A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) IN our country which abounds in illiteracy and poverty on the part of its people, should an illiterate and poverty-stricken litigant be denied to knock the doors of justice simply because he could not approach the forum for the purpose within the prescribed period of limitation for want of funds? This question in the main has cropped up in this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India for challenging the correctness of the decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the Tribunal for convenience) on 13th June 1986 in Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 101 of 1984. By its impugned decision, the Tribunal rejected the revisional application of the petitioners as time-barred without examining the merits of the case. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The petitioners moved the Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal at Khambat (the first authority for convenience) with an application under Sec. 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (the Act for brief) for declaration of their status as the tenants of one parcel of land bearing Survey No. 322 Paiki admeasuring 5 acres 9 gunthas situated in village Vatadra taluka Khambat (the disputed land for convenience ). It came to be registered as Tenancy Case (Vatadra) No. 14 of 1979. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, by his order passed on 14th July 1980 in the aforesaid proceedings, the first authority rejected it. The aggrieved petitioners carried the matter in appeal before the Deputy Collector at Petlad. Their appeal came to be registered as Tenancy Appeal No. 244 of 1980. By his order passed on 24th November 1980 in the aforesaid appeal, the Deputy Collector at Petlad dismissed it. The aggrieved petitioners thereupon invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Tribunal for questioning the correctness of the aforesaid order passed by the first authority as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Deputy Collector at Petlad. There was delay of some 4 1/2 months in prefering the revisional application before the Tribunal. It came to be registered as Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 101 of 1984. It did not accompany the delay condonation application at the time of its institution. Later on the delay condonation application was also filed on 8th July 1985. There was delay of some 4 1/2 months in prefering the revisional application before the Tribunal. It came to be registered as Revision Application No. TEN. B. A. 101 of 1984. It did not accompany the delay condonation application at the time of its institution. Later on the delay condonation application was also filed on 8th July 1985. It came to be registered as TEN. B. A. 899 of 1985 (3 ). Its copy is at Annexure A to this petition. It was also accompanied by the affidavit made by petitioner No. 1 herein. A copy of that affidavit is at Annexure B to this petition. By its decision rendered on 13th June 1986 in the aforesaid revisional application of the petitioners, the Tribunal rejected it. Its copy is at Annexure C to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon approached this Court by means of this petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the decision at Annexure C to this petition. ( 2 ) ). Shri Patel for the petitioners has been quite critical of the approach and attitude of the Tribunal towards the application for condonation of the delay in prefering the main application. According to Shri Patel for the petitioners, the Tribunal ought to have made it liberal approach to the delay condonation application and ought to have condoned the delay in prefering the main revisional application on the facts and in the circumstances narrated by the present petitioners in their delay condonation application. As against this, Shri Nanavati for the respondents has urged that the Tribunal has very well acted within its jurisdiction and no error of law whatsoever has been made by it in its impugned decision at Annexure C to this petition. Shri Nanavati has further urged that the Tribunal has applied settled principles of law enunciated by certain well considered ruling and this Court need not interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 3 ) ). This Court and the Supreme Court have time and again expressed the opinion that the approach of courts with respect to the delay condonation applications should be liberal and not technical. ( 3 ) ). This Court and the Supreme Court have time and again expressed the opinion that the approach of courts with respect to the delay condonation applications should be liberal and not technical. The land-mark ruling on the point is the one in the case of Karim Abdullah vs. Heirs of deceased Bai Hoorbahi Jam and others reported in (1975) 16 G. L. R. 835. I do not propose to burden this judgment of mine by extensively quoting therefrom. The sum and substance of the aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Abdullah (supra) is that, unless the delay is occasioned by unexplained gross negligence on the part of the concerned party or is attributable to some ultierior motive, it should normally and ordinarily be condoned. It has been held that substantial justice lies in deciding the case on merits rather than rejecting it on technical considerations. ( 4 ) ). The principles enunciated by this Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Karim Abdullah (supra) has come to be reiterated by the Supreme Court in its binding ruling in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and others reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1953. It cannot be gainsaid that the law declared by the Apex Court is binding to all courts and tribunal under Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. ( 5 ) ). That would bring me to the case on hand. As transpiring from a copy of the delay condonation application at Annexure A to his petition, the delay in prefering the revisional application at Annexure A to his petition, the delay in preferring the revisional application was sought to be condoned mainly on the ground that the petitioners were hard up in arranging for payment of fabulous and fat fees quoted by the advocates they contacted and their ignorance of law. The delay condonation application at Annexure A to this petition is quite elaborate with respect to the aforesaid two main grounds. I do not propose to burden this judgment of mine by translating the elaborate delay condonation application at Annexure A to this petition. It is needless to say that it is in Gujarat. ( 6 ) ). The delay condonation application at Annexure A to this petition is quite elaborate with respect to the aforesaid two main grounds. I do not propose to burden this judgment of mine by translating the elaborate delay condonation application at Annexure A to this petition. It is needless to say