State of Kerala v. Vallappally Plantations — 1993 DIGILAW 483 (KER)

ORDER T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. This revision petition under S.103 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964) (the Act for short) is filed by the State against the order of the Taluk Land Board, Kanjirappally dropping the proceedings initiated against the respondent under S.85(9) of the Act. The majority of the Taluk Land Board held that it had no authority or jurisdiction to reopen the ceiling case of the respondent under S.85(9). We shall state the facts leading to this order and how it is challenged by the State; 2. The respondent which is a private limited company filed statement of its holdings under S.85A for purposes of the ceiling provisions in the Act. They owned a total extent of 130.47 acres, 125 acres of which was claimed to be exempted as a rubber plantation as on January 1, 1970. But the Taluk Land Board did not accept the respondent's claim for exemption, inasmuch as the 125 acres in question was "other dry land" as on April 1, 1964, and was converted into rubber plantation only thereafter, and therefore the land had to be treated only as "other dry land" and not as rubber plantation in the computation of the extent of holdings under the ceiling provisions of the Act, because of the direction contained in S.82(4) to ignore such conversion. The Taluk Land Board accordingly passed order on February 24, 1976 holding that the respondent was liable to surrender 115.17 acres of land. This order was challenged in revision C.R.P.No.2274 of 1976 in this court which was disposed of by Bhaskaran, J. on February, 28, 1977. The learned Judge took the view that the ceiling provisions were made applicable to companies (like the respondent) only by the introduction of S.82(1)(d) by Act 35 of 1969 which came into force on January 1, 1970, that the respondent was therefore quite unconcerned with "the state of affairs of the land" prior to January 1, 1970, and therefore S.82(4) was not attracted to the case of the respondent. In the event, the learned Judge remitted the matter to the Taluk Land Board for fresh disposal with the following observations:- "For the foregoing reasons the revision is allowed in part; the impugned order is set aside; and the matter is remanded to the Taluk Land Board for fresh disposal in the light of the observations contained in this order, and in accordance with law. The Taluk Land Board would ascertain as to what, if any, is the extent of land covered by rubber plantation as on 1-1-1970 out of the 130.47 acres held by the revision petitioner company, and exempt such extent also, besides the extent of 30 cents already exempted, while reckoning the extent of land held by the revision petitioner for the purpose of ceiling area. There will be no order as to costs." The judgment of Bhaskaran, J. is reported at page 265 of 1977 KLT as Vellappally Plantations v. State of Kerala. 3. The Taluk Land Board passed consequential order on May 18, 1979 implementing the order of this court holding that 125 acres was rubber plantation as on January 1, 1970 and that therefore the respondent was not holding any land in excess of the ceiling limits. The proceedings were dropped. 4. Soon thereafter, a Division Bench of this Court dealt with a similar question in C.R.P.No.5023 of 1976, the decision in which is reported in Kuruvila v. Taluk Land Board, 1980 KLT 53 . This matter came up before the Division Bench on a reference made by M.P. Menon, J. who doubted the correctness of Bhaskaran, J.'s decision in the case of the respondent. The Division Bench held by its judgment dated September 12, 1979 that the decision in the respondent's case was erroneous in law and accordingly overruled it. The court stated that the introduction of S.82(1)(d) with effect from January; 1, 1970, had no impact on the applicability of S.82(4) and therefore conversions of dry land into plantations after April 1, 1964 had to be ignored in the computation of the ceiling area even in relation to companies like the respondent. 5. We may here mention that the Supreme Court had taken a similar view, though not in relation to companies, in Mathew v. Taluk Land Board, 1979 KLT 601 . 6. The result of the decision in Kuruvila was that the decision of Bhaskaran, J. stood overruled. 5. We may here mention that the Supreme Court had taken a similar view, though not in relation to companies, in Mathew v. Taluk Land Board, 1979 KLT 601 . 6. The result of the decision in Kuruvila was that the decision of Bhaskaran, J. stood overruled. The respondent who was holding excess land by the application of S.82(4), the conversion in their case being after April 1, 1964, had not surrendered the extent of land which they were in law liable to surrender. In this view, the Taluk Land Board reopened the ceiling proceedings under S.85(9) of the Act, and issued a draft statement on May 2,1980. The respondent filed two objections dated February 20 and March 7, 1981 respectively inter alia challenging the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to reopen the proceedings having regard to the decision of this Court in the revision petition filed by them. This contention was accepted and the Taluk Land Board passed order on February 20,1982, holding by a majority that it had no jurisdiction to reopen the proceedings. 