Delhi High Court P. K. Bahri, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision is directed against order of the Additional District Judge acting as Land Acquisition Court, dated November 30, 1978, by which in a reference petition under Sections 30 and 31 of the Land Acquisition Act he had held that out of Khasra No. 183 located in revenue estate of Village Tuglaqabad, 3 Bighas of land stand vested in the Gaon Sabha and remaining 8 Biswas is owned by the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner before me is that this Khasra number is part of his holding and no portion of the land comprised in this Khasra number could be vested in Gaon Sabha in view of Section 7 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act (for short the Act ). ( 3 ) SECTION 7 of the Act lays down that all rights of an individual proprietor or proprietors pertaining to waste lands, grazing or. . . . . . . . . . shall with effect from the commencement of this Act be terminated in accordance with the provision of Sub-section (2) and under Sub-section (2) the Deputy Commissioner has to pass an order in respect of such land divesting the individual proprietors from their rights and vest the same in Gaon Sabha. However, there is proviso to Sub-section (1) with the explanation which makes it clear that for the purposes of this Sub-section the "waste land" shall include cultivable and uncultivable waste area of the village. . . . . . . . except the unculti- vated area, (a) included in the holdings of such proprietor or proprietors. In nutshell, the provision of the statute is if there exists any waste land in a holding of a particular proprietor the same would not be treated as waste land for the purposes of Section 7 (1 ). This provision came to be interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in R. F. A. 167/86, Sher Singh and Others v. Gaon Sabha and Others, decided on May 30, 1991 and it was held that waste land falling within the holding of a proprietor shall not be treated as waste land for purposes of Section 7 (1) or Section 7 (2) of the Act. ( 4 ) SO, examined from this angle, it is evident that the order of the Additional District Judge declaring that 3 Bighas of the land out of Khasra No. 183 vested in Gaon Sabha is vitiated with illegality. This particular parcel of land was part of the holding of the petitioner who has been shown as owner of this Khasra No. 183 as per Jamabandi of the year 1948-49 and the Additional District Judge has already held that 8 Biswas of the land in the said hold ing continues to be owned by the petitioner. If that is so, the part of the land of that holding of the petitioner could not in law be declared as land vesting in Gaon Sabha being a waste land because the same stands excluded from the definition of "waste land" as given in explanation enumerated above. ( 5 ) COUNSEL for the respondent has contended that the declaration made by Collector under Section 7 (2) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act could not be challenged in proceedings under Sections 30 and 31 of the Act. He has argued that in case the petitioner was aggrieved with the order of the Collector by which this particular land had been held to be vesting in the Gaon Sabha the petitioner ought to have taken resort to the provisions of Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act for getting set aside the aforesaid order. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, has argued that once the matter stands referred under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act to the Court constituted under the aforesaid Act the question of ownership of land and apportionment of the compensation is within exclusive jurisdiction of such Court and the matter could not be agitated either in revenue Court or in the Civil Court. He has cited an unreported judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Sikri Brothers, Kiln Owners v. Union of India, R. F. A. No. 80-D/1965, decided on April 26, 1971. He has cited an unreported judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Sikri Brothers, Kiln Owners v. Union of India, R. F. A. No. 80-D/1965, decided on April 26, 1971. The learned Judge after referring to various judgments on the subject had held that once the land has been acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, there is no land which can be subject of the adjudication by the revenue assistant or the ordinary Civil Court and it was further laid down that the only dispute which would remain would be question relating to how the compensation awarded under the said Act was to be apportioned between the various claimants and by virtue of Section 31 (2) read with Section 32 of the said Act the land acquisition Court has to adjudicate upon such matter if reference has been made to the land acquisition Court by the Collector. The judgment given by the Supreme Court in the case of Hatti v. Sunder Singh, AIR 1971 SC 2320 , was distinguished as it was held that the law laid down by the Supreme Court would not apply when reference has been made to the land acquisition Court by the Collector under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and thereafter it is only the land acquisition Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the claims of the various persons for purposes of apportioning the compensation. ( 7 ) IN view of the above discussion, I hold that the whole of the land comprised in Khasra No. 183 is owned by the petitioner and the compensation pertaining to that land has to be paid to the petitioner. I allow this civil revision and modify the impugned order to that extent. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs in this petition.