch of the accused as distinguished from the search of person. It becomes, therefore an empty formality to take him to the Magistrate or the Gazetted Officer purely for search of the pouch or any other material objects where Narcotics were kept concealed. This view finds support from Ahammed Koya v. State of Kerala. It will be a dumb show to inform an accused before search the number of rights he has which he can avail of Notice to the accused of his right before which search by the officer is an absurd proposition. ( 23 ) INCIDENTALLY, the Ld. Counsels have made confusion between Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India and the import, meaning and implication of Section 50 of the Act. Article 22 (1) has its anchorage at arrest as distinguished from search and seizure. Article 22 of the Constitution of India in all its comprehensiveness deals with protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. It imposes an overwhelming duty on the authority that the person arrested must be informed about the grounds of arrest along with other ancillary rights. But section 50 of the N. D. P. S. Act maintains a silence that search and seizure is statutorily fastened with such a statutory obligation. Neither section 50 nor section 51 of the Cr. P. C. can aid the claim of the Counsel. Section 51 of. he Cr. P. C. lays down a right of the accused that he should be informed about the grounds of arrest and for enlargement of his bail. But Section 51 does not provide that the person to be searched should be taken before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. Even, Section 100 of the Cr. P. C. is restrictive in operation divorced from obligation of the Officer making the search to inform the person residing in or being in charge of such a place. But Section 51 does not provide that the person to be searched should be taken before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate. Even, Section 100 of the Cr. P. C. is restrictive in operation divorced from obligation of the Officer making the search to inform the person residing in or being in charge of such a place. On the other hand, sections 50, 51 and 100 of the Cr. P. C. prescribe the mode and manner to be observed by the Officer entrusted with different statutory duties as envisaged therein. ( 24 ) THE next example affords an irresistible conclusion that concealment of the contraband goods which is not exposed for sale in the market imputes adequate knowledge. Therefore, it knocks out the vain plea of the Ld. Counsels for the petitioners that there is an obligation of the officer to inform the accused of his right before the accused disclosed his willingness. ( 25 ) THE Ld. Counsels for the petitioners are more apt to raise an issue, which revolves centrifugally around Article 21. The right to life and personal liberty have been well enshrined in the temple of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the perspective of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is essential to understand the underlying tone, note and object of it. ( 26 ) IN the wake of constitution founded by our forefathers, Article 21 of the Constitution of India became the germane for consideration in its correlations to articles 19,20 and 22 in A. K Gopalan v. State of Madras. It reveals that the parameter of the said Article was somewhat narrowly construed by the majority of the Honble Judges excepting one learned Judge who recorded a note of dissent. It gave rise to the theory that the freedoms under Articles 19, 21, 22 and 31, are exclusive of each Article fundamental right. Even, in the case of R. C. Kapur v. Union of India, the view was quoted with approval. But I should not be oblivious that the decision in Maneka Gandhis case (supra) was again followed and analysed in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. To drive home the point further, the concept to life and liberty as nourished in Article 21 of our constitution continued its expansion and enlargement in Bank Nationalisation case (supra ). But I should not be oblivious that the decision in Maneka Gandhis case (supra) was again followed and analysed in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. To drive home the point further, the concept to life and liberty as nourished in Article 21 of our constitution continued its expansion and enlargement in Bank Nationalisation case (supra ). The principle of law laid down in A. K. Gopalas case by the reason of expansion and enlargement of right to life and liberty could not influence or arrest the subsequent decisions. In consequence, a new jurisprudence with its modern outlook having its root in Article 21 of the Constitution of India shows its head to the exclusion of the old concept where guarantee to life and liberty were in fact re-laid down by the apex court with all their effulgence. It is glorious triumph of the fundamental right to life and liberty, which has not been swept away. ( 27 ) IN the background of the dispute, a furore has been raised more often than not that when a statute makes a procedure or provision for compliance its departure by non - performance will render the act a nullity as mandatory procedure can never be whittled down at the pleasure of the authority. But could it by said with a degree of precision that violation of a provision per se could really vitiate the search, seizure and the conviction in absence of prejudice? Prejudice must be shown and proved. A mere slogan of prejudice is, therefore, a vain publicity to confuse the issue without anything more. When it is an act of the accused from its inception, the