7. The State has challenged this order as illegal and erroneous in law. It is stated that the power under S.85(9) extends to cases where a person had been held not liable to surrender any land as excess, even though he was owning or holding lands in excess of the ceiling area. The fact that the matter had, on the earlier occasion, reached this court will not deprive the Taluk Land Board of its wide power under S.85(9) to reopen the proceedings. So goes the argument of the Government Pleader. 8. We shall extract the relevant portions of S.85(9) for purposes of reference: "85.(9). The Taluk Land Board may, at any time, set aside its order under sub-section (5) or sub-s.(7), as the case may be, and proceed afresh under that sub-section if it is satisfied that" (a) the extent of lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person under S.85 is less than the extent of lands which he was liable to surrender under the provisions of this Act, or (b) the lands surrendered by, or assumed from, a person are not lawfully owned or held by him; or (c) in a case where a person is, according to such order, not liable to surrender any land, such person owns or holds lands in excess of the ceiling area." 9. In Chathunny v. Taluk Land Board, 1981 KLT 74, the scope of S.85(9) came up for consideration before a Division Bench. The contention was that in cases where the order of the Taluk Land Board had been the subject of revision to this court and the revision petition had either been allowed or dismissed, the power under S.85(9) could not be exercised. This was accepted, but this court did not deal with the question elaborately for the reason that the position was conceded by the Additional Advocate General. The ratio behind the decision was that sub-section (9) contemplated exercise of power by the Taluk Land Board only to set aside an order of its own under sub-section (5) or sub-section (7), thereby indicating that it had no power to act under the sub-section if the order to be set aside was that of the High Court, with which the order of the Taluk Land Board had merged. Accordingly it was held that in cases where the revisions filed against the orders of the Taluk Land Board had been disposed of on the merits, the Board will not be competent to exercise the power under S.85(9). 10. In the light of this decision, the attempt of the learned Government Pleader who appeared for the petitioner was to convince us that there was no merger of the earlier order of the Taluk Land Board in the order of this court in C.R.P.No.2274 of 1976, inasmuch as this court did not pass any final order in the matter, but only remitted it for fresh disposal in accordance with law, and the observations of this court, after ascertaining the extent of the rubber plantation as on January 1,1970. Counsel for the respondent did not demur to this contention, nor contend that there was a merger of the order of the Taluk Land Board in the order of this court in C.R.P.No.2274 of 1976. He placed his case in a different way. He stated that the order of this court being one of remand, it bound the parties. It governed the proceedings in all the subsequent stages. He placed his case in a different way. He stated that the order of this court being one of remand, it bound the parties. It governed the proceedings in all the subsequent stages. Therefore, the finding of this court that rubber plantations as on January 1, 1970 were liable to be exempted in the computation of the ceiling area of companies like the respondent bound the parties and the Taluk Land Board could not reopen the proceedings even though the view taken was erroneous. He referred to two decisions, Achuthan Nair v. Raman, 1979 KLT 119 , and Jasraj Indersingh v. Hemraj, Multanchand, AIR 1977 SC 1011 . In the first of these cases, it was held that an order of remand directing a reference to the Land Tribunal under S.125(3) of the Act was binding on the parties and had to be complied with despite the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Eapen Chacko v. Provident Investment Co., 1977 KLT 1 , that a reference was unnecessary in such cases. In the second of these cases, the Supreme Court observed that the court passing the order of remand, and the parties, were bound by it though it will not be binding on a superior court when it has seizin of the case. 11. Reference was also made to the decisions of two learned Single Judges of this court in O.P.No.5024 of 1981 and C.R.P.No.3858 of 1981, where in similar situations, this court held that S.85(9) could not be invoked for reopening the proceedings based on the line of reasoning adopted by the respondent. 12. We must observe even at this stage that the proposition of law as stated by the respondents cannot be disputed. In fact it is well established. But the decisions relied on, in Achuthan Nair and Jasraj Indersingh were not faced with a situation like the present where we are confronted with a provision like S.85(9) which enables the Taluk Land Board to reopen a proceeding in eases where the declarant has not surrendered the extent of land which he was In law liable to surrender. The courts were not concerned with a provision enabling reopening of art order, of its own or of any other authority. They dealt only with subsequent stages of the same proceeding, at an intermediate stage of which the order of remand was passed. The courts were not concerned with a provision enabling reopening of art order, of its own or of any other authority. They dealt only with subsequent stages of the same proceeding, at an intermediate stage of which the order of remand was passed. The problem posed here is different, namely what is the scope for exercise of the power under S.85(9),when an order of remand of this court has intervened. 