that it is in Gujarat. ( 6 ) ). What should be the approach of the court in such circumstances has been highlighted by the Apex Court in its ruling in the case of Ram Sumiran and others vs. D. D. C. and others reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 606. In that case, one writ petition in the Allahabad High Court was ordered to have been abated on the ground that legal representatives of the deceased respondent were not brought on record within time though the petitioners knew about his death and took no steps for nearly six years. I reiterate that the petitioners of the writ petition in that case were guilty of inaction or omission for 6 years in bringing the legal representatives of the deceased on record. In that context, it has been held:"but merely because no application was made by the appellants for bringing the legal representatives of the decased respondent No. 5 on record we do not think that in the circumstances of the present case that would be a valid ground for refusing to grant the application of the appellants for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 on record because the appellants are admittedly from the rural area and in a country like ours where there is so much poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, it would not be fair to presume that everyone knows that on death of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record with a certain time. The ends of justice require that the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 should have been granted. " [emphasis supplied]the aforesaid quotation from thye aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumiran (supra) is quite self-explanatory and needs no elaboration or elucidation. THE Apex Court has ruled that poverty, ignorance and illiteracy prevalent in this country of ours cannot be ignored when the question regarding the belated action is on the anvil. ( 7 ) ). THE Apex Court has ruled that poverty, ignorance and illiteracy prevalent in this country of ours cannot be ignored when the question regarding the belated action is on the anvil. ( 7 ) ). The aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of ram Sumiran (supra) is on all fours applicable in the present case. It is obviously binding to me in view of Art. 141 of the Constitution of India. ( 8 ) ). Shri Nanavati for the respondents has relied on the ruling of the Lahore High Court in the case of Balwant Singh vs. Jagjit Singh and another reported in AIR (34) 1947 Lahore 210. It has been held therein that poverty of a litigant cannot be regarded as a sufficient cause for extending the period of limitation under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. This ruling of the Lahore High Court cannot be said to be a good law in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sumiran (supra ). ( 9 ) ). On the same reasoning is distinguishable the Full Bench ruling of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Mahant Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Punjab and others reported in AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 282 rrelied on by Shri Nanavati for the respondents in support of his defence to the case set up by the petitioners in this petition. In that case, the concerned party could not collect a copy of the judgment to be appealed against for want of funds for about three months. The delay in that case was not condoned. I think it is not necessary for me to dilate much upon this ruling. ( 10 ) BESIDES, the aforesaid ruling of the Lahore High Court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court have merely persuasive value and no binding force. As against this, sitting as a Single Judge, I am bound by the ruling of this Court in the case of Karim Abdullah (supra ). Even otherwise, I am in respectful agreement with the principles of law enunciated therein. As pointed out hereinabove, the said principles have come to be reiterated by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra ). The ruling of the Supreme Court is obviously binding to me. ( 11 ) ). Even otherwise, I am in respectful agreement with the principles of law enunciated therein. As pointed out hereinabove, the said principles have come to be reiterated by the Supreme Court in its aforesaid ruling in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra ). The ruling of the Supreme Court is obviously binding to me. ( 11 ) ). The binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Yashwant Gajanan Joshi and others reported in Air 1991 Supreme Court 933 is distinguishable on its own facts. In that case, the delay was not at all satisfactorily explained by the petitioner. In the present case, as pointed out hereinabove, the petitioners have elaborately and sufficiently explained the delay in preferring the main revisional application as transpiring from their delay condonation application at Annexure A to this petition. It is needless to say that it was supported by the affidavit at Annexure B to this petition. It was not the case of the respondents herein before the Tribunal that the delay in preferring the main revisional application was deliberate or was attributable to unexplained gross negligence on the part of the present petitioners. In that case, no justifiable ground existed for not condoning the delay in preferring the main revisional application. ( 12 ) SHRI Nanavati for the respondents has then urged that this Court cannot upset the decision at Annexure C to this petition on the ground that the Tribunal grossly erred in law in rendering its impugned in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaquin and others reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court 38. ( 13 ) WITH respect, the Tribunal has not merely made an error of law; it has erred in exercise of its jurisdiction. Exercise of discretion on wrong principles would certainly be a jurisdictional error. The Tribunal can be said to have refused to exercise its jurisdiction by not condoning the delay in preferring the main revisional application on irrelevant consideration and by applying wrong principles. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) will not be applicable and is distinguishable on its own facts. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) will not be applicable and is distinguishable on its own facts. ( 14 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the decision at Annexure C to this petition cannot be sustained in law. It has to be quashed and set aside. ( 15 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted. The impugned decision rendered by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad on 13th June 1986 in Revision Application No. Ten. B. A. 101 of 1984 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad for restoration of the main revisional application to be and its decision on merits according to law. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs. .