information to the accused of his right before search by the officer as magnified is a fanciful imagination. ( 28 ) I may borrow wisdom from the celebrated decision of H. N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no bearing on the competence of the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. The cognizance, if taken on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. The cognizance, if taken on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. Can the accused demand return of the contraband article merely on the ground of minor wear and tear in the procedure regarding recovery? The answer would be in the negative. If it does it will open the floodgate of Narcotic Drug Trafficking activities. In Pooran v. Director of Inspection, the Supreme Court considered the question as to whether the evidence obtained as a result illegal search could be valid evidence and observed as follows: It would be seen that in India, as in England where the test of admissibility of evidence lies in relevancy, unless there is an express or necessarily implied prohibition in the constitution or other law, evidence obtained as, result of illegal search or seizure is not liable to be shut out. ( 29 ) AS I have already indicated that recovery of Narcotics from an accused cannot impede the course of justice merely on the ground of procedural lapses when the contraband goods on ultimate analysis are found to be Narcotic by the expert. It, therefore, excludes the plea of technically which cannot make any triumph over the social legislation. If it is allowed up the social order. Only God can say what crime is committed in the name of liberty. It is not permissible in the background of the beneficial legislation that one could barter his conscience for social evil in the odd name of human right and personal right. Liberty is not absolute but qualified. Further, there is a conceptual difference between law and procedure. They mean validly enacted law and procedure. Undoubtedly, it is true that the scope of Article 21 is all comprehensive. The permission given to the state by Article 21 to deprive a person of his liberty according to procedure established by law is expressly controlled by Article 21 in cases both of punitive and preventive detention. The N. D. P. S. Act, 1985 provides its own law and procedure, which has not been circumscribed by the comprehensive scope of Article 21. Article 21 may be comprehensive but it is not all pervading. The N. D. P. S. Act, 1985 provides its own law and procedure, which has not been circumscribed by the comprehensive scope of Article 21. Article 21 may be comprehensive but it is not all pervading. However, harsh the statute may be, the procedure when prescribed in the N. D. P. S. Act there is no conflict. It is a conflict created by argument in - absence of real conflict between the two. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution is, therefore, not hostile to the provisions of the N. D. P. S. Act as it never transgressed the boundary of the said Article. . It is a treasure handed down to us by the international conventions and modalities, the object being to promote drug free society. ( 30 ) THE Ld. counsel had attached much premium to ignorance of law as excuse. But ignorance of law in the context of the social, political and educational sphere sometimes may seem to appear as reasonable excuse in view of the mass illiteracy. But when an accused is possessed of contraband goods which are not a marketable item ignorance of law in the background of illiteracy does not prove to be an excuse. It is a conscious act constituting his knowledge where education in the truest sense of the term has no relevance. ( 31 ) THE Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has sought to have made the order dated. 2nd of March, 1993, passed by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue as sacrosanct. The order was passed in exercise of power under Section 3 (1) of the prevention of illicit traffic in N. D. P. S. Act, 1988 observing that there is no sufficient cause for detention of Md. Farid Ali. In the concluding portion of that order, the Central Govt. in exercise of power under section 9 (f) of the said Act revoked the order of detention and directed release of Farid Ali forthwith. But reading the section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, 1985, the word employed in section 37 is Court. The Ld. Counsel finding himself in this predicament has canvassed with great vigour that Court cannot readjudicate a matter already decided by the authority in favour of an accused. The Ld. But reading the section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act, 1985, the word employed in section 37 is Court. The Ld. Counsel finding himself in this predicament has canvassed with great vigour that Court cannot readjudicate a matter already decided by the authority in favour of an accused. The Ld. Counsel, however, could not satisfy me that the authority which passed the order dated 2nd of March, 1993, is a substitute for Court which could exercise power under section 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act in enlarging the accused on bail charged with drug trafficking which lays down essential conditions for enlargement of the accused person on bail, after its faithful adherence to the procedure prescribed where Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot prevail upon it. Later on: Let xerox copies of our order be made available to the parties on usual undertaking and upon compliance of necessary formalities. Bail Applications rejected.