13. Sub-s.(9) provides for the reopening of its order by the Taluk Land Board in one or other of the circumstances mentioned therein. The ultimate order in this case was one passed by the Taluk Land Board itself on May 18,1979. It cannot also be denied that the respondent had not surrendered the extent of .land which they would have been bound to surrender in the light of the decision in Kuruvila v. Taluk Land Board, 1980 KLT 53 . Prima facie -therefore S.85(9) applies on its terms. But the question is whether the inter position of this court's order in C.R.P.No.2274 of 1976 with the finding therein regarding the applicability of S.82(4) to the case of the respondent bars exercise of the power. 14. The Act is intended to subserve clauses (b) and (c) of Art.39 contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India dealing with Directive Principles of State Policy. Such an enactment has to be construed keeping its special purpose in view, to promote its scheme and to avoid mischief (vide Mohan, J. in ESI Corporation v. Hotel Kalpaka International, 1993 (1) KLT 281 (SC). As was observed in Vathiclierukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 228, the court should adopt a purposive approach to ascertain the social ends envisaged by an enactment, considering its scheme as an integrated whole. S.85(9) has to be viewed in this background. The ceiling provisions of the Act are intended to secure that there is no concentration, of. wealth or of available land in the hands of a few. It envisages distribution of the excess land surrendered by those in possession, among the landless poor, the kudikidappukars and those in the lower strata of society. It is quite likely, that mistakes are committed in the court of administration of the Act, and there is escape, in part or in whole, from the ceiling provisions. It envisages distribution of the excess land surrendered by those in possession, among the landless poor, the kudikidappukars and those in the lower strata of society. It is quite likely, that mistakes are committed in the court of administration of the Act, and there is escape, in part or in whole, from the ceiling provisions. The State should not be defeated of its social purpose and deprived of the land which otherwise should be available for distribution among the poorer sections. S.85(9) is intended to meet such situations. At the same time, the Act has provided safeguard that matters which have become concluded by the decisions of superior courts shall not be arbitrarily or capriciously reopened by the Taluk Land Board, by confining the reopening of its own orders. S.85(9) should therefore be allowed to operate in its field; without importing restrictions other than those warranted by its terms. One such restriction is that recognised by this court in Chathunny v. Taluk Land Board, 1981 KLT 74. We may conceive of other similar situations as well. But where, as in this case, the basis of the previous order is knocked out by subsequent decision or otherwise, we do not find anything in S.85(9) barring the reopening, based on the general principle governing orders of remand. As we mentioned earlier, the cases referred to, or others, have not had to deal with the situation, in the face of a provision like S.85(9). Therefore, in circumstances where a decision of this court stands overruled by a subsequent decision, it should not leave the Taluk Land Board powerless in the matter of reopening. The section, as it stands, is widely worded. In the absence of any merger of the Taluk Land Board's order with the order of this court, as in this case, and where the order to be set aside is that of the Taluk Land Board itself, it could not be said that the Taluk Land Board is deprived of its power of reopening under S.85(9). It is not possible to read the sub-section in a constricted manner, as suggested by the respondent, depriving the Taluk Land Board of its powers in regard to such cases, and leaving the parties to take advantage of an erroneous decision of this court. 15. It is not possible to read the sub-section in a constricted manner, as suggested by the respondent, depriving the Taluk Land Board of its powers in regard to such cases, and leaving the parties to take advantage of an erroneous decision of this court. 15. In the above view of the matter, we are unable to agree with the decisions of the two learned single Judges in O.P.No.5024 of 1981 and C.R.P.No.3858 of 1981 which proceeded on the basis of the finality of orders of remand. 16. We are therefore, of the view that the order of the majority of the Taluk Land Board dropping the proceedings as without jurisdiction or authority is erroneous in law and against the provisions in S.85(9). The proceedings should have been reopened and taken to culmination with opportunity to the respondent to be heard. The order of the Taluk Land Board is therefore set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Taluk Land Board for fresh disposal in accordance with law, to ascertain the extent of land, if any, held by the respondent in excess of the ceiling limits. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of as above. There will be no order as to costs.